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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 15th June 1981 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Opening of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly. 
2. Examination of Credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election ofthe Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First 
Part of the Session (Doe. 868). 
7. Twenty-sixth annual report ofthe Council (Presentation 
by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of S(ate f~r 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 869). 
8. Political activities of the Council -reply to the twenty-
sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 880). 
9. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on 
Defonce Questions and Armaments and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 875). 
10. Nomination of members to Committees. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Brugnon, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the Session 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Provisional President declared 
open the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly of Western European Union. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
givep in the Appendix. 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
The Provisional President addressed the 
Assembly. 
4. Examination of Credentials 
In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly took note of 
the letter from the President of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating 
that that Assembly had ratified the credentials 
of the Representatives and Substitutes listed in 
Notice No. I. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratifica-
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tion by the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, the Assembly unani-
mously ratified the credentials of Mr. 
Coleman as a Substitute for the United King-
dom. 
S. Election of the President of the Assembly 
One candidate only was proposed for the post 
of President, namely Mr. Mulley. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the 
President by acclamation. 
Mr. Mulley was elected President by accla-
mation. 
At the invitation of the Provisional President, 
Mr. Mulley took the Chair. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly 
The President addressed the Assembly. 
7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the 
Assembly 
Three candidates had been proposed for the 
six posts of Vice-President, namely: MM. 
Gessner, Tanghe and Maravalle. 
MINUTES 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the 
Vice-Presidents by acclamation. 
MM. Gessner, Tanghe and Maravalle were 
elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation. 
8. Adoption of the draft Order of Business 
for the First Part of the Session 
(Doe. 868) 
On the proposal of the President, the Assem-
bly adopted the draft Order of Business for the 
First Part of the Session. 
9. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
representing the Chairman-in-OffiCe 
of the Council, Doe. 869) 
The Report of the Council to the Assembly 
was presented by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council. 
Mr. Hurd replied to questions put by MM. 
Hardy, Tanghe, Wilkinson, Mrs. Knight, Mr. 
Spenale, Lord Duncan-Sandys and Dr. Miller. 
10. Political activities of the Council- reply to 
the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 880) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Page, Rapporteur. 
FIRST SITTING 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Urwin, Hanin, Osbom and 
Cavaliere. 
Mr. Page, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This Recommendation will be 
published as No. 364) 1• 
11. Application of the Brussels Treaty- reply 
to the twenty-sixth annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 875) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by 
Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Recommendation. 
The draft Recommendation was agreed to 
unanimously. (This Recommendation will be 
published as No. 365) 2• 
12. Nomination of members to Committees 
In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 bis of 
the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified 
the membership of the six Committees as 
follows: 
1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats) 
Members Alternates 
Belgium: MM. Bonnel MM. Van der Elst 
Dejardin Lambiotte 
Tanghe Peeters 
France: MM. Bizet MM. Bechter 
Bozzi Ferretti 
Menard Jung Louis 
Peronnet Schleiter 
N ... Caro 
1. See page 19. 
2. See page 20. 
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MINUTES FIRST SITTING 
Members Alternates 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Bahr MM. Ahrens 
Kittelmann Lenzer 
Lemmrich Wittmann 
Schmidt Hermann Biichner 
Vohrer Rosch 
Italy: MM. Be mini MM. Calice 
Cavaliere Giust 
Fosson Tripodi 
Maravalle Mondino 
Pecchioli Amadei 
Luxembourg: MM. Prussen Mr. Glesener 
Netherlands: MM. van den Bergh MM. Tummers 
Blaauw Mommersteeg 
Scholten van Hulst 
United Kingdom: Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Wilkinson 
MM. Cox Brown 
Edwards Dr. Miller 
Grant Mr. Beith 
Smith Lord Duncan-Sandys 
2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats) 
Belgium: MM. Hanin MM. Michel 
Lagneau Van der Elst 
Mangelschots van Waterschoot 
France: MM. Berrier MM. Baumel 
Brugnon Forni 
Deschamps Grussenmeyer 
Druon Koehl 
N ... Couderc 
Fed. Rep. ofGermany: MM. Ahrens MM. Corterier 
Gessner Biichner 
Jung Kurt Schmidt Hansheinrich 
Miiller Sprung 
Reddemann Amrehn 
Italy: Mrs. Boniver MM. Rubbi 
MM. Conti Persini Patriarca 
De Poi Benedikter 
Valiante Cavaliere 
Vecchietti Calamandrei 
Luxembourg: Mr. Thoss Mr. Be re hem 
Netherlands: MM. Mommersteeg Mrs. van der W erf-Terpstra 
Portheine MM. Schlingemann 
Voogd Lamberts 
14 
MINUTES 
United Kingdom: 
Members 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mr. Hardy 
Lord McNair 
Lord Reay 
Mr. Urwin 
Alternates 
MM. Page 
Pavitt 
FIRST SITTING 
Sir Anthony Kershaw 
Mr. Atkinson 
Sir Thomas Williams 
3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats) 
Belgium: MM. Adriaensens Mr. Brasseur 
van Waterschoot Mrs. Staels-Do m pas 
France: MM. Malvy MM. Bizet 
Peronnet Wargnies 
Valleix Lagourgue 
N ... Petit 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Lenzer MM. Bohm 
Manning Horn 
Spies von Biillesheim Miiller 
Topmann Pensky 
Italy: MM. Amadei Mr. Orione 
Antoni Mrs. Rosolen 
Fiandrotti MM. Maravalle 
Forma Spitella 
Luxembourg: Mr. Prussen Mr. Thoss 
Netherlands: MM. Comelissen MM. Portheine 
Konings Lamberts 
United Kingdom: MM. Garrett MM. Gourlay 
Hawkins Hill 
McGuire Coleman 
Wilkinson Jessel 
4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats) 
MM. Adriaensens MM. Mangelschots 
Peeters Bonnet 
Belgium: 
France: MM. Depietri MM. Lemoine 
Jager Belin 
Jeambrun Pignion 
Schleiter N ... 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: MM. Ahrens MM. Bardens 
Althammer Jager 
Schulte Schmidt Manfred 
Sprung Miiller 
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MINUTES FIRST SITTING 
Members Alternates 
Italy: MM. Martino MM. Cafiero 
Orione Ajello 
Petrilli Bonalumi 
Tripodi Pozzo 
Luxembourg Mr. Krieps Mr. Margue 
Netherlands Mr. Tummers MM. Voogd 
Mrs. van der W erf-Terpstra van Hulst 
United Kingdom: MM. Durant Sir Anthony Kershaw 
Fletcher Mr. Urwin 
Lord Hughes Lord MeN air 
Mr. Stain ton Mr. Grieve 
5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRMLEGES (2J seats) 
Belgium: MM. Brasseur MM. Lagneau 
Michel Lambiotte 
France: MM. Bozzi N ... 
Lagourgue Mr. Bechter 
Pignion N ... 
N ... N ... 
Fed. Rep. ofGermany: MM. Schmidt Manfred MM. Biichner 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
Belgium: 
Schulte Eickmeyer 
Spies von Biillesheim Schauble 
Unland Wittmann 
MM. Battaglia MM. Patriarca 
Giust Spitella 
Mondino Fiandrotti 
Sterpa Romano 
Mr. Glesener Mr. Margue 
MM. van Hulst MM. Comelissen 
Voogd Stoffelen 
MM. Edwards MM. Cox 
Grieve Osbom 
Lord Hughes Sir Thomas Williams 
Mrs. Knight Mr. Jessel 
6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (J4 seats) 
MM. Bonnel 
Tanghe 
16 
MM. Dejardin 
Hanin 
MINUTES 
France: 
Fed. Rep. of Germany: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
N ether/ands: 
United Kingdom: 
Members Alternates 
MM. Lemoine MM. Senes 
Visse Jeambrun 
MM. Bohm Mrs. Pack 
Enders Mr. Bardens 
MM. Agrimi MM. Forma 
Rubbi Maravalle 
MM. Be re hem MM. Prussen 
Glesener Thoss 
MM. Schlingemann MM. Mommersteeg 
Stoffelen Lamberts 
Mr. Ho well Mrs. Knight 
Lord Northfield Mr. Gourlay 
13. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 16th 
June, at 10 a. m. 
The Sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m. 
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FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX FIRST SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance1: 
Belgium 
MM. Adriaensens 
Lagneau (Bonnel) 
Hanin 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) 
Peeters 
Tanghe 
Michel (van Waterschoot) 
France 
MM. Brugnon 
Jung 
Schleiter 
Spenale 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Schmidt, Manfred 
(Ahrens) 
Wittmann (Althammer) 
Pensky (Bardens) 
Bohm 
Buchner 
Enders 
Gessner 
Jung 
Mrs. Pack (Kittelmaiin) 
MM. Bahr (Manning) 
Muller, Gunther 
Reddemann 
Schmidt, Hermann 
Topmann (Schulte) 
Amrehn 
Italy 
(Spies von Bullesheim) 
Sprung 
Unland 
Vohrer 
MM. Agrimi 
Be mini 
Orione (Bonalumi) 
Amadei (Calamandrei) 
Cavaliere 
De Poi 
Maravalle 
Spite/la (Petrilli) 
Pucci 
Tripodi 
Martino (Vecchietti) 
Luxembourg 
MM. Berchem 
Margue 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence: 
France MM. Senes 
Valleix 
MM. Berrier 
Bizet 
Caro Italy Depietri 
Deschamps 
Ferretti MM. Antoni 
Grussenmeyer Forma 
Jeambrun Fosson 
Peronnet Mondino 
Petit Pecchioli 
Pignion Rubbi 
Poncelet Valiante 
Netherlands 
MM. Blaauw (Comelissen) 
van Hulst 
Portheine 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Konings (Voogd) 
United Kingdom 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Cox 
Grant 
Grieve 
Hardy 
Osborn (Hawkins) 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Jessel 
Lord Duncan-Sandys 
(Sir Anthony 
Kershaw) 
Mrs. Knight 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Page 
Lord Reay 
MM. Urwin 
Wilkinson 
Luxembourg 
Mr. Thoss 
Netherlands 
Mr. Scholten 
United Kingdom 
Mr. McGuire 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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TEXTS ADOPTED FIRST SITTING 
RECOMMENDATION 364 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council demonstrates its wish to inform 
the Assembly of co-operation between member states in foreign policy matters even when such co-
operation has been pursued outside the framework of WEU; 
Considering that the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly has improved in recent 
years; 
Considering however that in several areas the Council does not provide the Assembly with the 
information to which it has a right, particularly on questions connected with the actual work of some 
organs of the Council; 
Considering that for the Assembly's work to be effective it must be able to have a genuine 
dialogue with the Council at all times; 
Considering that the efforts to rationalise the organs of WEU undertaken by the Council, 
together with its efforts to limit non-essential expenditure, must in no case compromise the future of 
an organisation which may be called upon to play an essential role for the security of Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Reduce the time taken to prepare texts for transmission to the Assembly, be it the annual 
report or replies to recommendations and written questions; 
2. Improve the clarity of the drafting of its annual report by including in an appropriate manner 
the texts referred to in the report; 
3. Ensure a high-level ministerial presence on each day of sessions and arrange for Ministers to 
give collective views on the texts which are being debated; 
4. Communicate to the Assembly as full information as feasible about the activities of all the 
organs of WEU; 
5. Strengthen its arrangements for giving the media regular information on its activities; 
6. Ensure that in everything it undertakes, while rationalising the work of WEU and maintaining 
the budget of the ministerial organs within acceptable limits, the present and future opportunities for 
action by WEU are in no way compromised; 
7. Ensure that budgetary preoccupations, however legitimate they may be, in no way diminish the 
means available to the only European assembly with responsibility in defence questions. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 365 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
FIRST SITTING 
(i) Considering that the fundamental provisiOns of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in 
Articles IV, V and VIII.3, have retained their full value and are one of the key factors in the security 
system of the signatory countries; 
(ii) Noting however that for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is 
undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European 
Programme Group; 
(iii) Considering that a continuing and tangible activity in the framework of the treaty is essential to 
its credibility and that at the present time this activity is chiefly ensured by the Assembly and by its 
dialogue with the Council; 
(iv) Considering further, for the abovementioned reasons, that at a time of economic difficulty for 
member countries the resources they make available to the WEU organs should be redeployed to 
adapt the latter to present conditions; 
(v) Congratulating the Council for its response to paragraphs l to 6 of Recommendation 348 of the 
Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COLJNCIL 
l. Conduct an investigation into: 
(a) the extent of the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. Ill and IV that should be 
maintained and the decisions the Council should take under Articles 11 and V of Protocol 
No. Ill; 
(b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and staff among all the WEU organs in the 
light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities; 
(c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice 
of close co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments; 
2. Entrust the international secretariat of the SAC with the research necessary for the report on 
the role and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
which is referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; 
3. Communicate to the Assembly the completed chapters of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee's study on the European armaments industry. 
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SECOND SITTING 
Tuesday, 16th June 1981 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. European security and the Mediterranean (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 876 and 
Amendments). 
2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe. 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
given in the Appendix. 
3. Election of two Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
Two candidates had been proposed for the 
three remammg posts of Vice-President, 
namely: MM. Berchem and Comelissen. 
The Assembly decided unanimously not to 
have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-
Presidents by acclamation. 
MM. Berchem and Comelissen were elected 
Vice-Presidents by acclamation. 
The President informed the Assembly that, 
according to age, the order of precedence of the 
Vice-Presidents so far elected was as follows: 
MM. Tanghe, Berchem, Gessner, Comelissen 
and Maravalle. 
4. Change in the membership 
of a Committee 
In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the 
following nomination to the Committee on 
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Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by 
the Italian Delegation: 
- Mr. Pucci as a titular member in place of 
Mr. Battaglia. 
5. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 876 and Amend.ments) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by 
Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, on 
behalf of Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Grant, Giinther 
Muller, Dr. Miller and Mr. van den Bergh. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
6. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe 
General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, addressed the Assembly. 
General Rogers replied to questions put by 
Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Mommersteeg, Gess-
ner, Louis Jung, Kurt Jung, Hardy, Prussen, 
Amrehn, Wilkinson, van den Bergh, Lord 
Duncan-Sandys, MM. Osbom and Cavaliere. 
7. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day 
at 3 p.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m. 
APPENDIX SECOND SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance•: 
Belgium MM. Muller, Gunther Netherlands 
Reddemann 
MM. Adriaensens &hmidt, Manfred (Schulte) MM. Blaauw (Comelissen) 
Lagneau (Bonnel) Spies von Bullesheim van Hulst 
Hanin Sprung Portheine 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) Mrs. Pack (Unland) Scholten 
Peeters Stoffelen 
Tanghe van den Bergh 
van Waterschoot (Tummers) 
Italy Voogd 
MM. Agrimi 
France Antoni United Kingdom 
Bemini 
MM. Brugnon Orione (Bonalumi) Lord McNair (Beith) 
Jung Cavaliere Sir Frederic Bennett 
Baumel (Peronnet) De Poi MM. Cox 
Schleiter Forma Grant 
Fortier (Valleix) Fosson Osborn (Grieve) 
Maravalle Hardy 
Mrs. Boniver (Mondino) Bowel/ (Hawkins) 
MM. Amadei (Pecchioli) Lord Hughes 
Federal Republic of Germany Pucci Mr. Durant (Jessel) 
Tripodi Lord Duncan-Sandys 
MM. Althammer Martino (Vecchietti) (Sir Anthony 
Pensky (Bardens) Kershaw) 
Bohm Mrs. Knight 
Buchner Mr. Fletcher (McGuire) 
Enders Luxembourg Dr. Miller 
Gessner Mr. Page 
Jung MM. Berchem Lord Reay 
Wittmann (Kittelmann) Glesener (Margue) MM. Garrett (Urwin) 
Bahr (Manning) Krieps (Thoss) Wilkinson 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence: 
France MM. Petit MM. Schmidt, Hermann 
Pignion Vohrer 
MM. Berrier Poncelet 
Bizet Senes 
Caro Spenale Italy 
Depietri 
Deschamps MM. Calamandrei 
Ferretti Federal Republic of Germany Petrilli 
Grussenmeyer Rubbi 
Jeambrun Mr. Ahrens Valiante 
I. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given 
in brackets. 
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THIRD SITTING 
Tuesday, 16th June 1981 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. European security and the Mediterranean (Resumed 
Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 876 and Amendments). 
2. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear 
forces in Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Defonce Questions and 
Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 879 and Amendments). 
3. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budget-
ary Affairs and Administration and Vote on the draft 
revised budget, Doe. 872 and Addendum). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
given in Appendix I. 
3. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armame11ts and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 676 and Amendments) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers: Mr. Bemini, Mrs. Knight and Mr. 
Baumel. 
Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Dejardin: 
1. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, insert: 
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"(z) Reaffirming its unswerving attachment to 
the values of parliamentary and pluralist 
democracy, the result offree elections by uni-
versal suffrage, and to the fundamental free-
doms set out in the European Convention of 
Human Rights;". 
Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Spenale; Grant, 
Miller (points of order); Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 8) was tabled by MM. 
Bemini, Martino and Antoni: 
8. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph: 
" Considering that the serious bombardment 
of the nuclear plant in Iraq by the Israelis is 
an act to be condemned and which increases 
the danger of war in the Middle East and that 
the justifications invoked by the Israeli autho-
rities are unfounded; ". 
Speakers: MM. Bemini, Miller and Cava-
Here. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. 
Dejardin: 
2. Replace paragraph (vz) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation by the following: 
"(vz) Believing that the maintenance and the 
strengthening of present links between Tur-
key and the various Atlantic and European 
MINUTES 
institutions depend on true and steady pro-
gress being made towards the early restora-
tion of democracy in Turkey in the interests 
of that country and of the Alliance, ". 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by MM. 
Urwin, Stoffelen and Hardy: 
7. In paragraph ( vz) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out " even the streng-
thening". 
Speakers: MM. Hardy, Grieve and Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by MM. 
Bernini, Martino and Antoni: 
9. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommend-
ation proper, insert: 
"To encourage international and regional 
agreements, with the participation of the 
great powers, to restrict and control sales of 
arms to countries in the area, particularly 
those at war, to facilitate the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes between states, respecting 
their independence and interests and guaran-
teeing mutual security; ". 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. 
Dejardin: 
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft 
recommendation proper and insert: 
"2. To increase mutual assistance for the 
modernisation of the military potential of the 
Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediter-
ranean with particular regard to the quality 
and level of armaments of neighbouring 
countries; ". 
The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. 
Cavaliere: 
6. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommend-
ation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"To concert allied policy on the supply of 
armaments to third countries; ". 
Speaker: Mr. Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. 
Dejardin: 
4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommend-
ation proper. 
Speakers: Dr. Miller, MM. Dejardin and 
Grant. 
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The Amendment was negatived. 
An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. 
Gessner, Stoffelen and Urwin: 
5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "and defence planning". 
Speakers: MM. Gessner, Giinther Muller and 
Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 10) was tabled by MM. 
Bernini, Martino and Antoni: 
10. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommend-
ation proper, insert: 
"To support the immediate resumption of 
negotiations on the Middle East which have 
become even more urgent after the Israeli 
attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, in order 
to find a fair solution to the crisis based on 
sure and guaranteed frontiers for all states, 
including the state of Israel, on the right of 
the Palestinian people to a homeland and on 
the unity and independence of Lebanon;·". 
The Amendment was negatived. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Hanin. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix 
11) by 50 votes to 4 with 2 abstentions ; 9 
Representatives who had signed the Register 
of Attendance did not take part in the vote. 
(This Recommendation will be published 
as No. 366) 1• 
4. Talks on the reduction oflong-range theatre 
nuclear forces in Europe 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 879 and Amendments) 
The Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments was presented by 
Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur. 
Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Bahr, Antoni, Baumel, van 
Hu1st, van den Bergh, Hardy, Blaauw and Lord 
Reay. 
Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
I. See page 29. 
MINUTES 
Speaker: Mr. Scholten. 
Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur, replied to 
the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. 
van den Bergh and others: 
5. In the preamble to the draft recommend-
ation, leave out paragraph (iv). 
Speakers: MM. van den Bergh, Scholten, 
Cavaliere, Hanin, van den Bergh, Cavaliere, 
Hardy (point of order) and Cavaliere. 
The Amendment was negatived. 
Amendments (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) were tabled 
by MM. Hardy, Bahr and Stoffelen: 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "earliest" and insert "urgent". 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from "at" to the end of the 
paragraph and insert " greatly reduced levels of 
nuclear weapons ". 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after" at" insert "much". 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommend-
ation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"6. To call for immediate pursuit of the 
proposal for a disarmament conference for 
Europe.". 
Speakers: MM. Hardy, Mommersteeg, Cava-
Here and Hardy. 
The Amendments were agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix 
Ill) by 24 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions; 36 
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Representatives who had signed the Register of 
Attendance did not take part in the vote. 
(This Recommendation will be published as 
No. 367) 1• 
5. Draft revised budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1981 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Vote on 
the draft revised budget, Doe. 872 and Addendum) 
In accordance with Rule 23 (1) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to continue 
to sit after half-past six o'clock in order to com-
plete the Orders of the Day. 
Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
The Report of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration was presented by 
Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Martino and 
Mulley. 
Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
replied to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
revised bndget. 
The draft revised budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1981 was agreed to. 
6. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 
17th June, at 10 a. m. 
The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m. 
I. See page 30. 
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APPENDIX I 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance •: 
Belgium MM. Schulte 
Spies von Bullesheim 
MM. Adriaensens Sprung 
Lagneau (Bonnel) Unland 
Hanin Vohrer 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) 
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Tanghe 
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France Antoni 
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MM. Bizet Cavaliere 
Baumel (Peronnet) De Poi 
Spenale Forma 
Fosson 
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Federal Republic of Germany Mrs. Boniver (Mondino) 
MM. Orione (Petrilli) 
MM. Bahr (Ahrens) Pucci 
Wittmann (Althammer) Spite/la (Valiante) 
Pensky (Bardens) Martino (Vecchietti) 
Buchner 
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Gessner 
Jung Luxembourg 
K.ittelmann 
Manning MM. Berchem 
Muller, Gunther M argue 
Schmidt, Hermann Thoss 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Berrier 
Brugnon 
Caro 
Depietri 
Deschamps 
Ferretti 
Grussenmeyer 
Jeambrun 
Jung 
Petit 
MM. Pignion 
Poncelet 
Schleiter 
Senes 
Valleix 
Federal Republic of Germany 
MM. Bohm 
Reddemann 
Netherlands 
MM. Mommersteeg 
(Cornelissen) 
van Hulst 
B/aauw (Portheine) 
Scholten 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
van den Bergh (V oogd) 
United Kingdom 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
MM. Stain ton (Sir Frederic 
Bennett) 
Cox 
Grant 
Grieve 
Hardy 
Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
Mr. Durant (Jessel) 
Mrs. Knight 
Mr. Brown (McGuire) 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Page 
Lord Reay 
MM. Garrett (Urwin) 
Wilkinson 
Italy 
MM. Bonalumi 
Calamandrei 
Pecchioli 
Rubbi 
Tripodi 
United Kingdom 
Sir Anthony Kershaw 
I. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on European security and the 
Mediterranean (Doe. 876) 1 : 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
MM. Adriaensens 
Agrimi 
Bahr (Ahrens) 
Wittmann (Althammer) 
Pensky (Bardens) 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
MM. Stainton (Sir Frederic 
Bennett) 
Berchem 
Lagneau (Bonnel) 
BUchner 
Cavaliere 
Mommersteeg 
(Comelissen) 
Cox 
De Poi 
Enders 
Fosson 
Ayes: 
MM. Gessner 
Grant 
Grieve 
Hardy 
Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
MM. van Hulst 
Durant (Jessel) 
Jung, Kurt 
Kittelmann 
Mrs. Knight 
MM. Brown (McGuire) 
Manning 
Margue 
Dr. Miller 
Mr. Page 
Noes: 
MM. Antoni 
Be mini 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) 
M artino (V ecchietti) 
Abstentions: 
MM. Hanin 
MUller, GUnther 
MM. Blaauw (Portheine) 
Pucci 
Lord Reay 
MM. Schmidt, Hermann 
Scholten 
Schulte 
Spies von BUllesheim 
Sprung 
Stoffelen 
Tanghe 
Thoss 
Tummers 
Unland 
Garrett (U rwin) 
Vohrer 
van den Bergh (Voogd) 
van W aterschoot 
Wilkinson 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on talks on the reduction of 
long-range theatre nuclear force's in Europe (Doe. 879) 1: 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Ayes: 
MM. Adriaensens MM. Fosson 
Gessner 
Hanin 
Hardy 
MM. Manning 
Wittmann (Althammer) 
Pensky (Bardens) 
Stainton (Sir Frederic 
Bennett) 
Berchem 
Cavaliere 
Mommersteeg 
(Cornelissen) 
Lord Hughes 
MM. van Hulst 
Kittelmann 
Brown (McGuire) 
Noes: 
MM. Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Abstentions: 
Lord Reay 
MM. Spies von Biillesheim 
van den Bergh (Voogd) 
Blaauw (Portheine) 
Schmidt, Hermann 
Scholten 
Schulte 
Unland 
Spite/la (Valiante) 
Vohrer 
van Waterschoot 
l. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 366 
on European security and the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting the continuous growth of Soviet military power and the strategic advantages enjoyed by 
the Soviet Union, and considering however that these factors have not led to any significant increase 
in the last three years in the direct conventional military threat from the Warsaw Pact countries in 
the Mediterranean region; 
(ii) Condemning the invasion of Afghanistan and the continued occupation of that country by 
Soviet forces; 
(iii) Concerned at the growing risk in parts of the eastern and southern Mediterranean region of 
conflicts or crises arising which can directly or indirectly involve the interests of allied countries; 
(iv) Drawing particular attention to the unprecedented levels of modern armaments in those areas, 
supplied both by the Soviet Union and certain countries of the Alliance, and which exceed in quan-
tity and quality those of local NATO countries; 
( v) Welcoming the return of Greek forces to the NATO integrated military structure; 
(vi) Considering that as long as the process which should lead to the creation of new democratic 
parliamentary institutions in Turkey is not placed in doubt, the interests of that country and of the 
Alliance presuppose the maintenance of the links which now exist between Turkey and the various 
Atlantic and European institutions; 
(vii) Believing however that European security depends also on diplomatic efforts to reduce the 
many local causes of tension, and on arms control measures, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL. 
Call for concerted action, where appropriate, in the North Atlantic Council or other bodies: 
1. To establish more clearly the indivisibility of the Alliance and the will of all members to main-
tain security in the Mediterranean area; 
2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of Greece, and 
even more urgently Turkey, for the purpose of fulfilling their contribution to NATO with particular 
regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries; 
3. To improve communications and air defence installations in the Mediterranean area; 
4. To take diplomatic action to deter non-member countries of NATO from allowing bases or 
other military installations on their territory to be used by Warsaw Pact armed forces; 
5. To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries; 
6. To develop reasonably flexible defence arrangements to counter rapidly any unexpected threats 
to peace in the area, and to diversify the ability to bring in reinforcements to replace those currently 
earmarked that may prove to be required outside the NATO area; 
7. To encourage Greece and Turkey to reach an early settlement of their disputes and to expe-
dite the command reorganisation in the Aegean area; 
8. To consider arrangements to permit Spain to participate in NATO exercices pending a possible 
completely independent decision by Spain to apply to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty; 
9. To promote diplomatic efforts with a view both to endeavouring to reduce local causes of ten-
sion, and to expediting the convening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. 
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RECOMMENDATION 367 
on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that the broad economic and cultural interdependence of Europe and the United 
States, and their shared concept of an open society, make a frank dialogue between the two both 
possible and desirable, especially on mutual security; 
(ii) Considering it desirable for the European countries of the Alliance to adopt a common cons-
tructive position in that dialogue, the better to influence the United States, in particular on security 
matters such as long-range theatre nuclear forces; 
(iii) Noting with concern the vast modernisation of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, 
and in particular the continued deployment of SS-20 missiles at the rate foreseen in Recommendation 
360; 
(iv) Reiterating its support for the twofold NATO decision of 12th December 1979 on LR TNF as a 
realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons; 
(v) Believing that such negotiations should provide the political impetus for broad negotiations on 
the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, long-range and battlefield 
so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world; 
(vi) Stressing the urgent need for the LR TNF negotiations with the Soviet Union to begin and to be 
pursued in the general SALT framework, taking into account the whole continuum of nuclear wea-
pons on which deterrence depends, with a view to securing agreement on broad parity with reduced 
levels of all such weapons in an overall military balance; 
( vii) Aware of the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces on the central front; 
(viii) Aware that all defence policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public 
opinion, that that opinion is both concerned and confused about nuclear weapons and calling there-
fore for objective comparable information to be published on the nuclear balance as a whole as per-
ceived both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ix) Welcoming the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on LRTNF with the 
Soviet Union before the end of the year; 
(x) Welcoming in particular the readiness of the United States to consult its allies on nuclear 
policy, in particular in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Special Consultative 
Group, and the High Level Group, which enable their European members to participate construc-
tively in formulating nuclear strategy and in the limitation and reduction of nuclear 
weapons, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council : 
l. To ensure that negotiations on LR TNF reductions in the framework of SALT begin without 
further delay; 
2. To call for the urgent resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a whole 
with a view to securing broad parity at greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons; 
3. To call meanwhile for the continued mutual respect of the SALT 11 limits and of the SALT I 
agreement and ABM treaty; 
4. To call subsequently for negotiations to secure a balance at much lower levels of battlefield 
nuclear and conventional weapons; 
5. To provide an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance as a whole; 
6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe. 
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Wednesday, 17th June 1981 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical 
developments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on &ientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions and Votes on the draft Recommenda-
tion, Doe. 874 and Amendments). 
2. Future of European space actiVIties - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on &ien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doe. 883 
and Amendment). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
given in Appendix I. 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees 
In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the fol-
lowing changes in the membership of Commit-
tees proposed by the United Kingdom Dele-
gation: 
- Mrs. Knight as an alternate member of the 
General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. 
Page; 
- Mr. Howell as a titular member of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri-
vileges in place of Mrs. Knight ; 
- Mr. Page as a titular member of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
in place of Mr. Howell ; 
- Sir Thomas Williams to cease to be an 
alternate member of the General Affairs 
Committee and of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges. 
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4. The European combat aircraft and other 
aeronautical developments 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 874 and Amendments) 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was 
presented by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Hermann Schmidt, Antoni, 
Hardy, Wilkinson, Brasseur, Forma and Kurt 
Jung. 
Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Commit-
tee, replied to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. 
Forma and Maravalle: 
4. In paragraph I, line I, of the draft recom-
mendation proper, leave out "British, French 
and German Governments " and insert " inter-
ested governments"; consequently, in line 2 
leave out " three ". 
Speaker: Mr. Antoni. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. I) was tabled by MM. 
Antoni, Bernini and Martino: 
1. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft 
recommendation proper, leave out " British, 
MINUTES 
French and German Governments " and insert 
" governments of the WEU countries " ; conse-
quently, in line 2 leave out" three". 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. 
Antoni, Bernini and Martino and an identical 
Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Forma 
and Maravalle: 
2 and 5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, leave out "other". 
The Amendments were agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. 
Antoni, Bernini and Martino: 
3. In the draft recommendation proper, alter 
the order of the paragraphs so that 3 becomes 
1 ; 4 becomes 2 ; 1 becomes 3 ; 2 becomes 4. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix 
11) by 33 votes to 8 with 8 abstentions ; 17 
Representatives who had signed the Register of 
Attendance did not take part in the vote. 
(This Recommendation will be published as 
No. 368) 1• 
5. Future of European space activities-
reply to the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Scientif"re, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, Doe. 883 and Amendment) 
The Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions was 
presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur. 
1. See page 35. 
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Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speaker: Mr. Topmann. 
Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair. 
Speakers: MM. Antoni, Atkinson, Konings, 
Cornelissen and Brown. 
Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, 
Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to 
the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. l) was tabled by Mr. 
Topmann: 
1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert: 
" 3. To pursue the further development of 
the Ariane programme, taking into account 
an established demand for it ; ". 
Speaker: Mr. Topmann. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
6. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for the same day 
at 3 p.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m. 
APPENDIX I FOURTH SITTING 
APPENDIX I 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1: 
Belgium MM. Schulte 
Lenzer (Spies von 
MM. Adriaensens Biillesheim) 
Lagneau (Bonnel) Sprung 
Hanin Mrs. Pack (Unland) 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) Mr. Vohrer 
van der Elst (Peeters) 
Mrs. Stae/s-Dompas (Tanghe) 
Mr. van Waterschoot 
Italy 
France 
MM. Agrimi 
MM. Brugnon Antoni 
Baumel (Peronnet) Be mini 
Spenale Bonalumi 
Cavaliere 
De Poi 
Federal Republic of Germany Forma 
Fosson 
MM. Topmann (Ahrens) Maravalle 
Amrehn (Althammer) Mrs. Boniver (Mondino) 
Pensky (Bardens) MM. Amadei (Pecchioli) 
Wittmann (Bohm) Orione (Petrilli) 
Biichner Pucci 
Enders Tripodi 
Gessner M artino (Vecchietti) 
Jung, Kurt 
Kittelmann 
Manning 
Miiller, Giinther Luxembourg 
Lemmrich (Reddemann) 
Schmidt, Hermann Mr. Berchem 
The following Representatives apologised for their absence: 
France 
MM. Berrier 
Bizet 
Caro 
Depietri 
Deschamps 
Ferretti 
Grussenmeyer 
MM. Jeambrun 
Jung 
Petit 
Pignion 
Ponce let 
Schleiter 
Senes 
Valleix 
MM. Glesener (Margue) 
Thoss 
Netherlands 
MM. Comelissen 
van Hulst 
Blaauw (Portheine) 
Scholten 
Stoffelen 
Tummers 
Konings (Voogd) 
United Kingdom 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
MM. Edwards (Cox) 
Howell (Grant) 
Grieve 
Hardy 
Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Jessel 
Atkinson (Sir Anthony 
Kershaw) 
Mrs. Knight 
MM. Garrett (McGuire) 
Durant (Page) 
Urwin 
Wilkinson 
Italy 
MM. Calamandrei 
Rubbi 
Valiante 
United Kingdom 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Dr. Miller 
Lord Reay 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the European combat aircraft 
and other aeronautical developments (Doe. 874) 1: 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Noes......................................... 8 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
MM. Adriaensens 
Agrimi 
Amrehn (Althammer) 
Berchem 
Wittmann (Bohm) 
Lagneau (Bonnel) 
Cavaliere 
Edwards (Cox) 
Forma 
Fosson 
Howell (Grant) 
Grieve 
Ayes: 
MM. Hanin 
Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
MM. van Hulst 
Jessel 
Jung, Kurt 
Atkinson (Sir Anthony 
Kershaw) 
Kittelmann 
Mrs. Knight 
MM. Garrett (McGuire) 
Glesener (Margue) 
Noes: 
MM. Topmann (Ahrens) 
Pensky (Bardens) 
Buchner 
Enders 
Gessner 
Manning 
Schmidt, Hermann 
Schulte 
Abstentions: 
MM. Antoni 
Be mini 
Hardy 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) 
Stoffelen 
M artino (Vecchietti) 
Vohrer 
Konings (V oogd) 
MM. Muller, Giinther 
Durant (Page) 
Orione (Petrilli) 
Blaauw (Portheine) 
Lemmrich (Reddemann) 
Lenzer (Spies von 
Bullesheim) 
Sprung 
Thoss 
Mrs. Pack (Unland) 
Mr. Wilkinson 
l. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 368 
on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments 
The Assembly, 
Considering that several European countries will need to procure a new combat aircraft in the 
early nineties to replace, inter alia, fighter aircraft which will then be obsolete; 
Considering that this aircraft must be designed in the light of the then prevailing threat to 
European states; 
Considering therefore that this aircraft will involve the use of very advanced technology and 
will have to meet a wide range of requirements (air-to-air, air-to-surface, ease of handling, short take-
off, etc.); 
Considering further that the time available for the study and design of this aircraft will thus 
allow detailed technical studies to be made (new designs) and the necessary financial means to be 
provided; 
Considering that the standard of industrial activity, employment and technological know-how 
in the European states is directly linked with the future of the civil and military aeronautical sector 
and hence to the maintenance of its order books, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Recall the need to design a multi-purpose aircraft adaptable to the specific requirements of the 
various WEU member countries; 
2. Insist on such co-operation being organised flexibly and efficiently, drawing on the lessons of 
twenty years of European experience of co-operation; 
3. Ask the interested governments to tackle their present study in greater detail and harmonise the 
specifications required by the staffs of the air forces so that the development of a European combat 
aircraft may be undertaken; 
4. Ask the governments of the WEU member states, in the framework of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and of the Independent European Programme Group, to show their interest in the 
development of this aircraft which should be available for procurement in about fifteen years' time; 
5. Consider extending European co-operation to other types of aircraft (helicopters, transport 
aircraft, etc.). 
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FIFfH SITTING 
Wednesday, 17th June 1981 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Future of European space activities - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, (Vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation, Doe. 883). 
2. Relations between parliaments and the press (Presen-
tation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments, Doe. 873). 
3. Developments in Poland (Presentation of and Debate on 
the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 870 
and Amendments). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
given in the Appendix. 
3. Future of European space activities - reply 
to the twenty sixth annual report 
of the Council 
(Vote on the amended draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 883) 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to unanimously. (This Recommen-
dation will be published as No. 369) 1• 
4. Relations between parliaments and the press 
(Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parlillments, Doe. 873) 
The Report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments was presented by Mrs. Knight, 
Rapporteur. 
I. See page 38. 
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The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Enders and Hawkins. 
Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Committee, 
and Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur, replied to the 
speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly took note of the Report of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
5. Developments in Poland 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee, Doe. 870 and Amendments) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: MM. Gessner, Atkinson, Bernini, 
Grieve, Blaauw, Cavaliere and Hawkins. 
The Debate was adjourned. 
6. Date and time of the next Sitting 
The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 18th 
June, at 10 a.m. 
The Sitting was closed at 5.10 p.m. 
APPENDIX FIFTH SITTING 
APPENDIX 
Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1: 
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Italy 
MM. Agrimi 
Be mini 
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The following Representatives apologised for their absence: 
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Senes 
Mr. Peeters Spenale 
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Bizet MM. Bardens 
Brugnon Bohm 
Caro Reddemann 
Depietri Schulte 
Deschamps Spies von Bullesheim 
Ferretti Unland 
Grussenmeyer 
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Jung Italy 
Peronnet 
Petit MM. Antoni 
Pignion Bonalumi 
Poncelet Calamandrei 
MM. Stoffelen 
Konings (Voogd) 
United Kingdom 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
MM. Cox 
Grieve 
Hardy 
Hawkins 
Lord Hughes 
MM. Jessel 
Atkinson (Sir Anthony 
Kershaw) 
Mrs. Knight 
MM. Garrett (McGuire) 
Fletcher (Miller) 
Durant (Page) 
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Wilkinson 
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l. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
37 
TEXT ADOPTED 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 369 
on the future of European space activities -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
FIFfH SITTING 
Considering the continuous efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of 
civil and military space research and applications; 
Considering also the growing space budgets of Japan, Brazil, India and other non-European 
countries; 
Concerned about the slow progress in establishing a new European space programme and the 
low total budget proposed; 
Regretting that too many parts of this programme are optional, not mandatory; 
Welcoming the successful test-flight of the shuttle Columbia which will aJlow full use to be 
made of the European Space lab; 
Regretting the reluctance to prepare and convene a meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council to 
give political impetus, direction and commitment to the European Space Agency, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge the governments of member states: 
I. To elaborate long-term European space planning: to identify a space strategy for Europe and 
the related technical, industrial and commercial objectives to be met; 
2. To ensure that Spacelab's potential is fully utilised for scientific trials and experiments in such 
areas as earth and stellar observation and microgravity research in life sciences and materials 
processmg; 
3. To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme, taking into account an estab-
lished demand for it; 
4. To agree on an earth resources satellite programme further to the Meteosat meteorological 
programme and to intensify the telecommunications technology programme; 
5. To promote, in a North Atlantic Alliance context, the exploitation of European military 
communication and observation satellites and the investigation of the military implications of space 
technology; 
6. To mobilise political and public opinion for an expanded European space programme in view 
of the scientific and industrial benefits to be derived from such potential future programmes as 
interplanetary missions and manned space flight. 
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SIXTH SITTING 
Thursday, 18th June 1981 
ORDERS OF THE DAY 
1. Developments in Poland (Resumed Debate on the Report 
ofthe General Affairs Committee and Votes on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 870 and Amendments). 
2. European security and events in the Gulf area (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 
871, Addendum and Amendments). 
3. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doe. 877 and Amend-
ment). 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous 
Sitting were agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The names of Representatives and Substitutes 
who signed the Register of Attendance are 
given in Appendix I. 
3. Developments in Poland 
(Resumed Debate on the Report 
of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 870 and Amendments) 
The Debate was resumed. 
Speakers: MM. Gunther Muller, De Poi, 
Dejardin, Rosch, Baumel and Kurt Jung. 
Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic 
Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to 
the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by 
Mr. Portheine and others: 
2. In paragraph (iiz) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out " in 1980 ". 
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Speaker: Mr. Blaauw. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. 
Portheine and others: 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out fendation proper, leave out 
from " Poland " to the end and insert: 
" which would constitute a flagrant violation 
of the principles laid down in the Helsinki 
final act and which would have consequences 
for the future CSCE process; ". 
Speaker: Mr. Blaauw. 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. 
Hanin, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Muller: 
7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from " Poland " to the end 
and insert: 
" which would be a flagrant violation of the 
Helsinki agreements and call in question their 
content; ". 
Speaker: Mr. Hanin. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
Amendments (Nos. 3 and 4) were tabled by 
MM. Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group: 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out " planning what measures all 
member countries should take in application " 
and insert " implementation ". 
MINUTES 
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out " application of these mea-
sures " and insert " implementation ". 
Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Dejardin and Hanin. 
Amendment 3 was negatived. 
Amendment 4 was not moved. 
Amendments (Nos. 5 and 6) were tabled by 
MM. Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group: 
5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 4. 
6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 5. 
Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Baumel, Gessner and 
Hanin. 
The Amendments were agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix 
11) by 34 votes to 18 with 1 abstention; 11 
Representatives who had signed the Register of 
Attendance did not take part in the vote. 
(This Recommendation will be published as 
No. 370) 1• 
Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett (explanation 
of vote); MM. Stoffelen and Himin (points of 
order); MM. Hanin and Giinther Miiller (expla-
nation of vote). 
4. European security and events in the 
Gulf area 
(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Commit-
tee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 871, 
Addendum and Amendments) 
The Report of the General Affairs Committee 
was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Chair-
man of the Committee, in place of Mr. Forni, 
Rapporteur. 
The Assembly proceeded to consider the 
draft Recommendation. 
An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by 
Sir Frederic Bennett: 
1. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, insert: 
"Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack 
on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension 
throughout the whole Middle East which 
reduces the credibility of the West, especially 
1. See page 44. 
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of the United States, in seeking to provide 
compromise solutions to intractable problems 
in the area;". 
Speaker: Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by 
Sir Frederic Bennett: 
2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert: 
" Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakis-
tan in order to help it to receive refugees on 
its territory without unacceptable social and 
economic damage to its own economy and 
also provide that country with the armaments 
it urgently needs for its own security; ". 
Speaker: Sir Frederic Bennett. 
A manuscript Amendment to the Amend-
ment was moved by Sir Frederic Bennett to 
insert " defensive " before " armaments ". 
The Amendment to the Amendment was 
agreed to. 
The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. 
Blaauw and Vohrer: 
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after "assistance " insert "in particular 
in the political and humanitarian field ". 
Speakers: Mr. Blaauw and Sir Frederic 
Bennett. 
The Amendment was withdrawn. 
An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by 
Sir Frederic Bennett: 
3. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert: 
•• Offer active support to all efforts made by 
the countries of the area to assume collec-
tively their own security and envisage giving 
them a unilateral European or western 
guarantee for their independence, if so 
requested; ". 
Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Hughes, 
Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Blaauw. 
A manuscript Amendment to the Amend-
ment was moved by Sir Frederic Bennett to 
insert •• and help " after •• support " and to 
leave out all the words after •• security". 
The Amendment to the Amendment was 
agreed to. 
The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to. 
An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by 
Sir Frederic Bennett: 
MINUTES 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, insert: 
" Express its condemnation of any aggression 
against countries in the area, and propose 
that the United Nations use appropriate sanc-
tions against any aggressor whatsoever. ". 
Speaker: Sir Frederic Bennett. 
The Amendment was agreed to. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation. 
The amended draft Recommendation was 
agreed to unanimously. (This Recommenda-
tion will be published as No. 3 71) 1• 
5. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
and Vote on the draft Resolution, 
Doe. 877 and Amendment) 
The Report of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. 
Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur. 
1. See page 45. 
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In accordance with Rule 23 (1) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to continue 
to sit after one o'clock in order to complete the 
Orders ofthe Day. 
The Debate was opened. 
Speakers: Lord Hughes and Mr. Stoffelen. 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen was 
withdrawn. 
Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur of 
the Committee, replied to the speakers. 
The Debate was closed. 
The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft 
Resolution. 
The draft Resolution was agreed to unani-
mously. (This Resolution will be published as 
No. 67)1• 
6. Adjournment of the Session 
The President adjourned the Twenty-Seventh 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly. 
The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m. 
1. See page 46. 
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1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on developments in Poland (Doe. 
870) 1: 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
MM. Adriaensens 
Agrimi 
Ahrens 
Pensky (Bardens) 
Lord McNair (Beith) 
MM. Bernini 
Bonalumi 
Buchner 
Cox 
Enders 
Forma 
Fosson 
Mr. Althammer 
Sir Frederic Bennett 
Mrs. Pack (Bohm) 
MM. Grieve 
Hanin 
Hawkins 
Ayes: 
MM. Gessner 
Edwards (Hardy) 
Lord Hughes 
MM. van Hulst 
Fletcher (McGuire) 
Dejardin (Mangelschots) 
Manning 
Dr. Miller 
Mrs. Boniver (Mondino) 
MM. Amadei (Pecchioli) 
Blaauw (Portheine) 
Noes: 
Mr. Atkinson (Sir Anthony 
Kershaw) 
Mrs. Knight 
MM. Muller, Giinther 
Durant (Page) 
Mrs. Staels-Dompas (Peeters) 
Abstention: 
Mr. Berchem 
MM. Giust (Pucci) 
Topmann (Schmidt, 
Hermann) 
Schulte 
Stoffelen 
Prussen (Thoss) 
Tummers 
Urwin 
Valiante 
Martino (Vecchietti) 
Rosch (Vohrer) 
Konings (Voogd) 
MM. Baumel (Peronnet) 
Orione (Petrilli) 
Lord Reay 
MM. Sprung 
van der Elst (Tanghe) 
Tripodi 
Unland 
1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in 
brackets. 
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RECOMMENDATION 370 
on developments in Poland 
The Assembly of WEU, 
(i) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and .co-operation m Europe, 
adopted in Helsinki on 1st August 1975, constitutes the charter of detente in Europe; 
(ii) Recalling that this text stipulates that: 
" The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international 
relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations and with the present declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to 
warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle. 
No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions 
likely to give rise to disputes, between them. "; 
and that 
" The participating states will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or 
collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another 
participating state, regardless of their mutual relations. 
They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such inter-
vention against another participating state. 
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, 
economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by 
another participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advan-
tages of any kind. "; 
(iii) Considering that the events in Poland concern only the internal affairs of that country; 
(iv) Considering consequently that any external intervention designed to impose on Poland 
, measures which it has not freely decided upon would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki final act 
and would therefore terminate any process of detente; 
(v) Recalling that in Order 53 the Assembly requested its President: 
"To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of 
Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention", 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Announce without delay the principles which will guide its reactions in the event of Soviet 
intervention in Poland, which would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki agreements and call in 
question their content; 
2. Proceed forthwith to hold consultations with a view to planning what measures all member 
countries should take in application of these principles; 
3. Draw up proposals for member states to submit to the North Atlantic Council in order to 
extend application of these measures to all member countries of the Atlantic Alliance; 
4. Request member states to respond as favourably as possible, under present circumstances, to 
any requests for credit facilities which the Polish Government has made or may make insofar as they 
are destined to improve living conditions for the Poles. 
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RECOMMENDATION 371 
on European security and events in the Gulf area 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Recommendation 361; 
Noting that the situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not changed 
since then but that the consequences for the Afghan people have become considerably worse; 
Considering that this invasion also constitutes a direct threat to the security of all southern 
Asian countries as well as to peace in the world; 
Recognising that the lack of progress towards peace between Israel and its neighbouring 
countries makes it impossible to restore stability throughout the Middle East; 
Deploring the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran; 
Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension 
throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the United 
States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area; 
Considering that it is of vital interest to Europe to maintain good relations with all the Arab 
countries but not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of any of these countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Demonstrate the will of its members to oppose any intervention by the Soviet Union in the 
Middle Eastern countries; 
2. Concert its efforts with the United States to afford assistance to the Afghan resistance 
movement; 
3. Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its terri-
tory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that 
country with the defensive armaments it urgently needs for its own security; 
4. At the same time express Europe's determination to oppose Soviet military intervention and its 
will not to intervene in disputes which remain confined to the area; 
5. Offer active support and help to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collec-
tively their own security; 
6. Actively and jointly seek agreement between all countries likely to supply weapons to Iraq and 
Iran with a view to halting arms supplies to the two belligerents; 
7. With a view to making Europe less dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers, propose 
consultations with the governments of other oil-consuming countries designed to promote an energy 
. policy aimed at a progressive reduction in world oil consumption; 
8. Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the 
United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever. 
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The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
RESOLUTION 67 
on the rel'ision of the Charter and of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
SIXTH SITTING 
To adopt the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly as set out in 
Document 877 presented by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
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FIRST SITTING 
Monday, 15th June 1981 
SUMMARY 
1. Opening of the Session. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Address by the Provisional President. 
4. Examination of Credentials. 
S. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
6. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
8. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First 
Part of the Session (Doe. 868). 
9. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth A./fairs, representing the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doe. 869). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hurd (Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom). 
Replies by Mr. Hurd to questions put by: Mr. Hardy, 
Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Wilkinson, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Spenale, 
Lord Duncan-Sandys, Dr. Miller. 
10. Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-
sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and 
Debate on the Report of the General A./fairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 880). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Page (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Urwin, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Osbom, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. 
Page. 
11. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommenda-
tion, Doe. 875). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Tanghe (Rapporteur). 
12. Nomination of members to Committees. 
13. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Brugnon, Provisional President, in the Chair. 
1. Opening of the Session 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Sit-
ting is open. 
In accordance with Article Ill (a) of the 
Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, I declare open the Twenty-Seventh 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western 
European Union. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting 
which have been notified to the President will 
be published with the list of Representatives 
appended to the Minutes of Proceedings1• 
3. Address by the Provisional President 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and 
Gentlemen, a man who, owing to his exception-
ally long political life, for many years held the 
more or less enviable position of oldest member 
l. See page 18. 
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of this Assembly, Marius Moutet, used to say 
that he particularly appreciated this role 
because it allowed him to say what he wanted 
and what he thought without having to worry 
about political strings and without any fear of 
rejoinders. Actually he was an exceptional 
orator who made brilliant impromptu speeches, 
some of which were epoch-making. 
As I cannot claim to be as eloquent as he 
was, I have a few notes, but these do not pre-
vent me from claiming a privilege of which 
Marius Moutet used to take advantage, speak-
ing to you as I am at a time when the political 
situation makes it difficult for a French parlia-
mentarian to say anything without committing 
others. The fact that I am not a candidate in 
the current elections will perhaps give parti-
cular weight to a cautious attitude which is not 
just an oratorical device. 
In this connection I hope that the Assembly 
will excuse the parliamentarians of the French 
Delegation, who, being engaged in the electoral 
campaign between the two ballots, will not be 
able to attend regularly during this session. I 
thank the Assembly in advance. 
As I cannot talk about the present, I shall 
confine myself to reviewing some aspects of a 
past which is not yet very distant and which 
may throw some light on the future. 
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The thought that I shall no longer be with 
you at the next session of our Assembly 
prompts me to ask myself what the institution 
which brings us together here, and the modified 
Brussels Treaty which gave birth to it, may 
have meant to the men of my generation. This 
is perhaps not devoid of interest, if we bear in 
mind that several of those who, in France at 
least, were members of the government which 
worked out and negotiated this treaty have 
recently returned to government office from 
which they had been excluded for nearly a 
quarter of a century. 
There is no doubt that the considerations 
which led to the revision of the Brussels Treaty 
were primarily European. The Atlantic Alli-
ance was already in existence and had just set 
up a political organisation and an integrated 
command structure when the Brussels Treaty 
was modified. The security of Europe was 
based on this Alliance, and the problem at that 
time was to increase its effectiveness by organis-
ing European participation in the defence of 
Europe. It is well known that this participa-
tion ran up against difficulties, which are very 
understandable when we recall that it was only 
ten years after the end of the second world war 
and that the wounds which it had opened were 
far from having healed. But it was already 
apparent that the organisation of a new Europe, 
beginning with the creation of the OEEC and 
the Council of Europe followed by the estab-
lishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, could not be restricted to econo-
mic affairs alone. Without a political expres-
sion of European solidarity to meet the dangers 
then threatening our continent there would 
have been no Europe. Without concertation of 
defence policies, a political Europe could not 
be established. 
It is ~asy and fashionable nowadays to com-
plain about the lack of progress by Europe 
since 1954, but allow me to say that we Euro-
peans have nevertheless made considerable 
headway since then. Although the institutions 
are still not as we would like them to be, and 
although co-operation is still inadequate in 
many cases, the rapprochement between the 
peoples of Western Europe has become a fact of 
our daily lives. The relations which we main-
tain in political forums such as ours bear 
witness to this, and European parliamentaria-
nism has become an important fact not only for 
us who are involved but also, in large measure, 
for public opinion in each of our countries. 
The modified Brussels Treaty has certainly 
contributed to this, particularly through some 
of its provisions, which may subsequently 
appear to have been overtaken by events to 
some extent, but which made possible the 
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incredible rapprochement between France and 
Germany which is still vital for any progress by 
Europe. 
I am thinking here not only of the role which 
WEU played in settling the dispute over the 
Saar, or even of the military commitments 
which the Atlantic Alliance and the Paris 
Agreements entail, but also of an entirely new 
factor which these agreements introduced into 
the international order. 
For what was, I believe, the first time in his-
tory, a military alliance directed against an 
external danger also included clauses designed 
to reassure the partners about each other by 
giving them a guarantee that none of them 
would increase its armaments beyond a level 
fixed by mutual agreement. I do not think that 
the significance of this clause, whereby a mili-
tary alliance is at the same time an agreement 
on arms limitation, has ever been sufficiently 
appreciated. 
I should add that this agreement not only 
covers the principles of such limitation but also 
specifies all the actual procedures and controls 
involved. The creation of a control body based 
not, as had nearly always been the case, on 
mutual distrust but on trust, represented a 
major contribution to reconciliation between 
the states and peoples of Europe. 
The need for such an institution may not be 
as obvious today, since the problems facing 
Europe no longer stem from the fear that one of 
the partners will over-arm but from the fear 
that none of them will arm sufficiently to 
match the scale of the armed forces and arma-
ments which we can see building up in other 
parts of the world. Nevertheless, this novel 
feature of the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
new ethic of the Alliance which it brought into 
being ought, I think, to inspire Europe's rela-
tions with the rest of the world. 
For, while it is fashionable to emphasise that 
security and disarmament must go hand in 
hand, it should be added not only that disarma-
ment and control are indissolubly linked but 
also that controlled disarmament has become, 
and must become more than ever during the 
coming years, one of the cornerstones of the 
international order. In other words, the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty and WEU, created by it, 
are by no means outdated institutions but, in a 
way, foreshadow what the shape of a new inter-
national order should be, to give Europe, if not 
the world, the era of peace which it so sorely 
needs. 
Another aspect of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, whose importance should not be under-
estimated, is that which calls upon European 
arms manufacturers to join forces and work 
together. True, it has often been stressed that 
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such an association ought to make it possible to 
keep down unit production costs and should 
thus lead to better and more economical perfor-
mance. That is probably so, but it is perhaps 
even more essential that, in this field as in 
others, solidarity among Europeans should be 
reflected in joint production, that is, in close 
co-operation, which in itself furthers the cause 
of disarmament by separating the effort required 
to ensure the security of our society from the 
individual interests which have too often deter-
mined the armaments policy of states. 
Admittedly, the progress made in this direc-
tion is very limited and the summary which the 
Council has just given us of the economic chap-
ter of the study by the Standing Armaments 
Committee of WEU does not give the impres-
sion that the cause of Europe has already 
triumphed. Nevertheless, the association, from 
the outset, of a military alliance with a deter-
mination to produce armaments jointly and a 
determination to limit the military power of 
each member represented a contribution to 
international practice which was new and, it is 
to be hoped, decisive. 
While designed to meet the requirements of 
the situation as it was in 1954, the modified 
Brussels Treaty remains the cornerstone for a 
continuing balance and co-operation between 
the signatories and, at the same time, retains its 
full significance as a bold anticipation of the 
organisation of world peace. 
For all these reasons, there seems to be no 
need today to despair of the institution which 
brings us together here. True, it has not pro-
duced the results expected by some people. 
Nor, however, has it justified its opponents' 
reservations and fears. The modified Brussels 
Treaty is in fact applied both in the field of 
political consultation and in its military aspects 
and has provided the backcloth against which 
other institutions are developing, even if they 
are taking over the position which the Brussels 
Treaty assigned to the Council of Western 
European Union. There is no reason to regret 
this, as it has enabled countries unwilling to 
enter into a military alliance to associate them-
selves in fact with the practice which the 
authors of the Paris Agreements modifying the 
Brussels Treaty wished to promote. The judg-
ment which will be passed by those who look 
back on this institution with the historian's 
detachment and impartiality will probably be 
far more favourable than that which some of 
today's politicians feel entitled to pass. 
These considerations lead me, now that I am 
about to leave you, to express to you my good 
wishes for the work which you still have to do 
together. There is every reason to have confi-
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dence in an institution which has succeeded in 
extending military co-operation beyond its own 
limits and, in particular, in giving it a very spe-
cial moral significance. As during the last 
twenty-six years, your role today is still to ensure 
that neither governments nor public opinion 
be allowed to forget what was intended by the 
signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
This calls for watchfulness, imagination and a 
keen sense of what is possible. These, I know, 
are virtues which European parliaments do 
possess, and it is therefore with confidence in 
your future and in the future of Europe that I 
say goodbye to you. (Applause) 
4. Examination of Credentials 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Orders of the Day provide for the examination 
of credentials. 
The list of Representatives and Substitutes 
attending the twenty-seventh ordinary session of 
the Assembly of Western European Union has 
been published in Notice No. 1. 
In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of 
Procedure, the credentials have been ratified by 
the Council of Europe, as notified by the letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly, with the exception of those of Mr. Cole-
man, a Substitute for the United Kingdom, who 
has been appointed since the adjournment of 
the Parliamentary Assembly. It falls, therefore, 
to our Assembly to ratify his credentials, in 
accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of 
Procedure. 
The appointment has been properly made in 
accordance with our rules and has not been 
contested. 
If the Assembly is unanimous, these creden-
tials can be validated without prior reference to 
the Credentials Committee. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The credentials of Mr. Coleman are agreed to 
subject to subsequent ratification by the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
Accordingly, Mr. Coleman may take his seat 
in the Assembly of Western European Union in 
his capacity as a Substitute for the United 
Kingdom. 
5. Election of the President 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
Orders of the Day now provide for the election 
of the President of the Assembly. 
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Rule 7 (2) of the Rules of Procedure stipula-
tes that Substitutes may not be elected to the 
Bureau ofthe Assembly. 
Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Rules of Proce-
dure provides that no Representative may stand 
as a candidate for the office of President unless 
a proposal for his candidature has been spon-
sored in writing by three or more Representa-
tives, and Representatives who are members of 
a national government may not be members of 
the Bureau. 
I have received only one nomination, that of 
Mr. Fred Mulley, a Representative of the 
United Kingdom. This nomination has been 
correctly submitted in the form prescribed by 
the rules. If the Assembly is unanimous, I 
propose that we elect Mr. Mulley by acclama-
tion. (Applause) 
Is there any opposition ? ... 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
I therefore proclaim Mr. Fred Mulley Presi-
dent of the Assembly of Western European 
Union and invite him to take the Chair. 
(Mr. Mulley then took the Chair) 
6. Address by the President 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT. - Members of the Assem-
bly, I am sure that you will agree that my first 
pleasant duty is to thank Mr. Brugnon as doyen 
d'age for giving us such an excellent start to 
this year's deliberations. It will be with regret 
that we have learned that he will no longer be 
eligible to be a member of our Assembly. 
I feel that this will also apply to a number of 
valued members of the past, and I am sure that 
you now wish me to say how much we have 
valued their contributions over the years, both 
to the work of this Assembly and in building 
Europe over the past decades. I am sure that 
all of us in our several countries will convey 
these remarks to those colleagues who are not 
seeking re-election to our delegations. 
I must now also thank you for the great 
honour that you have paid me of again electing 
me your President. I confess that when you 
did me the honour of electing me President last 
year, I did not foresee the full extent of the prob-
lems both in the small world of our own inter-
nal affairs and in the wider international scene 
that would arise in the past twelve months. It 
will be recalled that, within a few days of my 
election, Mr. Humblet, who had been Clerk of 
the Assembly on a part-time basis since its 
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inception twenty-six years ago, intimated his 
desire to retire at the end of 1980. Like all 
former members of the Assembly, I have the 
highest opinion of Mr. Humblet's judgment and 
competence and I did not relish the task of 
finding a successor, not least because it was the 
first time that the procedures set out in our 
Charter and Rules of Procedure had to be 
applied. If I may say so, they are perhaps not 
ideal. 
However, you will know that the Assembly 
elected Mr. Georges Moulias, for many years 
full-time Clerk Assistant, and it is with great 
pleasure that I welcome him to this first Assem-
bly as our Clerk. The procedures for selecting 
and electing a new Clerk and consequential 
considerations throw an extra burden on the 
Bureau of the Assembly, and I am most grateful 
for the support that I have received from the 
Vice-Presidents in carrying out these tasks. 
I should also like to pay a warm tribute to 
the work of all the staff of the Assembly 
- probably the smallest staff of any inter-
national organisation, now reduced from 
twenty-eight to twenty-seven, and covering all 
grades from the Clerk to the lowest grades. Very 
many of them have been with the Assembly for 
twenty years or more, and against the back-
ground of booming international bureaucracy, it 
is worth recalling that the Assembly staff has 
not been increased since 1966 and that there 
have been no regradings or promotions since 
1974. We are greatly indebted to them all. 
We shall later be discussing how best we can 
ensure that the decisions of the Assembly -
indeed, the Assembly itself - become better 
known in the media and among the people of 
our respective countries. Despite the excellent 
work of our staff, the outcome of our achieve-
ments in terms of public relations and influence 
depends upon ourselves - we, the members of 
the Assembly. Although, like all our national 
assemblies, we have budgetary problems, I do 
not believe that it is only or even mainly a 
matter of money. I can recall this Assembly 
receiving great publicity in the late 1950s when 
we anticipated NATO and, indeed, President 
Kennedy, in moving from the doctrine of mas-
sive retaliation to the so-called flexible response. 
We also had great coverage for our propo-
sals for a European Community deterrent, and 
at that time we had a minute information bud-
get and had only the part-time services of our 
excellent Chief of Information, Mr. Borcier. 
Although there are many other bodies that 
seek to become involved in parliamentary dis-
cussion of European defence issues, I am 
convinced that defence questions within the 
context of the NATO Alliance must in existing 
circumstances remain matters for national 
governments and national parliaments and, 
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accordingly, this Assembly, comprised of mem-
bers of national parliaments, is the proper 
European parliamentary forum for discussion of 
and decision on defence and related questions. 
This Assembly, therefore, still has and must 
have an important role to play. Its success or 
failure depends almost entirely on the contribu-
tion and dedication of its members, not only on 
what we do here but to the extent that we are 
willing to pursue the issues we debate here 
within our national parliaments and with our 
own constituents. It is, of course, unfortunate 
that the Brussels Treaty, which is difficult or 
almost impossible to amend, prescribes that our 
membership must be based on membership of 
the Council of Europe and that this dual mem-
bership imposes obligations and attracts mem-
bers with diverse interests detrimental to their 
full-time participation in our work. However, 
this problem has always been with us, and I 
believe that peace and security are matters that 
must command the interest and concern of all 
members of parliaments in all their countries. 
The world situation has changed in many 
respects since our last meeting and, while it is 
tempting to comment on the main issues of 
international affairs, I feel that I must resist the 
temptation as almost all the relevant considera-
tions will be discussed in the next few days. 
Both Poland and the Middle East present 
problems of great concern and we still have to 
assess the impact of the new Presidents in 
France and the United States of America. 
Although I would not wish for any other basis, 
an alliance of democratic states presents prob-
lems. There is hardly a time when there is 
not an election pending, or a government still 
to be formed or about to collapse, and conse-
quently decision-making is not easy. 
I need hardly say that when the Presidential 
Committee selected this week for our Assembly 
-the traditional first week of June having been 
pre-empted by the Council of Europe - we 
never thought that it would be the period 
between the first and second ballots of the elec-
tions for the French National Assembly. If I 
may be permitted a personal observation, apart 
from congratulating President Mitterrand and 
his colleagues on their remarkable success, it 
would be to hope that France may in future 
play a larger role in the integration of European 
defence planning within NATO and in building 
a better system of communication between 
Europe and our American allies. 
The appointment of Secretary of State Haig, 
who both knows the European scene from his 
period as SACEUR and who is widely respected 
here, should assist us to avoid some of the prob-
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lems of the past. It is, however, necessary to 
say emphatically that it is essential for progress, 
and real progress, to be offered by the United 
States in the SALT process if there is to be 
agreement here in Europe on its general NATO 
strategy. There is widespread concern that we 
are at the beginning of an arms race which, par-
·ticularly in the depressed economic circum-
stances, we cannot afford and which will in no 
way enhance our security. It must also be 
understood that the protest movements against 
nuclear weapons - and, indeed, in some cases, 
against the use of nuclear power for civil pur-
poses - have in many of our countries a deeper 
and wider support than had their counterparts 
of a decade or more ago. 
An effective and united defence policy for 
NATO will be possible only if it is combined 
with a determined and meaningful effort to 
achieve multilateral arms control agreement, in 
both nuclear and conventional areas. In all 
these matters this Assembly has a contribution 
to make, and I thank you again for your confi-
dence in asking me once more to preside over 
your deliberations in the coming year. Thank 
you all very much. (Applause) 
7. Election of three Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT. - The Orders of the Day 
provide for the election of six Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly. 
Rule 7 (2) of the Rules of Procedure states 
that Substitutes may not be elected to the 
Bureau of the Assembly. Rule 10 also states 
that no Representative may· ·be a candidate for 
the office of Vice-President if his nomination is 
not made in writing by at least three Repres~n­
tatives, and that Representatives who are mem-
bers of a national government may not be 
members of the Bureau. 
Only three Vice-Presidents have been nomi-
nated so far. I propose that we approve their 
appointment now and that, when the political 
groups and delegations come forward with other 
nominations, we deal with them as we proceed. 
I have valid nominations for Mr. Gessner of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Tanghe 
of Belgium and Mr. Maravalle of Italy. If the 
Assembly agrees, I propose that those candi-
dates be elected by acclamation. 
Are there any objections? ... 
There is none, and I therefore declare that 
the three candidates are elected Vice-Presidents 
and that we fill the remaining places when 
nominations are received. 
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8. Adoption of the draft Order of Business 
for the First Part of the Session 
(Doe. 868) 
The PRESIDENT. - The next Order of the 
Day is the adoption by the Assembly of the 
draft Order of Business for the first part of the 
twenty-seventh ordinary session of the Assem-
bly. 
The draft Order of Business has been distri-
buted as Document 868 dated 4th May 1981. 
We have a proposal that, for personal rea-
sons, the Order of Business on Wednesday 
should be changed so that Mr. Brasseur's report 
is taken before that of Mr. Wilkinson. That is 
a matter that we shall have to consider in view 
of the question that was raised with us this 
morning. 
Are there any objections to the adoption of 
this Order of Business? ... 
As there are no objections, the draft Order of 
business is adopted. 
The day is warm, and it is not my intention 
to raise the temperature of the proceedings, but 
I propose to take my coat off and I invite my 
colleagues who wish to do so to follow suit. 
9. Twenty-sixth annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
representing the Chairman-in-Office 
of the Council, Doe. 869) 
The PRESIDENT. - I now have the most 
agreeable duty of welcoming the Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
for the United Kingdom, Mr. Douglas Hurd, 
representing the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council, to present the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council, Document 869. 
Those who recall his previous visit and 
speech will know that we are in for a good 
account of the Council's position and for 
comments about particular matters of concern 
to the United Kingdom. I should also say that 
I have a personal message from Lord earring-
ton, the Foreign Secretary, expressing his per-
sonal regret that he was unable to be with us 
today. I know that he will take a close interest 
in our work. He has invited me at any time to 
approach him, and I know that, while a good 
deal of the work may fall on Mr. Hurd, Lord 
Carrington will want to be involved as well. 
If I may say so, in anticipation of what may 
be said in other contexts later, we should be 
conscious of the enormous burden that foreign 
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ministers carry these days. I believe that when 
we next meet - in December - not only will the 
United Kingdom have the important office of 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Western 
European Union, but Lord Carrington will be 
the Chairman of the Council of the European 
Community and of the Council of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. United Kingdom 
foreign affairs ministers therefore have a busy 
year ahead of them. Against that background 
we are particularly glad to welcome Mr. Hurd 
and his undertaking to answer questions at the 
end of his speech. 
I call Mr. Hurd. 
Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). -First, Mr. President, I congratulate you 
on your re-election as President of the Assem-
bly. That gives many of us great personal 
pleasure. The permissive style of your presi-
dency has already been illustrated by your 
ruling about dress, and, if I may, I shall take 
advantage of what you said. It is a great plea-
sure for us all to see you re-elected. 
I am delighted to have this second opportu-
nity of addressing the Assembly. The first 
opportunity was as Chairman-in-Office. I 
confirm what you have said about Lord 
Carrington's regret that, because of his crowded 
programme, it has not been possible for him to 
be present. I also confirm what you said about 
the interest that he takes personally in the 
affairs of this Assembly. I have already reported 
to him personally about the meetings that 
were held in The Hague last week. He has 
encouraged me to do the same after this present 
meeting. 
It is my privilege to present to the Assembly 
the Council's twenty-sixth annual report. I 
shall make a few observations under two 
headings. The first is relations between the 
Council and the Assembly, and that is dealt 
with in the first chapter of the report. The 
Council continues to appreciate the role played 
by the Assembly in watching over the evolution 
of the problems of security and European union 
and in submitting its thoughts to governments 
for their attention. We believe that the stan-
dard of these reports is generally high and that 
the Assembly, which is the only parliamentary 
institution empowered to debate defence ques-
tions, exercises this prerogative with remarkable 
consistency and insight. 
The Council is concerned to maintain close 
and constructive relations with the Assembly, 
and that is demonstrated by the detailed 
accounts of the Council's activities given in the 
twenty-sixth annual report and by its responses 
to Assembly recommendations on a number of 
important questions connected with implemen-
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tation of the Brussels Treaty, including those 
dealt with in other international institutions. 
The Council's interest is further demonstra-
ted by the informal contacts designed to give 
added depth to the political dialogue with the 
Assembly. These include the working dinner 
with the Presidential Committee after the 
ministerial meeting of 14th May in Luxem-
bourg last year, and, previously, a joint 
meeting with the General Affairs Committee. 
On the occasion of the recent ministerial 
meeting in The Hague last week, there was a 
working lunch with the Presidential Commit-
tee. There were the two joint meetings in the 
afternoon with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, and with your 
General Affairs Committee. 
I understand, because several people have 
spoken to me about it, the importance that 
members of the Assembly rightly and naturally 
attach to ministerial attendance and attention 
on such occasions as I have just described. 
You have pointed out, Mr. President, that the 
rhythm and pace of international meetings 
involving ministers are now intense - almost 
feverish - and that poses its problems. 
I have very much enjoyed the meetings which 
I have attended with your Assembly. I have 
found that they added considerably to my own 
education. I shall try to convey this interest 
and enthusiasm to my colleagues in other 
countries. 
Secondly, I refer to the implementation of the 
Brussels Treaty by the Council, assisted by its 
subsidiary bodies. This is dealt with in the 
second, third and fourth chapters of the report. 
The modified Brussels Treaty, Article V of 
which requires the member states to afford each 
other mutual assistance in the event of aggres-
sion, is in our view one of the keystones of the 
security system embracing the signatory coun-
tries. The validity of all the provisions of the 
treaty and its protocols and the determination 
of member countries to carry them out have 
been reaffirmed in the annual report. 
As emerges from the second chapter of the 
report, the Council continued in 1980 to keep a 
close watch on the application of the provisions 
of the treaty and its protocols concerning the 
levels of member states' forces and others. The 
procedures for that purpose functioned nor-
mally. At its meeting on 21st July last year 
the Council, following accepted procedures, 
cancelled paragraph V of Annex Ill to the 
protocol and you, Sir, were duly informed of 
the Council's decision. 
The responsibilities of the Armaments 
Control Agency, described in Chapter Ill of the 
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report, were carried out meticulously, as in pre-
vious years. 
The Standing Armaments Committee com-
pleted the first section of the economic part of 
its study of the situation in the armaments 
industries in member countries. At their meet-
ing in Luxembourg, ministers expressed their 
appreciation to the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee of its painstaking and original work 
which will be carefully studied. ' 
In addition to questions relating to the imple-
mentation of the treaty, ministers discussed 
East-West relations at their meetings of 14th 
May last year in Luxembourg and 3rd June this 
year in The Hague. At the last meeting we 
also exchanged views on the situation in the 
Mediterranean. 
I now wish to say a word about the future 
activities of the Council and to refer briefly to 
two valuable and interesting reports which you 
will be debating in the near future. I refer to 
the reports prepared by Mr. Tanghe and Mr. 
Page. They welcome what they see as a readi-
ness on the Council's part to be as helpful as 
possible both in the annual report and in reply 
to questions and recommendations. While we 
in the United Kingdom provide the Chairman-
in-Office, that will be our intention and resolve. 
It is not always possible to accede to every 
request from the Assembly, as I am sure mem-
bers recognise. From time to time you may 
feel that we are not living up fully to our own 
good intentions. For example, the annual 
report this year was later in coming out than 
you would have wished. We shall try to do 
better next time. I am sure that you under-
stand the practical problems. 
You would also like more information about 
the Independent European Programme Group. 
This is not an easy problem, because the 
group's discussions are confidential, and it does 
not issue communiques after its meetings. 
But in other respects I believe that the Coun-
cil's thinking is close to that of many members 
of this Assembly. We subscribed fully to the 
aim stressed in Mr. Tanghe's report of avoiding 
duplication of work between WEU and many 
other bodies, especially the Council of Europe, 
the North Atlantic Council and now the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group. 
With the emergence of these other bodies it 
is inevitable that the role originally envisaged 
for WEU has contracted somewhat. But the 
resources provided by member states have not 
contracted to match, and the staffing and struc-
ture of the various organisations have remained 
almost unchanged. That is why the Council 
has decided to take a fresh look at the tasks of 
the ministerial organs of WEU. The aim will 
be to achieve greater efficiency leading to 
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worthwhile savings. This is referred to in Mr. 
Page's report, and I am glad to have this oppor-
tunity to put the record straight. 
A working group has been set up charged 
with the task of listing the tasks carried out cur-
rently by WEU bodies, excluding the Assembly, 
and recommending steps to achieve economies 
and greater efficiency in the organisation's 
methods of work and use of staff. I stress that 
this mandate says nothing about rationalising 
the structure of the ministerial organs of 
WEU or about the Assembly, because neither is 
a current issue. 
Mr. Tanghe's report concludes that there is 
now a large question mark over the need for 
some of the controls for which Protocols Nos. 
Ill and IV make provision. He suggests that, if 
the modified Brussels Treaty is to be credible, 
WEU must be seen to have a continuing role. 
You may be interested to know that at our 
meeting on 3rd June in The Hague ministers 
instructed the permanent Council to prepare 
the ground so that in twelve months, when 
ministers meet again, we could have a serious 
and informed discussion leading, I hope, to 
decisions on what WEU should be aspiring to 
achieve for the remainder of its treaty's life. It 
is implicit in Mr. Tanghe's report - certainly it 
came through strongly in our own discussions 
at ministerial meetings - that the time has come 
for such a review. 
Mr. Tanghe's report also hints that such a 
review might result in more money being made 
available to the Assembly. I can make no pro-
mise on behalf of the Council about that, but 
the Council will pay very close attention to 
your debates on the Tanghe and Page reports 
and the draft recommendations which they 
propose. 
I turn briefly, as a British minister, to some 
general remarks about one aspect of defence 
policy with which all of us in this chamber are 
concerned. We live in democratic societies, 
and it is precisely because we do that our defence 
effort depends on our ability to convince our 
own people that the effort is needed. The 
Soviet Union has no such difficulty. The 
views of the Soviet people are irrelevant to 
their rulers, who can thus spend 13 % of their 
country's wealth each year on armaments with-
out worrying about disarmament petitions or 
campaigns. We, thank heaven, live in different 
societies, and we have to justify to our electors 
what we do. So it should come as no surprise 
that we are asked by our electors searching 
questions about our defence policies and the 
need for nuclear weapons. 
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It is natural enough that on any matter 
concerning nuclear weapons there should be 
honest though sometimes confused anxieties, 
which need a full, clear and forceful response. 
We need to explain once again the nature of 
the world in which we live and the threat that 
we face. 
In the Soviet Union we deal with a power 
that has been notably unsuccessful in achieving 
prosperity for its people or in constructing a 
political and social framework within which its 
people are content. Because of this, it is 
tempted constantly to use the military power in 
which it excels to counterbalance those econo-
mic and political weaknesses. We saw the 
Soviet Union yield to exactly that temptation in 
Afghanistan, and we see the temptation facing 
it again today in Poland. 
We in Western Europe have to live with the 
Soviet Union on peaceful terms. We can do so 
only if we ourselves retain and display the 
determination to be strong. If we do not show 
that determination, if we give the impression 
that we are being softened by the various disar-
mament campaigns, which have no effect on 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is less likely 
to feel the need to reach serious, balanced 
agreements with us. 
That means that we need credible deterrents 
and, whether we like it or not, that must include 
credible nuclear deterrents. We must have 
nuclear weapons with a high likelihood 
of reaching their targets, having modem war-
heads and with modem delivery systems. That 
is why we in the United Kingdom shall be 
replacing Polaris with Trident to ensure our 
contribution to the overall western deterrent for 
another generation and why we in Great Bri-
tain, together with many others here, are in 
favour of better nuclear force modernisation 
and why we attach importance to the Alliance 
as a whole fulfilling the 1979 NATO decision 
on that subject. 
Certainly nuclear weapons are not enough. 
Effective deterrence must convince the Soviet 
Union that it could not hope to gain by attack 
at any level, and we must maintain strong 
conventional forces. Many of us may have 
seen speculative stories in the press about poss-
ible changes in the scope and scale of the Bri-
tish defence effort. I welcome this opportunity 
to say something on that subject so far as I can, 
because my impression is that the media have 
allowed imagination to run pretty wild, with 
the danger that a good deal of quite unnecess-
ary anxiety has been caused, or might be 
caused, among our friends. 
First, let me say on this subject that we are 
not proposing to cut our published defence 
budget. On the contrary, our public expendi-
ture white paper makes absolutely clear that we 
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remain on a 3 % real rate of growth in defence 
spending, in line with the NATO aim. 
We expect to achieve 8 % real growth in 
three years since we took office in 1979, and 
that is a performance which, so far as I under-
stand it, in real growth terms is surpassed 
among our major NATO allies only by the 
United States. The following two years should 
see further increases of 3 % in each year in real 
terms. My colleague, John Nott, Secretary of 
State for Defence, has already denied press 
reports that the Royal Navy is to be reduced to 
little more than a coastal defence force. Nor is 
there any question, so far as the British Army 
of the Rhine is concerned, of our going back on 
our commitment under the Brussels Treaty. It 
is right that I should make that very clear 
before this Assembly. 
As I have explained, therefore, we intend to 
continue to honour the NATO commitment of 
increasing defence expenditure. The argument 
in Brussels is not about reduction: it is about 
how to spend the increase. What my colleague 
is concerned about is an exercise to build from 
the bottom up, as he described it, as a core pro-
gramme, providing a basic structure to which 
we should gear the equipment and manpower 
requirements of our armed forces for the next 
ten years and beyond. 
People may ask - and it is a question that 
may occur to members of this Assembly - why, 
if we have been able to increase our expendi-
ture, we have to reassess the way in which our 
forces fulfil their role. The answer is that even 
the increased expenditure in real terms is not 
enough to cover what is called technological 
inflation, that is, the upsurge in cost caused by 
the sheer complexity of modern defence sys-
tems. To take just one example, the Seacap 
missile, which was in production ten years ago, 
has now led on to the Sea Wolf missile, and in 
real terms that costs three and a half times as 
much as that other weapon, which was deemed 
perfectly adequate ten years ago. 
So to maintain future operational effective-
ness and enhance our frontline capability des-
pite rising costs we need to work out how tech-
nological and other changes can help us to 
conduct ourselves within the alliance. New 
ways must be found of coping with the inevi-
table pressures on our resources. This is not a 
problem only for Britain. It is one which pre-
sents difficult choices for all member states of 
WEU and, indeed, all members of the western 
Alliance. 
There is another fact that enforces the exami-
nation that we are now conducting. It is that 
the threat that confronts us is changing all the 
56 
FIRST SITTING 
time. The massive forces of the Warsaw Pact 
continue to grow remorselessly and are armed 
with increasingly sophisticated weapons. We 
know that the Soviet Union is now deploying 
an Oscar class submarine capable of attacking 
surface ships with missiles from a range of 250 
miles and we are all aware of the formidable air 
power provided by the new generation of Soviet 
aircraft, such as Foxbat and Backfire. For that 
reason also we have to take a new and search-
ing look at the way in which we ought to meet 
the evolving threats, whether on land, sea or in 
the air, and we must also - this is an important 
point - look at the problems and requirements 
that we may encounter in areas outside the 
boundaries of NATO. These, then, are the 
main reasons why we have felt it necessary to 
carry out a thorough examination of defence 
priorities, and I thought it might be sensible 
and useful to lay those reasons before this 
Assembly. 
What we are trying to do in Britain is to re-
establish in a long-term programme the right 
balance between our resources and our necess-
ary defence requirements. Our solutions must 
be reached, of course, within the context of the 
Alliance and our allies will be kept informed. 
Work is still in progress and final decisions 
have not yet been made, but my colleague, 
John Nott, intends to announce his plan before 
the summer holidays. 
Finally, I should like to stress, because it is 
crucial, the need to explain to our electorate 
the reasons for our defence effort. I have spo-
ken of the need for effective deterrence, and 
without that there would certainly be no sta-
bility in East-West relations; but we need to 
look at the problem more widely, because no 
sane person can be content with a situation in 
which the peace of Europe and the world is 
secured only by the piling up of arms at 
increasing cost. We all wish to see an end to 
the ruinous arms race so that these precious 
resources can be diverted to better use. That 
means that we should always be looking for 
areas of possible negotiation and agreement 
with the Soviet Union and its allies. 
The British Government are fully committed 
to the search for balanced verifiable arms 
control and disarmament agreements and we 
have played and will continue to play a leading 
part in this search. For example, we strongly 
support the NATO proposals for negotiations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
on theatre nuclear force arms control within the 
SALT framework. We were glad to associate 
ourselves last month with the endorsement by 
NATO ministers in Rome of the intention of 
the United States to begin such negotiations 
with the Soviet Union by the end of this year, 
and we welcome the news that preparatory dis-
cussions between these two governments - the 
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Soviet Union and the United States - have now 
begun. We would certainly be much further 
down this road if the Russians had not invaded 
Afghanistan. 
As a second example, we strongly support the 
proposal now being discussed in Madrid for a 
conference on disarmament in Europe. Every-
one knows that this proposal was originally 
made by the French Government and we have 
been glad to help it forward at different stages 
of its life. We believe that the agreements to 
be reached in the first stage of such a con-
ference will be devoted to the elaboration of 
confidence-building measures, which must be 
such as to make military dispositions on both 
sides more open. 
If such measures are to work, they must satisfy 
four basic criteria : they must be mandatory ; 
they must be verifiable ; they must be militarily 
significant ; and they must be applicable to the 
whole of Europe, including the European part 
of the Soviet Union. This is absolutely clear 
in the French proposals and is an essential part 
of them. The Russians have gone part of the 
way to meet these criteria, but we still have 
some way to go. We must be patient but we 
must also ensure that these criteria are included 
in the mandate for the conference on disarma-
ment in Europe and not left for discussion once 
that conference is convened. 
My last point is that I am sure that it is right 
to continue to look for other opportunities for 
nego~ation and agreement. Equally, though, 
we are absolutely convinced that such negotia-
tion will be successful only if the Soviet Union 
recognises on the western side a willingness to 
maintain at an adequate level our nuclear and 
conventional forces. 
Once the Soviet Union believes that we shall 
disarm or allow our armaments to become 
obsolete without any concessions on its side, it 
will no longer have any incentive to make such 
concessions. This is the crucial point which 
sometimes gets lost in the democratic argument 
with those who, naturally, abhor nuclear wea-
pons. 
If we fail to show determination to keep our 
armaments modern, the prospect for durable 
agreement with the Soviet Union is bleak 
indeed. I do not underestimate the political 
difficulties. We have had a taste of them in 
Britain and I know them well enough. They 
are, perhaps, even more intense in some other 
countries. We understand clearly the political 
difficulties involved in constantly showing 
determination to maintain and modernise our 
defensive armaments. But the prize is great, 
because if we can continue to show that deter-
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mination, it is possible - one cannot say more -
that, by patient negotiation, durable, balanced 
agreements on limiting and controlling the arms 
race will come within our reach. (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - I am sure that I speak 
for all distinguished representatives when I 
express our warm appreciation to Mr. Hurd 
both for his excellent account of the work of 
the Council over the last year and his very good 
intentions, which I have no doubt that he will 
do his best to fulfil after the direction that the 
Council will follow under the presidency of the 
United Kingdom in the twelve months to 
come. I am sure also that representatives will 
have been very interested to hear from a United 
Kingdom minister an account of the United 
Kingdom Government's thinking on current 
questions. 
Mr. Hurd has kindly undertaken to answer 
questions. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- To some 
extent, Mr. Hurd has answered the two ques-
tions which I had proposed to ask. 
The PRESIDENT. - I hope that members 
will not ask questions if they have already been 
answered. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- Then may 
I say that Mr. Hurd has answered half of one of 
the two questions and I should like to ask one 
and a half questions. 
The Minister properly said that he would 
draw to the attention of the Council .the desira-
bility of ministerial involvement in the meet-
ings with the Assembly and the Committee. 
Will he suggest to his colleagues not only that 
they should attend but that they should at all 
times be as forthcoming as possible in respond-
ing to questions? Presence alone would not 
entirely suffice. 
Mr. Hurd- may recall the serious question 
about Poland which I asked in The Hague. He 
will agree that, although we were delighted that 
two of the seven countries were represented by 
ministers, the answers were not as acceptable as 
some of us might wish. 
I should like to ask Mr. Hurd a more serious 
question. He referred to the disarmament 
campaigns which are noticeable in some of our 
countries but are not noticeable, as he properly 
said, in the Soviet Union. Would he not agree 
that this might be inevitable in a free and 
increasingly questioning society and that, given 
this inevitability, given the existence of these 
disarmament movements, it is essential for us 
and all other western governments to demons-
trate, both severally and jointly, our clear com-
mitment to international peace and our willing-
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ness to disarm on a multilateral basis, and that 
this commitment needs to be clearly demons-
trated, for otherwise the nature of our society 
will mean that these campaigns will thrive and 
perhaps too many slogans will be offered and 
too many serious questions ducked? 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Hurd. 
Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). - I can only stress again that I under-
stand the feeling in the Assembly in favour of 
stronger ministerial participation in the meet-
ings. I shall do my best to convey that feeling 
to other ministers, together with my own 
impression that the meetings which I attended 
were of substantial interest and importance. 
I agree with Mr. Hardy that it is necessary for 
all of us to explain over and over again that we 
are not just piling on armaments for their own 
sake but that we are engaged in the search for 
multilateral disarmament. I tried to give two 
examples. I wonder how many of Mr. Hardy's 
constituents or mine could pass even the 
easiest examination on either the French propo-
sal for a European disarmament conference or 
the proposals of the alliance for TNF arms 
control discussions. These are difficult techni-
cal points, but as democratic politicians we 
have an obligation to put them across at the 
same time as, in my case, we are defending the 
decision to accept cruise missiles in the United 
Kingdom or modernise our own British deter-
rent: it is the dual power. 
If we are to succeed in the democratic task, 
we have to stress both. We are looking for 
multilateral agreements, which will not be 
achieved by circulating petitions or forming 
committees. They will be achieved by hard, 
tough, ' slow bargaining among governments. 
That is one side. The other side is that we 
shall succeed in these tough, slow negotiations 
only if the Soviet Union perceives on our side a 
determination to remain strong if the negotia-
tions are not successful. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Minis-
ter. 
I call Mr. Tanghe. 
Mr. TANGHE (Belgium). - The Chairman-
in-Office of the Council said that there was no 
question of Britain going back on its BAOR 
Brussels Treaty commitments. Can he confirm 
that the United Kingdom has no intention in 
the foreseeable future of requesting the Council 
to authorise a reduction in the present agreed 
level of 55,000 men? 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Hurd. 
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Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). - Mr. Tanghe pursues this question 
relentlessly from meeting to meeting. I have 
no objection to that, because it is highly impor-
tant. It is absolutely implicit in what I said -
and I took care to check that my remarks were 
wholly valid at the time that I answered his 
question in The Hague and again when I 
answer it today - that it is our intention to 
maintain our obligations under the treaty. It is 
therefore clear that we would not come to any 
part of this organisation to ask to be relieved of 
those obligations. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- The 
Minister of State referred to the alarming 
increase in the capabilities of Soviet sea and air 
power and, in particular, to the Oscar class sub-
marines and Backfire and Foxbat aircraft - to 
which I add Fencers and Fitters. This Assem-
bly has always had a great concern in the wider 
world outside Western Europe and in this part-
session we are discussing, for example, Euro-
pean security and events in the Gulf area, as in 
recent part-sessions we have discussed Afghan-
istan. 
The Minister will have seen an admirable 
article in " The Times " by Admiral Stansfield 
Turner, former Commander-in-Chief Allied 
Forces Southern Europe and former Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency. Can Mr. 
Hurd reassure the Assembly that the Council 
will provide impetus towards securing a realisa-
tion within Western European Union of the 
growing threats to our joint security from 
events in the wider world? He mentioned this 
en passant; and in a recent tour of the Arabian 
Gulf the British Prime Minister has given poli-
tical expression to her commitment to support-
ing the line on these matters adopted by the 
President of the United States. Will the Coun-
cil of this organisation also give backing to 
what I regard as the valuable initiatives by the 
President of the United States? 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you. I hope 
that when asking questions members will come 
quickly to the point and that we shall not have 
such long prefaces. I am sure that Mr. Wilkin-
son will realise that the Speaker of the House of 
Commons would have called him to order some 
time ago. 
I call Mr. Hurd. 
Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). - I cannot speak for the Council off the 
cuff, but members of the Council will note the 
points that Mr. Wilkinson has made. Speaking 
for the British Government, we accept that 
much of the threat - to some extent, the most 
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difficult part of the threat to counter - falls out-
side the NATO area. We agree that a great 
deal of thought must be given, including 
thought in concert with the United States, to 
the best political and military means - the two 
cannot be divorced - effectively of countering 
this threat without antagonising the govern-
ments and peoples who live in the countries 
concerned. This is not an easy problem to 
solve or an easy puzzle to which we can find 
the answer. As Mr. Wilkinson indicated, a 
good deal of discussion and thought has been 
given to this matter, and I agree with the 
emphasis that he put on finding the right 
answer. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mrs. Knight. 
Mrs. KNIGHT (United Kingdom).- I should 
like to return for a moment to what the Minis-
ter of State said about the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, which I believe is lar-
gely composed of sincere and genuine people. 
However, there is a tiny minority of manipu-
lators preying upon the fears and concerns of 
the majority and endeavouring to bring pres-
sures to bear on member governments to adopt 
disarmament policies unilaterally. 
Such manipulators are greatly helped if there 
is not sufficient information about why there 
cannot be an easing of effort. Can the Minister 
say whether it is possible to embark upon a fir-
mer and clearer public relations policy, as this 
is a question of winning the hearts and minds of 
the people? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Hurd. 
Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). - I entirely agree with that. It is a ques-
tion that we perhaps need to consider further -
whether the effort to which Mrs. Knight refer-
red is best conducted purely on a national basis, 
because the political ingredients vary from 
country to country, or whether there is perhaps 
scope within NATO to consider a joint effort 
on persuasion. Britain is well aware of the 
problem. 
It is a mistake to dismiss all such protest 
questions as if they were inspired by the far 
left. That is not the position, as Mrs. Knight 
pointed out. We must deal patiently and force-
fully with the various arguments. It is a 
terrific task which should engage members of 
our political profession perhaps more tho-
roughly than it does. I very much welcome 
Mrs. Knight's encouragement in that direction. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Spenale. 
Mr. SPENALE (France) (Translation). - Does 
the argument - which I believe is the main 
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conclusion of your report - that we must arm 
ourselves more in order to be able to preach the 
gospel of disarmament effectively, although it 
may be fairly easy to understand among our-
selves, seem to you really convincing, firstly for 
the other side and secondly for outsiders - espe-
cially the third world - who see us pouring into 
defence a far greater volume of resources than 
we are devoting to re-establishing international 
justice and developing the third world? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Hurd. 
Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). - I think that the Soviet Union perfectly 
understands the situation and in my view per-
fectly understands the position adopted by the 
new United States Administration. We intend 
to strengthen the forces in the United States, 
but we are willing ..to negotiate arms control 
agreements. That was the stand taken by Pre-
sident Nixon in the past, and in a way it is a 
stand with which the Soviet Union is well at 
home. 
Of course, the Soviets hope for an easier 
answer and hope that we shall become so 
frightened and softened by campaigns in our 
own countries that we shall lose the determina-
tion to strengthen ourselves so that the question 
of concessions by the Soviet Union will not 
arise. I think the Soviet Union will perfectly 
well understand the position adopted by the 
governments of the Alliance at the present, 
because it is a hard-headed, rational line with 
which it would feel at home. 
Mr. Spenale may be right in indicating that 
we have a problem in relation to the third 
world. The arguments that we use must be the 
same as those that we address to our own elec-
torate. It is not simply a matter of dismantling 
our armaments in order to give more aid to the 
third world. In fact, the future peace of the 
world largely hangs on the willingness and abi-
lity of the West to maintain its strength, because 
without that other countries in the third world, 
besides Afghanistan, would understand at first 
hand the full impact of Soviet policy 
and strength. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Lord Duncan-
Sandys. 
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (United King-
dom). - Having regard to the fact that the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany is one of the main 
pillars of NATO and enjoys the total confi-
dence of her allies, is it not quite idiotic and 
highly insulting to continue indefinitely to 
maintain special limitations on her armaments 
under the Brussels Treaty? Will the Minister 
arrange for the Council to consider this matter 
seriously without further delay? 
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Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). - Lord Duncan-Sandys is right in saying 
that the Federal Republic of Germany is one of 
the strong pillars of the Alliance. I am sure 
that everyone in this Assembly appreciates 
that. As I mentioned in the report, we have 
asked the Council to examine the future activi-
ties of WEU over the remaining twenty-three 
years of the life of the treaty. We have done so 
within the framework of the treaty - that is, we 
are not asking it to examine changes in the 
treaty, logical though such changes may appear 
to be at first sight. I am sure that the reason is 
known by the government of the Federal 
Republic. If we begin to reopen the treaty in 
order to change one element, we shall rapidly 
come under pressure to change other ele-
ments. Mr. Tanghe has already reminded us 
of one element that is of particular importance 
to my country. Frankly, we are not keen on a 
renegotiation of the Brussels Treaty. We fear 
that, if one were to embark upon an operation 
of unpicking the treaty, the consequences would 
be different from the original intentions. 
I believe that the historical basis of the treaty 
and the balance within it are widely understood 
in the Federal Republic. I believe it is also 
understood that the rest of us know the extent 
of the German contribution to the Alliance. 
That is fully understood and applauded. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you. I call Dr. 
Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - The 
Minister of State lays a great deal of emphasis 
in his report on the fact that, if we do not sup-
port the continuation of a build-up in nuclear 
arms, it would produce no effect either on the 
Soviet leaders or on their people. How can he 
be so sure? Have we not reached the stage 
where the enormous escalating cost of more 
modem nuclear arms ought to make us think 
that we can take the chance and perhaps adopt 
an attitude that we are willing to relax this dan-
gerous build-up? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Hurd. 
Mr. HURD (Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United King-
dom). -But we are giving that indication to the 
Soviet Union day by day. We are willing to 
relax this expensive build-up as they are willing 
to relax, but not before them or without them. 
That is the message we send day by day to 
the Soviet Union. I believe that it is the only 
message that will get a clear response. 
Thirty or forty years ago it would have been 
understandable for people to argue that by its 
instincts and policies the Soviet Union was a 
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peace-loving, progressive country. It was 
wrong then, but at least it was possible to argue 
that. I do not honestly see how anyone who 
has studied the Soviet Union's actions since the 
end of the second world war can with any res-
ponsibility hold out the prospect that if we star-
ted to weaken our defences, the Soviet Union 
out of some sense of world citizenship will 
begin to do the same. It seems that all the evi-
dence accumulated over the years is in the 
opposite direction. 
Therefore, it must be right patiently - even 
though it is difficult politically - to continue to 
put across the message to the Soviet Union, the 
third world and our own people. We seek 
these agreements, first to put a ceiling on these 
arms and, secondly, gradually to reduce the 
arms race. But, on the basis of history and 
experience, we are absolutely sure that the only 
way of achieving that agreement is by showing 
a certain minimum determination on our own 
side. Without that evident determination, the 
chances of agreement are bleak. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Minister. Does any other member of the 
Assembly wish to ask the Minister a question? 
If not, I am sure that I speak for all of us 
when I again thank Mr. Hurd for his address, 
and particularly for the excellent and forthright 
manner with which he dealt with the ques-
tions. We are very much in your debt, Mr. 
Hurd. 
10. Political activities of the Council- reply to 
the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
General Affairs Committee and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Doe. 880) 
The PRESIDENT. - We come now to the 
next Order of the Day which is the political 
activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-
sixth annual report of the Council. Mr. Page 
will present the report and there will be a debate 
on the report of the General Affairs Committee 
and vote on the draft recommendation, Docu-
ment 880. 
I call Mr. Page, Rapporteur of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
Mr. PAGE (United Kingdom). - It is an 
honour for rile to be able, for the second time 
running, to present the draft report of the 
General Affairs Committee. It is really the 
Assembly's reply on the Council's political acti-
vities contained in its twenty-sixth annual 
report. 
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We have had two distinguished speeches this 
afternoon - from you, Mr. President, and from 
the Chairman-in-Office. I am afraid that my 
contribution is the suet pudding after the smoked 
salmon and fillet steak that the Assembly 
have already consumed. 
Last year was a cheerful occasion for the pre-
sentation of the report. It was the silver jubi-
lee for Western European Union, and a halfway 
house in its career. This year seems to be 
more like the morning after the night before. 
We are meeting in a thoroughly destabilised 
world. As the minister said in his speech, we 
are the only European parliamentary institution 
which is wholly committed to the discussion of 
defence questions. We are conscious of dete-
riorating world security. I cannot remember a 
time when there were more highly sensitive 
areas of tension around the world. These are 
in Europe, with Poland, in Afghanistan, in the 
Middle East, in Africa and in the Far East. 
These all have their particular effects on the 
defence attitudes of our member countries. 
We in the Assembly are deeply conscious of 
our responsibility. That is why the draft 
recommendations seem to demand, with more 
insistence than usual, closer and more regular 
contact with the Council of Ministers and with 
individual ministers. The Assembly is deter-
mined to see that the work done by its 
Committees is more effective in its impact on 
the Council and on member parliaments. I 
believe that the Chairman-in-Office, who is 
well known in the United Kingdom for his 
willingness to listen to the views of British par-
liamentarians, will persuade his colleagues on 
the Council enthusiastically to seek to improve 
the dialogue between the Assembly and its 
Committees and the Council of Ministers. We 
should also like an improvement in the speed 
with which our reports and questions are dealt 
with. 
On the fifth and sixth pages of our report, it 
can be seen that it can sometimes take up to 
two years from the time when an Assembly 
Committee considers a matter for it to be 
informed of the collective view of member 
governments. I was also grateful to the Minis-
ter this afternoon for mentioning the late hour 
at which the twenty-sixth annual report was 
received. It was received not at the eleventh 
hour but rather at a quarter to twelve, which 
made life difficult for the Committee of which I 
was Rapporteur. 
As a personal view directed at you, Mr. Pre-
sident, may I ask whether you could devise a 
way of ensuring that matters that are considered 
by this Assembly to be urgent could be dis-
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cussed and dealt with more expeditiously with 
the Council of Ministers? 
Of course, it is an impossibly difficult task to 
expect to achieve a result at the drop of a hat, 
given that so many ministers and governments 
are involved. However, if on urgent matters 
we could find a new procedure, that would be 
greatly valued by members of the Assembly. 
I also feel that it is time that we parliamenta-
rians accepted perhaps a greater willingness to 
play our part in advertising the activities of 
Western European Union. 
There is another report due to be discussed 
on Wednesday, the Rapporteur of which is Mrs. 
Knight. It discusses how the means of project-
ing our views can be improved. This deserves 
careful consideration. We have only a very 
small, albeit a very active, press and public 
relations section. However, as members of 
parliament we ourselves have platforms locally, 
nationally and internationally where we could 
make a greater effort ourselves to put across 
the ideas and views of the Assembly. 
I do not want this speech, Mr. Chairman-in-
Office, merely to be a catalogue of grouses. 
However, we in the Assembly long to know 
more about the activities of the other organs 
which are associated with Western European 
Union. I listened with great care to your 
speech, and I was a little disappointed by your 
comments about the Independent European 
Programme Group. Of course, I appreciate the 
confidentiality of the matters discussed and the 
point which you made about there not even 
being a statement issued after its meetings. I 
realise that I am giving you a great deal of extra 
work to do, but I wonder whether it might not 
be possible for you or your bureau in some 
confidential way to receive progress reports 
periodically of the IEPG. 
It was agreed in the Presidential Committee 
recently that this report of the General Affairs 
Committee could shine a torch on how Parts V 
and VI of the Council's report dealing with 
public administration and budgetary affairs 
affected the union politically. It is no secret in 
this connection that rumours have been cir-
culating that the Council was looking at the 
structure of the union with a surgeon's knife in 
its hand, if not an axe. 
All of us are conscious of the need for eco-
nomy expressed in our parliaments and by our 
governments, and we shall not shy away from 
accepting our fair share of any economies 
which have to be made. Therefore, we shall 
be studying with a magnifying glass your 
remarks today on this subject, Mr. Chairman-
in-Office. If I heard you aright, the terms of 
reference of the working group which has been 
set up to study the economies and the structure 
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do not include the Assembly. But we are 
grateful for that, because we want to ensure that 
the future opportunities and freedom for action 
of the Assembly are not compromised. 
After your speech today, on behalf of the 
Council of Ministers, it is hardly necessary to 
say that this is only a tiny international organi-
sation with a staff of only 150, whereas the 
EEC has 18,000, NATO about 2,000 and 
OECD about 2,500. I hope that the Chair-
man-in-Office will retain his well-known sense 
of proportion in guiding his colleagues in this 
respect. 
I feel conscious that my speech and the 
report which I am presenting on behalf of the 
Committee as a whole is rather pedestrian and 
ordinary, perhaps leaning too much on internal 
structures rather than being sufficiently a poli-
tical commentary. I accept that criticism, but 
I feel that there are not many occasions when it 
is possible for the Assembly to be introspective, 
and introspection does no harm if it is not car-
ried to excess. 
I remind you, Sir, that we are essentially a 
highly developed political assembly with sensi-
tive antennae and, what is important and valu-
able to the Council of Ministers, widely-based 
sources of information and intelligence centred 
round the world where our members travel and 
have had parliamentary and political contacts 
for many years as individuals. 
The governments of all our countries remain 
committed to the wide concept of deterrence. 
I believe sincerely that there is no body better 
qualified to make well formed political judg-
ments on defence matters than this Assembly. 
The basic philosophy behind the draft recom-
mendation is to try to find ways in which the 
political views and the actions of the Assembly 
can be made known more effectively, more 
speedily and with greater impact on an inter-
national and European political stage. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Page. 
Just in case there is any misunderstanding 
about the figures which you quoted, I ought 
perhaps to make it clear that the staff of the 
Assembly is only 27 of the 180. Under the 
rules, I have budgetary responsibility only for 
those 27. Ifl had greater budgetary responsibi-
lity, it may be that the number would be fewer, 
but that is another matter. 
We proceed to the debate. 
The first speaker is Mr. Urwin. 
Mr. URWIN (United Kingdom).- As a mem-
ber of the opposition party in the British House 
of Commons, I want unstintingly and unhesita-
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tingly to congratulate the Minister on his pre-
sentation and on the excellent manner in which 
he answered questions. I also extend to him a 
very warm welcome in his new office of Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council of Ministers and, 
although I accept entirely what he said about 
good intentions, I hope sincerely that they will 
become practicality. 
The Rapporteur, Mr. Page, continuing the 
mission which he accepted last year for this 
similar report, has presented us with a much 
stronger report than that which we dealt with in 
1980. 
Mr. Page stressed that the dialogue between 
the Council and the Assembly had improved 
over the last year. I shall try to avoid to as 
great an extent as possible some of the criti-
cisms which Mr. Page expressed in his oral pre-
sentation, but I believe that there has been very 
little improvement in relations between the 
Council and the Assembly over the last twelve 
months. There are continuing complaints 
which have arisen not just over one year but 
throughout the period of my service as a mem-
ber of the parliamentary Assembly of Western 
European Union. I have been one of the fore-
most critics of the lack of liaison between the 
Council and ourselves as parliamentarians. 
It is true that in our files today we have 
information about two organisations which has 
been very scarce in the past. Mr. Page was 
correct to refer to our justifiable aspirations 
about exacting more information about SAC 
and IEPG. I do not think it is good enough to 
see on the answer we have here to Recommen-
dation 362 that one of the handicaps with 
which the Minister is faced is the fact that not 
all the member states of the IEPG are members 
of WEU. I am sure some way could be found 
round that relatively small difficulty, as I see it. 
I am also concerned about the forfeiture of 
certain functions from Western European 
Union and the apparent willingness of many 
people increasingly to recognise the EEC as 
having a defence role. This is personally unac-
ceptable to me ; and I say for the umpteenth 
time that the European Parliament simply has 
no place so far as the policies of Western Euro-
pean Union on defence are concerned. 
The Minister has, in common with represen-
tatives of many other goverments, said this 
afternoon - and I am pleased to hear him reite-
rate it - that the British Government fully 
support Western European Union and all that 
it stands for ; and the Minister will recall the 
words I used in The Hague two weeks ago. 
This is the only parliamentary forum with 
defence responsibility. 
I come now into contact with the Council. 
You said in your opening remarks, Mr. Pre-
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sident, that the success of Western European 
Union depends on the contributions of its 
members. I was not sure whether you meant 
contributions of the member states or the 
.contributions of the parliamentarians. I am 
sure what you said is equally apposite to 
both. I turn to The Hague meeting with the 
ministers. 
We have this contact with the ministers only 
once a year. Reference has already been made 
in the course of questions to ministers to the 
fact that only two ministers were present on 
that occasion. Mr. Hardy has referred to the 
unsatisfactory nature of some of the answers to 
questions posed; and I confess that I was deli-
berately provocative with my questions in rela-
tion to the Middle East, provocative in the 
sense that I was hoping for a reply from a 
ministerial representative of another govern-
ment rather than the Dutch or British Govern-
ments, from other member states of WEU. I 
confess that afterwards when I realised that I 
was not getting a response from a minister of 
another country, I then discovered that there 
were only two ministers present. 
With every respect to the supporting team 
that ministers must inevitably have, and paying 
full respect and regard to their own individual 
ability, I feel that on this one occasion of the 
year member states should be represented at 
that dialogue by ministers directly representing 
their own governments and therefore with res-
ponsibility in turn to the parliaments that they 
represent. I have said that governments gene-
rally reiterate their belief not only in the vali-
dity but the importance of WEU. On that 
occasion we were asking questions about the 
approach of ministers to Poland, the Middle 
East, the Persian Gulf and the invasion of 
Aghanistan; and, frankly, the replies left a good 
deal to be desired. It is understandable that 
someone who is not a minister but nevertheless 
is representing his government would have 
some diffidence about rising to answer ques-
tions posed by parliamentarians. In turn, we 
have to pay more attention to relationships 
with the media. My understanding is that Mr. 
Borcier is employed by the Assembly and 
certainly does a very good job, but the Council 
of Ministers themselves have no publicity 
media or publicity organisation. Bearing in 
mind the fact that from time to time there must 
occasionally be a need to publicise activities, 
they should begin to pay more attention to that 
aspect. 
In conclusion, when we talk of the future of 
WEU and its future work programme I hope 
that the importance of WEU in relation to this 
proposal for a working group will not be in any 
way diminished. Bearing in mind what you 
63 
FIRST SITTING 
have said, Mr. President, of the importance of 
member states being contributory factors to the 
success of WEU, I would say to many of my 
parliamentary colleagues, and not only those 
present, that we have a very important role to 
play in the fulfilment of our responsibilities as 
members of WEU. All too often we arrive at 
committees and have to kick our heels for a 
long time before we can determine whether we 
have a quorum which will enable us to conti-
nue our business in a statutory manner. 
An important responsibility devolves upon 
all of us. I can tell the Assembly that the Bri-
tish Labour Delegation at least is elected by 
franchise of the parliamentary Labour Party 
and in that context perhaps there is a more per-
cipient willingness on the part of some mem-
bers to come more regularly than they used to 
do under the patronage system. So let us all 
rally round WEU and ensure that it continues 
to be the success that it has been in the past. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
U rwin. I am sure members will take your 
message to heart. I am only sorry that so few 
are present to hear it. Perhaps they will read it 
in the report tomorrow. 
The next speaker is Mr. Hanin, to be 
followed by Mr. Osborn of the United 
Kingdom. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have read 
with close attention the remarkable report pre-
pared by Mr. Page, who, I think, has given a 
good summary of the present situation. This 
examination gives us a unique opportunity of 
looking into the effectiveness of our work and 
also, therefore, into the nature of our relations 
with the Council of Ministers. 
I do not wish to suggest, however, that the 
conclusion we arrive at should be negative, but 
I do say that at present I am not fully satisfied 
on either of these two points. I think that we 
could be more effective and that our relations 
with the Council could be better organised. 
On the latter point, first of all with regard to 
the slowness in answering our questions, when I 
hear Mr. Page say that some of the questions 
put by the Assembly are answered only after as 
long as two years, I maintain that it is not 
consistent with the dignity of our Assembly for 
it to accept such a delay, and that it should 
protest when this happens. Because if the 
Assembly does not protest, the Council may 
feel that it can let it wait. 
I am not entirely satisfied, either, with the 
nature of the debates and the way in which they 
are conducted, but I should like to say that this 
remark does not apply at all to today's debate 
nor to the way in which Mr. Hurd has behaved 
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towards our Assembly, since his behaviour 
seems to me, on the contrary, exemplary. 
There have been occasions when ministers have 
spoken and then left without waiting to hear 
what we had to say, whereas the statement 
made to us this afternoon, the precise answers 
given to the questions asked and the fact that 
Mr. Hurd is still present after this item of the 
Orders of the Day has been dealt with is, to my 
mind, a perfect example of how things ought to 
be. 
Moreover, I maintain that, if we want to 
improve our relations with the Council of 
Ministers, the responsibility for this lies first of 
all with our Assembly. I consider that it ought 
to prepare itself better for encounters and deba-
tes of this kind. I, personally, find it very diffi-
cult to join in a debate such as today's - other 
members doubtless have quicker and more agile 
minds than I have - when I do not know what 
the Minister is going to say, but even harder 
when I do not even know exactly what he is 
going to talk about. 
Now this is not his, but our, responsibility 
and I consider that when a representative of the 
Council of Ministers is going to address us, it is 
up to the Assembly to look back over the 
various resolutions it has adopted, to ask what 
action has been taken on these resolutions and 
to see what is satisfactory and what is not. 
I am very glad to hear that, on a number of 
questions, the Council of Ministers shares our 
opinion, but this still does not convince me of 
our usefulness. What would convince me of 
my usefulness would be if a person I was speak-
ing to, who originally held an opinion differing 
from my own, agreed to change it because of 
my having spoken to him. 
It is my wish, therefore, Mr. President, that 
our Assembly should devote a little less time to 
preparing reports and a little more to thinking 
about what action has been taken on the 
reports which it has drawn up and the resolu-
tions which it has adopted, and should inform 
the Council that on this or that important point 
it has not obtained the desired results and that 
it would therefore ask the representative of the 
Council of Ministers to give an explanation. 
That is what I am interested in. I want to 
know why the Council of Ministers' opinion 
differs from ours. I want to know why, when 
we have expressed an opinion, it has felt that it 
cannot agree with us, although it may be right 
in not agreeing. I want to be able to talk it 
over with the Council. I think, incidentally, 
that when we become capable of doing this, we 
shall have much less need to worry about how 
the press reports our debates. 
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I have some experience of political life and I 
am well aware that the press takes an interest in 
our discussions when there is a real argument, 
when something happens at a meeting, when 
there is a divergence between the government 
and the parliamentarians, so that one wonders 
who will come out on top. 
Admittedly we only have an advisory func-
tion here, whereas in our national assemblies 
we can question ministers and ask them how 
the government has pursued its policy and the 
reasons why it has adopted this or that atti-
tude. And we are then entitled, in these natio-
nal parliaments, to table motions of confidence 
or no confidence. 
We should therefore radically rethink the 
organisation of our work, our way of conduct-
ing our debates, our relations with the Council 
of Ministers, and this rethinking should ultima-
tely lead to a genuine dialogue covering points 
of both agreement and disagreement. If it will 
act in this way, WEU will have all the influence 
it wants, which depends as much on the deter-
mination of its members as on the terms of the 
treaties. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr.·Hanin. 
I call Mr. Osborn. 
Mr. OSBORN (United Kingdom).- I should 
like to speak to Mr. Page's excellent report and 
his presentation roughly on the theme of how 
WEU can be made to work better, which has 
been the theme of the last three speeches. 
I welcome the fact that my colleague Douglas 
Hurd is present. He referred to the future of 
WEU during the lifetime of the Brussels Treaty 
as well as the work of the Council of Ministers. 
I should like to know more about that work, 
and perhaps I should like to participate in it, 
but how to do it is another matter. We have 
dealt with the relationship of the work of the 
Council of Ministers to this Assembly. I could 
refer to many of Mr. Hurd's comments, but 
particularly I welcome the disarmament initia-
tive arising from Madrid and the conditions 
which are relevant to WEU. I was not in The 
Hague. I know that Mr. Hurd, like me, is a 
firm believer in European co-operation in all 
fields. I reiterate our appreciation of his atten-
dance at this debate. 
The debate is about the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council. Mr. Page, alluding to 
the importance of the role of WEU, refers to it 
as a guarantor of the future shape of Europe in 
foreign policy and defence. He goes on to refer 
to the role of the Assembly and the way in 
which the Council intends to fulfil its role, and 
he suggests that the work of the Council is out 
of step with the work of the Assembly. 
Plainly, this raises how to put into practice the 
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Brussels Treaty, the role of this Assembly and 
the role of the Council. 
How can European countries co-ordinate 
their interests and role in defence, that is, cur-
tailment of the arms race with the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact countries, on the one 
hand, and the need to maintain a proper level 
of European defence and rearmament to match 
what is happening in the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact countries, on the other? 
Obviously, there is a special relationship among 
members of the NATO Alliance and NATO 
ministers. Also, the EEC is concerned with 
this matter and with procurement. Mr. van 
Hassel has made a report on this issue which is 
still to be considered by ministers and the 
Assembly. 
In my view, European countries should have 
common policies on foreign affairs, defence and 
defence procurement. However, the arrange-
ments for this may appear to conflict. First, 
NATO is now beginning to take an interest in 
the Gulf. Secondly, WEU - and this is refer-
red to in Chapter Ill of the report - is 
concerned with the work of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and why it came into 
being. Thirdly, the EEC has a desire for 
procurement and the harnessing of industries to 
defence needs. The European Democrats and 
Christian Democrats have shown increasing 
agreement on armaments and foreign policy 
among members of the EEC. This involves 
careful dovetailing and co-ordination of the 
work ofWEU. 
There has been concern about relations bet-
ween the Council of Ministers - that is, minis-
ters of governments who are represented in 
WEU- and this Assembly. However, there is 
equal concern in the Council of Europe and, as 
a former member of the European Parliament, I 
believe that it is a concern of the European 
Economic Community. 
This morning Mr. Page and Mr. Hanin and 
the Christian Democrat Group discussed the 
twenty-sixth annual report. I intervened to 
express the view that this was no new problem 
and that it existed eight years ago when I first 
attended meetings of this Assembly. My view 
is that, among member governments, foreign 
ministers and defence ministers know the 
importance of the international approach, parti-
cularly of WEU - and by " ministers " I 
mean those who hold responsibility for these 
matters, whether inside or outside national par-
liaments. This is a function of the role of our 
respective parliaments. 
Last week Mr. Hanin chaired a meeting of 
the Council of Europe's fifth Parliamentary and 
Scientific Conference. Mr. Hurd may have lis-
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tened to a programme on the BBC last night 
called " No, minister". I did not because I 
was travelling here. It questioned whether 
ministers or civil servants ran our respective 
governments. The theme was " Who runs 
Great Britain?". 
You, Mr. President, as a former minister, 
could better answer the question, but you might 
rightly feel constrained from doing so. 
At the Helsinki Conference I implied that in 
matters of international co-operation perma-
nent officials like to have control of research 
and development of science and technology. 
In the EEC, let alone the Council of Europe 
and WEU, international budgets are more 
easily cut than national budgets. That is 
because permanent officials like to keep activi-
ties that are within their responsibility under 
their control. If that is true of the subject that 
we are discussing, it is true also to a certain 
extent of the European Space Agency and 
Eurocontrol, which our Committee on Scienti-
fic, Technological and Aerospace Questions has 
examined. 
In foreign affairs and defence I have always 
believed that defence chiefs and diplomats in 
. our respective countries have taken a reason-
ably outward-looking attitude to this inter-
national approach. However, there are other 
ministries in government. You expressed the 
view, Mr. President, that defence was the 
concern of national governments and national 
parliaments. That is a paraphrase of what you 
said. But in each national government there 
are other ministries and departments, such as 
education and social services - which I admit 
are more the concern of the Council of Europe 
- energy, industry and science and technology, 
which are the concern of this Assembly. From 
time to time I have found - I encountered this 
for the first time eight years ago - ministers and 
their permanent officials in these departments 
to be unaware of the role of the Council of 
Europe and of Western European Union unless 
those ministers have been delegates to those 
bodies. 
I therefore suggest to Mr. Hurd, particularly 
since he has an important role in the next six 
months or so, that in this age of superconti-
nents and of industrial and technological 
importance, European countries must work 
together. Europe has imposed limitations 
upon itself. We are composed of divergent 
communities, different sovereign states and 
different cultures and languages. Each country 
wishes to preserve its individual sovereignty. 
The key link in defence must be through 
Western European Union. The international 
approach must be all-important. 
I suggest, therefore, that it is urgent that the 
members of this Assembly accept two challen-
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ges. The first is of close collaboration with our 
colleagues in the European Parliament. That 
has acquired importance as a result of the von 
Hassel approach and the work that is being 
done there. The second is close collaboration 
with the defence committees in our national 
parliaments to ensure that members of those 
committees are aware of what we are doing. 
I hope that Mr. Hurd will discuss with Lord 
Carrington and the other ministers how best 
ministers and members of Western European 
Union can work together to achieve a co-
ordinated defence policy within Europe. I go 
further than Mr. Page's recommendation 
requiring ministerial presence. I reinforce 
what he said. We in the Assembly want to 
know more of what the Council of Ministers is 
doing. We seek a way of working more closely 
with it. I shall be grateful if Mr. Hurd, during 
his period of office, will discuss this matter fully 
with his fellow ministers. If you and the 
Council will do the same, Mr. President, we 
can have a closer co-ordination in this subject 
and use Western European Union as a basis for 
it. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Osborn. 
I call Mr. Cavaliere. 
Mr. CA V ALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I should like to say a few words in 
full support of Mr. Page's report. 
This afternoon we heard the President say 
again that ours is a very important Assembly 
and the only Assembly entitled to discuss 
defence matters and to make suggestions. We 
welcome these statements, these fair words, but 
we are obliged to note somewhat bitterly that 
the behaviour of the Council does not live up 
to them in practice. While it is true that rela-
tions between the Assembly and the Council 
have recently improved considerably, and that 
the Council has paid more attention to our 
recommendations and has by and large shown 
us greater consideration, it is equally true that 
relations are still not yet wholly satisfactory to 
the Assembly and do not guarantee that it can 
work to better effect and in closer accord with 
its responsibilities and importance. 
There has already been a ban affecting pro-
ceedings at the recent meeting of the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
the General Affairs Committee with the Coun-
cil of Ministers at The Hague. In my modest 
capacity as Chairman of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments I feel 
obliged to endorse the harsh remarks which 
were made because, truth to tell, we were not 
completely satisfied. There were deficiencies 
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which I trust will not be repeated in future. If 
the work of our Assembly is specialised and is 
bound to increase and become even more 
demanding in view of what the Minister 
stressed earlier, namely that NATO is now 
thinking more and more urgently of having to 
take action outside the sphere of the Atlantic 
Treaty, it is equally true that this will call for 
ever closer collaboration between the Assembly 
and the Council of Ministers for the support 
which these European countries will have to 
give any recommendations and decisions 
adopted by NATO and the North Atlantic 
Treaty countries to meet any European defence 
requirements which may arise if the individual 
members of NATO have to intervene in areas 
outside the NATO sphere of competence. 
One last word, Mr. Minister: replies to our 
recommendations and questions must reach us 
more quickly particularly when the subjects are 
of immediate concern. In reality, I have the 
impression that in very many cases the replies 
are out of date when they arrive and serve no 
further purpose. For example, at its session 
last December, the Assembly adopted a recom-
mendation on Afghanistan and asked whether 
the Council was not of the opinion that they 
should consider the matter and enquire of 
member countries whether the Afghan resis-
tance movements should be supplied with arms 
to meet the increasingly large-scale and destruc-
tive intervention of the Soviet Union. I feel 
obliged to observe that this was a very impor-
tant matter which should have received an 
immediate reply; instead, not only did we not 
receive a reply but the reply to Question 225, 
which drew the Council's attention to this fact, 
said everything. This reply stated that huma-
nitarian action was being taken to help the 
refugees and that was all. The specific ques-
tion regarding the possibility of supplying the 
Afghan resistance movements with arms was in 
practice ignored. Perhaps the Council did not 
discuss the problem; if it did we should like 
to know whether we can be told anything. 
Recently, we have learnt that, as though in 
direct reply to the position carefully thought 
out by the Assembly, trade relations are being 
resumed with the Soviet Union, thus giving 
something to the refugees, much more to the 
Soviet Union and nothing to the Afghan resis-
tance. There is nothing to stop this but the 
Assembly cannot in my opinion be ignored. 
The Assembly at least deserves a reply; the 
Assembly is entitled to know the Council's 
attitude and what it thinks. Otherwise, we must 
say that our work is completely useless. But 
even if our work may serve no purpose as far as 
other people are concerned, I must say, Mr. 
Minister, that we consider it to be useful and 
responsible and will continue to press for 
adequate replies. 
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liere. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to reply? 
Mr. PAGE (United Kingdom).- I would only 
thank those distinguished colleagues who have 
spoken. I hope that they will always look 
upon the speeches that I make in the future 
with the same good will as they have shown 
today. I should also like to thank the Minister 
of State, who has stayed throughout, and it will 
be valuable to all our colleagues in the Assem-
bly that this message has got to him firsthand. 
The PRESIDENT. -It is greatly appreciated, 
Minister, that you have stayed throughout the 
criticisms. I happen to know that your only 
reason for leaving now is that you will be 
having an immediate consultation with one of 
your colleagues on the Council of Ministers. I 
have no doubt that you will convey to him the 
flavour of our discussion. We could scarcely 
ask for more rapid action. If you have time 
before you go back to London, I am sure that 
many of your colleagues would like the plea-
sure of your company at a reception that we are 
giving at 7 o'clock. Thank you very much 
indeed. 
Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to 
speak? · 
The debate is closed. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommen-
dation in the report of the General Affairs 
Committee, Document 880. 
No amendments have been tabled. 
If there are no objections or abstentions, and 
if the Assembly agrees, we can save time by not 
having a roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions? .. . 
The draft recommendation is adopted una-
nimously!. 
11. Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report 
of the Council 
(Presentation of the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 875) 
The PRESIDENT. - The next Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and vote on the draft recom-
mendation, Document 875. 
I. See page 19. 
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I call Mr. Tanghe. 
Mr. T ANGHE (Belgium). - As this is the 
only meeting of the Assembly at which I am 
allowed so speak my own language, I hope that 
you will allow me now to speak in Dutch, 
which also means Flemish, my mother tongue. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, all too often in the past the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
when reading the annual report from the Coun-
cil, has had to note with regret that little or no 
notice has been taken of some of this Assem-
bly's proposals. Not so this time - on the 
contrary. Reading the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council, one was spontaneously 
reminded of a biblical phrase: " Keep on asking 
and knocking, and it shall be opened unto 
you"! 
The Council has in fact at last responded to 
our repeated recommendation to give precise 
details in the annual report of the manning 
levels of British land forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe under the command of 
SACEUR. 
This time, the answer is quite clear; in 1980 
the average strength of these forces was 
56,985. We can see at once that, after deduct-
ing the 2,480 men of the British Rhine Army 
regularly detached to Northern Ireland, there 
are 54,505 troops in Germany, compared to the 
55,000 in the commitment. 
It is the first time, too, that the report has 
given details of the composition of the Second 
British Tactical Air Force, also stationed in 
continental Europe. 
The persistent asking and knocking this 
Assembly has been doing has also been rewar-
ded in respect of its recommendation - made to 
the Council as long ago as 1978 and adopted 
again last year as Recommendation 348 -
calling for the deletion of paragraph V of 
Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill of the Brussels 
Treaty, laying down which warships may not 
be built in Germany. This year's report does 
in fact show that at its meeting on 21st July 
1980, the Council deleted paragraph V, and 
consequently the Alliance's defensive capability 
at sea can be improved. 
The Committee has also voiced its satisfac-
tion at the fact that the Council has given a 
detailed reply on other points in Recommenda-
tion 348 adopted by this Assembly on the 
Committee's proposal. Indeed, paragraph 3 of 
this recommendation having asked last year for 
approval of the assignment of German naval 
forces to SACLANT as well as SACEUR, the 
annual report announces the decision by the 
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German Federal Security Council on 19th June 
1980 expressing Germany's willingness to let 
German naval and naval air forces henceforth 
be deployed also outside the area limits at 
present existing for the German navy in the 
northern flank command. 
There is perhaps less cause for satisfaction 
about the Council's reaction to paragraph 7 of 
the recommendation you adopted last year at 
the Committee's proposal, asking for clarifica-
tion in the annual report of the present situa-
tion as regards stocks of chemical weapons in 
the member states, and publication in it of the 
list of chemical products to be monitored by 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the 
list approved by the Council and currently in 
force. 
In its reply the Council recalls that the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments asks all 
member states to indicate clearly whether or 
not they possess chemical weapons, and that 
they have all replied in the negative. But the 
approved list of chemical products to be 
checked is not in the report, as once again 
requested by the Assembly. 
This refusal is all the more regrettable since 
this list, marked " unclassified ", has been given 
to anyone who asked for it, and details from it 
are included in the publications of the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute. 
To go a little further with the activities of the 
Agency, the Council says in its annual report 
that the situation has generally remained 
unchanged. No activity by the Agency in the 
nuclear sector other than in connection with 
missiles and other special equipment, except as 
regards the weapons of one member state, 
France; no controls in the biological weapons 
sector; where chemical weapons are concerned, 
only a check on whether they are being manu-
factured - no check on quantities, since the 
member states have invariably stated that they 
do not possess such weapons. 
So for the Committee there are·no fresh argu-
ments to change its opinion that the usefulness 
of these controls is still debatable. What about 
the member states which have not given up 
production of chemical weapons? Here the 
Council says that all these countries gave a 
negative answer when asked whether produc-
tion of chemical weapons on their mainland 
territory had progressed from the experimental 
stage to actual manufacture. So, there, too, 
there is no need for quantitative controls. And 
that's that! 
To close this chapter, I would like to draw 
your attention to a passage in the annual report 
where the Council stresses that the programme 
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of field controls, and certainly that of visits to 
private firms, is a limited one; and it says that 
the close co-operation between the Agency and 
the International Secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee has resulted in the best 
use of available credits by avoiding duplication, 
to the greater benefit of both bodies. 
I am mentioning this because the statement is 
in a way the starting point for paragraphs l(a) 
and l(b) of the recommendation now presented 
for the Assembly's approval, where the Council 
is asked to investigate the best possible alloca-
tion of financial resources and available staff 
among all the organs of WEU, in the light of 
the present scope and importance of their 
respective activities. 
Now a few words about the chapter on the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
The first section of the study on the situation 
of the armaments sector of industry in the 
member countries, entrusted to the SAC in 
1977, has now been completed; a declassified 
version is ready. A couple of weeks ago, at the 
last meeting of the Defence Committee in The 
Hague, this version was finally given to mem-
bers of the Committee, and has probably been 
sent to all members of the Assembly. The 
Committee has not yet had an opportunity to 
examine and discuss its contents. My imme-
diate reaction to the report was to want more 
explanation - perhaps by the Council, perhaps 
by the SAC itself. 
Meanwhile, here too we note that paragraph 
3 of our recommendation of last year was com-
plied with at the last minute. For this reason 
we would like to delete from our report the last 
sentence of paragraph 4.1 as well as paragraph 
3 of the recommendation. 
For the rest, our report on the activities of 
the Standing Armaments Committee is very 
brief. Some people might gain the impression 
that this denotes a lack of appreciation of a so 
far well-esteemed organ of WEU, but we had 
no such intention. 
The reasoning that led to the recommenda-
tion now before you is as follows: 
First, having studied the various chapters of 
the Council's annual report devoted to the acti-
vities of this organisation in respect of defence 
problems, the Committee - and perhaps the 
whole of the Assembly - are in agreement with 
the Council that the fundamental provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty are still just as valid as they 
were in 1948 when the treaty was signed. 
But to be, and remain, credible any treaty 
and certainly a mutual defence treaty, must be 
the focus of visible and continuing activity. 
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For many years now, the activities of this 
Assembly, its analysis of defence problems and 
its permanent dialogue with the Council have 
been the principal visible activities in the 
framework of the treaty. This genuinely poli-
tical activity is the best way of ensuring the 
credibility of the Brussels Treaty. At the same 
time, the continuation of activities that no lon-
ger serve any political or practical purpose is a 
waste of public money, and might bring the 
whole organisation into disrepute. 
Second, for years the Committee, with the 
evident support of the Assembly, has commen-
ted in reports covering the application of arma-
ments controls provided for in the various pro-
tocols to the treaty, that the practical usefulness 
of these controls is debatable. Indeed, the 
Council has never authorised application of the 
controls to nuclear and biological weapons. 
Controls on the non-production of chemical 
weapons apply only to Germany. As to the 
remaining controls on the non-production of 
certain conventional weapons in Germany, or 
on the quantities of certain conventional wea-
pons in all member countries on the European 
mainland, the list of these weapons has already 
been, or can still be, reduced in the way laid 
down in the treaty or its protocols. Lord 
Duncan-Sandys has just had some very blunt 
words to say about this. 
Third, regarding the work of the Standing 
Armaments Committee - a body set up not by 
the treaty or protocol, but by simple Council 
decision on 7th May 1955 - the Council has 
informed the Assembly that arrangements for 
co-operation in the field of arms production are 
the subject of work in the Independent Euro-
pean Programme Group, and that any duplica-
tion of work with that body must be avoided. 
Fourth, on the other hand there is the fact 
that, in view of the difficult economic position, 
all the member countries are trying to make 
economies in the budgets of international orga-
nisations, including WEU. 
For all these reasons the Committee is 
recommending the Council to examine the use-
fulness of the various organs of the organisa-
tion, in order, taking account of the scope and 
importance of their respective activities, to 
arrive at a fresh and sensible allocation of the 
resources still made available by our govern-
ments. 
I was glad to hear the Minister say a moment 
ago that the Council had set up a special work-
ing group. This has been instructed to make a 
study of the work of the various bodies, while 
being kind enough to leave out of consideration 
the activities of the Assembly itself. My inten-
tion is that the organ directly supported by the 
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Assembly shall also be looked at, to see 
whether the resources are adequate. The aim 
is to be able to do more with funds that are still 
limited. 
It is a question of maintaining the credibility 
of the treaty, which we too still consider to be 
essential. And that, Mr. President, is what lies 
behind the recommendation, which we hope 
the Assembly will adopt. Thank you, Mr. Pre-
sident. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Tanghe. 
No members have put their names down to 
speak in the debate. 
I will ask the Assembly to vote on the draft 
recommendation in Document 875. 
No amendments have been tabled. 
If there are no objections or abstentions, and 
if the Assembly agrees, we can save time by not 
having a roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions? .. . 
The draft recommendation is adopted una-
nimously!. 
Having had, as has been mentioned, a model 
ministerial address, we had a model presen-
tation of a reply to the Council, a very persua-
sive speech which has the immediate and una-
nimous support of the Assembly. 
12. Nomination of members to Committees 
The PRESIDENT. - We have now to deal 
with the next Order of the Day, the nomination 
of members to Committees. 
The candidates for the six permanent Com-
mittees of the Assembly have been published in 
an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been 
distributed. 
In accordance with Rule 39 (6) and Rule 
42 bis of the Rules of Procedure, these nomina-
tions are submitted to the Assembly. 
Is there any objection to these nominations? ... 
There is no objection. 
The nominations to the Committees are 
therefore agreed to. 
l. See page 20. 
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13. Date, time and Orders of the Day 
of the next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow 
morning, Tuesday 16th June, at I 0 a. m. with 
the following Orders of the Day: 
1. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions· 
and Armaments, Document 876 and 
Amendments). 
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2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
I have now to declare the sitting closed and 
to say how much my wife and I are looking for-
ward to receiving you in about an hour's time. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.) 
SECOND SITTING 
Tuesday, 16th June 1981 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
4. Change in the membership of a Committee. 
5. European security and the Mediterranean (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments, Doe. 876 and 
Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman of the 
Committee), Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Jung, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. 
Grant, Mr. Giinther Muller, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den 
Bergh. 
6. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe. 
Speakers: The President, General Rogers (Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe). 
Replies by General Rogers to questions put by: Sir Frede-
ric Bennett, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Louis 
Jung, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Am-
rehn, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van den Bergh, Lord Duncan-
Sandys, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Cavaliere. 
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings1• 
I stress again that each Representative, or, in 
the absence of a Representative, the Substitute 
on his or her behalf, should sign the Register of 
Attendance. This is important not only for the 
purpose of recording his or her presence but in 
order to conform with our rules should we need 
to take a roll-call vote. 
I. See page 22. 
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3. Election of two Vice-Presidents 
of the Assembly 
The PRESIDENT. - I have received further 
nominations for the posts of Vice-Presidents 
which have still to be filled. These are as 
follows: Mr. Berchem of Luxembourg, and Mr. 
Cornelissen of the Netherlands. In each case 
the nomination conforms to the rules. If the 
Assembly agrees, I propose that our colleagues 
Mr. Berchem and Mr. Cornelissen be elected by 
acclamation pending further nomination for the 
remaining place. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The Assembly is unanimous. Therefore, the 
candidates are elected. 
The order of seniority of the Vice-Presidents 
so far elected is as follows: MM. Tanghe, 
Berchem, Gessner, Cornelissen and Maravalle. 
4. Change in the membership 
of a Committee 
The PRESIDENT. - The Italian Delegation 
has proposed the following change in the mem-
bership of the Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges: Mr. Pucci as a titular 
member in place of Mr. Battaglia. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The nomination is agreed to. 
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5. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
Doe. 876 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - The first Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, Document 876 and Amend-
ments. 
Mr. Bozzi, understandably, is not able to be 
present because of commitments in connection 
with the French elections. Mr. Cavaliere, the 
Chairman of the Committee, has kindly under-
taken to introduce Mr. Bozzi's report on his· 
behalf. 
I call Mr. Cavaliere. 
Mr. CA VALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it falls to me 
to introduce the well-argued and vigorous 
report prepared by our colleague Mr. Bozzi 
who, to his regret, is unable to be present today. 
I should, therefore, like to apologise in 
advance if my exposition is not complete: in 
any case the report was circulated to all mem-
bers some time ago and I should imagine there-
fore that everyone has read the explanatory 
memorandum, which is very detailed and 
contains all the elements necessary for assessing 
the proposals in the draft recommendation. 
The last time our Committee dealt with the 
problem of security in the Mediterranean was 
in 1978, when, on 31st May, it approved the 
draft recommendation and report submitted by 
the Rapporteur, Mr. Grant. Since then quite 
substantial changes have taken place and it is 
fair to say that two factors have aggravated the 
situation in the Mediterranean: these are, firstly, 
the strengthening of the military capacity of 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in gene-
ral and, secondly, the rising tensions between 
countries in the area, which involves the Medi-
terranean and European security in general. 
There is tension between well-armed countries 
which in most cases are better armed than the 
Mediterranean countries belonging to NATO. 
As everyone knows the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries have become stronger in all directions. In 
case of nuclear armaments, everyone has said -
and this is regularly repeated by the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments - that 
the situation is extremely serious and alarming, 
particularly with the deployment of the SS-20 
and the new Backfire bomber. 
In the case of conventional armaments, mat-
ters are even more urgent and the situation is 
even more disquieting because the previous 
imbalance has recently tipped still further and 
if, for example, we compare the armoured divi-
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sions available to NATO in this area with those 
available to the Warsaw Pact countries, there 
are real grounds for concern. 
Turning to seaborne forces, the Soviet Union 
has now become the second naval power, cap-
able of ensuring its presence and carrying its 
offensive to all parts of the world. 
I should like to make a few specific 
comments on this point, and to recall what was 
said in February 1981 by Admiral Shapiro, 
Head of United States Naval Secret Services. 
He stressed that the Russians have Typhoon-
class missile submarines with a tonnage of 
25,000 tons which therefore substantially out-
weigh the Trident. Admiral Shapiro also 
observed that the Soviet navy can deploy Alfa-
class missile submarines and so on. 
Unquestionably, therefore, the naval presence 
of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact has 
become a matter of great concern. On this 
point I should like to refer to the remarks made 
by Admiral Crowe, Commander-in-Chief Allied 
Forces Southern Europe, in an interview in 
October 1980. He pointed out that the situa-
tion had changed completely since 1952 because, 
precisely as a result of the tensions develop-
ing in areas affecting the Mediterranean zone 
and Europe, and of increased Soviet naval 
power, consideration had now to be given not 
only to a land war, as in 1952, but also, and 
most importantly, to the possibility of a sea war 
in the Mediterranean. Admiral Crowe added 
that the southern region had ceased to be peri-
pheral and had become central and that the 
threat had shifted from the northern to the 
southern front, with the consequence that all 
the problems created by this new situation had 
to be met and resolved. Nor could the threat 
be regarded as less because the Soviet Union 
would have no naval bases in the Mediterra-
nean; the new relationship and the new pact 
with Syria tell us that the Soviet Union is pre-
sent in the Mediterranean. But one has only 
to think of possible early developments in the 
policies of Libya where we have Colonel Kad-
hafi who is completely unpredictable and extre-
mely dangerous because of his unscrupulous-
ness. We could find the Soviet Union with 
bases which would make it very troublesome if 
not outright difficult for us to defend the Medi-
terranean. Hence the need to suggest solutions 
as does the draft recommendation. 
In my view, one of the most important mea-
sures we suggest is that diplomatic action be 
taken to deter Mediterranean countries which 
are not members of NATO from allowing bases 
or assistance to the Soviet fleet. This point in 
the recommendation seems to me to be very 
important and with particular regard to the 
situation in the Mediterranean I should like to 
recall what the Defence Minister Mr. Lagorio, 
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who is a socialist, said to the Defence Commit-
tee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 14th 
April 1980. He said quite specifically that 
" The global threat in the Mediterranean has 
undoubtedly increased in both absolute and 
relative terms ". Hence, the need to think 
about what is to be done. 
At this point I think that special reference 
should be made to the problem of sales of arms 
to third countries because, as I mentioned ear-
lier, the growing tension in those areas which 
directly affect European security and .therefore 
the defence of the Mediterranean even more, 
involves countries which are much better and 
more heavily armed than the Mediterranean 
countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance 
and NATO. It is therefore essential that the 
WEU countries - and indeed all the NATO 
countries - should agree on a specific policy 
regarding sales of arms to third countries. The 
Committee has submitted an amendment on 
this point, adding to the draft recommenda-
tion. There must also be a complete policy for 
supplying the countries mainly involved in the 
defence of the Mediterranean with the defence 
material they require. Reference is made to 
Greece but we stress the urgent need for ade-
quate assistance to enable Turkey to modernise 
and strengthen its armaments. As concern is 
now beginning to be felt regarding the defence 
of the Straits - Dardanelles and Bosporus -
which in fact falls to Turkey, the special 
reference to that country seems to me to be 
more than justified. All this must be done 
quickly without further loss of time. 
As I reach my conclusion, I should like to 
remind the Assembly that for some years there 
has been growing talk here of looking into pro-
blems arising outside the NATO sphere of 
competence; today it is well known that events 
in countries outside Atlantic Alliance territory 
have a direct influence on European security. 
In the interview which I mentioned earlier, 
Admiral Crowe referred for example to the sub-
ject of oil supplies. I may add that other very 
important lines of communication such as the 
Cape route could be threatened; I could add 
that some raw materials which we import for 
industrial development and defence purposes 
from certain countries on those lines of com-
munication constitute a vital problem for Eur-
ope's survival. The British Prime Minister, 
General Rogers whom we shall be hearing 
today, and all the leading military and political 
authorities in the United States of America, 
reinforced by the political authorities of the 
member states of WEU - and I could mention 
another point in Mr. Lagorio's statement- have 
made it clear that the time has come to think of 
intervention, including armed intervention, out-
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side the sphere of the Atlantic Alliance; and 
this cannot be a matter for NATO because that 
would mean modifying the treaty and would 
involve serious problems on which all the 
NATO countries are not agreed but would have 
to be a matter for individual countries concert-
ing their intervention and acting in general with 
NATO. We therefore realise even more the 
urgency of taking action to provide the Medi-
terranean countries, which have to ensure the 
security of Europe in conjunction with that of 
the Mediterranean, with the help required to 
modernise their armaments and strengthen their 
defence because, in the event of movement of 
the forces at present deployed in Europe for the 
defence of Europe, the defence of the Mediter-
ranean could not be left to those countries 
alone. 
These, Ladies and Gentlemen, are the points 
I wished to make and I would strongly urge 
you to approve this draft recommendation 
which I feel to be of great immediacy and 
importance; of an importance vital for the sur-
vival of the Mediterranean and Europe. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Cava-
Here, for your readiness as Chairman to step 
into the breach created by the unavoidable 
absence of your Rapporteur. The Assembly is 
indebted to you both - for the excellence of the 
report and for your introductory speech. 
We now have the debate on the report, and 
the first speaker is Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, thank you for at least enabling 
me to state my views on this major report by 
Mr. Bozzi, which I was unable to do in Com-
mittee as Mr. Cavaliere, the Chairman, man-
aged to block the discussion, doubtless in order 
to please his Turkish military friends. 
In fact I had to leave the meeting in protest 
at the methods employed by the Committee 
Chairman. Preventing one's opponents from 
speaking is equivalent to driving nails into a 
potential WEU coffin; and that I would regret. 
In regard to this major report by our distin-
guished colleague, Mr. Bozzi - a report marked 
by Corsican, and therefore Mediterranean, sen-
sitivity - I would express a basic criticism of a 
general nature, as well as firm opposition to the 
substance and form of paragraphs 3.23 to 3.40, 
which relate to Turkey. However, Mr. Presi-
dent, I have reservations about criticising a 
colleague in his absence, reservations which 
have apparently not always been shared in 
WEU bodies. 
My basic criticism is this. In reading the 
report I wonder, like many other members, 
whether, as someone who refuses to participate 
in the North Atlantic Assembly, I really ought 
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to be here at all. If we persist in confusing our 
own responsibility and the terms of reference of 
WEU with those of NATO, we may involunta-
rily weaken ourselves to the point that, in the 
face of the North Atlantic Assembly and the 
European Parliament, our own WEU Assembly 
could appear redundant and come under threat 
of abolition by our own governments. 
My opposition is to the major section on 
Turkey, which, in my view, reveals a compla-
cent if not sycophantic attitude towards gene-
rals who have taken power by means of a mili-
tary coup. 
Some technical details. We note once again, 
that Turkey is the sick man of Europe: on the 
economic level, the suffering of the people, 
endemic unemployment, galloping inflation; on 
the political level, a military regime tending 
towards dictatorship of the most vulgar kind; on 
the military level, an army that is indeed large 
in numbers, but under- or badly-equipped. 
Now, we are told that for five years defence 
expenditure has averaged 5.3% of gross natio-
nal product; in fact we know that it accounts 
for over 25% of the budget - a quarter of the 
Turkish national budget - despite the fact that 
the Turkish army does not suffer the same 
problems, particularly in respect of personnel 
costs, as western armies, since all the lower 
ranks are comprised of militia men who receive 
no pay for two years. 
What are we to make of this? Where is the 
money going? In fact, we have seen for too 
long now that the armed forces, which Mr. 
Bozzi refers to as playing an important educa-
tional role - what a joke; have we ever seen the 
army playing an educational role? - are struc-
tured and trained to deal not with an external 
enemy but with what is called " internal 
subversion ". 
The army is actually constituted and trained 
for use against the people, mainly the Kurdish 
people. Mr. Bozzi himself mentions the great 
cultural diversity in Turkey, which is true. It 
is therefore regrettable that the Turkish authori-
ties do not recognise that cultural diversity and 
deny the Kurdish people, in their laws and 
constitution, even the right to be called by their 
name. 
And when we refer to destabilising events on 
the eastern side of the Mediterranean, we must 
bear in mind that for many years the main part 
of the Turkish elite forces have been in the 
eastern zone, not in order to guard the frontier 
but in order to subjugate the Kurdish people, 
who are basically claiming the right to cultural 
self-determination. 
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More than two-thirds of the Turkish military 
forces are assigned to the maintenance of order, 
even though today - and fortunately so - terror-
ism has been throttled and is therefore far from 
being what it was before. This gives the game 
away: it is not against terrorism that order is 
being maintained, but against the popular 
forces, against the workers who might claim 
their due and might be prepared to fight in 
order to improve their situation. 
We are told that the air force, in particular, is 
being modernised. Last week in the Belgian 
Parliament I had occasion to ask a question 
about the sale by Belgium to Turkey of 
seventy-five F-l04G Starfighters, the very 
planes which we were told had to be replaced 
immediately in Belgium because they were 
becoming a permanent danger for the civilian 
population owing to lack of safety in flight. I 
regret that the safety of the Turkish people is 
not valued as highly as that of the Belgian 
people. Modernising the Turkish air force 
with Starfighters seems to me rather curious ! 
As to the political aspect, I would refer 
- without reading them out, but I am prepared 
to do so for I have the texts before me - both to 
Article 55 c of the United Nations Charter and 
to the preambles to the Brussels and North 
Atlantic Treaties. All of them declare the will 
of the signatories to fight for respect for human 
rights and the maintenance of basic freedoms. 
Is the mention of these things in our treaties 
simply a matter of literary convention, folklore 
or political argument, or are we saying " Do as 
I say but not as I do "? 
It was the Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere, who 
mentioned the aggravation of tension in the 
Mediterranean area, but in my view the source 
is not the same in every case. Tension there 
is: increased tension in the Mediterranean; 
a coup in Turkey, where democracy has been 
murdered; an attempted coup in Spain, happily 
abortive; a very unstable political situation in 
Italy; a threat to Greece, and a threat even in 
Portugal. Yes, there is tension in the Mediter-
ranean, but it does not always spring from the 
sources unilaterally denounced in this Assem-
bly. 
It is true that European solidarity with the 
poorest peoples must be given practical expres-
sion. Those who still enjoy a comfortable 
standard of living despite the crisis have a duty 
to grant substantial economic aid to their 
weaker companions. I fully agree with this, on 
condition that together we are able to maintain 
respect for human rights and basic freedoms for 
all. 
I do not accept the postulate contained in 
paragraph 3.38 of the report, which expresses 
confidence in the military. 
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Are the members of the Assembly aware of 
the press release by the National Security 
Council announcing, on 2nd June last, a new 
series of bans on political activity in Turkey? 
Former parliamentarians are henceforth for-
bidden to make statements or write articles 
commenting on the previous period. Among 
the other decisive restrictions imposed by the 
Council are the following: disputes, particularly 
political disputes, are forbidden at all levels, the 
decrees instituting the state of siege may not be 
discussed - nor even commented on - and 
publications are censored. 
I am afraid, unfortunately, that I have been 
right since September: it is impossible for sol-
diers to establish a democratic regime because 
democracy as we parliamentarians understand it 
is incompatible with the democracy of the 
barracks. 
I shall vote against the draft recommendation. 
I have tabled four amendments. If they are 
not adopted I shall abstain since I, like certain 
other colleagues, intend to remain faithful to 
the United Nations Charter and to the pream-
bles to the Brussels and North Atlantic Trea-
ties. European security will never ... 
Mr. JUNG (France) (Translation). - What 
about the Russians! 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. Jung, I am not a communist and I make no 
reservations, unlike a certain former President 
of the French Republic! 
European security will never be properly 
assured if it is based on tyranny and the oppres-
sion of the peoples of a member state of 
NATO. NATO has endured the opprobrium 
caused by the presence of fascist Portugal. Are 
we going to accept that of the encouragement of 
military coups? 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Dejar-
din. 
Our next speaker is Mr. Grant. 
Mr. GRANT (United Kingdom). - I cannot 
allow Mr. Dejardin to get away with the out-
rageous remarks that he made in opening his 
speech. I am a member of the Defence 
Committee, as he is, and I can tell the Assem-
bly precisely what the facts are. 
There was a meeting of the Committee at 
which a decision was taken. Mr. Dejardin was 
not there; nor was I. At the next meeting, he 
sought to raise the matter again, because he had 
been absent from that earlier meeting. How-
ever, Committees cannot be conducted to meet 
the convenience of Mr. Dejardin, and the 
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conduct of the Committee by the Chairman, 
Mr. Cavaliere, was perfectly proper. It com-
manded the support of the remainder of the 
C_ommittee, and Mr. Dejardin left in a fit of 
p1que. 
The conduct of that Committee was quite 
proper. Mr. Cavaliere is one of the best Chair-
men of the Defence Committee that I have 
known. 
This is an admirable report, and I am only 
sorry that our colleague, Mr. Bozzi, is not here 
to present it, because he has a great interest in 
the subject and has done a great deal of work. 
The report brings up to date the earlier 
report which I presented to the Assembly and it 
provides a number of additional facts. I agree 
entirely with Mr. Cavaliere that the situation is 
more dangerous than it was when I presented 
my report. 
I said then that we regarded the Mediterra-
nean as a place of tourism, sun and blue skies. 
But it is also worth remembering that it is a 
place where as likely as anywhere in the world 
there could be a conflagration and the start of 
World War Ill, especially because of its proxi-
mity to the Middle East. I am also reminded 
of a remark by Sir Winston Churchill who, 
during the last war, described it as the "soft 
under-belly of Europe ". Therefore it is a 
place of immense importance to NATO. 
Generally, the view can be tak.~n - and I 
have no doubt that Mr. Dejardin takes it - that 
we do not like NATO, that we are not worried 
about the Warsaw Pact countries, that it is not 
very important to resist them, and that we 
would not complain at all if NATO folded up. 
That is a perfectly logical and sensible point 
of view. On the other hand, if we believe in 
NATO and that it is the most important def-
ence of the West and of freedom against the 
Soviet bloc, as I do, it is essential to maintain it 
in as strong and efficient a condition as poss-
ible. It is not logical to say that we believe in 
NATO but that we are not prepared to keep it 
strong and vigorous. 
I wish briefly to mention three countries. 
First, I must refer to what is probably the most 
important, which is Turkey. We went to Tur-
key with the Defence Committee. Mr. Dejar-
din was with us. I do not know what he was 
doing there, but it became clear to me and my 
colleagues that enormous relief was felt by. the 
Turkish people that law and order were being 
observed and that they were able to walk the 
streets again without the risk of being slaugh-
tered or injured in some way. 
There was immense support expressed by 
those whom Mr. Dejardin calls " the people " 
for the measures which have been taken and, in 
that sense, the army commands the support of 
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the overwhelming majority of the Turkish 
people. That may not appeal to Mr. Dejar-
din's extreme left-wing friends, but the majority 
of the people are relieved that they are no 
longer being slaughtered and injured. There-
fore, we have a duty to Turkey to see that, in 
view of all its difficulties and not least its 
serious economic difficulties, it is able to fulfil 
its role in NATO; and that is for the rest of us 
to sustain. 
As Mr. Cavaliere said, Turkey's position 
alone is vital: it is up against the borders of the 
Soviet Union, Iran and so on. There are all 
sorts of danger spots surrounding Turkey. 
Therefore, this report is right to emphasise that 
it is in the interests of the West and of the free 
world that we support Turkey in its present 
difficulties. If we construct a brick wall against 
our enemies, it is no good our saying " Because 
we do not like the colour of one of those bricks, 
we shall knock it out." We must instead 
maintain it and sustain it if we want to main-
tain the defence as a whole. 
The second country to which I refer is Spain. 
It was a great day for democracy and free-
dom when Spain became converted from dicta-
torship and subsequently was able to join the 
Council of Europe. 
It would seem to me wholly logical that at 
one end of the Mediterranean a free country, a 
democratic country, a large and important 
country controlling the western end of the 
Mediterranean, and indeed the Atlantic to some 
extent, should be a member of NATO. That 
may not be the wish of those of all political 
views in Spain but certainly it is the wish of the 
present government and one which, if we are 
interested in NATO and defence, we should 
support in every way. Therefore, I strongly 
commend the references in the recommenda-
tions to arranging for Spain to participate in 
NATO exercises and defence planning pending 
its complete joining of NATO, which I hope it 
will certainly do in the very near future. 
Having moved from the East to the West, I 
now wish to consider the middle of the Medi-
terranean. Paragraphs 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 on the 
subject of Malta - and I know this is only in 
the report itself - cause me and some others 
anxiety when they draw attention to the fact 
that whereas, on the one hand, there is an 
agreement between Italy and Malta whereby 
Italy gives aid to Malta on condition that Malta 
maintains a non-aligned profile, only in Janu-
ary of this year Malta concluded an agreement 
with the Soviet Union to provide facilities and 
bases. Quite rightly, the report asks whether 
this can be reconciled with the neutrality agree-
ment concluded with Italy. This is a matter 
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that I regard as serious and at which we should 
look in much closer detail in relation to the 
overall defence and security of the Mediterra-
nean. 
In conclusion, contrary to the slightly excited 
remarks of Mr. Dejardin, I greatly hope that the 
Assembly will see fit to maintain the report in 
its entirety, without amendment. It points out 
the dangers and says what should be done. 
The message in the report which should go 
loud and clear to the ministers is that any 
watering down or weakening of these recom-
mendations will only give comfort to the 
enemies of Western European Union and of 
everything for which we stand. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Grant. 
The next speaker is Mr. Giinther Muller, 
who will be followed by Dr. Miller. 
Mr. Giinther MULLER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, this morning a speaker 
criticised Mr. Bozzi's report for paying too 
much attention to the military situation in the 
Mediterranean area. I would like to emphasise 
that it is precisely this which I applaud. After 
all, it is precisely the military and security 
aspects that Western European Union and this 
Assembly exist to deal with. We owe Mr. Bozzi 
and the whole Committee a debt of gratitude 
for the wealth of material made available to us 
here for this debate. 
The previous speaker, Mr. Grant, pointed to 
the need to keep an eye on the real adversaries, 
the real threats to the member countries of 
Western European Union. In his report Mr. 
Bozzi is indeed primarily concerned with the 
strong naval build-up of the Soviet Union in 
the Mediterranean area. We all know that it 
was an old goal of Russian imperial policy -
not simply of communist policy since 1917, but 
of earlier policy too - to penetrate into south-
ern waters and gain influence there. Russia's 
interest in the area has been constant ever since 
Catherine the Great first sent a fleet into the 
Mediterranean under Prince Orlov. 
As we know, we in the West especially, and 
also in Turkey, do not really apply the Mon-
treux Convention as we should. You will 
remember that the convention lays down, for 
example, that no aircraft carrier may pass 
through the Straits - the Bosporus and the Dar-
danelles. However, the Soviet Union has sent 
a helicopter carrier, the Kiev, through the 
Straits of Bosporus. One would have to take a 
very generous view not to see this as an infrin-
gement of the Montreux Convention. In point 
of fact we are very liberal towards a potential 
adversary, the Soviet Union, in regard to the 
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build-up of naval forces in the Mediterranean 
area. 
Mr. Dejardin, who was the first speaker in 
this debate, expressed concern about one coun-
try. I shall return to this point. He spoke of 
unpredictability in this point. He spoke of 
unpredictability in the Mediterranean area. 
Such unpredictability does exist. But at the 
present time Turkey is certainly one of the least 
unpredictable factors. There are other factors. 
There is Mr. Kadhafi in Libya. There is 
also the Prime Minister of Malta, a man who is 
not all that predictable, as we have seen repeat-
edly in the past. 
There is above all the unpredictability of the 
whole eastern area of the Mediterranean, if we 
consider the conflict between Iraq and Iran or 
the conflicts in Lebanon. Indeed, even a coun-
try like Israel is now one of the factors that are 
difficult to predict, if only because of the 
reprehensible attack on the Iraqi reactor - all 
events in this area capable of contributing to a 
constant increase rather than a reduction of 
tension. 
Of course, there have also been positive deve-
lopments in the area. For instance, Egypt has 
become an element of stability there. We can 
be glad of this. The balance of power has been 
to some extent restored here. But of course 
this area remains inherently problematic, if 
only because of the situation that has built up 
there over the years. 
Let me say one more thing about Turkey. I 
would have done so even if Mr. Dejardin had 
not spoken, although he has of course given me 
a particular incentive in the form of his very 
emotional speech to this Assembl~. 
If Mr. Dejardin were a politician guided by 
ethical principles, he would have condemned 
the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces 
years ago, and I would have applauded him 
wholeheartedly. Only, this attack on another 
area was carried out not by the perpetrators of 
a military coup, as he calls them, but by demo-
crats, under a Prime Minister, moreover, who 
belongs to the same International as Mr. Dejar-
, din's party. I want to state this quite clearly 
here. 
Our experience in Turkey and in the discus-
sions with the leading people in Turkey today -
I was a member of the delegation - has shown 
after all that in relation to Greece, for example, 
it is apparently easier now than it was to find a 
spirit of compromise among the present Turk-
ish leaders. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we are all supporters 
of democracy. There have already been two 
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military interventions in Turkey which led, 
after a certain time, to the re-establishment of 
democracy under better conditions. I hope 
and firmly believe that this will also happen in 
the present case. But I know that in a country 
in which 4,000 people have been murdered, in 
which, for example, the pupils at the German 
school in Istanbul extracted pass marks from 
their teachers at machine-gun point, things 
could simply not go on like this, and it was 
necessary to institute in Turkey what I would 
call a cooling-off period. 
We should really be asking where the 
160,000 hand-guns in Turkey came from. 
Who was interested in stirring up trouble 
there? Who was interested in destabilising the 
country? If we were to examine these ques-
tions in detail, we would conclude that inter-
national terrorism, which has struck in Turkey 
as well, has certain common roots, common 
roots that threaten both the security of demo-
cracy and the security of our member countrie~. 
This is another aspect which must be consi-
dered in connection with security in the Medi-
terranean area. 
I am glad that Mr. Bozzi has tabled this 
report. I shall of course support it. I believe 
the majority of this Assembly regards the report 
as a necessary and distinguished piece of work. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Muller. 
I call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). - I often 
speak after my German namesake. I hope 
that I have a little more in common with him 
than merely a similarity in name. 
I have a dual mandate. I have to speak on 
behalf of Tom U rwin, who is not too well, who 
would, I believe, have represented the views of 
the Socialist Group. Also, I must combine 
what I believe he might have said with some of 
my own views on the subject. 
I regret that Mr. Bozzi is unable to be with 
us. I know that similar words are often used, 
but it is right to say that his report is compre-
hensive, extensive and far-reaching. However, 
I must express some relatively mild reservations 
of the Socialist Group. 
I regret that Mr. Dejardin did not voice to the 
Socialist Group his objections to the report. 
He appeared at the very last minute but did not 
indicate in the short time that he was with us 
on Monday morning that he intended to advance 
such a vociferous objection to the report. I 
am sorry that even now he is not present, and I 
have no intention of addressing any criticism 
towards him in his absence, but it is very much 
a matter of regret that we in the Socialist Group 
were not informed of his objections. 
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I think that I should be voicing the general 
views of the group - and I associate myself enti-
rely with them - if I were to draw the attention 
of the Assembly to paragraph 6.1 headed " Opi-
nion of the minority ". The words which I feel 
express our view are: 
" A minority of the Committee opposed the 
report on the grounds that it was too oriented 
to military measures of security." 
I should like to develop that theme. 
There is no sense in the Socialist Group of 
non-commitment to NATO. Certainly I am a 
supporter of NATO. However, we are concer-
ned, and I think that everyone should be 
concerned, about the military build-up and the 
generation in the world of an atmosphere of 
pessimism in which there seems to be a decided 
and unequivocal polarisation of the West and 
East into two blocs - the NATO bloc and the 
Warsaw Pact bloc. According to some views, 
the polarisation is immutable - never to change 
- and the possibility, even the probability, of 
conflict with the Soviet Union is uppermost in 
everyone's mind. 
I do not suggest that human rights flourish in 
the Soviet Union. It is not beyond pushing its 
objectives by military as well as by other 
means, and I can understand people's reserva-
tions, worries and fears about its intentions. It 
is continuing the kind of expansionism and 
imperialism that took place under the tsars. I 
say that advisedly. However, the build-up of 
arms and its escalating cost could bankrupt 
us. We may soon be able to buy nothing 
except arms to defend ourselves - and then 
what shall we have left to defend? I am 
concerned about this polarisation, this apparent 
acceptance of a situation that is fraught with all 
kinds of danger. It may well be that now is the 
time to give peaceful approaches a greater 
chance than they have been given in the past. 
I abhor the build-up of large business 
concerns, not simply for the selling of arms, but 
for the purpose of providing to nations advisers, 
experts and specialists of all descriptions who 
do very well in building up little empires for 
themselves. 
Having expressed those general reservations, 
may I say that I appreciate the way in which 
Mr. Bozzi tackled the report? He covered 
extensively the subject of the Mediterranean, 
showing clearly that he had a commendable 
grasp of the subject. He dealt with the ques-
tion of non-NATO countries and other areas in 
the Mediterranean where problems have arisen 
and other problems could arise. 
I wish to say a few words about two countries 
which exercise the minds of members of the 
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Socialist Group - Turkey and Spain. I appre-
ciate the delicacy of the problem about Turkey 
which confronts democrats. There is a danger 
that, if we do not show willingness to give Tur-
key a chance to return to the democratic pro-
cess, we shall push the Turks into hands 
totally opposed to western concepts, western 
culture and everything else western. I would 
not wish to be party to pushing them into such 
hands. We must, however, accept that Turkey 
is a military dictatorship - and a military dicta-
torship is a military dictatorship, regardless of 
what we say to show that it is different from 
other military dictatorships. The longer it goes 
on and the firmer the hold it develops, the 
more despotic and tyrannical it becomes. 
We must therefore be careful about appearing 
to accept the situation in Turkey and giving it 
too long to return to what we consider to be 
normality. If we make excuses for Turkey for 
too long, it will be asked what difference there 
is between the military dictatorship there and 
other military dictatorships which do not come 
within the purview of NATO or the western 
circumference. I therefore enter this caveat, 
reservation and fear about Turkey. 
Spain also is a democracy under strain. We 
must do everything we can to hold it together. 
That is why I should not object in the slight-
est if Spain wished to become a member of 
NATO. What we are worried about is being 
seen by the third world and by other non-
NA TO countries to be pushing Spain into 
membership. If Spain made overtures to 
NATO, if she wished with the willingness of 
her people to join NATO, not only would I 
have no objection to that but I would welcome 
Spain with open arms. 
I am sure that my colleagues later today will 
be thoroughly competent to deal with the 
amendments tabled by the Socialist Group. I 
shall leave the matter there for the moment. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Dr. Miller. 
As members will have seen, with punctilious 
military efficiency General Rogers arrived at 
exactly 11 o'clock. However, I said yesterday 
that he might not arrive until 11.15 because of 
the traffic. Therefore, with his ready consent, 
we shall have one more speaker before asking 
General Rogers to address us. 
I am sure that the General is not unfamiliar 
with the problems of the Mediterranean that we 
are now discussing. 
I understand that Mr. Baumel is not present 
and that Mr. Fortier does not wish to speak. 
Therefore, the next speaker is Mr. van den 
Bergh. Are you happy about that, Mr. van 
den Bergh? 
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is no problem, Mr. President. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I should like 
to make a few supplementary remarks. 
Although the report does not wholly reflect my 
views on the situation in the Middle East, I 
voted for it in Committee, so I cannot go back 
on it now. 
I wish to make three comments which affect 
an important aspect of the Mediterranean 
area. I refer specifically to the Middle East, 
the situation in Turkey and the situation in 
Spain. 
Although I largely endorse the Rapporteur's 
analysis, I feel that too little attention has been 
paid to a number of political aspects of the 
matter. 
As already observed, I believe that in military 
terms there is an overall balance in the Medi-
terranean area. As a rule, relatively little pro-
minence is given to the considerable geogra-
phical and strategic advantages which NATO 
enjoys in the Mediterranean area by compa-
rison with the Warsaw Pact countries. A 
finely modulated approach is vital here from 
the military standpoint. Various other mem-
bers of the Committee share my view that cur-
rent political developments represent a major 
threat to security in the Mediterranean area. 
There is unfortunately no doubt that the 
situation in the Middle East is deteriorating. 
These developments, whether they are caused 
by economic, military or political factors or by 
differences between various Arab countries, 
affect the military and political situation 
throughout the area. 
Let me list some of the danger points in the 
Middle J;:ast: Iran, Iraq and the state of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Developments in another 
part of North Africa are also affecting the situa-
tion in the Middle East. It is a major political 
challenge to the European countries and the 
member states of NATO to bring the deteriora-
ting political and military situation in the 
Middle East under control. Furthermore, in 
addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Palestinian side of it, there now appear to be 
genuine developments in the Arab world which 
have nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict but are aggravating the political situa-
tion in the Middle East and thus represent a 
growing threat to the political situation in the 
Mediterranean area. We must make more use 
than before of political resources in order to 
ensure increasing stability throughout the 
Middle East in future years, since the military 
situation in the Mediterranean area depends on 
it. 
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The Council of Europe has frequently dis-
cussed the situation in Turkey. We in WEU 
must also discuss Turkey. Many arguments 
can be advanced as to why Turkey needs 
time. I am opposed to those who describe the 
regime in Turkey as fascist. That is not 
true. In this I agree with Mr. E~;evit, Turkey's 
former President. During a recent visit to Tur-
key I realised that statements of this kind may 
in fact be counter-productive to the restoration 
of democracy in Turkey. There are sufficient 
grounds for advocating patience over the resto-
ration of democracy, but we must also keep a 
keen and critical eye on the present situation. 
After my visit I came to the conclusion that 
there is cause for hope. We could trust the 
Turkish military government to restore demo-
cracy. I do not know whether that is the situa-
tion today. It must be remembered that terror-
ism was widespread in Turkey and that it had 
to be stopped. The big question is why the 
present Turkish Government maintains restric-
tions on rights in Turkey, which in my opinion 
have nothing to do with putting an end to 
terrorism. I cannot understand why restric-
tions on trade union freedoms persist. I cannot 
understand why censorship is now stricter than 
it was a few months ago. I cannot understand 
why Turkish politicians now have less freedom 
than they had a few months ago. At the 
moment I cannot be sure that the present poli-
tical climate in Turkey is conducive to gradual 
progress towards the restoration of democracy. 
We do not hear much about the time-table 
announced for the restoration of democracy in 
Turkey. There is good reason for concern 
about all kinds of statements by the military 
leaders in Turkey on the kind of democracy 
that is to be restored. In my view, it is not for 
the Turkish generals to decide on the substance 
and content of democratic organisation. It is 
not for them to decide which Turkish politi-
cians may return and which may not. I find 
developments in Turkey more worrying now 
than in February and March of this year. I 
also feel that we must pay closer attention to 
this, here in WEU and in NATO, than we do 
now. If the Turkish situation continues to go 
badly, the cohesion of the Alliance will be 
threatened. 
To conclude, I should like to make just one 
comment on Spain. Here again, we must be 
cautious, because we are currently faced with 
an East-West situation which is unsatisfactory 
in many respects. Although some of those pre-
sent, including General Rogers, think differ-
ently, I feel we must beware of creating the 
impression that we are always bent on increas-
ing military strength. We must aim at a global 
balance and above all at reducing the level of 
the armed forces. In view of the prevailing 
military balance, I feel it is unwise to go on 
placing the emphasis on strengthening the mili-
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tary potential on both sides. The question is 
whether Spanish membership of NATO would 
not add still more to the tensions between East 
and West. A few years ago Willy Brandt said 
that the entry of Spain might lead to an intensi-
fication of pressure on some eastern bloc coun-
tries, especially Yugoslavia. That would be a 
bad thing in itself. I need not remind you of 
the unfortunate developments in Poland. 
We must be very cautious about the question 
of Spain's accession and we should tell the Spa-
nish Government that there is no need for us to 
discuss it, because it might lead to an exacerba-
tion of the situation between East and West. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. van 
den Bergh. 
The debate is adjourned. 
6. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe 
The PRESIDENT. - Now it is my extremely 
great pleasure to welcome General Rogers, the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to address 
us. He is well known and has carried on the 
excellent arrangements and relations that have 
existed between the Assembly and SHAPE 
headquarters. Many members will have met 
him on committees or in other contexts, but it 
is the first time that we have had the privilege 
and pleasure of welcoming him to address our 
Assembly. That is not from any want of a 
desire to arrange it sooner, but simply because 
it has not been possible, with the limited choice 
of dates that we are able to offer, to fix a date. 
From the inception of my presidency a year 
ago General Rogers readily agreed to come and 
I am most happy today to welcome him as 
Supreme Allied Commander. We look for-
ward to hearing what he has to say. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - Thank you, Mr. President. 
Distinguished members of the Council and 
the Assembly, it is a great pleasure for me to be 
here with you today. I have had the privilege 
in the past of consulting and holding discus-
sions with members of the Council, and now I 
am particularly delighted that I can be in the 
presence ofthe Assembly. 
At the outset I should like to express publi-
cly and strongly the gratitude that I and all of 
us in Allied Command Europe feel for the 
support that Western European Union has 
given to our defence efforts in NATO. It was 
particularly gratifying recently to share with 
you actions which led to the removal of the 
treaty restrictions on German naval armaments 
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production and disposition. That event, I 
believe, signified the stability of relationships 
·among the nations of Western Europe, towards 
which WEU has striven for these many years. 
In no small measure the ending of those res-
trictions also strengthened western security. 
WEU has special responsibilities for Euro-
pean security - responsibilities that parallel 
those I bear as SACEUR. Our interests are 
alike. We seek to promote the peace and secu-
rity of Europe. In my view, there are serious 
dangers to our security in the current interna-
tional environment. My intent today is to 
outline the gravity of the menace we face, to 
suggest several key tasks which we must under-
take in the 1980s, and to solicit your assistance 
in their accomplishment. 
Dominating our considerations must be the 
increasingly adverse force balance between the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO which emerged in the 
last decade. In the 1970s we witnessed the 
Warsaw Pact outdistancing the forces of 
NATO. We have seen the Soviet Union go 
beyond equivalence in the strategic nuclear 
area. We have seen it and its allies surpass 
NATO in the long-range theatre nuclear force 
area, and increase its traditional advantages in 
the conventional area. 
Over the past few years the West has become 
aware of these trends in the European security 
environment. Yet I am not convinced that 
most of our peoples realise the full scope of our 
deficiencies. Far more is involved than just a 
matter of comparing defence budgets, although 
it is instructive to note that the Soviet Union's 
allocation of resources to defence, in terms of 
percentage of GDP, is more than triple the 
NATO average. My concern is more for what 
this massive scale of investment in modern 
weapons means for us today and tomorrow. 
As is well known, the Warsaw Pact continues 
to outnumber NATO by more than two to one 
in all the key areas, such as divisions, 
tanks, theatre-deployed aircraft, artillery and 
submarines. In recent years the Soviets have 
made a determined effort to overtake the 
qualitative lead upon which we in the West 
have depended for our security. They have 
succeeded, and the change is indeed stark. 
In the 1970s the USSR deployed four new 
intercontinental ballistic missile systems. It 
deployed the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, 
forces that provide an unprecedented capability 
to reach into Asia, all of Western Europe and 
to most of North Africa. NATO has made no 
like nuclear deployments in that time frame. 
The Soviets also field a chemical warfare 
capability against which we have no adequate 
and modern retaliatory deterrent. Their new 
generations of armoured and mechanised wea-
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ponry at least match the quality of those that 
we in the West field, and they are fielding theirs 
at a much more rapid rate. The latest Soviet 
attack aircraft have three times the range and 
twice the payload of those that they have 
replaced, and we see more evidence of a large 
surface fleet with a seaborne air capability, 
modem missile cruisers and submarines that are 
faster and deeper diving than our own. 
This rapid modernisation of Soviet and other 
Warsaw Pact forces has been noted in past 
reports to this Assembly. It is of grave concern 
to all of us. Whereas the Soviet Union entered 
the 1970s as a continental land power with air 
and naval forces defensively oriented, it entered 
the 1980s as an offensively oriented global 
power. In my view, the Warsaw Pact has now 
surpassed NATO - or soon will - in all force 
categories necessary for us in NATO to carry 
out our strategy in the conventional, the theatre 
nuclear and the strategic nuclear areas. 
That is a harsh conclusion that I draw, but I 
assure you that it is based on consideration of 
Warsaw Pact weaknesses as well as strengths. 
Soviet forces today, and to no lesser extent 
those of their Warsaw Pact allies, have done 
more than simply add tanks, ships and aero-
planes. They have also vastly improved in the 
more esoteric areas, such as the reliability of 
their communications, the mobility and lethal-
ity of their air defence and artillery systems, 
their capabilities for warfare at sea and, across 
the board, their ability to sustain offensive 
theatre combat operations through extensive 
transport improvements, forward stockage of 
materiel and a ready defence industrial produc-
tion base. This military effort has been as 
balanced across the spectrum of military capa-
bilities as it has been extensive, and we must 
face the reality today that our own advantages 
have waned considerably. 
The extent of the military build-up by the 
Soviet Union contrasts sharply with the internal 
problems within the Soviet Union and the War-
saw Pact which they will have to face in the 
1980s. They are problems with declining pro-
ductivity, agriculture, agricultural deficiencies, 
impending leadership changes, a declining per-
centage of Russians in their society and the 
fidelity of their Warsaw Pact allies. Poland is 
but the latest manifestation of discontent with 
the Soviet brand of communism. 
Some western observers point to these trends 
in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as 
signs of weakness. I agree. They are signs of 
weakness. But there is another side of the coin 
which is troubling for me. Despite the poten-
tial for greater political and economic prob-
lems, there is no evidence that the Soviets' 
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rate of investment in military power will be res-
trained by domestic need or will decrease in 
this decade. If, as many predict, the Soviets 
experience more failures and anticipate the 
future declining appeal of their ideology, they 
may increasingly resort to the one area of 
success in which they are a superpower, and 
that is the exercise of military power. 
The broader strategic environment contains 
ample evidence of a demonstrated Soviet willing-
ness and capability to employ their military 
power for political purposes. The recent 
events in Poland demonstrated their conti-
nued readiness to use their forces to intimidate 
members of the Warsaw Pact. In Afghanistan 
the Soviet Union pursues a policy of extending 
the Brezhnev doctrine to justify military inter-
vention in non-Pact countries. We have seen 
this display of power in Afghanistan without 
any detectable impact upon the readiness of 
those forces opposite NATO, and we have 
strong indications now that the Kremlin is pre-
paring for a long-term occupation of Afghan-
istan, politically as well as militarily. 
Obviously, the greatest danger for the allied 
nations in this latest aggression in Afghanistan 
is that the Soviets have acquired a better posi-
tion to threaten a region whose resources are 
indispensable to the West. Thus, the menace 
that we face today is a dual one to which we 
must have a dual response. It is a menace 
internal to the boundaries of NATO and one 
external to those boundaries where we have 
collective and vital interests. 
This, then, is the challenge to the West posed 
by the Warsaw Pact in the East. A compre-
hensive modernisation effort and a growing 
power projection capability bolster an already 
offensively oriented Warsaw Pact military estab-
lishment. How this military potential will be 
used in the international arena cannot be 
judged with any precision. Much depends on 
internal developments within the Warsaw Pact, 
on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, on 
events throughout the world, predictable or not, 
and on the Soviet calculus about the opportuni-
ties to exploit those events. 
We might argue at length whether the Soviets 
are pursuing a long-term master strategy or one 
that seizes on events opportunistically. In 
either case one matter seems clear to me. It is 
that the single most important factor determin-
ing the bounds of Soviet behaviour will be the 
degree of resistance which they expect to 
encounter. That, to me, sets a clear overall 
direction for the defence policy of NATO in 
this decade. Where Soviet activities threaten 
our vital interests, we must be prepared to deter 
or counter them. 
Within the NATO area this means that we 
must bolster our strategy of flexible response 
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through measures that we have already agreed 
and by means of new measures as appropriate. 
We must also recognise that to an unprece-
dented extent our security will depend on pro-
viding resources to protect common interests -
the collective vital interests beyond NATO. 
More is required than just the mere redistri-
bution of already inadequate resources. Grea-
ter amounts of resources must be devoted to 
meet this greater threat. 
Today, in my opinion, the ability of NATO 
both to deter attack within our boundaries and 
to respond to the external menace are causes 
for major concern. First, there is the conti-
nuous relative decline in NA TO's military 
capabilities in comparison with those of the 
Warsaw Pact. I say that even while acknow-
ledging that the Alliance has considerable 
strength, able leaders, good troops and good 
equipment and that we have devoted substan-
tial resources over the past several years to 
enhance those security arrangements. 
Secondly, despite the size of the sacrifice by 
some member nations, too many security 
commitments are becoming what I call " over-
due promissory notes ". As my staff deals 
with nations on force proposals it notes slip-
pages, reductions and cancellations of essential 
programmes in almost every allied nation. 
Thirdly, this pattern of inadequate response 
is not changing, even in the backwash of Afghan-
istan, in most nations - the United States 
seems to be the exception - even though new 
defence requirements have been generated by 
Soviet actions during recent months. Although 
Allied Command Europe, with which I am 
associated, gets stronger every year, the gap bet-
ween N~ TO force capabilities and those of the 
Warsaw Pact gets wider every year. As a result 
of this relentless accumulation of military 
power coupled with our inadequate and oft-
times faltering response to commitments by 
nations, the very credibility of our deterrent is 
in jeopardy. 
It must be the urgent business of the nations 
of the Alliance to redress the current imba-
lance, and I should like now to outline the 
broad areas to which I believe we must devote 
our attention in this decade. The first in my 
list of priority tasks is to take the immediate . 
and sustained actions necessary to ensure that 
our military deterrent posture is credible. The 
Alliance must provide the full range of military 
forces that the strategy of flexible response 
requires - that continuum from the conven-
tional through the theatre nuclear to strategic 
nuclear. 
Our strategic nuclear forces remain the ulti-
mate arbiter of our deterrence. They must be 
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maintained in a credible posture and they must 
remain coupled with the security of Europe. 
Allied strategy also requires credible theatre 
nuclear forces, an area in which we lag danger-
ously behind the Warsaw Pact. As an integral 
part of our deterrent, NATO must also be pre-
pared to conduct a conventional forward 
defence. We face major challenges in all areas 
of conventional readiness, such as having suffi-
cient forces which are adequately manned, 
equipped or trained, suitably deployed, capable 
of going to the defence quickly and in an effect-
ive manner, and able to sustain themselves in 
that defence until we have accomplished our 
missions. As a consequence of those challen-
ges and the expense of overcoming them, the 
bulk of our nations' investments must go to 
those conventional forces. 
A critical aspect in building a credible 
conventional deterrent is strengthening the 
flanks of the Alliance. In the north, it is essen-
tial to counter growing Soviet maritime power, 
which threatens Norway and Denmark as well 
as the transatlantic lines of communications 
upon which we depend. In the south, Mediter-
ranean security is an ever-increasing Alliance 
concern, as the agenda today indicates. 
NA TO's southern region is now less a flank 
than a bridge to the vital Middle East and 
South-West Asia areas. We have witnessed the 
steady growth of Soviet power opposite 
NA TO's southern nations and on the Medi-
terranean Sea. To improve our posture we 
require upgrading of local force structures, 
extensive allied military and economic assis-
tance programmes for Turkey, Portugal and 
Greece, and the provision of more reinforce-
ments in our mobilisation planning. These 
and other steps are included in the report on 
Mediterranean security which is before you. 
There is, of course, an agonising irony to this 
need to prepare to prosecute a war in order to 
deter it. It is all the more agonising, given the 
fruits of peace we have enjoyed for more than 
three decades, which often add to our compla-
cency and wishful thinking and given the com-
peting social welfare programmes our people 
have come to expect. But, as NA TO's Secre-
tary-General has recently reminded us: 
" However high the price of protecting the 
free western way of life might be, it is incom-
parably cheaper than the price that would 
have to be paid to regain that life should it 
ever be lost. " 
A second, closely-related task for the Alliance 
in the 1980s is to define a more concrete pro-
gramme for NA TO's response to challenges 
arising outside the boundaries. We must ack-
nowledge the political infeasibility of changing 
those boundaries of NATO while acknowledg-
ing also that some nations must be prepared to 
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provide the capability to protect our vital 
interests. 
In the past year we have seen the welcome 
development in several 'member nations, parti-
cularly in the United States, of concepts for the 
rapid deployment of forces to external areas 
where our interests lie. The transformation of 
these concepts into factors for NATO planning 
will occupy a prominent part of the agenda at 
SHAPE and elsewhere in Allied Command 
Europe for the next several years. 
It will also entail the obligation by nations to 
ensure the fulfilment of their commitments to a 
new division of labour to compensate for the 
assumption .by the United States of America 
and other members of out-of-area responsibili-
ties. 
To carry out the dual response will demand 
of our nations intensive efforts to maintain the 
substance as well as the appearance of allied 
solidarity. This constitutes a third major task. 
The past three decades have taught us that 
major Alliance initiatives depend ultimately on 
the achievement of a broad consensus based on 
close and continuing consultations. We cannot 
afford major rifts to emerge over our defence 
policy. Instead, we must build on the unity 
displayed in tlie Alliance in adopting the two-
tracked long-range theatre nuclear force deci-
sion of December 1979, the post-Afghanistan 
measures in December 1980 and the resolute 
stand taken in respect of possible Soviet inter-
vention in Poland by ministers in the Council 
in recent months ; and we must be alert to pre-
clude threats by the East to divide us on issues 
on which firm commitments have been made. 
As a fourth task we must ensure that we are 
exploiting, on a collective basis, our technolo-
gical and scientific superiority in the West and 
seeking breakthroughs that will enhance our 
defence and thereby our deterrent capabilities. 
We must, at the same time, take care that we 
do not export our high technology to the East 
where it will be used against us. 
Next, and most important to me, we must, 
with all the vigour that we can muster, produce 
verifiable and equitable arms control measures 
that lend predictability to the military situation 
and by so doing also add to the stability and 
manageability of the situation and lead towards 
a reduced and balanced level of arms and 
forces. I share with this Assembly the hope 
that the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union will achieve such a result in their 
upcoming negotiations concerning theatre 
nuclear forces. 
You will be discussing theatre nuclear forces 
this afternoon. It is not my desire to pre-empt 
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that discussion, but it is such an important 
matter that I should like to present some of 
my views on it on this occasion. First, I 
believe that no single issue today is more criti-
cal of NATO's security and credibility than 
that the nations follow through on that two-
pronged decision of December 1979. We must 
proceed with NA TO's plans for a long-range 
theatre nuclear force programme, because, 
contrary to Soviet propaganda, their fielding of 
more than 225 highly accurate SS-20 missiles 
each with three warheads has upset the balance. 
That deployment continues at the rate of 
five more SS-20s per month, fifteen warheads. 
NA TO's planned force of 572 missiles, each 
with one warhead, a force not due to be fielded 
for two and a half years, has already been 
exceeded by the 675 SS-20 warheads the Soviets 
have deployed to date. The goal of our 
deployment is not to match the Soviets warhead 
for warhead but to field a visible and survivable 
theatre force to fill an extremely dangerous gap 
in our continuum of deterrence. 
Allied solidarity in carrying out this long-
range theatre nuclear force programme is also 
an essential prerequisite for progress in arms 
control measures for theatre nuclear forces. 
Given the current imbalance of theatre for-
ces, even with the prospect of full NATO 
deployment, it will be difficult enough to reach 
a balanced agreement with the Soviet Union. 
Any shortfall or failure in NATO deploy-
ment will leave us with no more than a plea to 
the Soviets that they follow suit and destroy 
their SS-20s. We have only to recall the com-
plete Soviet disregard of western calls for res-
traint in this area during the past decade to 
realise how naive that hope would be. No 
matter how virtuous our intention, the security 
of the Alliance will not be advanced by a policy 
of unilateral restraint, which failed in the 
1970s. It would also be imprudent for us to 
pursue arms control for its own sake without 
regard for the overall conventional balance. 
Arms limitations must remain instruments in 
the quest for a more secure environment, not 
just ends in themselves. They should not obs-
cure the greater goal of a stable balance of all 
forces, but they can and should serve to com-
plement that goal by allowing such a balance to 
exist at lower levels of armaments. 
The twin issues of long-range theatre nuclear 
force modernisation and arms control are com-
plex. They do not lend themselves to simple 
explanation before the publics of our democra-
tic nations. 
Yet they are subject to daily often simplistic 
appeals to the emotions, appeals which more 
often than not run counter to NA TO's security 
initiatives. In this regard the two-tracked 
NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces pro-
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gramme is not alone. It shares the trait of 
being poorly understood and arbitrarily mal-
igned with other areas of the West's defence 
efforts. 
Among the reasons for this is the natural 
inclination of all our peoples to want peace, 
which is of course a virtue. Another is that 
the desire to maintain a high standard of living 
often leads to reality being blurred by wishful 
thinking. There is also the reluctance, also 
regrettably natural, of many leaders in the free 
world to underline the threat and to state 
openly that peace with freedom requires sacri-
fices by our people. That leads to the sixth 
and last task, perhaps the most basic facing the 
Alliance today. We who occupy positions of 
responsibility for and in the nations of the 
West, both military and political, must inform 
our publics fully on the nature of our security 
challenge. We must not by our silence let our 
peoples be deluded into a false sense of security 
or complacency. We must convince the peo-
ple of the criticality of the times and of the jeo-
pardy to our freedom and seek their willingness 
to make sacrifices for their own security. 
They must also be made to realise that, des-
pite the continuing and growing imbalance, the 
situation is not yet unmanageable or beyond 
restoration. There are many positive advant-
ages in our democracies to include collectively 
having the necessary superior resources with 
which to fulfil our common defence needs if we 
resolve to do so. Our peoples must also 
understand that these efforts will take time, 
patience, and the allocation of major resources. 
But, as we know, freedom cannot be bought 
on the cheap. In the long run, it is upon peo-
ples' educated commitment to their own secur-
ity, a commitment that must be transmitted to 
political leaders with unmistakable clarity, that 
the collective Alliance will, to face the future 
robustly, ultimately depend. Thus, our readi-
ness to inform and to lead our publics toward a 
collective resolve to preserve their freedom 
ranks with the other five tasks that I have men-
tioned; indeed, it is essential to each of them 
and should perhaps occupy the position of pri-
macy. 
It is with all these tasks, but especially with 
this last, that of informing and leading our 
publics, that I solicit your assistance and that of 
your colleagues in your nations. For, to my 
mind, it is only when we recognise the scope 
and continuing growth of the dual menace 
which threatens us, and we respond in a 
manner which can be clearly perceived by the 
Soviet Union as displaying the collective resolve 
to pay whatever price is necessary to pre-
serve our freedom of action, our values and our 
way of life, that we can hope to deter the 
84 
SECOND SITTING 
Soviets from achieving their ultimate objective 
- the domination of the West. 
It has been a great pleasure for me to have 
the opportunity of appearing before your 
Assembly, Mr. President. Would it be in order 
for me to call for questions ? (Applause) 
The PRESIDENT. - We hope very much 
that you will do so, General. However, may I 
first say how grateful we are to you for your 
comprehensive assessment, serious and sober 
though it has been, made from your great 
knowledge and sense of responsibility within 
the Alliance. We shall find it beneficial to our 
work not only here but in our national parlia-
ments. We are much indebted to you. 
I hope that questioners will be brief. 
I call Sir Frederic Bennett. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I heard the General speak very recently in 
Brussels at SHAPEX. I am delighted to have 
had the opportunity of hearing him again 
today. Subsequent to his speech in Brussels, or 
Mons, I asked a question in my own parliament 
about the present tactical nuclear forces land 
based in Europe and was shocked to learn that, 
compared with the more than 600 Russian war-
heads, if we include the triple warheads, which 
could reach Western Europe and beyond, we do 
not have one land-based tactical nuclear wea-
pon which could penetrate further into the 
Warsaw Pact countries than the unfortunate 
East European satellites. 
In the event of the outbreak of war, one way 
of winning potential allies among countries dis-
satisfied with Soviet rule is not first to destroy 
those countries. It does not seem to be a good 
way of making friends or influencing people. 
Does the General agree that my statements 
are correct ? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - They are. We have no 
missiles that can reach into the Soviet Union. 
We have two types of aircraft that can carry 
nuclear weapons into the western part of the 
Soviet Union. One of them will shortly be 
deactivated - taken out of the structure. Sir 
Frederic raises a key issue and I should like to 
add a fairly sizeable footnote in my response to 
his question. 
When we view a scenario and consider whe-
ther theatre nuclear forces might be used, 
because of the guidance to SACEUR, it is 
incumbent upon us to distinguish that time 
when there is still cohesion conventionally in 
our defence and before we seek, through the 
potential of a breakthrough, or after a break-
through, the use of theatre nuclear forces. The 
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purpose of the initial use of theatre nuclear 
forces is to send a message to the other side that 
we are prepared to do whatever is necessary to 
defend ourselves. We must send that message 
when there is still cohesion - a coherent defence 
on our part conventionally. We do not wish 
to send that message in our country. We like 
to have the option to send it where we think it 
could do the most good and to get the kind of 
response for which we would hope. 
That, among other reasons, is why, in my 
opinion, it is so important to add these 572 
long-range theatre nuclear missiles to our 
inventory - not to match the 675 already 
deployed and the fifteen being deployed every 
month, nor the SS-4s and SS-5s which they still 
have in the inventory, nor the Gulf submarines 
which we have in the north whose missiles can 
reach us, but to point out to the other side that 
we know that there is this strength and that we 
intend to deter it, and that to deter it we shall 
deploy the 572 - to send that message to them 
that an attack by them using nuclear weapons 
from their soil in Western Europe would be 
responded to by NATO using weapons on its 
soil against them. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Mommer-
steeg, who is the Rapporteur for the report on 
theatre nuclear forces, which we shall be consi-
dering this afternoon. 
Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (Netherlands).- How 
many of the SS-20s are targeted to you and how 
many are far away in the Far East? What is 
the meaning of that ? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - We estimate that one-
quarter of the Soviet forces are aligned in the 
Far East with the exception of the SS-20s - and 
our estimate of that is one-third. Therefore, 
today the estimate is that two-thirds of the 675 
warheads are targeted against NATO. We are 
also aware of X number - an X I happen to 
know - of sites which have been prepared for 
additional SS-20 launches. The majority - in 
fact, almost the entire number of those that we 
have noted through our intelligence are being 
constructed - are in a position where they will 
be directed towards the West. But I remind 
you that the SS-20 system is a mobile system -
it can be moved fairly rapidly from point A to 
point B - so that even though one-third of the 
SS-20 force is now targeted to the East, it would 
take little effort to get the weapons to move so 
that they were targeted to the West. The 
direct answer is, two-thirds of the force. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, General. 
I call Mr. Gessner. 
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Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - We have listened to the 
General's statements with great interest. He 
has described how the Soviet Government is 
arming more and more vigorously and how its 
military potential has been constantly increas-
ing. Now I would like to ask him what, in his 
view, is the motive of the Soviet Union for this 
accelerated armament ? Does he believe, for 
example, that the Soviet Union is interested in 
embarking with us on an accelerated arms 
race ? Does he believe that the Soviet Union is 
preparing for war? Or what other motive does 
he see for the Soviet Union's behaviour? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - First, if we trace the genesis 
of this massive growth in military power, we 
find that it relates closely to the Cuban missile 
crisis. At that time the Soviet Union was face 
down and said "Never again". Therefore, 
this build-up really began in the middle of the 
1960s and with the Cuban missile crisis in 
1962. 
Secondly, those who are much more expert 
in this area than I say that, because of the 
regime's support of the army and the armed 
forces, this is a fly-wheel that keeps turning and 
cannot be stopped. I cannot confirm or deny 
that. 
Thirdly, let us look at it with Soviet eyes. 
They look to the east and see China. They 
look to the south and see forces in the Indian 
Ocean. They look to the west and see NATO 
- a sizeable force. The USSR knows our 
weaknesses and strengths as well as we do, and 
she has decided to take whatever action is 
necessary to ensure that she can defend herself 
against what she might presume to be an attack 
by our side. 
We know that NATO is a defensive alliance 
and that WEU is devoted to defence and not to 
offence. But sometimes it is difficult to 
convince the Soviet Union of that. All these 
factors play a part. When I asked a returning 
ambassador from the Soviet Union the same 
question, he replied that whenever additional 
plants are developed - you would be amazed at 
the number of plants in the Soviet Union that 
are devoted to the production of military hard-
ware - a number of people become more equal 
than others, and they like that within the Soviet 
Union. 
That view is based upon the judgment of a 
man who served in the Soviet Union for a 
number of years. All four of those factors 
play a part in the equation when trying to 
determine why the Soviet Union continues this 
massive growth. That is why it is important to 
move ahead with arms control measures. In 
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my opinion, we cannot continue this growth. 
It is to the advantage of both sides to find 
mutual, equitable, balanced and verifiable arms 
control measures. 
As I said, such measures lend predictability, 
even in SALT 11. There were ceilings on cer-
tain types of weapon systems, and there were 
ceilings on the number of warheads that one 
could place in a particular type of missile. All 
those things added predictability to that situa-
tion and, therefore, added to its stability and 
manageability. 
That is the best that I can do without having 
to get the direct answer from the Politburo why 
the Soviets continue with this massive growth. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
General. 
I now call Mr. Louis Jung, to be followed by 
Mr. Kurt Jung. 
Mr. Louis JUNG (France) (Translation). - I 
was very happy to hear what you had to say, 
General, and I would take the opportunity to 
express our thanks once again to all the coun-
tries of NATO, particularly the United States of 
America and Canada, for all their efforts for the 
defence of Europe. 
For once, however, I would like to reverse 
the roles. Generally it is the soldiers - your pre-
decessors and yourself - who appeal to politi-
cians for an increase in the defence budget. In 
the situation in which the European countries 
now find themselves, we are very aware of our 
responsibilities but we are also very sensitive to 
the economic crisis that is upon us. You know 
very well that in this respect any weakness is a 
danger. I believe you understand that I am 
referring to monetary problems. 
May I thank you once again for the frankness 
with which you have alerted us to the present 
situation. Indeed, my personal experience pro-
ved to me, in 1937-38, that people who claimed 
to be idealists and defenders of human rights 
were in reality - and they were exposed -
nothing other than Nazi agents. I hope that 
those who today preach about human rights 
and the defence of peace are not agents of the 
Comintern. 
The PRESIDENT. - I shall try to call all 
those representatives who wish to ask the Gene-
ral questions. However, I must ask that ques-
tions be much shorter than the question of Mr. 
Jung, for otherwise we shall run out of time. I 
ask members not to make speeches but to ask 
questions. 
I call General Rogers. 
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General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - Thank you, Mr. President. 
This is my opportunity to continue to make 
speeches, which I regret doing, in response to 
questions. However, some of the questions do 
not lend themselves to short answers. 
I should like to comment on what Mr. Jung 
said. It is true that it is easy for me as a mili-
tary man, charged with military responsibilities 
by our countries, to speak in terms of primacy 
for military needs. But I am not unmindful of 
the economic, cultural, social, diplomatic and 
political problems with which the political 
authorities and leaders must deal. However, as 
I am Commander-hi-Chief, European Com-
mand, all the intelligence from the United 
States of America is made fully available to me, 
as well as intelligence by other nations from 
SHAPE. Important as economics are, the fact 
is that every nation in the Alliance has econo-
mic problems today. I believe that if the peo-
ple became aware of the jeopardy in which 
their freedom is now placed, they would say to 
the political authorities that they were prepared 
to make sacrifices in other areas and pro-
grammes to ensure their security. 
That is my plea to you today as well as to 
any other forum in which I find myself. We 
must try to get that message across. I lack cre-
dibility because I am in uniform. Comman-
ders in uniform are always accused of wanting 
more men, money and materials. People say 
that we are never satisfied. As AI Haig used to 
say when he was SACEUR, " If you only knew 
what I know, you would believe what I 
say". What I know is based upon intelligence 
information which, unfortunately, cannot be 
made available. However, steps are being 
taken to try to declassify some of this informa-
tion so that it can be made available to the 
public via the newspapers, periodicals and so 
on, to undergird the credibility of those of us 
who possess this information and to assist in 
getting the message across. 
Thank you for giving me an opportunity to 
re-emphasise the theme of my speech. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, General. 
I call Mr. Kurt Jung to ask a question, to be 
followed by Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. Kurt JUNG (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - In his speech the Gene-
ral stated that NATO is constantly considering 
how, in order to secure Europe's energy 
supplies, among other things, these rapid 
deployment forces can best be developed. In 
discussions with leading politicians of the Gulf 
region I have been forced to conclude that rea-
diness to accept such rapid deployment forces 
in the region is very, very slight and that there 
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is therefore considerable aversion to them. 
What alternatives exist ? 
My second question to the General is 
this. In connection with the Eurostrategic sys-
tems he pointed on the one hand to the SS-20s 
that are directed against Europe, and on the 
other hand, in reply to a question from another 
member, he confirmed that with the exception 
of the eighteen French systems there are no 
land-based systems in Europe. The Soviet 
Union is now demanding the inclusion of the 
forward-based systems in arms control discus-
sions and claims that if the forward-based sys-
tems are included there are 1 ,000 systems 
agains~ 1,000. Would he confirm or inform us 
of the number of Eurostrategic systems, includ-
ing the forward-based systems ? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - Certain strategic systems are 
assigned to me as SACEUR by the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom, but 
they are carried as part of the central strategic 
nuclear forces and they come under the SALT 
negotiations, not under the negotiations on 
theatre nuclear forces. One should remember 
that it is not just the United States of America 
and other nations that have forward-based sys-
tems in Europe. The Soviet Union has them, 
too - in Eastern Europe. We do not find the 
Soviets discussing their forward-based systems. 
They speak of SS-20s versus our forward-
based systems. I cannot say how that will 
develop in the negotiations. 
I cannot say under what conditions the rapid 
deployment force would be deployed to the 
Middle East. That is a decision that the Uni-
ted States of America must make in consulta-
tion with its allies. I should think that there 
would also be consultation with nations in the 
area into which the forces would be placed. 
There has been a general feeling that, implicit 
in the creation of the force, is the fact that it 
will be deployed to an area irrespective of the 
desires of the nations in those areas. I do not 
believe that that is accurate. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, General. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - Does 
General Rogers accept that, while the immense 
Soviet military capacity must cause great 
concern, classified and unclassified technologi-
cal superiority will mean that western defence 
capability will certainly outstrip that of the 
Warsaw Pact during the mid-1980s? Does he 
also agree that this possible superiority could 
avail us little, and that the wholehearted public 
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commitment to defence which he rightly per-
ceives to be necessary could not be secured 
without a fully demonstrated, vigorous and 
genuine effort to achieve multilateral disarma-
ment, perhaps to a more extensive level than is 
currently envisaged? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - I am not sure that I agree 
with your premise that the West will surpass 
the East in its modernisation efforts in the 
second half of the 1980s. I say that because 
nations must meet their commitments. I ask 
only that they show the resolve to do that. 
Why do I ask that ? Let us consider the infa-
mous 3 %, the symbolic figure. What does 3 % 
mean ? If nations meet the commitments to 
which they agreed in May 1980 - their force 
goals - under which we have subsumed the 
long-term defence programme - that will 
require an average real increase of 4 % per 
country. If we add to those force goals the 
meeting of the phase 2 post-Afghanistan mea-
sures agreed in December 1980 that will require 
a 4.5% real increase per nation per year. I 
echo my plea, therefore, that nations should 
meet their commitments, which will cause them 
to reach out in the conventional area. The 
theatre nuclear aspect is being handled separ-
ately. The strategic aspect is being handled by 
the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom individually. If those nations will 
reach out in the conventional area, that will 
enhance our conventional capability and raise 
the nuclear threshold. 
Disarmament on a larger scale can come only 
after the negotiation of arms control measures 
in the two most dangerous areas - at the stra-
tegic nuclear and theatre nuclear levels - while 
we are expanding our conventional forces. My 
desire as the commander is best described as 
follows. We do not expect that we shall have 
an attack from the East by the Warsaw Pact out 
of the blue. The most plausible scenario is 
that an attack will result from a spillover from 
a confrontation of superpowers elsewhere - in 
South-West Asia or the Middle East. There 
would therefore be a time of tension. I would 
hope to get the political authority and guidance 
to start mobilising, bringing in replacements 
and doing what is necessary. 
I want to be able to hold conventionally the 
initial thrust of those lead armies until I can 
take under conventional attack the follow-on 
second echelon tactical divisions of those lead 
armies, and then the follow-on armies and the 
follow-on fronts, because they have to come 
through choke points - narrow places, bridges 
and so on. 
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If we can do that and then counter-attack, 
which is the essence of defence, two things 
happen. It is worth stressing here that we 
should not get ourselves into the position of 
saying that defence is a question of delay, delay, 
delay to the Rhine, to the Channel and so on. 
The essence of defence is counter-attack. If 
I am successful - I shall need additional 
conventional strength which I do not currently 
have to accomplish that - two things will 
happen. The other side will be forced to 
decide whether to escalate to using theatre 
nuclear weapons. The other side knows as 
well as we do that there is no empirical 
evidence upon which to base a projection of 
whether the initial use of theatre nuclear 
weapons will escalate to the strategic level. 
Which country would want such an exchange 
on its soil? 
I come to the second eventuality. Even 
thinking of trying to hold the position conven-
tionally may be nai"ve, but I do not think so. I 
am convinced that the fidelity of the Warsaw 
Pact allies to the Soviet Union will correspond 
to the direction in which the forward edge of 
the battlefield is moving. If it is moving west, 
they will be much more faithful than if we sta-
bilised it or if it moved east through a counter-
attack. 
So I want to place a doubt in the minds on 
the other side about whether to escalate. It is 
not a viable solution to reduce ourselves to the 
options of giving up or of using theatre nuclear 
forces. I am trying to preclude that by streng-
thening conventional theatre forces and raising 
the nuclear threshold. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Prussen. 
Mr. PRUSSEN (Luxembourg) (Translation). 
- How can SS-20s be intercepted? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - The way to destroy the 
SS-20s is to hit them on the ground before they 
are fired. As you are aware, efforts have been 
under way for years to try to find a means of 
destroying a missile in flight. It is diffi-
cult. Our anti-ballistic missile capability in 
the United States was eliminated after the ABM 
treaty. But the United States Army has conti-
nued to receive funding from the Congress to 
try to develop a technology to bring back the 
ABMs if necessary. But it is difficult today to 
develop the technology of hitting a missile with 
another missile, or with whatever type of wea-
pon we might use. 
The short answer is to hit them on the 
ground first. They are mobile and tough to 
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find. But so will our SS-20s be once we get 
them deployed from the base. 
The PRESIDENT.- I call Mr. Amrehn. 
Mr. AMHREN (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - How can the European 
strategic balance, specifically, be re-established, 
when the SS-20s have a range of 5,000 kilo-
metres and the Pershing lis have a range of 
only 1 ,900 kilometres? 
What is there against the Pershings being sea-
based rather than land-based? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - The ranges of the ground-
launched cruise missile and the Pershing 11 will 
provide for the West the capability to hit the 
soil of the Soviet Union with missiles where 
today she has a sanctuary from missiles. As I 
have mentioned, we have two types of aircraft -
but they are not missiles - which can reach that 
distance, but relatively few of them. 
The aim is not to match range for range or 
missile for missile. It is just to have that capa-
bility. The Soviet Union knows that we have 
that capability, and that to my mind enhances 
the coupling of the strategic nuclear force of the 
United States of America and the United King-
dom to the conventional and theatre nuclear 
forces, because they will be United States of 
America systems which will be deployed. 
I am afraid that I have forgotten the second 
part of the question. 
Mr. AMREHN (Federal Republic of Ger-
many). - Submarine-launched. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - This was discussed at great 
length prior to the decision being made in 
December 1979, and I believe that these are the 
factors which were taken into account by those 
who made recQmmendations to the decision 
makers. 
First, submarine-launched missiles would not 
carry with them the symbolism of solidarity of 
a number of nations having the weapons on 
their soil and their being deployed and employed 
from their soil. They would be another 
United States of America system or NATO sys-
tem but not directly associated with a country 
such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Belgium or the Netherlands. 
Another factor which is very important from 
the military standpoint is the accuracy of sea-
launched missiles. We do not yet have the 
capability to provide the same accuracy with 
sea-launched as we have with ground-launched 
missiles. That is especially true when one 
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compares a Pershing 11 type missile on a sea-
based platform with a land-based platform. 
Secondly, whether we like it or not, there is 
anxiety about the communication capability 
with those weapons systems which are deployed 
under the sea. We do not have the absolute 
communication capability today that we have 
with land-based missiles. 
Those are three of the factors that were taken 
into account by the high-level group that made 
the decision. There may have been others. 
The PRESIDENT. - On my list I have Mr. 
Wilkinson, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Osborn, 
and the Chairman of the Defence Committee, 
Mr. Cavaliere. I understand also that Lord 
Duncan-Sandys wishes to ask a question. I 
think that I ought to close the list at that point. 
I call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). -The 
security of Western Europe is totally predicated 
on the capability of the Alliance to reinforce 
from North America. Are you confident, 
General, that our forces in the East Atlantic 
and Channel areas and our air forces for the 
defence of the United Kingdom air defence 
region are adequate to make possible that rein-
forcement, especially in view of the very grave 
weakness on the northern flank, particularly 
Norway, to which you referred? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - I have to give you the eva-
luation made by the Supreme Allied Comman-
der Atlantic, Admiral Train, who is very much 
concerned about having that capability, espe-
cially by 1985, as he projects what will be in 
our programme and in our structure by 1985 
vis-a-vis what the Soviet Union will have in its 
naval structure in 1985 and 1986. 
He is very concerned about being able to 
carry out the tasks which have been assigned to 
him, recognising that, if there is an attack as a 
spillover from elsewhere in Western Europe, we 
can expect that to be a global war. At that 
time it would be very difficult to release those 
American naval forces in the Pacific to come to 
our assistance in the Atlantic. I think that you 
will find the Commander-in-Chief of Channel 
Command, at least, the man who has just left 
that position, Admiral Eberle, would concur in 
that in spades. 
May I go back to one question which I failed 
to answer completely? The point was made that 
by 1985 or 1986 we would start surpassing the 
Soviet Union in technology and perhaps in 
numbers. I do not agree with that because of 
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what I see of its programmes and of ours. If 
we had all the resources that we needed today 
to provide the production just of equipment, we 
would not get the pay-off on it until 
1985. That is why I think we face a critical 
period in the first half of the 1980s. 
I believe that all that we have to show is that 
collective will and that collective resolve. We 
know that the threat is greater. Therefore, we 
shall have to provide additional resources to 
meet that threat. Primacy goes to security 
arrangements. Sacrifices will be made in other 
programmes to do that. I come through the 
revolving door one more time, because that is 
when we have to meet the people face to face 
and convince them. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. van den 
Bergh. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - I thank General Rogers for his 
address, although I feel that we have been listen-
ing to the same address from SACEURs for 
many years. As always, General Rogers has 
said that the situation between the Warsaw Pact 
countries and NATO is disquieting. I should 
like to hear the General's comments on a state-
ment in a report to this Assembly dated 17th 
November 1980. This report says that for 
many years NATO has been spending substan-
tially more on defence than the Warsaw Pact 
countries. In 1979 it spent 44 % more than 
the Warsaw Pact. The report also states that 
the two have approximate parity in numbers of 
armed forces and that in the thirty systems in 
which high technology is used the United States 
of America is superior in fourteen, the United 
States of America and the USSR are equal in 
nine and the United States of America is infe-
rior in seven. The report also shows that in 
the twenty basic technology areas absolutely 
essential to the future of military technology 
and referred to in the fiscal year 1981 pro-
gramme, the United States of America is 
superior in fifteen, while the United States of 
America and the USSR are equal in five. 
I should like to ask the General whether, in 
the light of these figures, he can continue to 
maintain that NA TO's military position is as 
bad as all that. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - You will see that, as I have 
said, SACEURs have no credibility but I can 
guarantee that if you go back to 1949 when the 
Alliance was founded and look at the balance 
and then go back to 1955, and then to 1962 
and then come to today, you will find a major 
difference has occurred in that balance. I am 
only saying what I happen to believe, with just 
as much seriousness as I can muster - that they 
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have surpassed us, or soon will, in all three 
areas of force capability, and we need to sup-
plement our strength. They have gone beyond 
essential equipment. I was a member of the 
joint chiefs of staff before this assignment and I 
can say to you that the Soviet Union has gone 
beyond the essential equivalent at the strategic 
level. 
I say also that we have that major gap in the 
modernisation of our long-range theatre nuclear 
force that we must fill. Thirdly, traditionally 
they have been superior in conventional num-
bers that they have concealed and in numbers 
that they have trained for reserves, and in num-
bers of equipment that they can field. Now, 
with respect to technology, let us never put 
ourselves in a position, I would plead, where 
we believe that their weapons are not sophisti-
cated. I have seen them. I have driven 
them. I have ridden in them and I tell you 
they have made much progress in the 1970s 
because they made the decision at that time. 
Now you speak of the sums of money that 
you spend. Surely, we pay more to our 
soldiers in the West. For example, in Vietnam 
a United States private got $ 78. Today, when 
a recruit comes in he gets $ 501. 
Certainly, of the United States defence budget 
52 o/o to 53 o/o goes to manpower. That is true 
in some but not in all countries. It is certainly 
not true in the Soviet Union and it certainly is 
not true in the Warsaw Pact. They have been 
devoting 12 o/o to 13 % of their gross national 
product every year to defence - three times the 
level that we have in NATO. I cannot 
confirm or deny the figures that you use. I just 
happen to know those figures that I use, which 
I believe are right, as you believe your figures 
are accurate. 
I am paid as a commander to make my 
assessment and to make it to the ministers and 
to bodies such as this. It does no good for me 
to stand before you when I know it is not true 
and say "We are still on that knife edge", or 
" It is still marginal ", the kind of language that 
we have used for so many years. The time has 
come to stand up and be counted and say it as 
it is. That is what I have done today. 
Whether or not I have convinced you is depen-
dent upon two things - you and me. But I say 
to you that there is no question of how I come 
out of this and "If you knew what I know, you 
would believe what I have said ". 
The PRESIDENT. - We still have Lord 
Duncan-Sandys and Mr. Osborn and, appro-
priately, to finish, the Chairman of the Defence 
Committee. I have a sense that we are subject-
ing the General to a very long and intense 
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cross-examination, but he seems to be taking it 
very well. I hope that the three remaining 
members will bear the time in mind. 
I call Lord Duncan-Sandys. 
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (United King-
dom).- While thanking the Supreme Comman-
der for his frank and challenging remarks about 
the dangerous situation that we face, I should 
like to ask two very short questions. First, 
does he agree that the possession of effective, 
up-dated strategic nuclear weapons by Great 
Britain and France makes a worthwhile contri-
bution to the western deterrent? Secondly, is 
he satisfied that the decision-making procedure 
of NATO is adequate to ensure a sufficiently 
rapid decision, when necessary, to use theatre 
nuclear weapons? 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - I believe that having strate-
gic nuclear weapons possessed by Great Britain 
and France makes it much more difficult for 
the Soviet planners and I believe it adds to our 
deterrents. Lord Duncan-Sandys did not ask 
the follow-up question, which I shall certainly 
not get into - which would one rather have, 
this one or that one, when one has to make 
difficult choices as to whether something will 
go. 
With respect to the decision-making process 
within the Alliance, a year ago I would have 
been much more pessimistic than I am 
today. I will tell the Assembly why. In 
August we watched what was occurring around 
Poland and became concerned. I went to the 
staff and said: "Tell me what guidance I should 
seek from political authorities if something 
occurs. " We developed seven items. By 
early December it became apparent to me that I 
should go and knock on the door of the Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Luns, and say " Secretary-
General, these are the items for which I will 
seek political guidance should the Soviets inter-
vene in Poland. " There were just the two of 
us, Secretary-General Luns and myself. I said 
to him: "Joseph, I want to remind you of what 
happened in 1968. The then SACEUR tells 
me that he sought political guidance and is still 
waiting to get it. You and I do not want that 
to happen. " 
Before I got back to my headquarters that 
evening I had telephone calls and I found that 
Secretary-General Joseph Luns had called a 
meeting of the DPC and had tabled these seven 
items. The call was " Do you wish predelega-
tion or what are you seeking? " I said that 
these were the things I was going to seek guid-
ance on within a week. It was fortunate that 
the ministers were meeting within that week as 
well at Brussels. Within a week I had predele-
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gation authority to take six of the seven actions 
upon which I was seeking guidance, predelega-
ted before any intervention, which was almost 
unheard of and was certainly a surprise to me. 
Having witnessed that, I am more optimistic 
now than I would have been a year ago. That 
being said, it is so important that the political 
authorities do not abdicate their responsibility 
when a war starts. Why do I say that? It is 
because in peacetime we fight to have political 
authorities in charge. We insist on that and 
that is the way it must be. But it must be the 
same in wartime. They should not come in 
wartime and say "We will let all decisions be 
made by SACEUR. " That is wrong. Politi-
cal authorities must still remain in command of 
our lands. To do that, though, they have to be 
able to respond very swiftly to the requests that 
the SACEUR makes. 
If one speaks to them I think one will find 
that they say that they will be able to do that 
fairly rapidly with their system, perhaps even 
more rapidly, of course, depending on where 
the political authorities locate themselves 
should an attack come from the East. Political 
authorities should not remain in Brussels if an 
attack comes and they may put themselves in a 
position where decisions can be more quickly 
reached than otherwise. Does that come out 
hopeful? I think that that is the best I can say. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Osborn. 
Mr. OSBORN (United Kingdom). -General 
Rogers, may I say that it has been a privilege 
for members of parliament of Western Euro-
pean Union to listen to your assessment. May 
I raise two quick issues? In my area there are 
many church groups and others who seek disar-
mament almost at any price, unaware of the 
· considerations that you have so lucidly put to 
us. Most of us here support your view that the 
only road to peace is through strength. You 
mentioned task No. 6. How best can we 
present your case? Have you illustrated docu-
mentation to put to small audiences. so that we 
can project your work and your image to those 
who believe entirely differently? 
Secondly, Douglas Hurd an~ Mi~isters .of 
Defence in Britain have outlmed m wh1te 
papers a true appreciation of the scene that you 
have put to ·us. It is important that we shoul~ 
understand what we mean by " adequate mom-
toring of disarmament ". We should lik~ to 
know what you mean by " adequate momtor-
ing ". 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - With regard to how to get 
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my message across, 1 have available here a 
number of copies of the text which I followed, 
which is obviously unclassified, and I believe 
that we left copies with the public information 
office. I gather that we have some more. We 
can therefore provide you with those copies 
until they run out. That gives the textual 
content of what I have said. 
As for the pictorial content, I believe that we 
shall have to wait upon the release of the infor-
mation from the intelligence community to be 
made available to ministers of defence. The 
ministers of defence, both at the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group in April and at the .ministerial 
meeting in May, pleaded - and that .1s a correct 
word to use - with Secretary Wemberger to 
make that available, and I know that he is 
working quite diligently to do that. I also 
believe that Her Majesty's Government have 
available to them a considerable amount of 
material that can be used to get the message 
across. 
The verification of disarmament measures is 
crucial and difficult. For example, in SALT 11 
one of our major concerns was whether we 
could verify that there would be only ten re-
entry vehicles on an ICBM and only fourteen 
on a sea-launched ballistic missile. I had to 
satisfy myself by ascertaining from the experts 
how they would intend to do it. They con-
vinced me that they could, so I accepted that. 
You talk about numbers of troops. As I 
mentioned in my talk, it is not good enough to 
have arms control measures for theatre nuclear 
forces, important though they are, or for strate-
gic forces. It is important to have arms control 
measures for conventional forces. I do not 
have the solution. We have the so-called 
confidence-building measures associated with 
the CSCE and with the mutual and balanced 
force reduction talks. As I have analysed 
them these are some good confidence-building meas~res. They permit us to put people at cri-
tical points where we can observe, or observe 
flying above in certain areas. It is difficult to 
get some nations in the West to agree to that. 
However confidence-building measures of 
that kind ' will lend themselves to leading 
towards adequate verification. Whether they 
alone will be adequate, I do not know. In fact, 
I doubt whether they will be, and I doubt 
whether we shall expect them to be. There-
fore we have to find others. I do not have the 
solution, though I am prepared to work on it 
and to assist with it. 
The PRESIDENT. - The final speaker is, 
appropriately, the Chairman of the Defence 
Committee, Mr. Cavaliere. 
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Mr. CA VALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
General, as you know, the Assembly is discuss-
ing the report on European security and the 
Mediterranean. I should, therefore, like to ask 
you a specific question which may help us in 
reaching our decisions this afternoon. 
There is a growing belief that the threat to 
NATO which has hitherto been regarded as 
directed against central Europe now points 
more to the southern areas, with the result that 
the Mediterranean is ceasing to be a peripheral 
region and is becoming a central region. What 
are your views on this point? 
I should also like to know whether you consi-
der that the probable accession of Spain to 
NATO is likely to be of positive assistance in 
meeting this changed situation. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call General Rogers. 
General ROGERS (Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe). - SACEUR faces the greatest 
challenges in the southern region. Those 
challenges are the greatest that I have. I men-
tioned them in my text and said what I believed 
needed to be done to enhance our capability 
there. I say that so that you do not think that 
I believe that all effort must go to the central 
region. I mentioned our difficulties on the 
flanks. 
Spain can make a contribution to us on the 
southern flank for a number of reasons. The 
first relates to the navy, in the Mediterranean, 
probably under me, and in the Atlantic under 
SACLANT, although those command control 
arrangements would not be worked out until 
she joined. Secondly, we need the air force. 
We look across the Mediterranean at the littoral 
countries and what may be occurring there. It 
may be helpful to get Spanish assistance there. 
With regard to her ground forces, it would be 
very helpful to me if we could get a division or 
two divisions to the point where we could meld 
them into our rapid reinforcement plan to be 
used on the southern flank. Finally, as you 
well know, it would enable us to deploy addi-
tional facilities and reinforcements to the cen-
tral or southern flank, depending on where 
SACEUR decides that he must have them. 
Therefore, I can see a number of advantages 
which could come from Spain joining, and 
many of them would be associated with helping 
us on the southern flank. 
The PRESIDENT. - I think that you will 
understand, General, how greatly we have 
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appreciated your remarks and your full and 
comprehensive replies to questions. We 
should also like, through you, to thank the 
members of your staff, who help us in the year 
in our work. 
Like us, you are greatly concerned with 
public debate on these great issues and it is very 
good to know that you are seeking, within the 
bounds of security, to ascertain what additional 
information can be declassified. We hope that 
you will continue to help us to give to national 
parliamentarians, through our Assembly, the 
maximum possible information. This has been 
a memorable experience for the Assembly, and 
we are very much in your debt. 
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day 
of the next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting this after-
noon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the 
Day: 
1. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments and Vote on the draft Recom-
mendation, Document 876 and Amend-
ments). 
2. Talks on the reduction of long-range thea-
tre nuclear forces in Europe (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and Vote on the draft Recommen-
dation, Document 879 and Amendments). 
3. Draft revised budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the finan-
cial year 1981 (Presentation of and Debate 
on the Report of the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration and 
Vote on the draft revised budget, Docu-
ment 872 and Addendum). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next 
Sitting are therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.) 
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SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. European security and the Mediterranean (Resumed 
Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recom-
mendation, Doe. 876 and Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bemini, Mrs. Knight, Mr. 
Baumel, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Spenale; Mr. 
Grant, Dr. Miller (points of order); Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. 
Bemini, Dr. Miller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy, Mr. 
Grieve, Mr. Cavaliere, Dr. Miller, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. 
Grant, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Miiller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. 
Hanin (explanation of vote). 
4. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear 
forces in Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arm-
aments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 
879 and Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mommersteeg (Rappor-
teur), Mr. Bahr, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Baumel, Mr. van Hulst, 
Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Blaauw, Lord Reay, 
Mr. Scholten, Mr. Mommersteeg (Rapporteur), Mr. van 
den Bergh, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hanin, Mr. 
van den Bergh, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy (point of 
order), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Mommersteeg, 
Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy. 
S. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of 
the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budget-
ary Affairs and Administration, and Vote on the draft 
revised budget, Doe. 872 and Addendum). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Adriaensens (Chairman 
and Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Martino, Mr. 
Mulley, Mr. Adriaensens (Chairman and Rapporteur). 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings1• 
l. See page 26. 
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3. European security and the Mediterranean 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 876 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - The first Order of the 
Day is the resumed debate on the report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and vote on the draft recommendation, 
Document 876 and Amendments. 
I call Mr. Bernini as the first speaker. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I am impressed by the documents 
now before us and should also like to thank Mr. 
Bozzi, despite his absence, for the wealth of 
detail he has assembled. At the same time, I 
have to declare myself totally opposed to the 
line taken in both the report and the recom-
mendation, which I consider to be unilateral in 
their arguments and wholly and seriously 
unsuitable in many respects - as regards the 
suggestions made to the Council - for the 
problems of European security and the 
Mediterranean. 
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The explanatory memorandum in fact 
contains two basic judgments on the situation 
in the Mediterranean zone with which I am in 
agreement: First, it is stated that, taking account 
of the deployment of forces and the relative 
strengths of the two military blocs, the threat 
has not increased over the last few years and is 
even less than it was at the start of the 
1970s. Basically, the military balance has not 
changed significantly over that period. Second, 
on the other hand, there are more armaments 
of higher quality in North Africa, the Eastern 
Mediterranean and South-West Asia adding 
fresh dangers to the unstable and strife-tom 
situation in the area and thus increasing the 
threat to the security of Europe. 
How does the draft recommendation respond 
to these assessments, which were in fact fully 
endorsed during the meetings with the NATO 
commands on the southern flank? The pre-
amble is mainly devoted to criticising the Soviet 
Union's growing military strength and ignores 
other contributory factors which we believe 
should also be blamed and which cannot be 
overlooked in any objective assessment of the 
situation: the failure to ratify SALT 11; the 
breaking off of the Geneva negotiations on 
theatre nuclear weapons; and the drive by the 
new American Administration to achieve mili-
tary superiority, which emerged clearly from 
some of General Rogers' remarks. 
Then again, regarding the spread of arma-
ments, the preamble is particularly concerned 
to blame the USSR, forgetting that the Soviet 
Union is only the second supplier of arms while 
the United States is first with 48 % of world 
turnover, going in increasing proportion to the 
Mediterdmean area and South-West Asia. The 
truth I am afraid - as must be clearly stated - is 
that we are faced by a dangerous and uncon-
trolled arms race between the two superpowers 
which are at the same time taking advantage of 
disputes between states to try to extend their 
areas of influence by military means beyond the 
limits of their existing alliances and in parti-
cular to the area beyond the southern flank of 
the two alliances. For the sake of real security 
in Europe, it is therefore becoming more and 
more essential to halt this ruinous arms race 
and the spread of new weapons to all parts of 
the world, by a speedy resumption of negotia-
tions, not only on theatre nuclear weapons but 
also on the reduction of military forces in Cen-
tral Europe, with the aim of reaching interna-
tional agreement for the limitation and control 
of sales of arms, particularly to the areas of 
worst conflict, thus making the recourse to arms 
more difficult. 
In view of the particular deployment of their 
forces and of their relationships and interests 
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linking them with countries outside the two 
military blocs, the countries on the southern 
flank of NATO and the Warsaw Pact can and 
must contribute to the achievement of these 
objectives, by furthering new confidence-build-
ing measures, by looking for ways and means of 
starting negotiations for the controlled, balan-
ced reduction of military forces and by promot-
ing stability and co-operation in the Mediterra-
nean area while, of course, respecting the two 
alliances. This should in our view be the first 
commitment of the Council of WEU. The 
recommendation, however, does not call for 
any agreement on the reduction and control of 
arms sales but in points 4 and 5 first calls on 
countries which are not members of the Alli-
ance to refuse bases to the members of the War-
saw Pact and then calls for co-ordination bet-
ween member countries with a view to possible 
military intervention in the area. 
This, when it is a matter of increasing 
urgency to reduce the use of force and to 
remove the underlying causes of the crisis and 
of instability, by calling for and furthering the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, by way of 
multilateral agreements, with the participation 
of the great powers and of the countries invol-
ved, providing guarantees of autonomy, inde-
pendence and security for all the peoples con-
cerned. Failing this, as the speeding up of 
events in Lebanon and the disgraceful bombing 
of Iraq's nuclear power plant by Israel so drama-
tically prove, stability cannot be achieved and 
conditions for real security in Europe and the 
Mediterranean cannot be created, with ever-
growing risks for peace and the future of 
mankind. 
The PRESIDENT. -Mr. Bemini, you have 
already had your ten minutes. I hope that you 
can conclude your remarks very shortly. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation).- For this 
reason also, Israel's aggression must be severely 
condemned; and the gravity of the act for which 
there can be no justification calls even more 
powerfully for the immediate resumption of 
negotiations for a just solution to the Middle 
East crisis, based on secure, guaranteed frontiers 
for all the states, including Israel, on the unity 
and independence of Lebanon and on the right 
of the Palestinian people to have a homeland. 
It is against this background that the prob-
lems of the Alliance's southern flank must, in 
my view, be considered: European co-operation 
for the modernisation of armaments; the neu-
trality of Malta; relations with Spain, the ques-
tion of whose possible accession to NATO must 
not only be left to the Spanish people to decide 
in complete freedom but must also be assessed 
in terms of balance between the two military 
blocs; and, lastly, Turkey and its contribution 
to the Alliance on which a completely unaccep-
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table and disputable judgment -is offered. Not 
only because credit is given to the people who 
organised the military coup and because the 
destruction of democracy is in fact regarded as 
justified, while nothing is said about the conti-
nuation of an illegal situation and of repression, 
contrary to human rights and the principles of 
freedom which are the basic beliefs of the mem-
bers of the Alliance, but also because any real 
strengthening of links with Turkey can only 
come about through condemnation of the ille-
gal acts of its present regime and by the speedy 
restoration of democracy in that country. 
For these reasons, Mr. President, we are 
opposed to the report and will vote against the 
draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Ber-
nini. 
Mrs. Kl)ight is the last speaker. 
Mrsr. KNIGHT (United Kingdom). - I find 
this an excellent report. It is full of informa-
tion, and all of it is most important. 
In what will be a short speech, I wish to refer 
to Malta. The report, quite rightly, speaks of 
the unpredictable leadership of Malta, but I 
want to comment on two other facts about the 
country which should cause all of us great 
concern. One of them is mentioned in the 
report. 
I want first to draw attention to the position 
of the courts in Malta. They have been mani-
pulated, al)d they have even been suspended. I 
cite the example of the legal dispute between 
the state of Malta and the Blue Sister nuns over 
the use of the famous Maltese hospital run by 
that order. I shall not go into the wrangle in 
detail. I say only that it was a scandalous 
affair from beginning to end, assuming that it 
has ended. At the moment, the state's case has 
been discarded as being gravely at fault, and the 
sisters have won. But, having observed how 
the Maltese Prime Minister operates, I fear 
that the case will not rest there. 
History shows us again and again that, where 
the due process of the law is destroyed by the 
state, the freedom of the individual in that state 
is gravely at risk. I have always found it to be 
a very competent red light to the rest of the 
world that, where any state denies the freedom 
of its individuals, almost invariably it becomes 
a wider danger. Therefore I suggest that this 
matter of the courts in Malta is not an unim-
portant internal issue. It indicates a basic 
approach that has sharp and most uncomfort-
able implications for external policy. I fear for 
Malta and, in doing so, I fear for stability in the 
Mediterranean. 
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The strategic geographical position of Malta 
is still vital. It may be, as some say, that the 
way in which defence capabilities have devel-
oped means that this is no longer so, and I 
know that an argument is carried on along 
those lines. But I do not believe that this 
contention has been proved and, time and 
again, those so-called experts of hostilities and 
campaigns have told us that A is the case and, 
when trouble breaks out, it transpires that it 
was B. I believe that Malta is strategically 
vital, which brings me to my second question 
which is whether, in the event of hostilities in 
Europe - and God preserve us from them -
Malta would be used and, if so, by whom. 
Mr. Mintoff promised Britain solemnly that 
no Warsaw Pact country would be permitted to 
station forces in Malta or to use its military 
facilities. It is true to say - and the report 
refers to this - that the British presence was 
withdrawn mainly on that promise. There was 
concern enough when Malta and Libya were 
intertwined in friendship. The implications of 
that were extremely worrying. But that has 
now ended, apparently, and the two states are 
no longer friendly. However, the agreement 
between Malta and the Soviet Union on 26th 
January this year smashed Mintotrs solemn 
promise to Britain to smithereens. As the 
report says, it is strongly at odds with the neu-
trality agreement with Italy. 
We hear sometimes about the desire of the 
Soviets for warm water ports. People who say 
that often give the impression that the Soviets 
have no warm water ports. Yet, very rightly, 
the report draws attention to the fact that there 
are Soviet fleet anchorages in Algeria, Tunisia, 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Libya, Cape Gata and 
Syria. The Soviet Union has plenty of warm 
water ports there, and I believe that the Soviets 
have in mind the possibility of another one in 
Arabia. 
All these implications are of immense impor-
tance. My suggestion is that at home Malta is 
denying her citizens not only the protection of 
the courts but very often the protection of the 
police. The deputy leader of the opposition 
was beaten up by the police. Abroad, Malta is 
breaking the most solemn promise to member 
countries of WEU. I submit that the implica-
tions are frightening. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mrs. 
Knight. 
I am glad Mr. Baumel has joined us. We 
understand why he was not here this morning. 
He has come straight from his successful elec-
tion fight. I understand, Mr. Baumel, that you 
are not interested personally in the second 
ballot. We are glad that, despite the preoccu-
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pations of the French elections, you are able to 
participate in our work this week. 
I call Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). -
Thank you very much, Mr. President. 
I wish to make some brief comments on the 
excellent report by my colleague Mr. Bozzi, 
who is unfortunately absent, relating to Euro-
pean security in the Mediterranean. 
The Mediterranean is not a secondary theatre 
but a strategic area of the highest importance 
for the defence of Europe, on the one hand 
because of Soviet penetration and the presence 
of a number of Soviet naval units, and on the 
other because it is Europe's "soft underbelly", 
as Winston Churchill said long before me. 
Moreover it forms an indispensable link bet-
ween Europe and Africa - not only North 
Africa but also black Africa which, as you 
know, is exposed to the threat of destabilis-
ation. Lastly it borders one of the world's 
" hot " theatres - the Middle East - with the 
ever-present danger of hostilities between 
certain countries in that region. 
This is the reason why the document submit-
ted to us is of immense importance. 
As its title indicates, this report concerns 
European security in the Mediterranean. Yet 
we can see that for the moment this means 
Atlantic security; in other words - and this is 
something we rejoice in - the presence and 
influence of the American forces in the Medi-
terranean constitute the only real factor which 
restores the balance in the face of the Soviet 
threat. I mean by this that the Mediterranean 
states, which consist of European states and 
African states, are unable effectively to oppose 
Soviet infiltration. This is a reality and serves 
to confirm Europe's powerlessness. 
It is a fact that Europe is unable to defend 
itself on its southern flank, the Mediterranean, 
without American help. Consequently we 
must do all we can to strengthen European stra-
tegic power in this area. France is contributing 
to this very actively, but better co-ordination is 
needed; Spain in particular should be more 
involved in the strategic effort in the Mediterra-
nean, for that country, once a world power, 
represents a significant factor of equilibrium in 
the western Mediterranean. 
We rejoice over Greece's return into the 
Atlantic defence organisations. This is of 
considerable significance. On the other hand, 
the continuing quarrels between Turkey and 
Greece must be ironed out and the burning 
issue of Cyprus must be settled at last. For 
96 
THIRD SITTING 
Cyprus is like a painful thorn in Europe's 
side. Until we find a solution to the Cyprus 
problem, whatever we accomplish in the sou-
them part of the Mediterranean will unfortun-
ately be inadequate. 
It is vital, at once for human rights, democ-
racy in Europe and defence strategy, that a 
genuine solution be found to the Cyprus prob-
lem and that, instead of clashing and opposing 
each other, those two nations so vital to the 
defence of Europe's southern flank - namely 
Turkey and Greece - should co-operate in any 
plan to safeguard the free western world. 
Finally, there can be no doubt that political 
developments not only in the Middle East but 
also along the southern shores of the Mediterra-
nean need to be watched carefully, and here I 
refer to North Africa and to Libya in particular. 
As long as an arsenal of such magnitude and 
a hotbed of terrorism and subversive activity 
remain concentrated in Libya, there can be no 
real security in the Mediterranean. Free com-
munications between southern Europe and 
Africa will be permanently threatened. And 
the value of this report lies in the timeliness 
with which it has drawn our attention to the 
problems of European security. It is my most 
fervent wish that it will be followed by practical 
achievements, for what is at stake is not just the 
security of southern Europe but global stability. 
The Mediterranean, for a long time the mare 
nostrum of our ancestors, which has lost a 
great deal of its influence in the last seventy 
years, is becoming a vital area once more toge-
ther with Europe's central and northern fronts, 
particularly in view of the Soviet effort to build 
up an ever more powerful fleet and implement 
a long-range strategy, directing its policy espe-
cially at certain countries in the Middle East 
and on the African continent, in order to out-
flank and isolate Europe, the more so as a 
Europe deprived of its natural extensions to the 
Mediterranean and Africa would be a weakened 
Europe. 
For this reason the report presented by my 
colleague Mr. Bozzi has my approval, and I 
thank the Committee for having submitted it to 
us. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Bau-
mel. We are particularly appreciative of the 
fact that you have come from your election 
campaign to participate in our affairs. Natu-. 
rally, we are extremely sorry that, because of 
events, Mr. Bozzi has been unable to present 
his excellent report; and as I understand it, it is 
unlikely that he will remain a member of the 
delegation of the French Parliament. I should 
like to place on record our appreciation of his 
work and his contribution to our work in the 
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Assembly. I hope that you, Mr. Baumel, will 
convey to him our thanks and good wishes. 
That concludes the list of speakers. I ask the 
Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Cavaliere, 
who is doubling in the role of Rapporteur - so 
that we shall have only one speaker - whether 
he wishes to respond to the debate. 
Mr. CA V ALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, it is now my duty to answer a num-
ber of speakers. First of all I should like, with 
your permission Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, to offer my warmest thanks to Mr. 
Grant for his firm rebuttal of the unfounded 
accusations and untruths uttered by Mr. Dejar-
din in an attempt to gainsay the Committee's 
wishes. 
Regarding the discussion on this important 
report, I should like to thank all speakers and 
wish simply to refer to a number of points 
brought up. 
First of all, on the subject of Malta, I should 
like to say that Italy, which has concluded an 
agreement with that country, feels that it has 
prevented Malta from falling under the extre-
mely pernicious influence of Colonel Kadhafi 
and the Soviet Union. 
As regards the agreement concluded early this 
year between the Soviet Union and Malta, I can 
say that the Italian Government is keeping a 
close watch and is aware that this agreement 
covers only the revictualling of merchant 
ships. Italy will be vigilant to ensure that the 
limits of this agreement are not exceeded. I 
consider, therefore, that no threat can arise to 
the security of the Mediterranean and Europe. 
I wish to thank everyone who agreed that this 
is a good report and to observe to Mr. Baumel 
that the title is not "Mediterranean security" 
but " European security and the Mediterra-
nean ". In other words, the actual title shows 
that we are discussing the situation in the Medi-
terranean in the context of its significance for 
the overall defence of Europe. Indeed, this was 
the principle underlying all the Committee's 
work. 
Then I should like to inform everyone who 
made points concerning the part of the report 
and of the draft recommendation dealing speci-
fically with Turkey, that the Committee took 
account of both the time and the political situa-
tion in that country; particular account was 
taken of Turkey's position and its importance 
for the defence of the Mediterranean and Eur-
ope. I was rather impressed by Mr. van den 
Bergh's remarks, as it seems to me that, since 
our visit to Turkey, there have been no changes 
which could justify the fears expressed regard-
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ing the chances for a return to democracy. On 
the contrary we learnt that a time-table for such 
a return has virtually been fixed. I therefore 
believe that there are no grounds for any of the 
reserves expressed. So far as our Assembly is 
concerned, however, it remains a fact that Tur-
key is absolutely essential for the defence of the 
West and of Europe. The fullest attention 
must therefore be given to that country so that 
it can fulfil its role and discharge its responsibi-
lities adequately. 
I should next like to say a few words regard-
ing the speech made by Dr. Miller who argued 
that the polarisation of the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO - and more generally the Atlantic 
Alliance - could have disastrous consequences 
because it would result in an endless spiral of 
expenditure on new weapons. I would observe 
that, if we do find ourselves in this position, 
this is due not to the United States of America 
or to NATO but to the Soviet Union. Why? 
Because we have marked time, the United 
States of America has marked time, we have 
marked time too long and have allowed the 
Soviet Union to make up any gap between the 
defensive potential of the Warsaw Pact and that 
of NATO. Indeed, the unanimous view today 
is that the Soviet Union, after having achieved 
parity, has moved ahead of NATO so that we 
are now in the position of having to make up 
for lost time and to repair our omissions, in 
order to achieve a degree of parity. 
I would remind the Assembly, and Mr. Ber-
nini first and foremost, that the Italian Defence 
Minister, Mr. Lagorio, a true socialist, referred 
to this situation in the report which he made to 
the Defence Committee of the Italian Parlia-
ment on 14th April last. Regarding the 
modernisation of NATO's nuclear weaponry, 
Mr. Lagorio said that the current deployment of 
the SS-20 created an offensive capacity equal to 
that of the West's modernisation programme 
when it was completed. I am quoting what 
Mr. Lagorio said, as recorded in the verbatim 
reports of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. 
According to his statement, the position is such 
that when we have completed modernisation 
we shall be able to declare ourselves equal to 
the present strength of the Soviet Union. This 
being so, how can it be said that NATO has 
engaged in a completely unjustified arms race? 
May I conclude my replies by reminding Mr. 
Bernini that, when the Committee approved the 
draft recommendation, it reserved the right, as 
time was short, to submit an amendment on the 
extremely important and serious question of 
arms sales to third world countries. But as I 
announced this morning in introducing the 
report, the Committee has submitted an amend-
ment on the subject and has therefore covered 
all questions. Finally therefore, in thanking all 
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speakers, I am confident that this excellent 
report and this important draft recommenda-
tion will be approved by the Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Cava-
liere, for your comments and for your work 
during the year as Chairman of the Committee. 
We have concluded the debate on the report 
and we come now to the numerous amend-
ments. A group of amendments has been pro-
posed by Mr. Dejardin and another group by 
Mr. Bernini. I hope that the remarks which 
Mr. Dejardin will naturally want to make in 
introducing his amendments will cover all of 
them. We shall have a vote on each amend-
ment, but we do not need a repetition of the 
debate. The amendments tend to follow a 
theme. If Mr. Dejardin agrees, perhaps we 
could have only one debate with a separate vote 
on each amendment. 
Would you like to move Amendment 1, Mr. 
Dejardin? 
1. Before paragraph (l) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, insert: 
"(z) Reaffirming its unswerving attachment 
to the values of parliamentary and pluralist 
democracy, the result of free elections by uni-
versal suffrage, and to the fundamental free-
doms set out in the European Convention of 
Human Rights;". 
Perhaps you would agree to discuss at the 
same time the other three amendments in your 
name: 
2. Replace paragraph (vl) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation by the following: 
"(vi) Believing that the maintenance and the 
strengthening of present links between Tur-
key and the various Atlantic and European 
institutions depend on true and steady pro-
gress being made towards the early restora-
tion of democracy in Turkey in the interests 
of that country and of the Alliance, ". 
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert: 
"2. To increase mutual assistance for the 
modernisation of the military potential of the 
Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterra-
nean with particular regard to the quality and 
level of armaments of neighbouring coun-
tries; ". 
4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommen-
dation proper. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation).- If 
I have understood correctly, Mr. President, you 
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would like me to introduce my four amend-
ments together. 
The PRESIDENT. - Perhaps that will be 
convenient to you. If you agree, we shall have 
only the one discussion on the amendments 
with a separate vote on each. However, if you 
prefer to move each amendment separately, you 
are at liberty to do so. The amendments seem 
to me to hang together as a group. It is a 
matter for you. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
This is not a group of amendments. However, 
I am prepared to oblige you as far as I can, Mr. 
President, providing what you suggest does not 
restrict my speaking time. This said, I have no 
intention of delaying either the labours of our 
Assembly, as the speeches, particularly the last 
one we have just heard, are all sufficiently 
explicit. 
The PRESIDENT. - Let me make it clear 
that there will be no restriction on time if you 
wish to deal at the same time with all the 
amendments. However, it would save time if 
we had one debate. I shall not call you to 
order on a matter of time. You will have all 
the time that you need. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
am not going to haggle and nor are you. I 
therefore agree to go along with what you 
suggest. However, at least one of the amend-
ments I have tabled must be kept separate from 
the others: Amendment 4. 
In accordance with your wish, Mr. President, 
I shall therefore defend my first three amend-
ments together. 
Amendment 1, which falls within the frame-
work of this important report being debated, 
tends to reaffirm what I said when I spoke, 
namely the bases on which our action rests 
both within the United Nations and withi~ 
NATO and Western European Union. In this 
text I merely recall a sentence in the preamble 
to the Brussels Treaty, stating that the heads of 
state of the participating nations are resolved to 
reaffirm their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person and in the other ideals proclaimed in 
the Charter of the United Nations. The text of 
this amendment, which I do not propose to 
read out again, reaffirms our democratic option 
which it may not be superfluous to recall one~ 
again. 
My second amendment relates to paragraph 
(vl) of the preamble. I tabled it because I dis-
agree with the wording of the draft, as submit-
ted to us, and because I prefer to look at things 
the other way round, as it were. The wording 
of paragraph (vz) in fact reflects the content of 
paragraph 3.40 of the report which, though I 
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am convinced such was not Mr. Bozzi's wish, 
could be interpreted from outside as a typically 
neo-colonialist view that takes into account 
only the strategic interests of Western Europe 
and not those of the Turkish people. 
In his reply Mr. Cavaliere stated that he him-
self placed trust - and this he is entitled to do -
in the process for a return to democracy in that 
country. 
But this is only a postulate, and all of us 
know that in mathematics a postulate is 
never demonstrated. For my part, I have 
noted not a single act - show me a single 
concrete fact, or even the smallest gesture on 
the part of the Turkish generals - to suggest 
that the process of restoring democracy is under 
way. 
On the contrary, I would refer you to the 
declaration of the National Security Council of 
2nd June which, contrary to your hopes, still 
further restricts - if that is possible - the free-
dom and even the right to speak of former 
Turkish members of parliament, now reduced 
to complete silence. In Amendment 2, confi-
dent of the common desire to respect demo-
cracy all over the world, I assert that it is our 
duty to press for, or at least encourage, the pro-
cess of restoring democracy in a country dear to 
us all - and, believe me, to me as much as to 
you, though perhaps from a different viewpoint. 
This brings me to Amendment 3, Mr. Presi-
dent. From the first two amendments it will 
be clear that I cannot share the point of view 
expressed in paragraph 2 of the recommenda-
tion proper. As I made clear in my statement, 
my own analysis of the situation suggests to me 
that, unfortunately for NATO and European 
security, Turkey's armed forces are in essence 
not directed against the outside enemy but are 
organised and used to maintain order in the 
country. And it does not please m~ think 
that we should be helping to strengthen an 
authoritarian regime which uses its armed for-
ces to maintain order. 
No matter what Mr. Jung may think, having 
insulted me here and called me a " member of 
the Comintern " because I do not happen to 
share his views, I favour responsible action and 
strengthening the Mediterranean forces, but not 
at any price! For me, democracy also has its 
worth. 
Such then, Mr. President, is the purpose of 
my first three amendments. I expect to be per-
mitted later to speak in support of Amendment 
4 concerning Spain's admission to NATO, 
which is a question quite different from the 
problem of Turkey. 
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The PRESIDENT.- I accept completely that 
Amendment 4 is different, and you will be 
called to move that amendment when the time 
comes. Mr. Dejardin has moved Amendment 
1, and in this discussion we are also including 
Amendments 2 and 3 standing in the name of 
Mr. Dejardin. 
Does anyone wish to oppose them? ... 
I call Mr. Spenale. 
Mr. SPENALE (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, all of us here play several different 
roles. Sometimes we come together in the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, whose main concern is the defence of 
human rights. On other occasions we meet in 
a context where defence problems are the main 
item of discussion. 
These are two different viewpoints, to be 
sure. However, I believe we have but one con-
science and that we cannot divorce these prob-
lems. Consequently I am with Mr. Dejardin 
when he states that, even when considering 
defence problems, we cannot set aside matters 
concerning human rights. That is why I shall 
personally, together with my French socialist 
comrades, vote in favour of this amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - Does Mr. Cavaliere, 
acting as Rapporteur, wish to speak? ... 
You have already spoken, Mr. Grant, but if 
you must speak, by all means do so. 
Mr. GRANT (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. I thought that it 
was the custom that when a person had pro-
posed an amendment an opportunity was given 
for someone to oppose it. Unless I misheard 
our friend, I understood him to say that he was 
supporting the amendment. I heard no voice 
against it. 
The PRESIDENT. - I heard no opposition, 
but I cannot tell, until someone begins to speak, 
what he intends to say. I take it from your 
speech, Mr. Grant, that you oppose the amend-
ment. We can note that. However, if you 
want to make a speech, of course you may do 
so, and if you want to be here until 10 o'clock, 
I am available to the Assembly. That is what 
we are likely to do if we go on as we are. 
Mr. GRANT (United Kingdom). -I do not 
want to make a speech, Mr. President, and I 
shall certainly accede to your wish. But if you 
ask someone to speak against an amendment, 
he should at least speak against it. If he speaks 
in favour, that defeats the whole purpose of the 
procedure. 
The PRESIDENT. -I agree completely, but 
you will understand that I cannot possibly anti-
cipate what people will say until they begin 
their speeches. 
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point of order, Mr. President. Is it in order for 
someone, called upon to put a view contrary to 
the amendment, to speak in favour of it? 
Would you not be entitled to call him to order, 
since he clearly would not be in order? 
The PRESIDENT. - I am afraid that the 
rules of the Assembly are such that if members 
want to debate the amendment and nothing else 
until 10 p.m., I have no power, as President, to 
stop them. I can express some concern, but I 
have no power to stop them. The Assembly 
can debate the subject all night if it wishes, but 
if it did that it would make a nonsense of itself. 
Let us simply say, therefore, that there are 
clearly two views in the Assembly. We should, 
therefore, now ask for the customary guidance 
from the Committee from the member who, 
fortunately, combines the roles of Chairman 
and Rapporteur. I therefore ask Mr. Cavaliere 
to give the views of the Committee, so that we 
may come to a decision. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Commit-
tee has not been able to discuss the amend-
ments tabled and I shall therefore confine 
myselfto giving my views as Rapporteur. 
I am opposed to all the amendments tabled 
by Mr. Dejardin. First of all, I wish to state 
quite definitely that the Turkish army is not 
arrayed against the Turkish people but against 
the enemies of Europe and the enemies of the 
free world rather than against the enemies of 
Turkey itself. 
I would remind all members of the Assembly 
that the Council of Europe which is concerned 
with the protection of human rights recently 
adopted a decision under the terms of which 
Turkey remains a member of the Council of 
Europe. I consider therefore that there are no 
grounds for the reserves expressed by Mr. 
Dejardin and other speakers. 
I would add that Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. 
Dejardin virtually repeats in another form what 
is said in paragraph (vi) of the preamble. I 
coulq accept this amendment but will not do so 
because it repeats what is said under paragraph 
(vl). 
The PRESIDENT. -Thank you, Mr. Cava-
Here. Before we vote on the amendment I 
should like to ask all Representatives and all 
Substitutes sitting in the seats of Representa-
tives to ensure that they have signed the register 
of attendance. Our rules stipulate that this is 
the guide we need for a roll-call vote, and I am 
advised that there are more members sitting in 
their seats than have signed the register. A 
number of members cannot therefore have 
signed. It will be helpful if they will do so 
before the vote. 
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We shall now vote on Amendment 1 by Mr. 
Dejardin. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 1 is negatived. 
We now come to Amendment 8: 
8. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph: 
" Considering that the serious bombardment 
of the nuclear plant in Iraq by the Israelis is 
an act to be condemned and which increases 
the danger of war in the Middle East and that 
the justifications invoked by the Israeli autho-
rities are unfounded; ". 
I hope, since this amendment is closely 
related to the other two amendments in the 
names of Mr. Bernini, Mr. Martino and Mr. 
Antoni, that they will be prepared, like Mr. 
Dejardin, to make one speech followed by a 
discussion on the issue which in turn will be 
followed by a vote on each amendment. 
I call Mr. Bernini. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, very briefly, because I tried to 
explain the intention of this amendment in my 
earlier speech. 
I think it is wrong to speak of growing 
dangers due to the rising quantity and quality of 
armaments without proposing measures for an 
agreement to reduce the spread of armaments. 
The Committee's proposal, Mr. President, 
does not deal with this problem, but refers to 
concerted action. The issue is not one of 
concerted action but of reducing the spread of 
armaments and of trying to cut down the use of 
force in the settlement of disputes. 
Mr. CA VALIERE (Italy) (Translation). -
That is not the issue. 
Mr. ~RNINI (Italy) (Translation).- Excuse 
me, Mr. President. The amendment is con-
cerned with the question of the Middle East 
and in my view it is not possible - I refer to the 
problem raised by Amendments 8 and 10 on 
the same subject - to talk of the unresolved 
problems of the Mediterranean and the possible 
threat which they involve for the security of 
Europe and not only of Europe, without men-
tioning a dramatic event which has taken place 
in the Middle East, namely the totally unjusti-
fied attack on the nuclear power plant. I 
therefore propose the inclusion in the draft 
recommendation of a clause calling on the 
Council to further all measures for the 
resumption of negotiations, so that the Middle 
East crisis may finally be solved. Thank you, 
Mr. President. 
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The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Ber-
nini. 
I call Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). -I wish to 
oppose Amendment 8. 
It is not my intention to justify the Israeli 
attack on the atom bomb centre in Iraq, 
although it is strange that there should be no 
condemnation of an even more serious act 
represented by the invasion of Iran by Iraq. 
I wish to draw attention to the last two lines, 
to the effect that the justifications invoked by 
the Israeli authorities are unfounded. They are 
far from being unfounded. I do not say that 
the justifications are valid, but there is no doubt 
that the justifications put forward by the Israe-
lis, far from being unfounded, are corroborated 
by all the objective evidence of what was hap-
pening in that plant in Iraq. 
In my view, we should be adopting an 
amendment in which the accusation flies in the 
face of the facts if we approved this proposal. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Dr. Miller. 
May we now have the view of the Rappor-
teur and Chairman of the Committee? 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, I am opposed to this amendment. 
Apart from the arguments put forward by Dr. 
Miller, which I do not share, I have to say that 
this matter was not discussed by the Committee 
and therefore falls outside the draft recommen-
dation. 
I should then like to say to Mr. Bernini that 
this Assembly will be discussing the specific 
problem of the Middle East at an early meet-
ing. That will perhaps be the best time to 
deal with this particular problem. I shall 
therefore vote against. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Cavaliere. 
It has to be said that these amendments were 
tabled very late, otherwise I should probably 
have had to rule that the amendment was out 
of order in that it went much beyond the sub-
ject matter of the text of the resolution on 
European security in the Mediterranean. 
Nevertheless, I have accepted it, and it has been 
moved, so I must put it to the vote. 
We shall now vote therefore on Amendment 
8. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 8 is negatived. 
We come to Amendment 2: 
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2. Replace paragraph (vi) of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation by the following: 
" ( vz) Believing that the maintenance and the 
strengthening of present links between Tur-
key and the various Atlantic and European 
institutions depend on true and steady pro-
gress being made towards the early restora-
tion of democracy in Turkey in the interests 
of that country and of the Alliance, ". 
With the agreement of Mr. Dejardin, we can 
take it without further debate since it has been 
dealt with in the discussion. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 2 by Mr. 
Dejardin. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 2 is negatived. 
We come to Amendment 7: 
7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation, leave out " even the streng-
thening". 
This amendment is to be moved by Mr. 
Hardy in the absence of Mr. Urwin. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- On behalf 
of Mr. Urwin, I shall move this amendment 
briefly. I hope that we shall not have to vote 
on it and that the Chairman of the Committee 
will accept that it is reasonable, that we can 
avoid a division, and that it can be accepted. 
We believe that, so long as any question 
mark hangs over the democratic future of Tur-
key, it would be quite unwise for the words 
" even the strengthening " to be included 
in the draft recommendation. 
We did not wish to be provocative and to 
suggest that there should be any further weak-
ening of the original proposal. However, in 
our view there might be an enhancement of the 
military potential in advance of firm progress 
towards democracy, which could be regarded as 
inflammatory. We need to be confident that 
democracy will return to Turkey, but to antici-
pate an increased irtvolvement of military capa-
city in advance of that would be quite impru-
dent. 
I hope that the Rapporteur will accept the 
amendment. It maintains the present involve-
ments and the present relationship, but it does 
not fuel existing fears about the present politi-
cal condition of Turkey, and we ought not to 
inflame them. I hope that we can maintain 
the wisdom and balance which this· proposal 
would have if the amendment were incorpor-
ated in it. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Hardy. 
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I hope that the continued absence of Mr. 
Urwin does not mean that he is still unwell. If 
he is, I hope that you will convey to him the 
warm wishes of the Assembly for his speedy 
recovery. 
Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Yes, Mr. 
President. Although I understand and respect 
the motivation of Mr. Hardy in moving the 
amendment, I should deplore the leaving out of 
the words " even the strengthening ". 
I hope that, like me, my colleagues in the 
Assembly believe that Turkey is indispensable 
to western defence. The bona fides and the 
desire of the present Turkish administration of 
the generals to return to democracy as soon as 
possible were recognised fully recently by the 
Council of Europe by its overwhelming vote in 
favour of maintaining the position of Turkey in 
the Council of Europe amongst the fraternity of 
the free countries of the western world. It 
would be a grave error if the Assembly now 
were not to place on record its recognition of 
the need for the maintenance and strengthening 
of the links of Turkey with the Atlantic and 
European institutions. 
For those reasons, I trust that my colleagues 
in the Assembly will defeat the amendment 
overwhelmingly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Grieve. 
Can we now have the views of the Chair-
man and Rapporteur, Mr. Cavaliere? 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, I understand Mr. Hardy's arguments 
and ask you to believe that, if we were not 
living through a particularly difficult and 
important time for the life of NATO and the 
securitportant time for the life of NATO and 
the security of Europe, I would accept his 
amendment. I therefore endorse the remarks 
just made by Mr. Hardy but I would ask him 
and the other signatories to withdraw the 
amendment while taking note that we under-
stand. If the amendment is not withdrawn I 
shall be obliged to vote against it. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Cava-
Here. 
Mr. Hardy, are you willing to withdraw your 
amendment? 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- No. It is 
the result of serious and mature consideration 
in the Socialist Group. Not merely will I not 
withdraw the amendment, but I shall have 
seriously to consider voting against the report if 
it is resisted. 
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The PRESIDENT. - I have now to put 
Amendment 7 tabled by MM. Urwin, Stoffelen 
and Hardy, as I understand it on behalf of the 
Socialist Group. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 7 is agreed to. 
We now come to Amendment 9: 
9. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert: 
" To encourage international and regional 
agreements, with the participation of the 
great powers, to restrict and control sales of 
arms to countries in the area, particularly 
those at war, to facilitate the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes between states, respecting 
their independence and interests and guaran-
teeing mutual security; ". 
Mr. Bernini has very kindly agreed that this 
amendment may be taken without further dis-
cussion. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 9. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 9 is negatived. 
Next we come to Amendment 3, which Mr. 
Dejardin has agreed, following the opening 
debate, may be put without further discussion: 
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recom-
mendation proper and insert: 
"2. To increase mutual assistance for the 
modernisation of the military potential of the 
Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterra-
nean with particular regard to the quality and 
level of armaments of neighbouring coun-
tries; ". 
We shall now vote on Amendment 3 by Mr. 
Dejardin. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
We come to Amendment 6: 
6. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"To concert allied policy on the supply of 
armaments to third countries;". 
This has been tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, I do 
not know whether in his personal capacity or 
his capacity as Chairman. No doubt he will 
explain that. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. CA V ALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I repeat what 
I said in my reply; when it approved the draft 
recommendation, the Committee agreed that 
this amendment, which it had not been able to 
discuss, should be tabled. I therefore signed it 
as Chairman rather than as Rapporteur, in 
accordance with the Committee's rules. 
The PRESIDENT. - Amendment 6 has been 
moved. Is there any opposition to this amend-
ment? 
Mr. Bernini. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation). - I oppose 
this because it is not a matter of concerted 
action. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Bernini wishes to 
oppose the amendment. In that case I have to 
put it to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 6 is agreed to. 
We come to Amendment 4: 
4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommen-
dation proper. 
As this is on a separate point from the pre-
vious amendment of Mr. Dejardin, I have 
agreed that he should move it. I call upon him 
now to move the amendment to delete para-
graph 7 of the draft recommendation proper 
concerning Spain. 
Dr. Miller. 
Dr. MILLER (United Kingdom). -Would it 
be possible to take Amendment 5 first? These 
amendments deal with the same paragraph and 
one will depend upon the other. 
The PRESIDENT. - No. If paragraph 7 is 
deleted, of course it cannot be amended. 
Therefore, I must first put the proposition that 
it should be eliminated. If it is eliminated, 
there is no possibility of accepting the amend-
ment to it, for all amendments to paragraph 7 
would then consequentially fall. That will be 
in the minds of members of the Assembly when 
they vote on Mr. Dejardin's amendment. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
This morning I heard several remarks which 
hardly surprised me. It was said that I am 
indifferent to the expansion of the Warsaw Pact 
forces. This shows how little people know 
me. The interests of the free world were also 
invoked. I am all for the free world person-
ally, but I cannot help but note with regret that, 
on occasion, it contains negative elements, such 
as Chile, South Africa and today also unfortu-
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nately - though not for too long I hope - Tur-
key. I was described as an agent of the Comin-
tern. May I ask the Assembly to be heedful of 
the danger there is in manifesting too much 
anti-communism today - yesterday it was anti-
bolshevism - for that was the reason for which, 
not so long ago - I was only a child then -
French volunteers were dispatched to the eas-
tern front to fight alongside troops of whom 
they disapproved at the bottom of their hearts. 
We must beware of "antis "; that is the dan-
ger which threatens us most, wherever we may 
be. 
Mr. President, because I am aware of the 
problems regarding the balance of forces, I 
might perhaps have been in favour of para-
graph 7 of the draft recommendation. But it 
so happens that I fully share my friend Mr. van 
den Bergh's beliefs concerning any extension of 
the policy of military blocs and the risks of a 
general escalation of tension it entails. There-
fore all I ask is that we should not start some-
thing which we might find getting out of hand 
and leading to consequences we are not pre-
pared to accept. 
This is the reason why I tabled Amendment 
4 which, no matter what Mr. Cavaliere may 
say, was submitted to the Committee on 4th 
May together with all the others but which I 
did not have an opportunity to uphold before 
that Committee - and he knows the reason 
why. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Dejar-
din. 
Is there any opposition to the amendment? 
Mr. GRANT (United Kingdom). -I oppose 
the amendment. It is completely undesir-
able. Spain has, by a remarkable process, 
become a democratic country which is good 
enough to be a member of the Council of 
Europe. It is seeking to join the European 
Economic Community. In all probability, it 
will seek to join NATO. In the event of a 
major war in the Mediterranean, it is unthink-
able that we could conduct it without Spain. 
We heard only this morning from General 
Rogers that Spain had a contribution to make 
to NA TO's defence. 
Therefore, if we believe in Spanish demo-
cracy, in NATO and in the defence of the 
Mediterranean, this paragraph is absolutely 
essential and should remain in the text. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Grant. 
If the amendment is carried, Amendment 5 
will fall. 
Does the Chairman and Rapporteur of the 
Committee wish to speak to the amendment? 
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Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- No, 
Mr. President. I am opposed. 
The PRESIDENT. - The cases for and 
against Amendment 4 have been presented. I 
must put the amendment to the Assembly. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 4 is negatived. 
The PRESIDENT. - Do you wish to move 
Amendment 5, Mr. Gessner? It is: 
5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out'' and defence planning". 
Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, there is 
undoubtedly broad agreement in our Assembly 
that Spain is part of the western world. We 
have very close cultural contacts and very close 
economic relations. The collapse of the dicta-
torship in Spain has forged the bonds of solida-
rity between the western nations and Spain -
bonds which, I hope, are both strong and 
reliable. 
There is also military co-operation between 
Spain and the United States of America. I 
have no doubt - that is why I am saying this 
now - that should Spain ever apply to become 
a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, it 
would have a great deal of support in this 
Assembly. 
I say this because I do not want to create the 
impression that our amendment is designed to 
prevent Spain's accession to the North Atlantic 
defence Alliance. But to see this amendment 
in its proper perspective, we must realise that 
if, as the draft recommendation says, arrange-
ments should be made to permit Spain to parti-
cipate in NATO defence planning, we are in 
fact advocating that Spain become, in a way, a 
member of the Alliance. This would not be 
formal, but partial, de facto membership. This 
being so, I do not think we would be doing the 
Alliance a favour by giving the impression that 
someone was, as it were, trying to slip into the 
Alliance through the back door. We must 
insist on the importance of a precise definition 
of the rights and obligations of each member 
state, which would not be so if Spain were to 
participate in defence planning without other-
wise being integrated into the Alliance. 
We therefore propose the deletion of the 
words " and defence planning " from the draft 
recommendation, because this is in the interests 
of the Alliance itself. I ask you: how would 
the Spanish Government look if the Spanish 
people got the impression that it was trying to 
creep into the Alliance through the back door, 
as it were? That would not help the Alliance 
or the internal situation in Spain. 
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I am therefore in favour of our deleting these 
three words, which does not mean that we are 
generally opposed to Spain's accession to the 
Alliance. I ask you to approve the amend-
ment. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Gess-
ner. 
I call Mr. Miiller. 
Mr. MULLER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, I oppose 
this amendment because it does not seem quite 
logical to me, particularly after what Mr. Gess-
ner has just said. If he had pursued the idea 
he has just introduced to its logical conclusion, 
he ought to have called for the deletion of the 
whole paragraph. If we are going to talk about 
joint exercises as it says here, Mr. Gessner, we 
cannot of course think only of the United 
States, which has an agreement with Spain ena-
bling it to maintain bases in that country. 
When it comes to such joint exercises and the 
defence of the Mediterranean area, our thinking 
must obviously extend beyond the United 
States. 
This is not, of course, to prejudge the issue of 
Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. 
That is for Spain to decide; it is an inter-
nal matter for Spain. The decision on joining 
the European Community will also be taken in 
Spain or other countries, but arrangements, 
talks and agreements take place beforehand -
not on military matters but on other areas -
and in this way people gradually become accus-
tomed to the possibility of full membership. 
Since I regard myself as a democrat, I think it 
is much fairer and more honest to say: yes, we 
will have joint exercises if there is a mutual 
understanding, if an agreement is reached; yes, 
we will also talk about joint defence plan-
ning. Why should democracies not discuss this 
openly before coming to a decision about 
it? At all events, it is fairer and more honest 
than secret diplomacy, from which people may 
draw quite the wrong conclusions. 
So I say again, for the sake of clarity and fair-
ness, either delete the whole paragraph, which I 
should not like, or leave it as it is. I therefore 
oppose Amendment 5, seeking the deletion of 
the three words. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Muller. 
May we have the views of the Rapporteur 
and Chairman? 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, I would ask the proposers of this 
amendment to consider that the possible acces-
sion of Spain does not exclude a move by 
Spain itself, nor could it. It is also true that 
any participation by Spain in exercises and 
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defence planning is a matter for Spain to 
decide. Here we say that we hope that Spain 
will accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and 
become a member of NATO. As this will take 
a long time and as we are convinced of the 
value and usefulness of such participation, it 
would be possible in the meantime, pending 
full accession, to make arrangements which 
would enable Spain to take part in exercises 
and defence planning. I see no reason why a 
distinction should be made between exercises 
and defence planning. In other words, it is not 
the intention to bring in through the back door 
someone not wanted through the front but, in 
any event, it is more and more a bilateral deci-
sion to be arrived at with the consent of both 
parties, that is NATO as at present and Spain, 
for immediate participation - or when the 
necessary arrangements have been made - in 
exercises and defence planning. That is why I 
am asking our colleagues to withdraw their 
amendment if possible. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. I must now put the amendment moved 
by Mr. Gessner- Amendment 5. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 5 is agreed to. 
We now come to Amendment 10, moved by 
MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni, which we 
have already discussed. 
10. After paragraph 7 ofthe draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert: 
"To support the immediate resumption of 
negotiations on the Middle East which have 
become even more urgent after the Israeli 
attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, in order 
to find a fair solution to the crisis based on 
sure and guaranteed frontiers for all states, 
including the state of Israel, on the right of 
the Palestinian people to a homeland and on 
the unity and independence of Lebanon; ". 
With their agreement, I shall put it immedi-
ately to the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and stand-
ing) 
Amendment 10 is negatived. 
I must now put the draft recommendation, as 
amended. To make it absolutely clear, it has 
already been amended in three respects: first, in 
paragraph (vz) of the preamble, the words 
" even the strengthening " are omitted; secon-
dly, after paragraph 4 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, a new paragraph is inserted: 
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"To concert allied policy on the supply of 
armaments to third countries; ". 
Finally, we have Amendment 5 moved by 
Mr. Gessner, in paragraph 7 of the draft recom-
mendation leave out the words " and defence 
planning ". 
I must now put the draft recommendation, as 
amended, contained in Document 876. 
Are there any objections? ... 
Do you wish to object, Mr. Hanin? 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I am on the whole favourable to the 
draft recommendation, but since the adoption 
of the amendment relating to Spain removes a 
large part of its significance, I shall abstain. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Bernini. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation). - We 
shall vote against. 
The PRESIDENT. - We can record absten-
tions but if there are objections I must take a 
roll-call vote. 
Does anyone else wish to object or abstain? ... 
There is an objection and an abstention. I 
must therefore take a roll-call vote. There is 
no alternative under the rules. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. 
Maravalle. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows1: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . 56 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted2• 
4. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre 
nuclear forces in Europe 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote 
on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 879 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - We now move to the 
second Order of the Day, which is the presenta-
I. See page 27. 
2. See page 29. 
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tion of and debate on the report of the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Armaments and 
vote on the draft recommendation, Document 
879 and Amendments. 
I call Mr. Mommersteeg. 
Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (Netherlands). - This 
is a short report on highly topical subjects. 
The report from the Committee follows deve-
lopments concerning the SALT process in the 
wake of the Committee's report of last Decem-
ber. The Assembly adopted Recommendation 
360 by thirty-five votes to three with ten 
abstentions. For the convenience of members 
the text of that recommendation is reproduced 
in Appendix I to the Committee's present 
report. Since that recommendation was adopted 
the new Reagan administration has taken office, 
and Chapter 11 of the explanatory memoran-
dum deals with the evolution of United States 
policy. The new administration has not yet 
formulated its policy on the SALT process as a 
whole in respect of its approach to the Soviet 
Union. 
In paragraph 2.5 of the explanatory memo-
randum the Committee quotes a recent remark 
by the United States of America's Secretary of 
State, Mr. Haig, when, asked whether there was 
a time-table for the SALT negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, he replied: 
"No ... Clearly President Reagan has reiter-
ated his willingness and desire to engage in a 
full range of negotiations that are necessary to 
provide equitable balanced reductions in 
nuclear weaponry, and I emphasise reduc-
tions. This is a problem associated with a 
host of technical issues associated with the 
arms control of central strategic systems 
themselves, but it is also clearly related to 
Soviet international behaviour and overall 
relationnships between East and West. And 
I do not foresee in the immediate future a 
resumption of those talks. " 
Since taking office, the new American 
Administration has given priority to economic 
policy. It has been slow to formulate general 
foreign policy, and in particular policy on arms 
control. At times it has appeared publicly 
divided on these issues. The new administra-
tion seemed, and still seems, in need of more 
time than many Europeans, who are anxious 
for the resumption of the SALT process, expec-
ted or hoped for. 
In judging these developments we should not 
forget, first, that President Reagan has commit-
ted himself repeatedly and emphatically to the 
SALT process. Secondly, we should remember 
that he has decided to embark on TNF negotia-
tions. Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that 
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Europe can influence United States policy, par-
ticularly if it is united and if it takes a common 
constructive stand. The fourth point is that 
SALT negotiations have to be carefully pre-
pared, particularly if they are directed not only 
at limitations but at reductions, of which the 
American President has spoken repeatedly. 
One aspect of the SALT process - the wea-
pons that have become known as long-range 
theatre nuclear forces - is, for two reasons, the 
more urgent issue. The first is that the Soviet 
Union is continuing its rapid deployment of the 
new SS-20 missile. The second is the impor-
tant twofold NATO decision of December 1979 
to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing 11 miss-
iles in Europe from December 1983, and for 
the United States simultaneously to engage in 
negotiations with the Soviet Union on reduc-
tions in this type of weapon system. That is 
based on the assumption that those negotiations 
will begin urgently and will endeavour to seek 
reductions in the level of Soviet weapons now 
being deployed and in the number of missiles in 
the NATO plan announced in December 1979. 
The draft recommendation which the 
Committee now submits to the Assembly 
concentrates, therefore, on the urgency of these 
talks with the Soviet Union. In the preamble 
there are no new themes which are not already 
to be found in Recommendation 360, pre-
viously adopted by the Assembly, with two 
exceptions. The first is that the two opening 
paragraphs stress the possibility of a frank dia-
logue between Europe and the United States as 
well as the desirability of a common construc-
tive contribution by Europe to that dia-
logue. In itself it is not a new theme, but I 
believe that there are reasons why attention 
should be given to that subject. 
The second is the belief, or rather the hope, 
in paragraph (v) that the TNF negotiations 
should provide the political impetus to include 
gradually all nuclear weapons in a broad nego-
tiating process so as to forestall an unrestricted 
nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous 
world. 
The third paragraph of the preamble calls 
attention to the vast modernisation of Soviet 
conventional nuclear forces. I remind the 
Assembly that the last ten years have seen the 
deployment by the Soviet Union of three new 
strategic missiles - the SS-17, the SS-18 and the 
SS-19 - and of three new submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles - the SSN-8, the SSN-17 and 
the SSN-18. Over the same period, the United 
States has deployed only two strategic missiles, 
the Poseidon and the Trident. 
The preamble continues to reiterate support 
for the twofold NATO decision of December 
1979 as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously 
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on reductions. It can now be said, following 
President Mitterrand's comments during his 
meeting with Chancellor Schmidt, that the 
French Government, too, support that decision 
in that sense, although France of course, which 
has its own strategic missile systems, will not be 
participating in the NATO decision to deploy 
United States cruise missiles in Europe. 
I believe that the rest of the preamble speaks 
for itself. Paragraph (vi) stresses the need for 
long-range TNF to be considered in the general 
SALT framework, as reports of the Committee 
have frequently stressed, because any attempts 
to establish a separate regional balance of 
nuclear forces could only serve to uncouple 
deterrence in Europe from the overall protec-
tion of the main United States strategic nuclear 
forces. 
The eighth paragraph calls for comparable 
information to be made public. 
There is a hint in the last sentence of para-
graph 12 of the communique of the ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5th 
May 1981 that a new assessment of the force 
balance is being undertaken within NATO. 
The Committee notes, in the explanatory 
memorandum to this report, that the Soviet 
Union never provides information on Soviet 
weapons systems. At the same time, it has to 
be said that some of the information on the 
force balance provided in NATO communiques 
is sometimes confusing or misleading rather 
than informative. 
The Nuclear Planning Group, for example, 
in its communique of 8th April 1981, points 
out that about 220 SS-20 missile launchers are 
operational and that the Soviets have deployed 
some 660 warheads. Not mentioned, however 
- as the military experts know perfectly well -
is that a proportion of those 220 missiles, 
usually reported to be about one-third, are out 
of range of Europe, deployed in the far east of 
Soviet territory. Moreover, some SS-20 mis-
siles deployed centrally in the so-called " swing 
position" would reach Western European tar-
gets at extreme range and for this purpose 
would not carry three warheads each. The 
true military assessment, at the present time, of 
the number of SS-20 warheads actually in range 
of European targets is probably nearer to 350 
than the 660 referred to in more general terms 
in the NPG communique. 
On the other hand, the SS-20 launchers are 
mobile and, besides, the deployment process is 
still going on - to say nothing of the still 
deployed SS-4 and SS-5. The Committee calls 
for the sort of balanced and objective assess-
ment to be found in the reports of various 
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private institutes to be made available officially 
by NATO. Only by public opinion being pro-
perly informed in this way can democratic 
support for defence policies be secured. 
The draft recommendation welcomes the 
decision of the United States to embark on 
negotiations on the long-range TNF with the 
Soviet Union before the end of the year, and 
the operative part of the recommendation calls 
for these negotiations to begin without delay, 
and continues in paragraph 2 to call for the ear-
liest resumption of negotiations on SALT as a 
whole, for, as I mentioned earlier, there is a 
close link between TNFs and the general SALT 
framework. 
Paragraph 3 calls for the continued mutual 
respect of the SALT 11 limits and the SALT I 
agreement and the ABM treaty. This anti-
ballistic missile treaty, signed in 1972 and open 
for renewal or not next year, is an important 
element in the SALT framework. Abolition of 
this guarantee against the build-up of new 
ballistic missile defence systems would enhance 
the danger of an unrestricted nuclear arms race. 
While SALT 11 has not been ratified by the 
United States - and it is not the policy of the 
present administration to submit that treaty for 
ratification - it is nevertheless a principle of 
international law that the provisions of treaties, 
once signed, must be respected pending their 
ratification or pending the successful outcome 
of further negotiations to amend an unratified 
treaty. In two previous recommendations the 
Assembly has expressed its support for the 
existing SALT agreements. 
You, Mr. President, in your speech yesterday 
said: 
"It is, however, necessary to say emphati-
cally that it is essential for progress, and real 
progress, to be offered by the United States in 
the SALT process if there is to be agreement 
here in Europe on its general NATO stra-
tegy. There is widespread concern that we 
are at the beginning of an arms race which, 
particularly in the depressed economic cir-
cumstances, we cannot afford and which will 
in no way enhance our security. It must 
also be understood that the protest move-
ments against nuclear weapons - and, indeed 
in some cases, against the use of nuclear 
power for civil purposes - have in many of 
our countries a deeper and wider support 
than had their counterparts of a decade or 
more ago." 
Yes, and in those protest movements against 
nuclear weapons there is a growing tendency to 
view the United States and the Soviet Union on 
an equal footing, forgetting the framework of 
essential relations - and that is also not only a 
military treaty - which unites Europe and the 
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United States and which is essential for mutual 
security. I believe that this tendency, which 
influences also part of some political parties in 
Europe, is a dangerous one. 
It is the concern of the Committee that equal 
emphasis be placed on both aspects of the 
December 1979 decision in the hope that the 
final levels of long-range TNF deployed by 
both sides will be much lower than the present 
levels of Soviet missiles. It is also the hope of 
the Committee that the TNF negotiations will 
lead to that broad process of negotiations which 
I mentioned in which gradually all nuclear wea-
pons are included to secure a balance at conti-
nuous lower level. 
It is in that spirit that I commend the draft 
recommendation to the Assembly. 
(Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, 
took the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I wish to 
thank the Rapporteur very much for his report, 
and I now open the debate. 
There are ten speakers on the list. I call Mr. 
Bahr as the first speaker. 
Mr. BAHR (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, I should like to begin by making 
two comments. The first is that the report 
which has just been presented proves that even 
a short report can contain a wealth of inform-
ation. We are particularly grateful to Mr. 
Mommersteeg for this. 
The second comment is that this report 
proves that WEU's opponents are wrong to 
accuse us of only being interested in armament 
and not bothering about arms control. 
We heard the American Supreme Comman-
der's statement this morning. He is the most 
senior American soldier in Europe. He recei-
ves his orders from the political leaders and 
gives orders to the units under his command. 
It is quite obvious that what he has said here is 
in the Supreme Commander's interests, which 
does not relieve the bodies to which he reports 
of their political responsibility. 
We must base our decisions on the twofold 
NATO decision which has already been men-
tioned several times. I believe this is also 
reflected in the recommendations made by Mr. 
Mommersteeg in his report. Both parts of this 
twofold decision must continue to apply. 
Without this twofold decision the United States 
of America would not have been prepared to 
negotiate, and without negotiations we will not 
achieve the objectives we have set ourselves in 
the report. 
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Having had the opportunity to visit Moscow 
only a few days ago, I can tell you that the 
Soviet Union also assumes that the twofold 
NATO decision applies. I say this particularly 
in the light of some remarks made by Mr. 
Mommersteeg about the growing peace move-
ment in a number of member states. I believe 
we can all sympathise with the concern felt by 
many people, especially the young, at the grow-
ing dangers inherent in an unchecked arms 
race. But these are the people to whom we 
must explain that such dangers can only be sur-
mounted by negotiation, and there will be no 
negotiation if we interfere with the twofold 
NATO decision. I am quite convinced that if 
we want negotiations, we must also accept the 
twofold decision. 
I would also like to say a few words about the 
aim of the negotiations. I think the Soviet 
Union is undoubtedly concerned about the new 
missiles the United States of America intends to 
base in Europe. It is noted that the early war-
ning time will then be reduced to a few minutes 
and that, practically speaking, there is no 
defence against the American Pershing 11 
missile. I believe that to be correct. 
But we must point out that we are already 
living under a similar threat in Western 
Europe. The SS-20 is not to be deployed in 
two or three years' time: it is already being 
deployed, and it takes no longer to reach its 
destination than the Pershing 11. It too takes 
only four or five or at the most six minutes, 
and there is no · defence against this missile 
either. In other words, we in Western Europe 
are already living under the constant threat 
which the Soviet Union wants to avoid. 
If we want to change this situation, negotia-
tions are the only way. This is the proposal 
made in Mr. Mommersteeg's report. 
My colleagues will be moving the amend-
ments we should like to see adopted. The first 
three do not seek to change the tenor of the 
report in any way, but merely to stress the 
urgency with which we feel negotiations should 
begin, with a view to securing a balance at the 
lowest possible level. 
In our fourth amendment we propose an 
addition to the report to the effect that we are 
in favour of a conference which was talked 
about in Madrid as a follow-up to the Madrid 
conference, and which, as far as I can see, has 
the general support of the governments of all 
our member states. This amendment therefore 
proposes an addition to the proposals made 
here. 
I would be grateful for the widest possible 
support for them all. 
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I call Mr. Antoni. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the vote we 
are about to give in favour of the draft recom-
mendation submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg on 
the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear 
forces means first of all that we are concerned 
with and approve any political option, initiative 
and programme which seeks to combat a world 
arms race and to create conditions for the 
reduction and limitation of armaments - of all 
kinds - agreed and pursued through interna-
tional negotiations. We regret therefore that 
the draft recommendation as worded does not 
meet with our entire approval, for the reasons 
which I shall give. 
Our approval is in fact limited to the recom-
mendation proper, the more so if the Assembly 
adopts the amendments tabled by Mr. Hardy 
and others, which we support particularly 
because they set out even more explicitly the 
call for the earliest resumption of negotiations 
on the limitation of strategic arms and imme-
diate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament 
conference for Europe. For this to come about 
and for a start to be made along such a difficult 
and disputed road, the political will must be 
expressed objectively on the basis of detailed, 
logical analysis. Unilateral assessments set 
limits to the solution of these problems and in 
our case do not assist a policy for the reduction 
of armaments. 
Our reserves concerning the whole preamble 
to the recommendation are based on our view 
that they do not fully meet the need for a com-
plex overall study. We would argue therefore 
that the basic data should be collected and 
assessed over a broader spectrum so that, 
without in any way toning down the criticisms 
expressed and the charges of responsibility, all 
aspects of the problem and all areas of responsi-
bility can be grasped, together with all the 
obstacles to a policy for the reduction of arma-
ments, which is stated to be the aim. In our 
view it is not possible to achieve such a policy 
so long as doubts and uncertainties remain. 
The approach adopted in the preamble is 
the standard approach which we have heard 
repeated so many times. This applies in the 
matter of responsibility. But if we want to 
negotiate, this blinkered line of thought must 
somehow be set aside. And this is possible if 
we compare responsibilities for example for the 
non-signature of SALT 11, the breakdown of the 
Geneva negotiations and the armaments race 
initiated by the new United States Administra-
tion. 
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It is agreed on all sides that defence capacity 
cannot be separated from the economy or 
rather from the state of the economy of the 
individual countries and of the West as a 
whole. And it is not sufficient in the present 
situation - and in our view it is not right either 
- to state the question exclusively in terms of 
increasing funds for military expenditure. 
Is it possible to ignore the extremely harmful 
effects of the rising dollar for the countries of 
Europe? Is this or is it not an external infla-
tionary pressure which is damaging the indivi-
dual economies? Why not argue for genuine 
economic solidarity and co-ordination between 
the United States and the countries of Europe 
instead of insisting on the need for further sacri-
fices by Europeans, as if what is happening in 
the monetary and economic fields were not 
already a heavy sacrifice imposed by external 
policies within the western camp itself? 
It is obvious that such an analysis, which is 
more objective because it is more complete, 
reinforces the urgent need to resume negotia-
tions because it is certain that otherwise the 
danger of war will increase. Above all this 
seems to us, and not to us alone, if we all 
"want peace" as General Rogers said this 
morning, the most likely way of achieving the 
consensus, which the Rapporteur himself says 
must be reached between peoples, as the basis 
for a more trusting and co-operative relation-
ship between countries, opening the way to 
implementation of the recommendations to 
governments and, therefore, to establishment of 
the political conditions for starting and success-
fully concluding the negotiations, which will 
free mankind from the danger of destruction 
and extermination. 
Considerable importance should be attached 
to the statement made by General Rogers, also 
this morning, to the effect that the technical 
lead is increasing continuously in all armament 
sectors so that, while our security systems are 
being strengthened, the response is already ina-
dequate and out of date. We also noted that 
the situation can however be handled. It was 
not very clear to me how it is possible to speak 
of an " agonising irony " in connection with the 
need to increase armaments; however, the 
emphasis on armaments control as a vital 
necessity and the positive view on the need, 
which we support, for the resumption of nego-
tiations between the United States of America 
and the Soviet Union are to be welcomed. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we 
have tried to make a number of points explain-
ing our vote and at the same time to provide 
the Assembly, the political parties and every 
representative with further food for thought on 
the questions now before us. 
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We are convinced that in the interests of the 
West and of the whole planet each one of us 
should do his utmost, in accordance with his 
own views, but for a common purpose, to 
ensure that the peoples can live in freedom and 
in peace. We are fully prepared to play our 
part in any action of this kind of such impor-
tance for mankind. 
And finally, this is the more general signifi-
cance of our vote in favour of the recommenda-
tion proper, by which we also wish to express 
our appreciation to Mr. Mommersteeg for his 
report, and to declare our commitment both 
here and at national level to working for a fair 
nuclear balance overall, at a much lower level, 
and to ensuring that the disarmament confe-
rence be held as soon as possible in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Antoni. 
I call Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - The 
report submitted by our colleague Mr. Mom-
mersteeg on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments appears to 
me to be both encouraging and ambitious. It 
is encouraging because it is part of a move to 
resist the false attractions of the neutralism 
which, in varying degrees, affects the member 
states of WEU and his own country in particu-
lar. It is ambitious to the extent that it 
attempts to outline a possible joint armaments 
control strategy for the Atlantic Alliance. 
The essential merit of Mr. Mommersteeg's 
report is that it clearly underscores th~ grave 
imbalance of the military situation in Europe 
and that it reaches the logical conclusion that 
the allied potential must be strengthened. 
The usual objection to such strengthening has 
been that the conventional and nuclear imba-
lance is nothing new in the European theatre, 
that it has always existed and that for a long 
time it was not perceived as an intolerable dan-
ger since President Kennedy himself dismantled 
the Jupiter and Thor protection systems which, 
until the early 1960s, threatened the Soviet 
Union from the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Turkey. 
The critics of a modernisation of the Euro-
pean nuclear arsenal appear to have overlooked 
something of major significance, namely that 
the protection of Europe by America's central 
system is neither as credible nor as assured as it 
was before the Russians acquired the ability to 
unleash a large-scale nuclear attack against the 
United States of America itself. 
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the 1960s and legally sanctioned by the SALT 
agreements, that today gives reality to the 
notion of a military balance in Europe. 
Since the two superpowers cannot destroy 
each other, they will be compelled, in the event 
of an armed confrontation, to test their forces in 
the theatre of war with the biggest political, 
economic and strategic stakes, namely Europe. 
Actually it is the fact that it can be employed 
in an offensive role on a theatre of operations 
that makes the notorious SS-20 a very frighten-
ing weapon. For is it not a weapon intended 
to wage war rather than to prevent it by dissua-
sion? All its characteristics suggest that this is 
so- its accuracy, its mobility, the number of its 
warheads and the ability to reload the weapon 
to suit operational needs. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this: 
First, the need to restore the coupling of the 
central strategic systems of the United States of 
America with the theatre weapons stationed in 
Europe, so that the notion of a European imba-
lance of forces will lose its significance and the 
Russians can be certain that, in the event of an 
attack against Europe, there would be massive 
nuclear retaliation by the Alliance. Second, 
that Europe should again have the means of 
determining the conditions of its own defence 
so that the United States of America does not 
become resigned to the idea of a war limited to 
the European theatre. 
France's allies regard the NATO decision of 
December 1979 as a factor coupling the central 
systems and theatre weapons. France has spelt 
out its position on this matter very clearly -
and this over and above any possible changes in 
the political majority at home. It feels, and 
still appears to feel, that the best pledge of such 
a coupling is the independence of European 
deterrent forces. At the same time, though it 
could not itself be a party to any such arrange-
ment in view of its own independent nuclear 
force, it is pleased to note that the need to pre-
serve such a capability is more clearly per-
ceived by the principal European states. 
Mr. Mommersteeg deserves the support of all 
who are aware of the new threats hanging over 
Europe when he asks the European nations to 
adopt a common stand in the matter of security 
and when he reaffirms his approval of the deci-
sion to modernise the NATO theatre nuclear 
forces. 
It is not by referring to a SALT agreement 
which has become more of a historic memory 
than a future incentive that the Europeans will 
acquire new credibility in the eyes of the Ame-
rican Administration. The latter has now rea-
It is precisely the ~oviet:American strategic lised the dangers inherent in any treaty con-
balance of forces, achieved m the latter half of eluded for strictly political reasons without 
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sufficient attention being paid to the technical 
problems of the military balance of forces. 
It would be imprudent, to say the least, to 
abandon the positions worked out jointly for 
the defence of Europe. 
A final comment is called for concerning Mr. 
Mommersteeg's report. The Rapporteur 
appears to believe that to negotiate is an acti-
vity sufficient in itself and that there is no need 
to have misgivings about either the efficacy of 
the enterprise or the linkage with international 
relations. Yet it is clear that the major cause 
of the stagnating disarmament effort in Europe 
stems not just from the purely military pheno-
menon, namely the considerable build-up of the 
Soviet potential, but also from the deterioration 
in East/West relations as a result of the latest 
internatonal tensions, due mainly to the inva-
sion of Afghanistan. 
Consequently the problem of an arms build-
up in Europe must be viewed in a wider 
context. So long as the conditions for a return 
to mutual trust do not exist, in other words so 
long as the Soviet Union does not demonstrate 
in concrete fashion that it is prepared to change 
its present pattern of behaviour, it will be 
useless to hope that disarmament negotiations 
will produce satisfactory results. 
Only by demonstrating cohesion among 
Europeans and within the Atlantic Alliance, by 
guarding against all feelings of abandonment, 
resignation or neutralism, and by agreeing to 
the necessary defence effort can one hope to 
influence Soviet behaviour. What will lead the 
Soviet leaders to modify their attitude is the 
balance of forces, not speeches on disarmament 
which they regard as nothing but an ideological 
myth. 
Therefore we must not believe in according 
priority to arms reductions talks. This is an 
argument for the weak and for those seeking a 
pretext to do nothing. It is an attitude of resig-
nation and accommodation. 
Rather than make any agreement by the Uni-
ted States conditional on a resumption of nego-
tiations, Europeans should adopt an entirely 
opposite stand and make any negotiations by 
the United States conditional on the installation 
of a credible system of nuclear theatre weapons 
capable of restoring a balance of forces. 
To assert, as I have heard it said, that a 
resumption of negotiations is necessary to avoid 
a risk of war is a grave failure to understand the 
situation, and this for two reasons: first, because 
the danger of war already exists, with or 
without a resumption of negotiations; and 
secondly, because if negotiations did take place, 
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no matter under what circumstances, the risk of 
war would be greater still because they would 
sanction the current imbalance of forces. 
Having made these points and subject to 
these reservations, therefore, I would be happy 
to adopt the report by our colleague Mr. 
Mommersteeg. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Baumel. 
I call Mr. van Hulst. 
Mr. van HULST (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, the Mommersteeg report we 
are now discussing is highly topical. The sub-
ject with which it deals is being discussed not 
only in our national parliaments but also in all 
kinds of social bodies, action groups and above 
all the churches. 
Topical reports have the defects of their vir-
tues. Their defect is that they inevitably fail to 
cover the most recent developments. This is 
particularly true of the WEU reports on Turkey 
and Poland and the talks on long-range theatre 
nuclear force reductions. To be right up to 
date on the Mommersteeg report one really 
needs a radio beside one to pick up the latest 
news while one is speaking. For example, last 
week's meeting between the Swedish politician 
Mr. Palme and Mr. Brezhnev is naturally not in 
the report. I will refer to this in a moment. 
I should like to express my great appreciation 
to Mr. Mommersteeg for the document he has 
presented to this Assembly on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments. What I like about this document is its 
objectivity and balance. Its objectivity is evi-
dent from the wide range of quotations, from 
President Reagan, Mr. William Dyess, Mr. 
Genscher, Chancellor Schmidt, Mr. Brezhnev, 
General Petrov, President Mitterrand and so 
on. Strange bedfellows indeed ! 
The report is certainly full of quotations, but 
none the worse for that. The various state-
ments quoted represent valuable documentation 
which we can use in our national parlia-
ments. Its balance is evident from the fact that 
it discusses three kinds of dialogue: the dialogue 
among the Western European countries, the 
dialogue between Western Europe and the Uni-
ted States of America and the dialogue between 
the whole of the West, united in NATO, and 
the Warsaw Pact. 
The Mommersteeg report expresses a concern 
which I fully share. Talks between the United 
States of America and the Soviet Union have 
been indefinitely postponed. Virtually nothing 
has happened since December 1979. As par-
liamentarians we must not accept this, and our 
view is reflected in paragraph 1 of the draft 
recommendation. 
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I must now give you my own humble 
opinion on the attitude of both the United 
States Government and the Kremlin leaders, 
beginning with what Mr. Brezhnev said to Mr. 
Palme last week. I have not yet seen the 
complete text of Mr. Brezhnev's statement, but 
I have read the same words in various Euro-
pean newspapers: "The West is not seriously 
interested in talks on disarmament. " If Mr. 
Brezhnev were right, the Mommersteeg report 
would be a hypocritical document. But Mr. 
Brezhnev is not right. 
We members of WEU are in fact thoroughly 
interested, certainly in arms limitation, and we 
would like to begin negotiations on this today 
rather than tomorrow. 
I should like to make four brief comments on 
the report. Firstly, every American President, 
Democrat or Republican, has needed some time 
after his election to transform the statements 
made before his election so that they rise above 
party politics and become more objective. I 
feel that the statements made by President Rea-
gan, Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Haig a few days 
after the presidential election still smacked of 
the slogans used before the election. Opinions 
in the White House have mellowed consider-
ably by now and give me hope that there is a 
readiness for frank talks with the Kremlin. 
Secondly, as representatives of the people we 
have to know not only what our governments 
want but also what our own people are think-
ing, and as a rule we do know. The Dutch 
people want everything possible done - even if 
it is only clutching at a straw - on behalf of 
negotiations on long-range nuclear weapons. 
Just such a straw now exists. Although SALT 
11 has not been ratified by the United States of 
America, Mr. Brezhnev has said he is willing to 
continue the dialogue, and we should take full 
advantage of this opportunity. 
Thirdly, the Soviet mentality is such that the 
Soviets expect to negotiate on a basis of equal-
ity, strength for strength. Let me give you a 
simple example. It would be ridiculous for an 
amateur lightweight boxer to discuss the possi-
bility of a fight with Muhammad Ali. The 
Soviet Union quite simply expects to conduct a 
dialogue with a strong West. Otherwise, 
instead of being of interest to them the dialogue 
becomes pointless and ridiculous. 
The Mommersteeg report rightly assumes 
that negotiations will serve a useful purpose 
only if the West is strong - not, I would add, if 
the West is stronger. I am deliberately refrain-
ing from using a comparative. 
Fourthly, a report that places the accent firm-
ly on negotiations is of great importance, parti-
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cularly for WEU. WEU has the only treaty 
under which the contracting parties are 
required automatically to afford each .other 
assistance should one of our countries be 
attacked in Europe. Not even the North 
Atlantic Treaty goes this far: it does not 
provide for automatic assistance. 
Mr. President, I hope this will help to per-
suade this Assembly to adopt the recommenda-
tions. Needless to say, I fully endorse the 
recommendations contained in the Mommer-
steeg report. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. van Hulst. 
I call Mr. van den Bergh. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - I believe that if we look at the arms 
race on the one hand and efforts to control it 
on the other, we can but conclude that the 
efforts to exert a modest control over the arms 
race by means of talks on arms control have 
increasingly failed, even to the extent that the 
talks themselves have come to a complete 
standstill. Take, for example, the MBFR nego-
tiations in Vienna, which have become com-
pletely bogged down. Personally I feel that the 
West has a great deal to answer for here. The 
SALT 11 agreement has not been ratified. No 
real progress has been made in Madrid on the 
military issues. Nor have talks begun yet on 
the control of TNF weapons. A few years ago 
there was still some hope of negotiations on 
control of the arms race. Today there is no 
room for hope. All the talks have come to a 
standstill. 
If I understand the Mommersteeg report 
correctly, it says that a number of arms control 
forums face the political challenge in the years 
to come of trying to achieve a break-
through. Mr. Mommersteeg is quite right. I 
feel we should endorse his description of the 
political challenge in the draft recommendation 
proper. 
As regards the specific question of the moder-
nisation of LRTNF, I have said before in this 
Assembly that I do not think this mode~isa­
tion should take place, and I have explamed 
why. Above all, I do not consider it is necess-
ary from a military point of view. There are 
alternatives, and we have the time. However, 
the Assembly chose not to agree with me on 
this. I would therefore point out - again 
General Rogers will bear me out - that it is 
becoming increasingly fashionable to compare 
numbers of different types of weapon. We find 
this in the case of the Eurostrategic balance, 
too. Particularly where nuclear weapons are 
concerned, it is extremely dangerous to talk 
only in terms of equal numbers, rather than 
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guarantees of sufficient nuclear capacity to act 
as a deterrent. 
Being one of those who consider the nuclear 
deterrent indispensable at present, I want to say 
that I think it is dangerous to compare num-
bers. Plenty of alternatives are available as 
regards the overall nuclear and conventional 
balance between East and West. This was one 
reason why I advocated at the time that NATO 
should offer a moratorium. NATO rejected 
the idea. Since then the Soviet Union has 
made various proposals which were undoubt-
edly open to criticism. I do not think that 
NATO has reacted creatively enough to East 
European efforts to achieve arms control. 
NATO should respond to these proposals, 
which are often unsatisfactory, with its own 
counter-proposals, and it is regrettable that it 
does not do so. 
I have not a good word to say for present 
developments in nuclear weaponry in the 
Soviet Union. The SS-20 does in fact repre-
sent an additional threat, but not so serious a 
threat in the short term that we cannot find an 
answer to it. Here again, the reaction to pro-
posals such as those recently made by the 
Soviet leader was unsatisfactory. The Dutch 
socialists have seen this as a reason for main-
taining that there are still political opportu-
nities for negotiations between East and West 
on the limitation of nuclear weapons without 
setting about the complete modernisation of the 
nuclear arsenal. In my opinion, a substantial 
part of these negotiations should be devoted to 
studying the feasibility of the nil option on both 
sides. I should like to hear the Rapporteur's 
views on this. 
I feel, Mr. President, that the European mem-
ber states of NATO have an important role to 
play in the political situation that has emerged 
in the last year. What is the situation in 
NATO? On the one hand, we have an Ameri-
can President intent on what I consider to be an 
excessive build-up of conventional and nuclear 
armaments, and on the other hand we have a 
number of European member states, led by the 
Federal German Chancellor, who are doing 
their utmost to get the negotiations on arms 
controls resumed. I think Mr. Mommersteeg's 
recommendation to begin with negotiations on 
conventional, TNF and short-range weapons 
and to respect and if possible ratify the SALT 11 
agreement represents emphatic political sup-
port for those European governments which 
have chosen this course. Mr. Mommersteeg's 
report is to be commended for this. 
As far as the Dutch socialists are concerned, 
a decision on the report is not so simple. Spe-
cifically, paragraph (iv) of the preamble reflects 
113 
THIRD SITTING 
a sentiment we cannot share, for a number of 
reasons. You will appreciate why. To be 
perfectly frank and honest, we are trying to 
make up our minds whether to say that we 
endorse the political thrust of the draft recom-
mendation proper, but feel that paragraph (iv) 
of the preamble must be deleted, or whether, on 
the other hand, paragraph (iv) is not in fact the 
determining factor in the position we adopt. It 
is a difficult decision. I have not yet been able 
to arrive at a decision with my socialist col-
leagues. We approve many aspects of the 
Mommersteeg report. The position we finally 
adopt will depend on Mr. Mommersteeg's 
reply. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. van den Bergh. 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - The 
Mommersteeg report is a very worthwhile 
document which gives us an extremely topical 
opportunity to debate a vital matter. 
This morning, the Assembly had the advan-
tage of hearing an address from the most senior 
military figure in Western Europe. It was a 
most interesting address which provided 
grounds commanding our thought. General 
Rogers spoke of the agonising irony of prepara-
tions to prosecute war in order to deter it, and I 
appreciated, as I think we all did, that the word 
" agonising " was entirely justified, not least 
because of the enormous cost involved in that 
preparation requiring, as it does, such an enor-
mous share of our wealth and resources. 
I do not rule out the incurring of these enor-
mous costs. They may be necessary. It may 
be that the intensive efforts about which Gene-
ral Rogers spoke will be required. However, 
we need to be quite clear that it is a last resort. 
We need to have an assurance that the 
increasing of our defence capacity is not some-
thing for which we can provide alternatives. 
One reason for that is, of course, that our 
intensive efforts could be matched by further 
intensive efforts in the East and in the end this 
may bring our collective resolve - to quote 
General Rogers again - into greater doubt than 
there may be today. That collective resolve 
may be necessary but, given the social costs 
involved and given the terrific capacity of the 
weaponry which we will acquire and already 
possess, we are entitled to pursue alternatives 
which would allow us more fully to stimulate 
our prosperity and more readily to serve the 
case and the cause for the abolition of inter-
national want. 
I suggest, therefore, that we need to be 
assured that the resolve for which General 
Rogers called is wholly justified. It cannot be 
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justified if the alternative of peace and reduced 
tension can be achieved. I believe, therefore, 
that we need to demonstrate clearly and incon-
trovertibly that the West has made clear. 
vigorous, determined and entirely genuine 
efforts to promote peace. I have suggested 
some amendments which seek to press that 
particular case further. 
Two weeks ago, following expressions of 
difference between those in my area who· are 
unilateralists and myself as a multilateralist, I 
attended a public meeting in my area organised 
by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It 
was a most interesting and largely civilised 
meeting and I must confess that I was in a 
minority. There were many good people there 
for whom I have a good deal of respect. They 
represent the pacifist tradition who could be 
seen, if one liked, as those on the side of saint-
liness, those who reject violence. There were 
others present who may not exactly share my 
own political commitments and attachments. 
Some of them feel that Western European 
countries should unilaterally disarm, should 
abandon weaponry and leave NATO; and some 
were even very willing to ignore the reality of 
the Warsaw Pact's military strength. But, 
whatever the source of the membership of that 
organisation and disarmament groups through-
out Western Europe, they are entirely justified 
in demanding that, if increased defence expen-
diture is a last resort, before being committed to 
it and before committing themselves to the 
positive resolve for which General Rogers 
called and which may be necessary, the West 
should be prepared to make enormous efforts to 
avoid it. 
In Appendix 11 I noticed a reference to the 
speech which Mr. Brezhnev made on 23rd Feb-
ruary this year in which he offered to stop 
manufacturing and to reduce the stockpiling of 
weapons, in which he offered to extend the 
zones of confidence, in which he offered to 
break the chains of the nuclear race. It may be 
that we feel that Mr. Brezhnev is more pre-
pared to promise in speeches than he is pre-
pared to deliver in actual negotiation but we 
need to demonstrate to the people of Western · 
Europe that, if there is a fault in this field, that 
fault lies not in ourselves. Therefore, I have 
tabled amendments so that the West can 
demonstrate its good faith, so that the West can 
demonstrate that it is willing to pursue 
alternatives. 
I believe it is necessary for us to adopt such a 
posture because there is a great deal of cynicism 
about multilateralists like myself. There are 
those who feel that the multilateralist has 
adopted an easy way out. There are those who 
114 
THIRD SITTING 
feel that the multilateralist has surrendered to 
the pressure of the armaments industry and the 
defence lobby. If we are to defeat cynicism 
and if we are to demonstrate that we are 
seriously concerned to promote peace, we need 
to demonstrate it and demonstrate it with a 
genuine vigour. For this reason, with the 
approval of the Socialist Group, I have tabled a 
number of very simple amendments. 
It may be that the sophisticated politicians 
among us will accuse me of being too simplistic 
in my approach. Unfortunately, there are 
many millions of people who are not interested 
in the refinements of political science and are 
not particularly well informed about the nature 
of the nuclear horrors that we all possess. 
They may be too attached to simple words and 
far too easily 'prepared to accept simple slo-
gans. In this battle for the hearts and minds of 
our people we need not be too ashamed to be 
simplistic. We ought not to be too ready to 
surrender ourselves to the complexity of def-
ence language and political terminology and 
therefore I do not apologise for the simplistic 
nature of those amendments. 
If we are to accept General Rogers' thesis, if 
we are to believe that in the end the collective 
resolve will require the devotion of our resour-
ces, in our democracies we have to carry our 
people with us - and a bare majority would not 
suffice. We have to have the hearts and minds 
of the West determined to join in the collective 
effort. In the hope that that effort would not 
be required, we need to demonstrate our will 
and our desire for peace. It is for those reasons 
that I have tabled the amendments which I 
hope Mr. Mommersteeg and his colleagues will 
be prepared to accept. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Hardy. 
I call Mr. Blaauw. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands) (Translation).-
Mr. President, I should like to begin by saying 
how happy I am, as a newcomer to this august 
and venerable Assembly, to have this opportu-
nity of speaking to a subject as important as the 
Mommersteeg report. We face many problems 
in the world at this time: hunger in many areas, 
universal unemployment, the underdevelop-
ment of various countries and military tension 
and an excessive arms build-up in various parts 
of the world. This arms build-up in itself 
represents a threat of future conflicts. The ten-
sion between East and West is certainly not the 
least significant factor in this context. In fact, 
it dominates relations between important 
nations of this world in many ways. We in 
WEU - as members of the community in Eur-
ope - therefore have no alternative but to adopt 
a strong and resolute position as regards the 
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necessary levels of armaments on both sides. 
We must adopt a strong and firm attitude 
towards the threat which devolves from this. 
WEU has already expressed its appreciation 
and endorsement of the twofold decision of 
12th December 1979 in Recommendation 360, 
and this is reiterated in the strongest terms by 
the Mommersteeg report. It is important to 
insist explicitly yet again that the West wants a 
dialogue with the East, that the West wants to 
negotiate with the East on armaments, on the 
appalling overkill capability which has been 
gradually built up on both sides, that the West 
wants to encourage arms control and disarma-
ment and to provide an impetus which will 
impart greater momentum to this whole 
issue. An important aspect of the twofold 
decision is that, if LR TNF arms control could 
be achieved in this way - meaning for the West 
that positive results could be achieved by pos-
sible talks - the second part of the twofold deci-
sion would need to be implemented only in 
part, or not at all. This is our goal and it has 
been graphically expressed in the Mommersteeg 
report. 
To conclude, I should like to comment on 
the amendments, and on Amendment 5 in par-
ticular. I consider this to be a destructive 
amendment. Its adoption would undermine 
the whole of the Mommersteeg report and 
Recommendation 360, adopted at the last part-
session. We shall oppose this vigorously. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Blaauw. 
I call Lord Reay. 
Lord REAY (United Kingdom). -I welcome 
this report of Mr. Mommersteeg. I certainly 
believe that we in the West should keep open 
the possibility of negotiation with the Soviet 
Union while NATO sets about the business of 
modernising its own theatre nuclear missiles, 
but, as Mr. Blaauw has pointed out, the Soviet 
Union has already modernised its own compa-
rable weapons and the urgent need for NATO, 
as Mr. Baumel argued, is not to negotiate but to 
modernise. To leave things as they are, in the 
words of the North Atlantic Council communi-
que of last May, would to be freeze NATO for-
ces into inferiority and would be wholly 
unacceptable. 
It takes two to negotiate, however, and I 
question whether the Soviet Union has a 
serious interest in negotiating theatre nuclear 
force reductions at the present time for the sim-
ple reason that we in the West, we in Europe, 
have yet to prove that we are actually willing to 
install land-based cruise missiles and the Persh-
ing 11 in Europe itself. For as long as there is 
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still a possibility that European governments 
may be too weak or too irresolute to do so, the 
less incentive the Soviet Union has to enter into 
any such negotiations, for the Soviet Union is 
relying on western public opinion, under the 
influence of those who push for a policy of 
disarmament, to press western governments into 
ever weaker responses to the fait accompli of 
Soviet military policy. 
For so long as the prospect of its continuing 
holds out, the Soviet Union will never make 
any concessions. 
I think that General Rogers was right this 
morning when he drew attention to wishful 
thinking, based on the fear of hardship and 
other disagreeable possible consequences, as 
being the explanation for the pressures brought 
to bear within our societies against rearma-
ment. This is exactly as it was in the 
19 30s. To counter these pressures there is no 
alternative to more information, more widely 
diffused, more vivid in character, to disclose the 
threat which faces us from the East. 
I hope, therefore, most strongly that the 
release of previously classified material by the 
Pentagon, to which General Rogers referred this 
morning as being under consideration - .and 
presumably this information includes photogra-
phic material if it is to have strong public 
impact today - will take place soon. This at 
least should make it easier to rebut those who 
misleadingly argue that NATO has quite 
enough weaponry already and that SACEUR is 
simply trying, as usual, to scare us, and there-
fore why not let us start the process of disarm-
ing on our own, for the Soviets will be sure to 
follow this gesture of good will with similar 
measures - a process of thought rightly des-
cribed by General Rogers as na'ive. 
I was pleased that General Rogers, in reply to 
a question, reminded us that one of the reasons 
for stationing cruise missiles on land in Europe 
was to give expression to the solidarity of the 
Alliance. It would have a deplorable effect on 
the Alliance were Europe to refuse to 
station missiles on its soil, yet accepted that it 
should station American troops. In this 
context, I should like to take up a point to 
which Mr. Mommersteeg referred. 
I think that European democratic politicians 
should take very good care these days not to 
refer to both superpowers in the same breath as 
though they were indistinguishable in character 
and behaviour and in their relationship to our-
selves. The fact is that to one of them we owe 
the survival of our freedoms; by the other those 
freedoms are potentially threatened. It is 
lamentable to talk in such a way, and I can 
conceive of nothing more harmful to the Atlan-
tic Alliance as a whole. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Lord Reay (continued) 
I support Mr. Mommersteeg's recommenda-
tion although, I think, without the proposed 
amendments of Mr. Hardy and Mr. Stoffelen, 
which show traces of wishful thinking; and, as I 
have attempted to argue, it is precisely wishful 
thinking which it should be our duty to eradi-
cate rather than encourage. 
(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Lord Reay. 
Mr. Scholten is the last speaker. 
Mr. SCHOLTEN (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- Mr. President, as a member of the Dutch 
Christian Democratic Party, I should like to 
express my very sincere appreciation of the 
report by my fellow Christian Democrat Mr. 
Mommersteeg. The Christen-Democratisch 
Appe/ (CDA) has had a lively debate on the 
absolute necessity to reduce the number of wea-
pons by the process of arms control. The 
nuclear arms race in particular is a source of 
grave concern to us Christian Democrats. 
The world and mankind are threatened by 
man himself. This gloomy fact calls for a crea-
tive effort to break through the vicious circle of 
the arms race. I feel that so far neither side -
neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO - has put 
forward enough promising proposals. 
The Mommersteeg report has the merit of 
calling in the recommendation proper for five 
practical initiatives, the first relating to LRTNF 
weapons. The second applies to the strategic 
arms area, the central systems. Mr. Mommer-
steeg also appeals for continued respect of the 
SALT I and 11 limits. I consider this particu-
larly important. The fourth recommendation 
concerns battlefield nuclear weapons, known as 
short-range weapons. He also feels that the 
disarmament negotiations should extend to 
conventional weapons. That too is important. 
The fifth recommendation refers to the need 
for overall nuclear balance. This is very 
important, since it may prevent us from paying 
too much attention to nuclear balance in indi-
vidual areas, such as Europe. 
I share Mr. van den Bergh's view that the 
proposals formulated by Mr. Mommersteeg as 
Rapporteur represent a major political chal-
lenge for the West and for the world. His 
recommendation should therefore be supported. 
If the Assembly adopts the Rapporteur's 
recommendation, it will be emphasising that we 
for our part are willing to negotiate. We 
attach the greatest possible importance to nego-
tiations. After all, this is a question of arms 
control processes designed to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in particular. 
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To counter the vicious spiral of the arms 
race, we need a system geared to preventing 
war, at the lowest possible level of armaments. 
A similar idea has been advanced by Federal 
Chancellor Schmidt. 
We are now in Paris. I expect President 
Mitterrand's Government to move towards new 
prospects in Europe, in the field of human 
rights and the North-South relationship, for ins-
tance. The Mitterrand Government has re-
ferred to the Soviet SS-20 as a destabilising 
factor in international relations. It has also 
emphasised the need for a new policy on the 
part of the Soviet Union. My colleagues and I 
agree with the Mitterrand Government on this. 
The Soviet attitude is a danger which we 
must on no account overlook. 
In December 1979 NATO took what is 
known as the twofold decision. This is also 
referred to in paragraph (iv) of the preamble to 
Mr. Mommersteeg's draft recommendation. So 
far the Netherlands has not agreed to have 
LRTNF weapons based on its territory. The 
CDA, my party, also disclaims any responsibi-
lity for the decision to produce such weapons. 
This is part of our election programme. I 
would point out that my party gained the most 
seats in the elections in the Netherlands on 
26th May of this year. Bearing in mind its 
election programme, my party does not consi-
der the Brussels decisions on production to be 
the most balanced reaction to the present Soviet 
threat. 
Against this background and in view of my 
personal objections, Mr. Mommersteeg will 
appreciate that I cannot agree to paragraph (iv) 
of the preamble. 
I attach great importance to the process of 
arms control. This is the most important 
aspect of the recommendation before us. The 
process is under way, but it is taking too long, 
and from the United States we hear far from 
encouraging noises, by which I mean the state-
ments by Mr. Haig's director of military policy. 
He is now one of the chief American 
negotiators on nuclear arms control. He is 
rather reticent in his attitude. I agree with 
what my colleague Professor van Hulst said 
about this. The West should consider every 
opportunity for detente and arms control to see 
how realistic it is. In the same context, I 
should like to hear what the Rapporteur thinks 
about a remark by Georgiy Arbatov, the leading 
expert of the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party, on the situation in the West 
and relations with the United States of Ame-
rica. He said in Moscow last Sunday that the 
United States might continue its research on 
and production of LR TNF weapons while 
negotiating with the Soviet Union on these 
weapons. The Soviet Union would be pre-
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pared to discontinue the deployment of new 
missiles until 1983. If I am interpreting this 
correctly, this may represent an important 
variation in the Soviet offer regarding the mora-
torium. I should like to hear what the Rap-
porteur thinks about this. 
I repeat that I hold Mr. Mommersteeg's work 
on this report in high regard. I fully endorse 
the five recommendations he has put forward. 
What is needed is arms control at production 
level. Arms control demands good will on 
both sides, both West and East. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Schol-
ten. 
That concludes the list of speakers. Does 
the Chairman wish to speak? Does Mr. Mom-
mersteeg wish to reply to the debate? 
In view of the time, I hope that you will 
make your remarks brief. We shall take the 
amendments separately. 
Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (Netherlands). - I 
appreciate, Mr. President, that in view of the 
time I must be brief. However, on this occa-
sion I shall speak in my mother tongue. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, I am very 
impressed by what Mr. Bahr has said. I agree 
with him. 
All I wish to say now is that I disagree with 
Mr. van den Bergh's Amendment 5. Really, 
we want no more of the twofold decision. 
This is how I see it: negotiations have been 
decided on, so this is the starting point for real, 
constructive negotiations. This is an important 
point to remember if we want to achieve any-
thing in these negotiations. 
Mr. Baumel's opinion and mine on this mat-
ter differ. This is of course partly because I 
represent a non-nuclear country. That also 
applies to the German, Belgian and Italian 
members. France has an independent nuclear 
capability of its own. That is also true to some 
extent of the United Kingdom, although this is 
linked with NATO. 
I agree with Mr. Baumel that the need for 
negotiations and for armament should perhaps 
be viewed in a broader, international context. 
I am not keen on a broad linkage. There 
was talk of this last year. I hope that there 
will be a possibility of concrete agreements 
which provide a pattern for both sides. The 
international climate naturally affects negotia-
tions of all kinds. 
I now come to the amendments. 
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The PRESIDENT. - We shall be dealing 
with the amendments later, and you will have 
the opportunity to reply, Mr. Mommersteeg. 
Perhaps you can leave it at that, because we 
must allow members to move their amend-
ments before you give your views. Will you 
please conclude your other remarks? 
Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - I wish to express my special thanks to 
all those who have made such a valuable 
contribution to this debate. I await the result 
of the vote with confidence. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much. 
The Assembly is indebted to you for the work 
that you have put into this report. It is an 
extra report for which the Committee asked. 
That is one of the reasons why our 
agenda is somewhat overburdened today. I am 
sure that everyone agrees that it is an extremely 
important and topical issue, and it is only right 
that the Assembly should be concerned with it. 
We must now proceed to the amendments 
before the draft recommendation in Document 
879 can be taken. Five amendments have 
been submitted, four in the name of Mr. Hardy 
and one in the name of Mr. van den Bergh. 
The first amendment to be moved is Amend-
ment 5: 
5. In the preamble to the draft recommenda-
tion, leave out paragraph (iv). 
I call upon Mr. van den Bergh to move it. 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I am quite willing to 
reply to the Chairman of our Committee. As I 
said, I took the position as long as a year and a 
half ago that the modernisation decision ought 
not to be adopted and that political means 
should first be sought in order to curb the pro-
duction and stationing of the SS-20. 
It seems to me a matter of political integrity 
to make the following point. Since I argued a 
year and a half ago against adopting the deci-
sion to modernise, to accept paragraph (iv) of 
the preamble would imply that we now felt able 
to assent to the modernisation decision as 
such. I note of course - but this does not 
mean that I am expressing my political agree-
ment - that if negotiations take place between 
East and West part of these negotiations will be 
about the twofold decision taken by NATO. 
I am not prepared to withdraw my amend-
ment. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. van 
den Bergh. Is that opposed? 
You have already spoken, Mr. Scholten. 
Does anyone else wish to speak? 
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- Mr. President, I do not exactly wish to speak 
against the amendment. My problem is as 
follows. I will put it to the Rapporteur. 
The PRESIDENT. - It would be better if 
someone who wanted to speak against the 
amendment were to speak. Does anyone wish 
to do so? 
Since no one does I call on Mr. Scholten. 
Mr. SCHOLTEN (Netherlands) (Translation). 
- I do not agree with the Brussels decisions with 
regard to modernisation. The decisions them-
selves have become a reality. I agree with Mr. 
Mommersteeg on that point. We now have to 
go on working on this basis. 
If I vote for Mr. van den Bergh's amendment 
it means discarding the whole of the existing 
situation from the recommendation. That 
seems to me rather too far removed from reality 
- a reality which, in itself, I do not welcome. 
Paragraph (iv) of the preamble implies, if I am 
not mistaken, a certain amount of enthusiasm 
for the NATO decision of December 
1979. This strikes me as agreement after the 
event, and that, as far as I am concerned, is 
definitely not possible; I cannot associate myself 
with this decision. I am thus faced with a 
problem. I am quite prepared to admit the 
reality of the fact that a decision has been 
made, but I do not wish to display any enthu-
siasm for it after the event because I feel none. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Schol-
ten. 
Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman wish 
to speak? Perhaps, Mr. Cavaliere, you should 
have had the opportunity to speak in the gene-
ral debate. I gathered that you did not wish to 
do so. We should like your views on the 
amendment, however. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - I 
am speaking on this amendment on behalf of 
the Committee, or rather as Chairman, because 
we were unable to put the matter to the Com-
mittee itself. We are firmly opposed to the 
amendment. I would remind Mr. van den 
Bergh that this matter is now closed, that the 
Assembly has already discussed it and reached a 
decision which I must regard as irrevocable 
because it is in fact the linchpin of NATO pol-
icy on the subject. I therefore strongly urge 
that the amendment be withdrawn; if not, I am 
sorry Mr. President that I shall be forced to ask 
for a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT. - If there is no further 
debate, I shall put the amendment to the vote. 
Mr. Hanin. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
would point out that the Chairman of the 
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Committee called on Mr. van den Bergh to 
withdraw his amendment, saying that otherwise 
he would ask for a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT.- It is entirely up 'to Mr. 
van den Bergh. He has given no indication of 
a desire to withdraw his amendment. I took it 
that he did not wish to do so. Is that so, Mr. 
van den Bergh? 
Mr. van den BERGH (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - In asking for paragraph (iv) to be left 
out, I am standing by the position I initially 
adopted two years ago. I cannot agree to with-
draw my amendment because I do not agree 
with the modernisation of nuclear weapons and 
the Brussels decision should be called in ques-
tion if East-West negotiations are to be 
resumed. 
The PRESIDENT. - You are entitled to 
press the amendment if you wish, Mr. van den 
Bergh. I must therefore put the amendment to 
the vote. 
I have had no indication, as is required by 
the rules, that members wish to have a roll-call 
vote. For there to be such a vote ten members 
must give such notice, and therefore the vote on 
the amendment will be by standing and sitting. 
Do I gather that you want to speak again, 
Mr. Cavaliere? It is most irregular for mem-
bers to make two or three speeches. It is half 
past six. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, I have asked for a vote by roll-call. 
The PRESIDENT. - Under the new rules, 
one member cannot ask for a roll-call vote. 
Ten members must give notice that they wish 
to have such a vote. There can be a roll-call 
vote on the main recommendation, but ten 
members have not given notice that they wish a 
roll-call vote on the amendment. I must rule 
that it is not possible to have a roll-call vote on 
the amendment. 
(Several members rose) 
Under the rules I need the names of ten 
members seeking a roll-call vote. If members 
insist, we can have a roll-call vote, but the 
numbers will be the same whether we vote by 
standing and sitting or by a roll-call. Very 
well, we shall have a roll-call vote. I must 
have the names of the members seeking it. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- Would it 
help those who wish the amendment to be 
adopted if we took a vote quickly so that we 
could demonstrate whether they would win? 
That would save a lot of time. 
The PRESIDENT. - I have no discretion in 
the matter. I am stretching the rules in allow-
ing a roll-call vote, because those who wish it 
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should have submitted their names in writing. 
If they wish to have a roll-call vote, I do not 
intend to stand in their way. We have a quo-
rum and so that aspect is not in question. We 
must therefore proceed. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - On a 
point of order, Mr. President. I am no expert 
on the rules. As you know, I am not all that 
worried about them. But if you say that the 
procedure of having a roll-call vote is against 
the rules and since it will add ten or fifteen 
minutes to our sitting today, I cannot help feel-
ing that the rules should be adhered to strictly. 
The PRESIDENT. - The rules are not ter-
ribly clear. I have to be given notice by ten 
representatives that they require a roll-call 
vote. Ten representatives stood in their places, 
so I suppose that it means that we encounter 
one of the flexibilities of the rules. 
I think that our best course will be to start 
the roll-call vote with those representatives who 
stood in their places. It is not a desirable prac-
tice, but this is a new rule and was adopted 
only in December. However, I make it clear 
that in future I shall require written notice, as 
the rules provide, before we have a roll-call 
vote on an amendment. I do not wish to deny 
anyone the opportunity to vote by a roll-call. 
However, I cannot see that it means any-
thing, because the votes will be counted whe-
ther the vote is by a roll-call or by representa-
tives standing to be counted. 
In order not to waste any more time, we shall 
have a roll-call vote. According to the 
rules, we shall start with those who were stand-
ing in their places originally. We shall take 
their votes first. 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation).- Mr. 
President, I withdraw my request. 
The PRESIDENT.- Mr. Cavaliere has with-
drawn his request for a roll-call vote. How-
ever, I do not know whether the other represen-
tatives who are still standing withdraw it. I do 
not know whether they still want a roll-call. 
Apparently the request for a roll-call vote has 
been withdrawn. We shall therefore vote in 
the normal way on Amendment 5 tabled by 
Mr. van den Bergh. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 5 is negatived. 
The PRESIDENT.- We turn to the amend-
ments moved by MM. Hardy, Bahr and Stoffe-
len. They fall into one group, so perhaps Mr. 
Hardy will group them all together. They are: 
II9 
THIRD SITTING 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out " earliest " and insert 
"urgent". 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from "at" to the end of the 
paragraph and insert " greatly-reduced levels of 
nuclear weapons ". 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after" at" insert "much". 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, add a new paragraph: 
"6. To call for immediate pursuit of the 
proposal for a disarmament conference for 
Europe.". 
I call Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). -It would 
be odious offensive and hypocritical of me to 
make a l~ng speech. I share your view, Mr. 
President, that the four amendments can be 
seen together. 
In my view, we need to offer a clear demon-
stration of our commitment to peace. We 
need to recognise that there is a need for the 
immediate pursuit of whole-hearted and genu-
ine disarmament negotiations. It would be 
good for the whole of W estem Europe to 
demonstrate that we regard this matter as 
important and the procedure as desirably 
urgent. 
For those reasons, I beg to move all four 
amendments. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Hardy, 
for your brevity and clarity. 
Does anyone wish to speak for or against any 
of these amendments? 
Apparently no one does. Therefore I call 
the Rapporteur, Mr. Mommersteeg. 
Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (Netherlands) (Trans-
lation). - Mr. President, I am in sympathy with 
Amendments I to 3, but I think the balance is 
being tipped too far in the direction of verbal 
refinements. In Amendment I, for instance, I 
do not really see the distinction between " ear-
liest " and " urgent ". 
(The speaker continued in English) 
The expression " earliest " and " urgent ", 
calling for the earliest resumption, is not clear. 
However in my opinion the subject matter is 
urgent, ~d I wonder whether it is not provok-
ing too great an expectation for the short term 
in difficult negotiations to say " greatly-redu~ed 
levels of nuclear weapons ". I am not agamst 
that so I shall leave it to the Assembly, because 
I w~s to some degree impressed by the speech 
ofMr. Hardy. 
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I come to Amendment 4. If I may use a 
German word, I find a Fremdkorper in the 
recommendation, which concentrates itself 
expressly on nuclear weapons. Of course I am 
for the pursuit of a disarmament conference for 
Europe. However, we do not have any elabo-
ration of the situation in the report. 
I am not against the amendment, but I leave 
it to the Assembly. I find a Fremdkorper- a 
foreign body - in the context of this recommen-
dation. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Mommersteeg. 
Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to 
speak to these amendments? 
Mr. CAVALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I should like to ask Mr. Hardy and 
the other proposers to consider what I am 
about to say. Amendment 1 requests that the 
word "earliest" be replaced by "urgent". I 
would observe that " urgent " has no meaning 
because it refers to a whole series of situations 
for which responsibility lies not with the United 
States alone but also with the parties. I think, 
therefore, that the term used in the recommen-
dation is the most meaningful and suitable. 
Otherwise if we say " urgent " we shall be 
saying nothing. 
As regards Amendments 2 and 3, I would 
observe that the words " greatly-reduced 
levels " are much more general and equally can 
have no meaning, in particular because the 
negotiations involve not only one party, the 
United States, but also the Soviet Union. The 
same applies to Amendment 2. I would like to 
propose an amendment to the amendment: 
instead of " greatly-reduced " I should like to 
have " the lowest possible " - that is " at the 
lowest possible levels " - to show that these 
negotiations involve both parties and that the 
aim must therefore be to achieve the best pos-
sible results, and for us these are the lowest 
possible levels. 
As regards Amendment 4, I agree with Mr. 
Mommersteeg's comments. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Cava-
Here. 
I do not know whether Mr. Hardy is 
willing to accept the Chairman's proposal for 
an amendment to his Amendment 2. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom). - I am 
extremely grateful but I do not think that 
the suggested change to the amendment would 
help at all because recommendation 2 reads 
" with a view to securing... lower levels ". 
All we are saying is " with a view to secu-
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ring greatly-reduced levels". The same can 
be said of Amendment 4 where Mr. Mom-
mersteeg suggests there is a foreign body. 
I would draw his attention to Appendix 
11 in the report where the same matter is 
included; so it is not entirely irrelevant to have 
a recommendation which refers to_ part of the 
content of the report. 
I do not see that any of the suggestions that 
have been made so far improves the amend-
ment in any way whatever and I do not believe 
they change the meaning. The word " ear-
liest " is far less emphatic than " urgent " and I 
believe the appropriate emphasis is desirable. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Hardy. It is clear that the movers of the 
amendment are unable to come to terms with 
the proposals of the Chairman and the Rappor-
teur, so we have to put these amendments to 
the vote. 
The first is Amendment 1: 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "earliest" and insert 
" urgent ". 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 2: 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from " at " to the end of the 
paragraph and insert " greatly-reduced levels of 
nuclear weapons "; 
(Mr. Cavaliere rose to speak) 
We cannot have a point of order in the 
middle of a vote. We must conclude the vote 
and then I will listen to the Chairman of the 
Committee. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
I am sorry, Mr. Cavaliere, but it is contrary 
to normal practice to have a point of order in 
the middle of a vote. If you now wish to 
speak, I shall be very happy to listen. 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to 
speak? No. I am sorry, but we cannot have a 
debate in the middle of a vote. 
Next, Amendment 3: 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after" at" insert "much". 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 3 is agreed to. 
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Next, Amendment 4: 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, add a new paragraph: 
"6. To call for immediate pursuit of the pro-
posal for a disarmament conference for 
Europe.". 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 4 is agreed to. 
Each of the four amendments moved by Mr. 
Hardy is carried. 
I now have to put the text as amended by 
Mr. Hardy's four amendments. 
If there is no objection or abstention, we need 
not have a roll-call vote. 
Are there any objections to the draft 
recommendation? 
Mr. Stoffelen, do you object? Are you 
asking for a roll-call vote? If there is an objec-
tion, there must be a roll-call vote under the 
rules. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - I am 
sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I, too, have to obey 
the rules. Personally, I do not want a roll-call 
vote, but I certainly intend to vote against the 
amended text. 
The PRESIDENT. - In that case I have no 
alternative. We must have a roll-call. It will 
be a roll-call vote on the draft recommendation, 
as amended, in Document 879. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. 
Maravalle. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Are there any other Representatives or Sub-
stitutes for them who have not taken part in the 
vote but wish to do so? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows1: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . 29 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted2• 
1. See page 28. 
2. See page 30. 
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5. Draft revised budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1981 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Vote on 
the draft revised budget, Doe. 871 and Addendum) 
The PRESIDENT. - I want the guidance of 
the Assembly. I hope very much that we shall 
be able to finish the Orders of the Day and deal 
with the budget - it need not take very long -
because of the inconvenience it causes represen-
tatives if we cannot complete the business 
which we started out to do. Is there any objec-
tion to our continuing in order to complete the 
business concerning the amended budget? 
There is no objection. Therefore, I ask Mr. 
Adriaensens to present his amended report on 
behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assem-
bly, took the Chair) 
Mr. ADRIAENSENS (Belgium) (Transla-
tion). - Ladies and Gentlemen, at the last part-
session of our Assembly we accepted a revised 
draft budget for 1981, Document 872. We 
pointed out at that time that we had no assur-
ance at all of its being approved by the WEU 
Council. Despite the personal intervention of 
our President, our respective governments could 
not be persuaded to make larger appropriations 
available to WEU. We were officially notified 
of the Council's decision by the Secretary-
General of WEU in his letter dated 29th May 
1981, which you will find among your docu-
ments. This means that the maximum monies 
available are the same as in 1980, plus 12 % to 
cover inflation. 
At a meeting in The Hague the President 
again tried to persuade the Council, but Lord 
Carrington's reply was as follows: 
" They will be pleased to study at the earliest 
opportunity an Assembly budget for 1981 
revised in accordance with the terms of and 
following the suggestions contained in the 
letter sent to you by the Secretary-General on 
29th May: within this framework the Assem-
bly might be allowed some degree of latitude 
in the allocation of resources, provided that a 
maximum increase of 12% over the 1980 
budget is respected. " 
Taking these views into account, the Presi-
dential Committee of WEU once more 
reviewed the draft budget for 1981; a new, 
amended version was approved and is now 
submitted to the Assembly for approval. In 
view of the lateness of the hour, I do not think 
it is necessary to read out this document - you 
have it in your files, and you will find the final 
result on the last page. 
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The total of the 1981 budget is 10,886,000 
francs, or 1,164,523 francs more than in 1980, 
representing an increase of 12%. I ask the 
meeting to accept the amendments to the 
already approved budget for 1981. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Adriaensens. 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - First, I 
want to say that I speak on behalf of my group. 
(The speaker continued in Dutch) 
(Translation). - My first comment refers to 
the original budget. I considered this budget 
well-founded and justified, because, for inst-
ance, we welcomed the possibility of replacing 
the Clerk in the case of illness or absence. 
This is a perfectly reasonable demand. We 
wanted each Committee to have its own 
clerk. We wanted better information services 
because of the confused state of public opinion 
- people regularly mix up all the European 
institutions - and to enable the political groups 
here to operate in such a way that this Assem-
bly bears some genuine resemblance to a parlia-
ment. 
My second comment is that the Council's 
very unsympathetic reaction is understand-
able. We know that in every country the 
financial and socio-economic situation is extre-
mely worrying and that economy campaigns are 
being conducted in every country. In connec-
tion with the formation of the cabinet which is 
in progress in the Netherlands, cuts of many 
billions of guilders are being discussed. In 
every country, everyone - except for the lowest-
paid - is expected to lose ground in earnings, to 
make sacrifices. Against this background there 
is no reason to make a fuss about the now 
twice-revised budget which has the approval of 
the President of the Assembly and of the Chair-
man of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. It has our approval. 
My third comment concerns a point which is 
seemingly only indirectly connected with the 
subject of the budget. The subject is " top 
salaries in European institutions". We are 
fully aware that this relates to a European 
arrangement, to the co-ordination of the salary 
structures of the Council of Europe, for inst-
ance, and WEU with those of other European 
institutions; salaries in the European Communi-
ties are in fact at an even higher level. We 
could say that the subject is therefore not open 
to discussion here. The same could be said if 
it were to be discussed in the Council of Europe 
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or the European Parliament, which would 
mean that it could not be debated in any parlia-
ment at all. The financial situation is exceed-
ingly worrying in every country. In every 
country there is talk of economies, moderation · 
and retrenchment. In the Netherlands there is 
a willingness to accept retrenchment, but on 
condition that everyone - except the lowest-
paid - participates in the retrenchment 
operation and that those with higher incomes 
make the greatest sacrifices. The trend is thus 
towards a levelling of incomes. It would be 
improper of me to advocate fixing a maximum 
income in my country and to say nothing about 
it here. 
Last week I again argued in the Netherlands 
in favour of a maximum level for all top civil 
service and political salaries. For the sake of 
comparison I have converted the figure: the top 
salary in question is 271,000 francs. Looking 
at the budget I see that the Clerk earns a salary 
of 354,000 francs plus 21,000 francs in allow-
ances, making a total of 375,000 francs. The 
Senior Counsellor, in Grade A6, earns 314,500 
francs plus allowances and Counsellors in 
Grade A5 receive 301 ,000 francs. I under-
stand that these salaries are tax-free. That in 
fact means that all the officials just mentioned 
earn considerably more than any of the top 
civil servants or politicians in my country and 
that all these officials, if they wanted to become 
Prime Minister of the Netherlands, would have 
to accept a sharp drop in income. This makes 
it quite clear that in a situation where the 
lowest-paid, who can hardly make ends meet, 
have to make sacrifices, it is absolutely essential 
to address ourselves to the subject of the high 
top salaries in Europe. 
I therefore ask you, Mr. President, via the 
Assembly and the Council and in consultation 
with the other European institutions, to ensure 
that discussion does at last take place with a 
view to restoring a more realistic situation as 
regards the salaries of top European officials for 
the sake of more equitable relative income 
levels in all our countries. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Stoffe-
len. 
I call Mr. Martino. 
Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the amend-
ments to the Assembly budget for 1981 are 
really of little account in relation to the overall 
budget now submitted to us for approval with 
those amendments. 
The available funds are in fact little more 
than half a per cent less than the initial esti-
mates of expenditure for staff, reduced, and 
general administrative costs, slightly increased. 
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What is again perplexing is that the Council 
continues to hold the view that Assembly 
expenditure on some items is excessive, will not 
agree to any increase in real expenditure and, 
in a very artificial manner, takes account of 
inflation in one country only, France, with a 
highly contestable forecast. 
The consequence is that the available funds 
are inevitably almost wholly devoted to expen-
diture for staff which is clearly becoming 
incompressible, with the consequence that the 
cuts are applied to expenditure on the activities 
of the Assembly and its Committees. 
It must be recognised that this seriously 
limits the Assembly's activities thus giving the 
impression that, despite what is affirmed, its 
function as the only European parliamentary 
assembly with defence responsibilities is not in 
fact recognised. 
Everyone is aware of the discussions and 
arguments in which we ourselves took part 
regarding the functions of our Assembly, 
following the election of the European Parlia-
ment by the member countries of the Commu-
nity. 
We now reaffirm the very clear attitude we 
adopted at that time. 
We believe therefore that it is for the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly to discuss 
and propose changes in the current procedures 
for the preparation of the budget as the existing 
procedure does not leave sufficient margin for 
indepencient decisions by the Assemblv. 
Clearly, this again involves a political option 
and the political will of member countries and 
governments but it is also true that it is for us 
to say that we are not satisfied with this state of 
affairs and to put forward reasonable alternative 
solutions which will better safeguard the work 
of the political groups and the Committees. 
Comparison with the expenditure of other 
European organisations, including those linked 
with WEU, argues strongly for a reform of the 
kind we are suggesting. Such a reform does 
not of course dispute the right of the Council to 
suggest possible economies and increasingly 
careful and strict control over all use of funds; 
there is certainly no objection on our part to 
resolving the question of the Office of the Clerk 
at much lower cost, as appears possible to the 
Council, without specific reasons being given 
however. 
We also regret that the original proposals for 
funds for information and for the political 
groups· have not yet been met. There remains 
however the wider question of a new procedure 
and the political approval of a real function 
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which is both unrecognised and lacks financial 
support. 
In our view all the most recent developments 
on armaments questions and on the armaments 
policy of the WEU countries mean that they 
must be subject to the control and initiative of 
elected representatives. For that reason we 
have once again expressed, during discussion of 
the budget, the ideas which we feel should 
govern its preparation and therefore its alloca-
tion in order to avoid the imposition of damag-
ing conditions and excessive restrictions, and to 
ensure that our Assembly can pursue its politi-
cal activities to better effect. These critical 
comments will not prevent us from voting in 
favour. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Mar-
tino. 
I call Mr. Mulley. 
Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom).- Mr. Pre-
sident, I am extremely grateful to you - at some 
personal inconvenience to yourself- for presid-
ing over this part of our discussions. I under-
stand that the precedents are that, if the Presi-
dent of the Assembly wishes to speak on bud-
getary matters, he does so from his seat as a 
representative. Uniquely in these affairs, the 
President is charged by our rules - I think Rule 
48 - to be personally responsible for the expen-
diture of the Assembly. Of course, it is the 
Bureau and the Presidential Committee, over 
which I have the honour to preside, which have 
made the recommendations that are now before 
you. 
To avoid misunderstanding, I should say that 
it has been the custom and, indeed, the rule 
since the beginnings of our Assembly that the 
Council must approve our budget. Not only 
that, but there must be a rather unnecessarily 
detailed examination and approval of even the 
minute sums amounting to a few thousand 
francs. They have required the specific appro-
val of the very senior members of the perma-
nent Council and, indeed, of the Council of 
Ministers itself. 
As members know, for reasons with which we 
may not agree but appreciate, there was wide-
spread agreement among all members of the 
Council that they would not agree to the pro-
posed increase in the budget for the current 
year. As a Bureau, we are obliged to examine 
the staffing of the Assembly following our deci-
sion in December to appoint a full-time 
Clerk. The arrangements that we have made 
are satisfactory and provide a clear line of 
communication and responsibility for persons 
to act in his absence. 
In addition, my hope was that we could 
appoint an extra member of the staff because 
our small staff of twenty-seven is under heavy 
pressure if there happens to be illness or any 
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unforeseen emergency. But in present circum-
stances, unhappily, that is not possible. 
·After our informal discussions on these 
matters with the Council of Ministers at The 
Hague, and as a result of the exchange of 
correspondence I had with the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, it was made quite clear 
that it would be unrealistic for the Assembly to 
ask for any growth in last year's budget, other 
than the 12 % allowed for inflation. On the 
other hand, if we are prepared to accept that 
proposal, I understand that we would have dis-
cretion over how we expend those sums. It is 
possible to make some small improvements in 
information and sums to the political groups as 
well as small financial promotions that will 
help the structure of the Office. 
It is realistic, therefore, that we should now 
go to the Council, accepting the unhappy eco-
nomic circumstances that prevail in all our 
countries. We are asking for no growth this 
year. The Budgetary Committee will be exa-
mining the budget for next year, and we may 
want to return to some of these matters. 
However, I hope that we can approve the 
recommendations now before the Assembly and 
that the Council will be able also rapidly to 
agree to them so that we may plan for and 
work through the rest of the year with some 
certainty. 
This is a realistic, practical and reasonable 
proposal to put before the Assembly. I hope 
that it will be agreed. I repeat my thanks to 
my colleagues in the Bureau for the tremendous 
efforts they have made in dealing with these 
problems. I also express the debt I owe to Mr. 
Adriaensens and his colleagues on the Budget-
ary Committee for the attention that they have 
given and will continue to give to our budget-
ary problems. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Mulley. 
I call Mr. Adriaensens. 
Mr. ADRIAENSENS (Belgium) (Transla-
tion). - Mr. President, I think Mr. Stoffelen's 
intervention is in line with what was said 
during the first discussion of the budget. 
It is indeed regrettable that we do not have 
greater resources both for information services 
and for political groups and, possibly, staff. As 
Mr. Stoffelen has already said, the present 
situation is such that we cannot obtain increa-
sed appropriations for WEU from our seven 
respective national governments. We felt obli-
ged to consolidate this Realpolitik in the form 
of a revised budget. That means dismissing 
any wishful thinking and working solely on the 
income allocated to us. 
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I think that Mr. Martino's intervention is in 
the same spirit and that we therefore really 
must work on the basis of the limited resources 
now available to us. 
The explanation given by the President, Mr. 
Mulley, also made it clear that, despite his own 
efforts and those of the Presidential Committee, 
it was not possible to obtain a higher budget. I 
think we should be well-advised to approve the 
revised budget submitted to us today and to 
bear in mind the various suggestions made both 
now and previously when we draw up our bud-
get for 1982. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The 
debate is closed. 
The Assembly will now vote on the draft 
revised budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1981. 
If there are no objections to it, and if the 
Assembly agrees, we could save the time requi-
red for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions? .. . 
I note that the Assembly is unanimous. 
The draft revised budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1981 is adopted unanimously. 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose 
that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting 
tomorrow morning, Wednesday 17th June, at 
10 a. m. with the following Orders of the Day: 
1. The European combat aircraft and other 
aeronautical developments (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the Commit-
tee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions and Vote on the 
draft Recommendation, Document 874 
and Amendments). 
2. Future of European space activities- reply 
to the twenty-sixth annual report of the 
Council (Presentation of and Debate on 
the Report of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
Document 883 and Amendment). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m.) 
FOURTH SITTING 
Wednesday, 17th June 1981 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees. 
4. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical 
developments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 874 and Amendments). 
Speakers: Mr. Brasseur (Rapporteur), Mr. Hermann 
Schmidt, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. 
Brasseur (Rapporteur), Mr. Forma, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. 
Lenzer (Vice-Chairman of the Committee), Mr. Antoni. 
5. Future of European space activities - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation 
of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doe. 883 
and Amendment). 
Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson (Rapporteur), Mr. Topmann, 
Mr. Antoni, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Konings, Mr. Comelis-
sen, Mr. Brown, Mr. Wilkinson (Rapporteur), Mr. Lenzer 
(Vice-Chairman ofthe Committee), Mr. Topmann. 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT.- The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings1• 
3. Changes in the membership of Committees 
The PRESIDENT.- We have information of 
changes in the membership of Committees. 
The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the 
following alterations: 
I. See page 33. 
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General Affairs Committee: Mrs. Knight as 
an alternate member in place of Mr. Page. Sir 
Tom Williams to cease to be an alternate 
member. 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. 
Howell as a member in place of Mrs. Knight. 
Sir Tom Williams to cease to be an alternate 
member. 
Relations with Parliaments: Mr. Page as a 
member in place of Mr. Ho well. 
Are there any objections to these changes? ... 
They are agreed to. 
4. The European combat aircraft and other 
aeronautical developments 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and 
Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 874 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - The first Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions and vote on 
the draft recommendation, Document 874 and 
Amendments. 
I call Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur of the 
Committee. 
Mr. BRASSEUR (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as the 
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international crisis worsens, as tensions between 
nations and power blocs grow, efforts to 
promote peace are certainly essential. Unfor-
tunately, despite the efforts of several govern-
ments, such initiatives have been limited in 
scope, and the major powers in particular are 
continuing to expand their offensive and defen-
sive potential. 
This is perhaps the logical outcome of a 
confrontation that serves both the capitalist 
economy and authoritarianism in the commu-
nist world. In such a context it seems to me 
that the fundamental question for Europe -
both East and West - is to decide whether to 
be part of this confrontation or whether to 
guarantee its independence and chart its own 
course towards progress. If the choice is firmly 
in favour of European independence, then 
Europe must ensure its own defence and ~ro­
vide itself with the economic and technological 
means to make this defence fully effective. 
Consequently I plead here in favour of Euro-
pean armament and, since this is the subject we 
are dealing with today, for the development of a 
European combat aircraft. 
Most of the member states of Western Euro-
pean Union are now faced with a most i~por­
tant choice to make, namely to develop a smgle 
European combat aircraft for the 1990s or to 
pursue their individual national policies 
without any real co-ordination. 
The United Kingdom, for example, could co-
operate with the United States to develop a 
successor to the Harrier vertical take-off 
aircraft. Or France could produce a new ver-
sion of the Mirage 2000 before the introduction 
of the Mirage 4000. Similarly, the Federal 
Republic of Germany could adopt a modified 
version of the Tornado or buy a McDonnell-
Douglas design. 
Obviously, Ladies and Gentlemen, each of 
these approaches might secure for the indivi-
dual member state concerned certain immediate 
if trivial economic advantages. But at the 
same time this kind of approach would in many 
cases reduce our aircraft industry to a mere sub-
contracting industry, ultimately hiving off its 
design and research and development depart-
ments, which would be most detrimental to our 
mastery of technology. 
The idea of designing a European combat air-
craft has already been considered several times, 
and notably by the French, British and German 
Governments which decided several years ago 
to undertake economic and technical studies to 
determine whether or not it was possible to 
achieve the goal of building a European combat 
aircraft. The high commands were asked to 
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identify the requirements and to see whether 
they could be met by a single type of aircraft. 
What results did this produce ? 
Certain requirements of the French, British 
and German air forces are fairly similar and 
could be met by a single type of aircraft. Such 
an aircraft would have to be highly manoeuv-
rable and be capable of flying at supersonic 
speeds at low altitudes in poor weather 
conditions. It would also need to have an air-
to-air and air-to-ground capability, the ability 
to destroy aerodromes and tanks and to operate 
from fairly short strips, and a range of nearly 
I ,000 kilometres. The three countries concerned 
should be able to agree on common require-
ments concerning not only the type of aircraft 
and its structural characteristics but also its 
engine and armament. Naturally, some of the 
avionic components might differ with the type 
of armament demanded by individual high 
commands. The aircraft's performance could 
thus be modified without any big increase in 
development costs. 
In 1978 the French, British and German 
Defence Ministers decided to undertake a study 
to identify the aircraft characteristics required 
by all three countries. They instructed their 
armaments directors to set up working groups 
within the three ministries with the object of 
preparing a joint report on the industrial possi-
bilities of a partnership for the purpose of 
developing a European combat aircraft. 
This report was sent to the three governments 
in the summer of 1980. The reaction of the 
ministers to it was highly favourable but they 
pointed out that the projected costs were prob-
ably too high in view of the current budget prob-
lems. Nevertheless the three governments 
invited the high commands to pursue the study, 
to look into areas of convergence more exhaus-
tively, and to reduce the cost of the aircraft. 
Difficulties remain however, particularly 
concerning the type of weapons with which the 
aircraft should be equipped, as the specifica-
tions laid down by the three high commands in 
this respect still differ somewhat. 
A hope of unification is emerging neverthe-
less. In the report that was circulated, I spell 
out the advantages of such an undertaking on 
the European scale, indicating at the same time 
what difficulties would need to be overcome. 
Concerning the industrial aspect, for exam-
ple, it is clear that as far as the three countries 
interested in this project are concerned, the 
European aeronautical industry, after hesita-
tions which some of us have bitterly regretted, 
now has a very real opportunity to unite for the 
purpose of building a European combat air-
craft. It would be disastrous if Europe were to 
fail once more to grasp this chance and to fall 
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short of what has come to be referred to as 
"aeronautical Europe ". 
The budget aspects are probably those which 
pose the most real difficulties. We are aware 
of these difficulties and know too well how 
governments, mainly on parliamentary initia-
tive, find their defence budgets curbed and fre-
quently reduced. As I realised from talks I had 
with various senior officials in several Euro-
pean countries, the chief obstacles to the 
implementation of this project are the very real 
funding difficulties and the resolve of certain 
parliaments to restrict defence and armament 
budgets as much as possible. 
I believe nevertheless that there are real 
possibilities. The problem of designing and 
building an aircraft is essentially a market prob-
lem. Home markets remain narrow and res-
tricted whereas a European market offers inva-
luable assets to our industries. Indeed the fact 
that so far the growth of the aircraft industry, 
particularly in the field of military aircraft, has 
been greatest in the United States is due to the 
existence of a market wide enough to guarantee 
the success of such an enterprise. 
Well, we too must take steps to ensure that 
the market is wide enough and that prospects 
for our industries are encouraging and the 
outlets offered genuinely promising, so that 
they can take the necessary initiative, first at 
development and later at production level. If 
we plan to build a European aircraft, we must 
exercise care in choosing the kind of organisa-
tion to be set up for the purpose. Indeed pre-
vious experi~nce in Europe shows that we inva-
riably tend to set up cumbersome administra-
tive structures, so that if for some reason or 
other one wishes to change even a bolt on an 
aircraft, one immediately has to convene four 
or five panels of experts from the different 
nations. This can be very expensive, for it 
increases the cost of the aircraft and of the 
whole venture. 
We must take advantage of past experience 
and set up flexible structures and leave a great 
deal to industry, which has become increasingly 
accustomed to international collaboration. I 
am convinced that if our market is wide 
enough, the aircraft we build in this way could 
be exported extensively to many parts of the 
world. 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the 
European chiefs of staff know that ten years or 
so hence our defence needs in terms of combat 
aircraft will no longer be covered. This is true 
of most of the member states of our organisa-
tion. We therefore have ten years in which to 
design our air defence system. And ten years 
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is the time it takes to design and produce an 
aircraft. Consequently, if we so desire and if 
we hav~ the political will to do so, we have a 
decade before us in which to develop a new 
advanced-technology aircraft embodying the 
fruit of research which we can have the ability 
to undertake successfully in Europe. Ten years 
is not a long time to build an aircraft. 
We must make it a European project which 
pools our capabilities and our potentials -
which are so great - so as to bring about colla-
boration on the European scale by our aircraft 
industries which, if they are to survive, must 
conceive and work on new projects, failing 
which they will become mere sub-contractors 
completely deprived of all aspects of research 
and design. 
If we wish to preserve for Europe its role as a 
continent of progress, it seems to me that we 
must grasp this opportunity before us and rise 
to this new challenge to our intelligence. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Brasseur. 
As Mr. Hardy is not present, I call next on 
the list of speakers Mr. Hermann Schmidt. 
Mr. Hermann SCHMIDT (Federal Republic 
of Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all express 
my special thanks to the Rapporteur for his 
remarks, which, while I do not agree with them 
- and I would like to emphasise that - never-
theless deserve recognition, particularly as 
regards the recommendation before us, which 
speaks of European co-operation. I am a very 
staunch advocate of co-operation by the Federal 
Republic of Germany with, for example, France 
and Britain and all the other countries, 
including the NATO ones. However - and 
this is the stage of reflection I have just gone 
through - we have been dealing with this 
matter at national level in the Federal Republic 
itself, in connection with a new combat aircraft, 
the Tornado, in a parliamentary study commit-
tee. We are therefore on the ball, so to speak, 
and in a position to say something about the 
combat aircraft of the future. That is what I 
will now do. 
I would like first of all to ask a question 
about the second paragraph of the preamble, 
which states that this aircraft must be designed 
in the light of the threat to European countries 
in the nineties. Who can say now what the 
threat will be in 1990, 1991 and 1992 ? It is 
quite impossible. We are being overtaken by 
events as it is. I think it is wrong to be so 
categorical. It is no good our embarking now 
on a design stage and possibly a development 
stage and saying that all the threats in store for 
us in 1992 or 1995 have already been covered 
by that design or that development. 
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The third paragraph, as the Rapporteur has 
just remarked, states that the aircraft will 
involve the use of very advanced technology, 
etc. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been in the 
Defence Committee of the Federal Parliament 
for twenty years. When the soldiers have 
specified their requirements and discussed them 
with us, we have sometimes said, with a 
chuckle, " There they go again, asking us for a 
cross between a sheep and a dairy pig, " in 
other words, an all-purpose instrument. All I 
can say is that the Tornado system costs 170 
million DM today because everything has been 
packed into it, all the requirements have been 
taken into consideration, in the belief that a 
plane like that could do everything. 
We need a change of attitude, a new way of 
thinking that is not reflected in this report but 
that we, who sit in the parliaments, must 
eventually adopt. We do not yet know what 
functions that are now still performed by 
manned aircraft can in future be taken over by 
unmanned aircraft. We should concentrate 
our research capabilities - and each national 
budget has a sizeable allocation for research 
and development - more intensely on this 
subject, in order to return to the previous state 
of affairs - which will also pertain in the future 
- when weapons systems can be both usable 
and affordable. Paid for they must be, at all 
events, but they must be usable too. We 
cannot have a situation in which we go on 
needing specialists for every weapons system in 
the army. Our armies include conscripts. 
Weapons systems - leaving aircraft aside for the 
moment - must be capable of operation by 
conscripts. Therefore our slogan must be: 
make things simpler, not more complicated. 
We must get away from the idea that the latest 
technological gimmick has to be incorporated. 
This is where I see an important role for our 
parliaments. At one place in the report, for 
example, we are told that the specifications 
drawn up by the general staffs of the three air 
forces need to be harmonised. I have to point 
out that our air force does not have a general 
staff, nor indeed does a general staff exist any-
where in our armed forces. 
We are also told that there is a need - which 
has to be "recalled" - to design a multi-
purpose aircraft which is nevertheless adaptable 
to the specific requirements of the various 
WEU member countries. I ask myself: adapt-
able also to the requirements of the various 
· branches of the armed forces, e.g. the navy, but 
in particular the air force ? Where will it 
end? We must take the other path, we must 
have machines we can both use and pay for. I 
believe that we have a whole series of special 
tasks, both as members of our national parlia-
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ments and as members of the WEU Assembly. 
We must keep on telling the various coun-
tries that of course we must continue to develop 
our weapons systems, but only within the limits 
of our budgets - the Rapporteur mentioned the 
tightness of the budgets - and that the systems 
themselves must be usable. Here the bounds 
of possibility have already been reached in 
some respects. 
May I briefly mention that, in co-operation 
between organisations, we have had some 
problems with NAMMA, the organisation that 
has been supervising the development of the 
Tornado. I acknowledge the restrictions aris-
ing from the opportunities for European co-
operation, but if anything similar is considered 
again in the future we shall have to draw some 
conclusions from NAMMA's mistakes. We in 
the Federal Republic of Germany have learnt a 
few lessons. Our plans for the nineties had 
included the tactical combat aircraft, the 
TK.F-90. After thorough consideration the air-
craft has been scrapped, that is completely 
removed from our plans. Consequently we 
have not currently allocated any development 
funds for a new combat aircraft. We shall of 
course carry out further studies, including joint 
studies with our friends in the WEU countries 
and in NATO, and above all with France, 
Britain and Italy. For the immediate future, 
however, we have blocked trilateral co-
operation on the development of a new combat 
aircraft and believe that this problem should be 
tackled again, perhaps in 1983 or 1984, after a 
pause for reflection, in friendly co-operation -
as I have said - with all the interested parties. 
I would also like to add a word about the rate 
of technological development in other areas, for 
example in regard to armoured vehicles. For 
instance, we know that the development of 
armour-piercing ammunition has overtaken 
tank development. We need some new ideas; 
we must develop a new philosophy of the tank 
force and its future operation. However, one 
more point must be made in this connection: 
the discussion must be initiated by parliamen-
tarians. Generals and soldiers cannot be left to 
decide on the action needed and the nature of 
the threat, and then to ask the parliaments to 
pay for the ideas of these thoroughly highly-
qualified, good people. We must be involved, 
come to grips with the necessary technology 
and not leave everything to those whose work is 
deemed to be a matter for experts. I can 
understand that even now an admiral would 
prefer a battleship on whose bridge he himself 
could stand. We do not need that any more-
things have developed in quite a different way. 
The parliamentarian must therefore assume 
much greater responsibility for these matters 
than in the past. He must acquire the neces-
sary knowledge and make a contribution in 
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committee, naturally with the help of the offi-
cers and men of the various armed forces. 
My colleagues in the Social Democratic Party 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and I have 
considered this report very carefully. We are 
unable to give it our support. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Schmidt. 
The next speaker is Mr. Antoni. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the 
frequent references made by our German 
colleague to our duties as parliamentarians, I 
must at once make serious reservations regar-
ding the basic options underlying the general 
line of the report and the draft recommendation 
submitted by Mr. Brasseur, while at the same 
time paying tribute to the work he has done 
with such thoroughness. 
Basically, it seems to us that what is sugges-
ted is a repetition of an unsuccessful experi-
ment and that the Rapporteur's own regrets 
regarding the F-16 affair, which struck a blow 
at the establishment of a European aircraft-
building community, have ended up in bitter-
ness, preventing positive conclusions from 
being reached. Why ? Because, starting from 
the assumption that a new multi-purpose air-
craft, adaptable to the individual requirements 
of all the WEU countries, must be available by 
1990, basically what is advocated is European 
co-operation and planning in the hope of 
succeeding where there has definitely been no 
success in the past. But what happens in real-
ity, Ladies and Gentlemen? In my opinion, 
what happens is planning which, at most, 
commits all the countries in different ways but 
commits some of them more especially. 
I realise that this is a delicate question, parti-
cularly as the past attitude of the various coun-
tries does not inspire any great hopes. In any 
event, it has to be recognised that, while the 
term European planning is used, the countries 
are really divided into a first group - France, 
United Kingdom and Germany - which would 
have to study and build the aircraft and a 
second group - all the other countries - which 
would have to assess the possibilities and would 
primarily have to undertake to buy it. In my 
view, this kind of planning is bound to fail and 
I would at once like to make it clear, in all 
humility as regards my scientific knowledge 
but very firmly as a politician, that I have no 
intention of questioning the capacity of the 
three countries I have named to study and build 
the aircraft. On the contrary, I not merely 
respect but fully appreciate the technical capa-
city and inititative of the three countries. But 
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what I am asking myself and my colleagues is 
what kind of co-operation we want to see pro-
moted in Europe and on the basis of what 
European experience over the last twenty years. 
It hardly seems realistic to me to say that the 
way proposed is the only possible one and the 
only one which could successfully produce an 
aircraft in the short span of ten years. 
Why? As I have said already, I am not a 
technical expert. Like our German colleague, 
I am trying to make a political assessment, on 
the basis of what the Committee decided to 
submit to us for approval. The way proposed 
is not the shortest, if it is true, as it is at 
present, that there is not much agreement 
between these three countries on options and 
studies and, therefore, on decisions. 
It is clear from Mr. Brasseur's report that 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany 
have no common view. The type of aircraft 
which these three countries believe they need is 
different. France is in favour of a versatile, 
multi-purpose aircraft differing from that requi-
red by the German air staff. The RAF propo-
ses a solution similar to the French but not the 
same. It is stated that Italy is, in turn, closer 
to Germany's ideas. The military budget of 
any one of these countries could not meet the 
financial cost. I have heard a figure of some-
thing like 40 billion and finding the necessary 
finance remains a problem ; nor, in my view, is 
the Rapporteur's proposal strengthened by his 
own forecast that the other ' countries are 
unlikely to buy the aircraft - the Netherlands, 
Norway, Denmark. Finally, it is repeated that 
no definite decision has yet been taken by the 
Italian Government. 
I shall not allow myself the thought that the 
choices we shall have to make will be unduly 
influenced by other interests, which I hesitate to 
call illicit but which certainly cannot represent 
the overall interests of the WEU countries. 
The uncertainties, doubts and differences are, 
therefore, so great, that the Rapporteur feels it 
necessary to postulate other possible arrange-
ments to be based on bilateral agreements 
between the individual states and almost all 
between an individual state (the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany) and the 
United States; and this, I consider - as in fact 
the Rapporteur himself says in connection with 
Germany and I believe that the same can be 
said of all the WEU countries - would be a 
serious blow to the prospects for a concerted 
European policy in this sector. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am well aware of 
the difficulties in the way of a planned policy 
but I should also like to point out that it is 
difficult to accept as a concerted policy for 
Europe a proposal with the many alternatives I 
have drawn to your attention - I believe I have 
interpreted them correctly. I consider, there-
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fore, that what should be advocated is Euro-
pean co-operation based - and I shall elaborate 
on this when I speak on this morning's Orders 
of the Day - on national realities which should 
be stressed and not slurred over. This means 
that efforts should be directed to establishing 
the conditions for combined technical progress 
and a combined WEU commitment. 
In my view, therefore- and this also emerges 
from the report and the draft recommendation 
- the requirements for a common policy in this 
sector cannot be met in full. That is why, Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our group 
has tabled three amendments, to which I shall 
speak briefly, without having to elaborate 
further on the point, seeking to affirm that a 
concerted policy is a policy of all the WEU 
countries. The intention is therefore to replace 
those parts of the draft recommendation which 
distinguish between the two groups, that is, I 
repeat, between the countries which are to be 
responsible for study, research and construction 
and the countries which will only be purchasing 
the aircraft. From the purely formal stand-
point, we shall be able to explain the amend-
ments better - very quickly if necessary - when 
they come up for discussion, but this is our 
choice. It is a choice consistent with every 
position we have taken up and declared in this 
Assembly whenever we have discussed prob-
lems relating to the concertation of armaments 
policy and the management of that policy. 
Finally, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentle-
men, I wish to thank you for your attention 
and to confirm in advance that we cannot vote 
for the draft recommendation in its present 
form. Our decision may change according to 
the view taken by the Assembly of our pro-
posed amendments to the draft recommenda-
tion. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Antoni. 
The next speaker in this debate is Mr. Hardy. 
Mr. HARDY (United Kingdom).- I had not 
realised that our business had been changed or I 
should have attended the whole debate, in spite 
of our earlier start and the multiplicity of meet-
ings here before the Assembly began. 
I recognise that enormous advantages can 
accrue from international co-operation, espe-
cially in this sphere of advanced technology. 
Economy of scale can provide substantial 
benefit. If we each produce separate aircraft, 
separate weapons systems, or almost any 
sophisticated manufacture, each of us will incur 
high design and development costs. However, 
with projects such as Tornado those costs are 
shared. Even so, they are enormous, especially 
in the light of international needs and the alter-
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native placement of the resources which these 
projects consume. 
In spite of the savings from international co-
operation, there are difficulties, the chief of 
which in this context being that different 
nations have different requirements. The 
report makes clear that the Federal Republic of 
Germany requires aircraft with an air-to-air 
capability. The United Kingdom seems to 
favour a vertical take-off specification. The 
French seem to be much less enthusiastic about 
that type of aircraft. Currently in Britain it is 
reported that the Royal Air Force is interested 
in the P-106, a single-engine lightweight 
combat aircraft - the modem version of the 
cavalry - and in the P-109, a swivel-engine 
design which can fly from an ultra-short take-
off. Both would be supersonic. 
It is possible to take co-operation to the point 
of absurdity. If one country wanted a lorry 
and another wanted a motor cycle while a third 
wanted a bus, none would be satisfied if a taxi 
were the common result. We could reach the 
situation in which three potential customers 
regarded the aircraft they received as very much 
second best. I am concerned that we may 
reach the position in which specifications 
would vary so enormously that the economic 
advantages would be destroyed, where there 
would be so many meetings, so much consulta-
tion, paper and travelling, and so many 
committee deliberations that the economic 
advantage would be rapidly eroded. 
I am reminded of the recent arrangement 
within the Community for the energy-labelling 
project that was approved not long ago. I 
recall estimating in the House of Commons that 
it would take 250 years before there was any 
net gain from the energy labelling requirement 
because so much paper, so many meetings and 
so much energy had been used in bringing that 
requirement about - more than would ever be 
saved in anything less than a quarter of a 
millennium. We are in danger of proceeding 
along those lines in this project as well. 
I am neither an aeronautical engineer nor a 
statistician, and I am not qualified to assess the 
technological potential of this project. Instead 
I want to make a different point. By far the 
greater part of the service life of the aircraft that 
may develop will be spent in the next century, 
and by that time, I am convinced, we shall have 
more sophisticated weapons systems and a 
much greater missile capability. The aircrew 
who would have to fly these aircraft would have 
to be young men with swift reactions, quick 
minds, of extremely high intelligence and 
highly educated. Before they were placed in a 
squadron they would have had to spend months 
in training, and that training would - certainly 
in our case - cost many millions of pounds. 
We are in danger of designing aircraft in order 
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to ensure that we continue to employ pilots 
with this level of ability. 
I recall visiting a Royal Air Force squadron a 
few months ago. I discovered that all but two 
of the pilots had been virtually flight lieu-
tenants before entering squadron service. A 
majority of the squadron pilots were physics 
graduates. We should question whether we 
need to employ physics graduates - extremely 
able young men - to fly aircraft when we may 
not need manned air vehicles for the purposes 
envisaged in this project. Generals clung to 
cavalry for generations longer than it was requi-
red for frontal assault purposes. It may be that 
air marshals are pursuing the same path with 
manned combat aircraft. 
I am not suggesting that we shall not need air 
crew. We shall need pilots for helicopter:s, for 
transport purposes, for training, reconnaissance 
and high-level flying. But are we right to envi-
sage that we shall need young men to fly super-
sonically at low level in the twenty-first 
century? There may be a more economic 
alternative. 
Cannot the Committee turn its mind to that 
purpose? I do not believe that we should be 
envisaging a situation in which young men of 
scarce talent will be required to be the 
kamikaze pilots of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Hardy. 
I now call Mr. Wilkinson. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). - I 
greatly welcome the report by my friend and 
colleague, Mr. Brasseur, which is, I think, the 
first political report of its kind on European 
combat aircraft. That aircraft is potentially for 
service in a number of European air forces. It 
is of crucial significance not just for their capa-
bilities, but for the industrial potential of many 
important European companies. I therefore 
again welcome what Mr. Brasseur has written, 
and I broadly support his recommendations to 
the Assembly, upon which we are to vote later. 
This Assembly is in grave danger, in its 
understandable scepticism about international 
co-operation, of forgetting the broad objectives 
of collaboration. They are not just to share 
the cost. Without co-operation very few, if 
any, of our member countries could go it 
alone on the research, the development, the 
production and the maintenance in service of 
aircraft of this calibre. There are also benefits 
of standardisation and interoperability which it 
would be wrong to overlook. 
There is no sphere of military activity in 
which the importance of standardisation and 
interoperability is greater than that of combat 
aircraft. The aircraft, by its speed of reaction 
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and its capability for rapid dispersal, requires 
common facilities to turn it around, and to 
rearm, refuel and maintain it if it is to be used 
effectively in our common defence. Just 
because the Tornado may, for example, have 
cost us rather more than we envisaged origi-
nally, it would be quite wrong to throw out 
altogether the concept of collaboration and not 
to support the joint development of a new 
European combat aircraft for the future. 
Let us look more closely at that Tornado 
experience. It brought to the air forces of three 
countries a broadly similar type of aeroplane. 
That brought with it standardisation. We 
must include also the Tornadoes that will serve 
in the fleet air arm of the German navy. It has 
brought with it close personal contact among 
the military personnel of the user services. 
Only a few months ago, the trinational training 
establishment at Cottesmore began operation, 
and the joint training of that unit is an example 
of what will happen in the future. I repeat 
that there is no way that the user countries 
could have procured for themselves unilaterally 
an aircraft of that capability and done so within 
any reasonable parameter of cost. 
Then we must remember that the Tornado is 
a highly versatile aeroplane. It was, after all, 
known originally as the multi-role combat air-
craft. It is fulfilling both missions for the 
interdiction and strike roles but also for the air 
defence of the United Kingdom through its F-2 
variant. 
That is one example of co-operation, and I 
recognise that the superimposition of an official 
management agency, the NAMMA, perhaps 
over-bureaucratised the management and per-
haps inhibited rapid decision-taking. But we 
have learnt from that experience, and the 
industrial co-operation was effective and sound 
and the aeroplane is much respected by the 
user services. 
The other prime example was the F-16, the 
aeroplane which gained the marche du siecle at 
the expense particularly of the Mirage and 
which is now in service with the air forces of 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. This 
aeroplane, too, is a remarkable success in its 
way. It has entered service, broadly speaking, 
on time and to cost, and it has brought benefits 
once more of standardisation and inter-
operability. It has enabled the participating 
companies to provide work for their employees, 
and the air forces have an aircraft in service of 
the very highest performance obtainable for the 
cost which they were prepared to pay. They 
have also benefited from the operational expe-
rience of the United States Air Force, with 
which it serves, and the participating compa-
nies have been able to benefit from sales to 
third world countries. 
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I recognise that the future of European co-
operation is in doubt. In terms of helicopters, 
for example, there is a question mark over the 
Franco-German new anti-tank helicopter. In 
terms of anti-submarine activities, there is a 
question mark over the newly-proposed Anglo-
Italian helicopter. It would be quite wrong for 
this Assembly, which is par excellence the 
Assembly which cares for the joint defence of 
Western Europe, to inject a further note of 
uncertainty and pessimism. 
I know that there are industrial difficulties to 
be overcome, for example, over the engine. 
Do we accept a proven power plant, for 
example, the RB-119, which powers the 
Tornado? Do we accept a French design, the 
SNECMA M-88? Do we even go to an Ameri-
can proven power plant, the General Electric 
F-404, which powers the F-18? These are 
difficulties. I recognise that there are rivalries. 
Marcel Dassault may prefer design leadership. 
That is the way that it has worked over the 
Alpha-Jet, and very successfully. British Aero-
space may have its own rightful pride. 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm is now, thanks to 
the Tornado, a company of the very highest 
capability. 
But surely we can resolve these difficulties to 
our mutual advantage. What is required is the 
will. It is possible that we have rather more 
time than we thought although, like Mr. Bras-
seur, I do not accept that we can wait for 
another fifteen years, because the improvement 
in the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact air forces 
is such that we shall need - certainly in the 
United Kingdom we shall need - to bring into 
service an aeroplane to replace the Jaguar 
sooner than 1995. Until then, we can improve 
the capabilities of the Jaguar and we can at 
least meet our staff target 409 with the intro-
duction to service of the A V -8B improved 
Harrier, to be built jointly in collaboration 
between British Aerospace and McDonnell-
Douglas. 
I welcome this report. It is timely. It is 
well researched. It is thoughtful. In its broad 
objectives, it deserves our wholehearted 
support. 
It would be ironic if, on the day after General 
Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, reminded us of the magnitude of the 
Soviet threat and the growth in the potential of 
Soviet air power, we denied ourselves, by the 
conscious negative decision of this Assembly, 
the way forward to continue to maintain an 
independent advanced industrial capability that 
would keep us in Europe in the forefront of 
aeronautical development and also denied our-
selves the possibility of standardised equipment 
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and interoperability which would greatly 
enhance the effectiveness of our armed forces. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Wilkinson. 
We are in a slight difficulty in that the 
Rapporteur, Mr. Brasseur, who has come here 
at great personal inconvenience in the middle 
of an important parliamentary engagement in 
his own country, has to return immediately. 
He wishes to say a few words about the debate 
so far. I think that the Assembly will agree 
that we should permit him to do so. The 
Chairman of the Committee has undertaken to 
. reply to the debate and amendments in the 
usual way. 
We appreciate your coming, Mr. Brasseur. 
If you wish to comment on the debate so far, 
perhaps you will do so now. 
Mr. BRASSEUR (Belgium) (Translation). -
As you say, Mr. President, I have to chair a 
very important parliamentary committee at 2 
o'clock this afternoon, which compels me to 
return home at the end of the morning. I wish 
to apologise to the Assembly for this and to 
thank you, Mr. President, for permitting me to 
say a few words now to the representatives who 
spoke in the debate. I will also give you my 
views concerning the amendments tabled by 
Mr. Antoni and several of his colleagues, and 
those tabled by Mr. Forma. 
Let me say first of all that I endeavoured to 
submit an objective report, stressing not only 
the possibilities and opportunities offered to 
Europe but also the difficulties it might have to 
overcome. The question now is whether our 
Assembly has the political will to promote true 
European co-operation on a combat aircraft. 
I am aware that, as some have pointed out, 
the aircraft's technology could well be chal-
lenged in ten to fifteen years' time because 
other types of armament are deployed -
whether unmanned aircraft or missiles. How-
ever, all the contacts I have had with experts 
indicate that, irrespective of how new weaponry 
develops, aircraft will retain a specific mission 
capability primarily because of their great 
manoeuvrability. Consequently the future air-
craft's specification will have to provide for this 
mission within the overall defence capability 
for, as I emphasised in my report, aircraft will 
remain an important element in combat thanks 
to their manoeuvrability and very short 
response times. 
Admittedly, the project would be very costly, 
and Mr. Antoni has stated that it would lead to 
heavy expenditure. I am aware of this, but at 
the same time I believe that the development of 
separate aircraft would likewise be a very 
expensive business. Moreover, to defer the 
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project or to incur delay would cost just as 
much - as experience has shown in case of 
delays with other aircraft projects in which the 
initial estimated cost was found to have 
doubled, trebled or even quintupled. 
Of course, a common project would still pose 
certain difficulties, but it would be a mistake to 
want to do everything with the one aircraft and 
to refuse to accept certain compromises. Co-
ordination is not to add together the various 
specifications and requirements. It involves 
making choices, and it would be up to the 
governments to negotiate these. The politi-
cians must accept their responsibilities and 
WEU can play an important role. To attempt 
to develop an unduly complex aircraft capable 
of satisfying all requirements could result in 
failure of the project. And as has already been 
suggested, I believe that this project, were it to 
be adopted by the member states, should have a 
comparatively flexible structure, for an organi-
sation based on bureaucracy would be costly 
and would imperil the project. 
The amendments tabled by Mr. Forma and 
Mr. Antoni are consistent with this thinking 
and in fact take up the previous suggestion that 
a distinction be made between countries willing 
to commit themselves to the project and the 
remaining member states of WEU. I accept 
the spirit of these amendments even though this 
position is somewhat less realistic in view of the 
intergovernmental contacts which have already 
taken place and the fact that relatively precise 
projects have been formulated. 
In adopting these amendments, then, we shall 
perhaps be adopting a rather less realistic posi-
tion, but since we are a political assembly it is 
up to us to chart the main courses. I also 
believe it would be useful for all those WEU 
members interested in the project to join in. 
This being so, I personally accept Amend-
ment 1 tabled by Mr. Antoni, which proposes 
that in paragraph 1 of the draft recommenda-
tion the words " interested governments " be 
substituted for the words " British, French and 
German Governments ". I also accept the 
second part of this amendment, which is 
common to the second paragraph of Amend-
ment 4 tabled by Mr. Forma and proposes that 
the word " three " be deleted wherever it 
appears in the text, as this would broaden the 
possibilities. I also accept Mr. Antoni's 
Amendment 2 proposing that the word 
" other " be left out as, once again, we have all 
the countries in mind - this being a point made 
by Mr. Forma. 
As for Amendment 3 concerning a change in 
the order of the paragraphs of the draft 
133 
FOURTH SITTING 
recommendation, I accept it as well since it in 
no way affects the intention of the draft and 
makes it more logical. 
However, we must not automatically involve 
all the WEU states as some of them may have 
reservations on the matter. Consequently I 
prefer the amendment which proposes the 
words " interested governments " rather than 
"governments of the WEU countries". It 
seems to me that this leaves the governments 
free to join the others or not; furthermore this 
would not compromise the project, which could 
therefore be undertaken. 
These were the comments I wished to make, 
Mr. President. I am truly sorry to leave you, 
but the Chairman of the Committee will cer-
tainly be glad to deliver the rest of my reply. 
Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Bras-
seur. I hope your enthusiasm for the subject 
and your dedication to duty do not cause you 
to miss your train. You have gone on rather 
longer than you had thought and may have 
now to run. 
The next speaker is Mr. Forma. 
Mr. FORMA (Italy) (Translation). - If there 
had been any need for clarification of certain 
key points in the arguments advanced by Mr. 
Brasseur for the building of a common combat 
aircraft, I feel that this point may have been 
partly covered by the speech which we heard 
yesterday from General Rogers and by his 
replies to a number of questions. I cannot of 
course pretend to go into the consequences 
which the type of aircraft required for certain 
specified purposes may have. Perhaps this is a 
matter for the staffs. I shall confine myself to 
making a few political points and a number of 
proposals, which have already been favourably 
received by the Rapporteur, whom I wish to 
thank. 
Substantially, it is an old argument that 
Europe should prove itself to be capable of 
defending itself, with the strategic support of its 
allies of course. Quite clearly any defence is 
inconceivable unless the component forces and 
their armaments complement each other in a 
co-ordinated overall structure, suitably adapted 
to the needs of the fronts held by the individual 
countries. Even I, as a politician, can under-
stand that the same aircraft can be armed differ-
ently with the help of the air staffs. 
I think that another preliminary remark, this 
time of a rather different character, may be 
acceptable even to those who, while wishing 
Europe to remain faithful to the Atlantic 
Alliance, do not wish it to be powerless and 
incapable of taking independent decisions and 
contributing constructively to the policy of the 
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blocs created by the need for a balance between 
systems and rooted in the now distant events of 
Yalta. In other words, a Europe wholly geared 
to allied technology and production could never 
be self-sufficient and autonomous, within the 
strategic context of world politics; nor could it, 
if it continued to be influenced by nationalistic 
pressures which are unfortunately not lacking, 
or if it became a thing of " shreds and patches " 
by donning the multicoloured costume which 
we Italians attribute to Harlequin. It may be 
that this character is the image not only of my 
country but also of all of us in a small 
way. To use the words of the Risorgimento we 
" are not a people but are still divided " and we 
find it hard to think of ourselves as one people. 
This explains the Council's replies to Recom-
mendations 329 and 339 on the need to identify 
systems which can be produced in collaboration 
and to improve European interoperability. In 
the report, therefore, we accept these basic 
principles which should certainly encourage the 
individual governments and even more the 
European authorities, and ourselves in particu-
lar, to remove the few points of disagreement 
which seem to exist between the various coun-
tries and the air staffs and which, according to 
the report, have reappeared in the efforts to 
define a successor to the RB-199, the Jaguar, 
the Harrier, the Mirage and the latest type we 
have just mentioned, the Tornado. 
As the Rapporteur says, technical develop-
ments are so swift that when a new type of air-
craft comes into service work must already have 
started on designing the next. The time-scale 
is long, techniques are racing ahead and equip-
ment becomes obsolete at a rate which is 
perhaps faster than that which marked the 
change from the cavalry to the aeroplane. 
The Rapporteur gives us an excellent 
summary of the motives, the points of agree-
ment and disagreement, and the technical, eco-
nomic and market arguments in favour of co-
operating seriously and as flexibly as possible in 
this field. He also lists a number of difficulties 
which have arisen with the Tornado and other 
earlier programmes, but which he qualifies as 
" a good exercise in European collaboration ". 
He recognises the relationship between markets, 
costs and prices as regards both the harmonisa-
tion of armaments and, therefore, of procure-
ment within the WEU countries and the possi-
bilities of supplying external markets. I agree 
on all these points, except possibly that of sales 
to third countries, which the Rapporteur him-
self treats with some caution. I also agree on 
the " chronicle of events " which led to the 
tripartite decision of the French, German and 
British ministries to associate British Aerospace, 
Dassault-Breguet and MBB in a joint report on 
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the possibility of building a European combat 
aircraft. This report appeared in 1980 and 
revealed the divergences which I have already 
mentioned. 
All these points, supplemented by the course 
of the " talks " mentioned in paragraph 50 of 
the explanatory memorandum, resulted in the 
drafting of the recommendation in a form 
which seems to me to be out of step with the 
memorandum and to show little respect for the 
present or future technical and industrial capa-
city of the member countries of WEU. The 
fact that they have not so far been willing to 
take part in projects - with the disagreements 
and results we have been discussing - does not 
seem to me to justify our adopting a recom-
mendation which ignores the capacity, know-
ledge and equal rights of all the member coun-
tries ; even less in my view can we adopt a 
recommendation that account be taken of the 
requirements of three air staffs which make up 
the allied forces represented by WEU. It may 
have been stressed already ; there will be other 
ways of participating but it is not up to us to 
say how. This will depend on the situation of 
the various countries, on whether the industries 
- because this concerns the industries - will be 
able to make the " instrument " which Europe 
needs and on the needs of the various countries 
in the context of a harmonious development 
adapted to the specific technical and military 
requirements of the individual countries. 
Naturally, these requirements differ and are 
geared to different purposes, in the context of 
the weapons with which the European army 
will be equipped. To overcome these difficul-
ties, I together with my socialist colleague, Mr. 
Maravalle, proposed a number of amendments, 
which the Rapporteur favoured. I thank him 
for his judgment and I may add that, if these 
amendments are accepted, I shall have no 
further hesitation about voting for the report, as 
my sole doubt was concerned with the relations 
needed between the countries of WEU. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Forma. 
The last speaker of whom I have notice to 
speak is Mr. Kurt Jung. 
Mr. Kurt JUNG (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, as Mr. Schmidt has already 
made some remarks about our experience of the 
Tornado project, I think I can be brief. I wel-
come the Brasseur report in principle because it 
deals with a problem that I think WEU needs 
to go into in rather more depth. The report 
recognises that we should not, as in the case of 
the Tornado, develop one aircraft or one pro-
ject designed to cover every requirement, but 
that a major future defence task is the develop-
ment of an aircraft specifically for interception 
purposes. I welcome this very sensible 
restriction. 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. lung (continued) 
In the case of the MRCA, which was origi-
nally envisaged as a multi-role combat aircraft, 
we have, as Mr. Schmidt pointed out, devel-
oped " a cross between a sheep and a dairy 
pig", an all-purpose instrument that is not in 
fact suitable for all purposes. In the Tornado 
committee we also noted that the military 
requirements for the project were not estab-
lished until a later date. I was interpreting 
" MRCA " in the Bundestag back in 1969-70 as 
" Military Requirement Comes Afterwards ". 
The Brasseur report lays the basis for the 
recognition that we shall in future have to 
develop differentiated systems for the great 
variety of different tasks. 
I am very grateful to Mr. Schmidt for poin-
ting out that we also need to consider whether, 
in the circumstances, we should continue to 
develop manned aircraft only or whether we 
cannot develop much cheaper unmanned sys-
tems - for example cruise-missile type systems 
- for specific purposes. It emerges clearly from 
this report - which is why I welcome it - that a 
project of this kind will be developed in the 
interests of standardisation and harmonisation 
within WEU or among the various countries 
interested. 
The Tornado experience must be taken into 
account from the outset, for it has been 
dreadful. From the beginning of production in 
1976 to the reference date of 31st December 
1979, the cost of the Tornado rose by approxi-
mately 45 %, i.e. 15 % per year. Mr. Schmidt 
gave the cost of the system as 70 million DM 
per unit. That was a polite understatement. 
The cost is already much higher than that. If 
we project current trends, we arrive at a unit 
cost of 110 million DM for the system at the 
end of the project period. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, our studies in Com-
mittee made it quite clear that at least some of 
the blame for this cost escalation must be attri-
buted to mismanagement by the international 
agency NAMMA. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to establish this precisely, because the 
members of NAMMA were not authorised to 
make a statement. I regret this very much and 
would like to record that fact here. 
Western European Union is therefore faced 
with the task of solving the problems of co-
ordination, standardisation, interoperability and 
compatibility of the various aircraft of the air 
and naval forces of the NATO or WEU 
member states and of considering the possibility 
of integrating them under some kind of Euro-
pean armaments agency. Such an agency 
would of course have to be democratically 
controlled by this Assembly. Its terms of refer-
135 
FOURTH SITTING 
ence would include the problems of arms 
exports, arms limitation and the harmonisation 
of the activity of all participants in such a 
scheme. It is no good having several countries 
collaborating on a project and some of them 
obeying self-imposed national restrictions while 
others cheerfully export the jointly-developed 
product to areas of tension. 
I believe these ideas should be linked to the 
Brasseur report. There would then be a possi-
bility of achieving the ideal situation, in which 
a European armaments agency of this kind 
would enable us in the future to have systems 
that are interchangeable, technically advanced 
and highly sophisticated, at a cost that would 
make them acceptable to all the countries 
concerned. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Jung. 
Does any other member wish to take part in 
the debate? 
If not, does the acting Chairman wish to say 
a few words? 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, as you correctly 
pointed out, I am standing in for the Chairman 
of the Committee, our French colleague Jean 
Valleix, who because of the internal political 
situation in his country has of course somewhat 
more complex affairs to attend to than the 
presentation of his Committee's report to this 
Assembly. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all 
thank those who have taken part in the debate 
for their suggestions, criticisms and proposals. 
I would like to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. 
Brasseur, and again apologise on his behalf. 
As you already said, Mr. President, he has 
unfortunately had to leave. 
May I make some comments on the contribu-
tions to the debate. As far as the amend-
ments are concerned, the position taken by the 
Rapporteur has clearly already led to a solu-
tion. The Rapporteur stated his willingness to 
accept all the amendments tabled by our Italian 
colleagues. I would endorse that on behalf of 
the Committee. Mr. Antoni and Mr. Forma 
have already given us to understand in their 
contributions to the debate that, in the circum-
stances, they are satisfied that their objections 
to the draft recommendation have been met. 
With regard to the other contributions, two 
lines of thought have emerged. My colleagues 
Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Jung, in particular, have 
expressed doubts as to whether we can possibly 
predict, at this stage, technical and tactical 
requirements that will not have to be defined 
until the early nineties. This is certainly a 
serious objection. The question was then 
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raised as to whether an all-purpose system is 
feasible at all, or whether we should not go over 
to unmanned aircraft, or whether, instead of 
trying to develop an all-purpose system, we 
ought not to adopt a more flexible approach 
and develop different weapons systems for the 
different tasks involved. This - it was claimed 
- would certainly be less costly, present fewer 
technical difficulties and, finally, be simpler to 
use. 
I agree with the speakers who have pointed 
out that it is not enough for an army to possess 
technically sophisticated systems - Mr. Hardy 
made this point - but that these systems must 
also take account of their human operators. 
What he seems to me to be saying is that as a 
matter of principle these systems should be so 
designed that they do not necessarily have to be 
flown by physics graduates. 
In my own country, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the tactical combat aircraft TKF-90 
has had to be deferred for budgetary reasons. 
This should certainly not mean, however, that 
the project will not be given further thought in 
design studies and resumed at a later date, 
possibly in 1983 or 1984. 
All these points are important and deserve 
consideration. In concluding my reply to the 
individual contributions I would like to refer 
once again to the new element which the last 
speaker, Mr. Jung, introduced into the debate, 
the idea of establishing a European armaments 
agency whose terms of reference would include 
the very thorny problem of arms exports to 
areas of tension. I would ask Mr. Jung not to 
pursue this matter in the context of today's 
report. What he is proposing is something so 
difficult, in political terms as well, that to 
discuss it today would be right outside the 
scope of this report and would therefore 
necessitate another debate. 
Both the report and the recommendation 
were adopted unanimously in Committee. It 
would certainly have been easier, Ladies and 
Gentlemen - if I may say so - if some of the 
suggestions we have heard today in plenary 
session had been made at the Committee stage. 
The point of this report is quite simply to 
consider, on the grounds of cost, greater inter-
operability and increased standardisation of our 
weapons systems, the possibility of a single 
solution for the nineties in the field of aircraft 
design and the design of tactical combat aircraft 
in particular. It may well be that after detailed 
study we shall reach the conclusion that this is 
not feasible and that we must fall back on a 
variety of systems. This, however, in no way 
contradicts the intention of the report, which is 
to look first for the most comprehensive pos-
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sible European solution. I believe we should 
support this. 
A final point is that we in Europe are con-
stantly having to decide whether to buy ready-
made systems off the peg from the United 
States, or whether, for a variety of reasons, we 
must maintain our own European technologi-
cal and industrial capacity in this field. This 
was another question which the report was 
intended to stress and I think we should bear it 
in mind. 
I admit that some mistakes have been made 
in the management of joint projects, as several 
speakers have pointed out. That is a criticism 
of the management, not necessarily of the pro-
jects themselves. The Europa rockets were a 
case in point. The failure of the Europa 
rockets - Europa I and 11 - was not, in my 
opinion, the result of a lack of the necessary 
technology in Europe, but of mismanagement 
for a variety of reasons - including the jealous 
pursuit of the principle of fair return. 
May I conclude by once again thanking all 
those who have taken part in the debate. The 
amendments have been accepted. In these 
circumstances I would urge you not to withhold 
your support for the report. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you very much, 
Mr. Lenzer. 
That concludes the debate, but before voting 
on the draft recommendation, we must deal 
with the amendments. I ask members to listen 
carefully. Although I understand that the 
amendments are acceptable to the Committee, 
as they overlap I shall have to explain what will 
happen. If Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. 
Forma, is carried, and if Mr. Antoni wishes, I 
shall then put the amendment to insert: 
" governments of the WEU countries " in place 
of "interested governments". However, we 
shall have to see whether that is what Mr. 
Antoni wishes. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I support Amendment 4 proposed by 
Mr. Forma and Mr. Maravalle. This being so, 
I withdraw Amendment 1 tabled by myself and 
a number of others. If the Italian proposers 
agree, Amendment 4 will have the support of 
both myself and my colleagues. 
The PRESIDENT.- That is most helpful. I 
understand that Mr. Forma wishes to move his 
amendment formally. 
Mr. FORMA (Italy) (Translation). - No 
thank you, Mr. President, I do not wish to add 
to what I said earlier. 
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The PRESIDENT. - Amendment 4: 
4. In paragraph 1, line l, of the draft recom-
mendation proper, leave out " British, French 
and German Governments " and insert " inter-
ested governments " ; consequently, in line 2 
leave out " three ". 
has been moved and we shall now vote on it. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 4 is agreed to. 
Amendment l is not moved. 
I put Amendment 2, and with it the identical 
Amendment 5. 
2 and 5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommen-
dation proper, leave out "other". 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendments 2 and 5 are agreed to. 
We come finally to Amendment 3: 
3. In the draft recommendation proper, alter 
the order of the paragraphs so that 3 becomes 
1 ; 4 becomes 2 ; 1 becomes 3 ; 2 becomes 4. 
I gather that this amendment, in the name of 
Mr. Antoni, is also acceptable to the Commit-
tee and we shall now vote on it. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 3 is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on the draft recommenda-
tion in Document 874 as amended. 
Is there any abstention? ... 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Yes, I 
abstain. 
'The PRESIDENT. - Is there any objec-
tion? ... 
Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, I and 
some of my colleagues wish to vote against the 
draft recommendation. 
The PRESIDENT.- In that case we must 
have a roll-call vote. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. 
van Hulst. 
The voting is open. 
(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
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The result of the vote is as follows1: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted2. 
5. Future of European space activities -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee 
on Scientifu:, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
Doe. 883 and Amendment) 
The PRESIDENT. - We move to the next 
Order of the Day, which is the presentation of 
and debate on the report of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions, Document 883 and Amendment. 
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I call Mr. Wilkinson to present his report on 
the future of European space activities. 
(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assem-
bly, took the Chair) 
Mr. WILK.INSON (United Kingdom). -It is a 
great privilege to be able to introduce this 
report on the future of European space activi-
ties on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, and to 
use this occasion also to provide the reply of 
our Committee to the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council. 
This report merits very careful consideration, 
because it is an example of the continued inter-
est of this Assembly in an area of European 
industrial and technological activity which is of 
great significance to the security of our member 
countries and of great importance also for the 
Western European member countries' technolo-
gical capabilities in the future. 
Over many years, WEU has taken an interest 
in space affairs, and this Assembly has shown 
its primacy in these matters. Those who ques-
tion the importance of our work would do well 
to look at our preoccupation with space and the 
recommendations which we have made. 
We are deeply conscious of the energy with 
which the Soviet Union and the United States 
pursue their space programmes for military 
applications. We do not believe that Europe 
can follow their path. However, we feel that 
Europe should take note of the military impli-
l. See page 34. 
2. See page 35. 
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cations of space and utilise space technologies 
which Europe has developed for peaceful 
purposes where those technologies have a mili-
tary implication. But, of course, Europe 
should do so only in the context of the North 
Atlantic Alliance. It should seek to pursue 
military objectives in space not unilaterally but 
only as part of the effort of the Alliance. 
Looking further afield, we are aware of the 
great efforts being made by industrial nations 
other than the superpowers and outside Europe 
to develop for themselves a space capability. 
This applies to Japan, Brazil and India. Even 
the Arab world is now interested in this 
activity. 
But we live in straitened economic circum-
stances. At a time of recession, proposals 
which we make must be practical and, 
obviously, must take note of the severe econo-
mic difficulties that we face. It would be quite 
unrealistic for member governments of WEU to 
present to their electorates exorbitant budgetary 
demands for space. However, it is up to us to 
make it quite clear to our electorates that there 
are technical, industrial and employment bene-
fits to be derived from space as well as the 
application benefits from such activities as 
remote sensing, telecommunications and so on. 
If Europe is to be effective in space, it is par 
excellence an area where we can be effective 
only if we collaborate - if we concert our 
efforts. -For that concerted programme, the 
national components must be strong. I do not 
see any fundamental incompatability between 
what the nation states themselves are doing and 
the capacities which they are creating - for 
example, the activities in France, those of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and of the 
United Kingdom - so long as those activities 
are harmonised within the context of an overall 
European strategy. In other words, the natio-
nal activities must be compatible with and 
complementary to the overall European 
strategy. 
The trouble is that until now we have had far 
too little strategic thinking on the part of minis-
ters in Europe about space. You will recall 
that it was only last year that the ESA conven-
tion was ratified. We suggested last year not 
only the ratification of the ESA convention but 
also ministerial participation at Council 
meetings of the European Space Agency. This 
happens far too seldom. If the space pro-
gramme of Europe is to acquire direction and 
purpose, this is dependent in my view upon 
ministerial support and active ministerial parti-
cipation in ESA. 
The European Space Agency has many cri-
tics, but they tend to be negative and they do 
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not usually suggest what else should be done 
other than stressing the complication of Euro-
pean space activities in the European Space 
Agency. It is unrealistic just to imagine that 
nation states can go it alone. It would also be 
short-sighted if Europe were consciously to opt 
out for lack of political will, for lack of politi-
cal vision, from an area of industrial activity 
which must necessarily grow and which is 
attracting the interest and, of course, the parti-
cipation of other countries who are competitors 
of ours in so many fields. 
We have therefore to make the European 
Space Agency effective, and it is particularly 
appropriate that Western European Union 
should have a part in this as the seat of our 
Assembly is here in Paris, as is the headquarters 
of the European Space Agency. ESA has a 
budget for its administration and upkeep. It 
also has a scientific programme and these are 
mandatory upon the member governments. 
With the accession of Ireland to the European 
Space Agency, there are now eleven member 
countries and there are three others - Canada, 
Austria and Norway - who are associated to 
some degree with ESA. 
The trouble has been that so much of the 
work of the European Space Agency has not 
been part of that mandatory programme but has 
been an optional programme carried out under 
the aegis of ESA but not part of the mandatory 
joint funding. If one looks at what the Euro-
pean Space Agency has undertaken, one sees 
that part of its work is purely European but 
part is an example of effective transatlantic 
co-operation. I welcome this. It is all very 
well to decry single nation chauvinism and old-
fashioned nationalism on the part of nation 
states in Europe, but it would equally be wrong 
for us to set Europe aside as purely and simply 
a competitor of the United States because space 
is above all a human endeavour which should 
transcend national boundaries and transceDd 
power bloc rivalries. 
So many of the benefits of space activity are 
benefits which should accrue to the world 
community as a whole ; for example, remote 
sensing, the development of the third world, the 
agricultural resources of the developing coun-
tries, the potential of the oceans and the 
seas. These are the kind of benefits that would 
apply worldwide and we should not therefore 
be narrow in our view. 
I am very glad, therefore, that the European 
Space Agency has been so active in the space 
programme, which is primarily a European 
component funded to the tune of$ 850 million 
by ESA as against $ 155 million by the Natio-
nal Space Administration as part of NASA's 
shuttle activities. The space shuttle is a 
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dramatic and revolutionary development in 
space. The concept of a reusable launcher 
makes possible the economic exploitation of 
space which was not practicable to any 
meaningful degree before. On the other hand, 
it is crucial also that Europe develop its own 
capability, and the greatest emphasis in this 
regard has been placed on the development of 
the Ariane launcher. That launcher has great 
significance, because without it Europe will not 
on its own be able to place payloads in space 
without dependence on American boosters such 
as the Thor Delta rocket, and all the signs are 
that, if the launch due to take place almost any 
time now is successful, Ariane will be the 
economic and sound basis for a European 
capability. That capability should be fully 
utilised and that booster development should 
continue. 
I recognise, however, that Spacelab, on the 
one hand, and Ariane, on the other, and to a 
certain extent the British effort in marine 
communications, have largely pre-empted 
European funding for space at the cost of 
important scientific developments. The scien-
tific development to which I want to draw 
attention particularly now is the international 
solar mission, again an example of European-
American co-operation whose future is in doubt 
due to the withdrawal of budgetary support by 
the United States administration. 
It will be remembered that the Americans 
were to have placed one spacecraft in orbit in 
1985 as part of that mission and the Europeans, 
under ESA, were to have placed in orbit 
another. If agreement cannot be reached and if 
this programme cannot be carried through 
successfully, that must, I think, call in question 
transatlantic space co-operation, and that would 
be a tragedy. 
To conclude, I must just summarise the main 
recommendations. We in Europe should 
evolve a clear objective of what we want to 
do. If I may in a way mix metaphors, it has 
to be a down-to-earth, feet-on-the-ground 
approach. We have to say quite clearly what 
we can economically fulfil which will be com-
plementary to what the Americans are doing 
and which will add to the totality of western 
Alliance capability. Secondly, as Spacelab has 
assumed so large a share of our resources, we 
have fully to utilise that system. The number 
of Spacelab missions has gone down from an 
annual predicted total of twelve a year to only 
one or two missions a year. That is not 
adequate, and in particular missions for the 
years beyond 1985 have not been finalised. 
Thirdly, we should pursue the further deve-
lopment of Ariane because it is illogical to pro-
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duce a system and not to develop it as far as is 
economically practically possible. But at this 
stage, in view of the budgetary constraints, I 
would be very well prepared to accept 
Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Topmann to leave 
out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper and insert: " 3. To pursue the further 
development of the Ariane programme taking 
into account an established demand for it ; ". 
There is clearly a demand in as much as an 
industrial company, Ariane Spatiale, has been 
set up to benefit from the commercial exploita-
tion of the potential of the launcher, but at this 
stage Mr. Topmann's amendment is realistic. 
Then, as we agreed last year, we should pursue 
an earth resources satellite programme beyond 
the Inmarsat programme. This will comprise 
two satellites in the first instance, an oceanogra-
phic satellite, Oceanographic 1, and ERS 1 and 
ERS 2 for land sensing. We have the techno-
logy for an effective remote-sensing satellite 
programme and, particularly as a military 
application, we should pursue it. 
In an Alliance context, and only in an 
Alliance context, we must make use, at least, of 
the technical capabilities we have developed in 
space where they have military application, and 
when I speak of " military application " I quite 
explicitly exclude the use of space for nuclear 
bombardment or offensive missions of that 
kind. What I suggest is that we use the 
technologies we have developed to ensure our 
security, to enhance our defence. The kinds of 
things one can envisage are reconnaissance, 
because obviously that gives warning and is a 
political tool to arms control measures and to 
disarmament, and early warning. Early war-
ning is essential and, in view of the develop-
ment of offensive systems, we need to enhance 
our early warning capability, and that can 
realistically be done in a space context. 
Last but not least, it is our duty to create a 
sense of vision among our people about the 
potential of space. It sometimes astounds me 
that this continent, which has been so inven-
tive, which has led the world in, for example, 
supersonic flight, the evolution of the jet 
engine, of radar and so on, should, after its own 
initial strides in rocketry and space, have 
almost opted out in terms of scale compared 
with the superpowers. The Americans, for 
example, spend $ 8,000 million a year on 
space. ESA's budget is less than one-eighth of 
that: it spends only $ 700 million. Europe 
spends only $ 1 ,000 million on space. We 
must emphasise the benefits which will 
accrue and the longer-term, almost visionary, 
objectives. 
I regret that two French air force officers 
should be the first European astronauts thanks 
only to participation in a Russian space pro-
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gramme. I do not think that that is right for a 
Western European Union member country, and 
that needs to be said loud and clear. I do not 
say that just because our French friends are not 
here. I do not believe that that is the way for-
ward for Western Europe. The way forward is 
through the European scientists who are taking 
part in Spacelab and who are active in that 
work. 
It is necessary to concert a European strategy 
which takes into account our national capabili-
ties as well as the importance of ESA, because, 
without an effective European space agency, the 
smaller countries of Europe will be squeezed 
out and will not have an effective space 
programme. 
I hope that the report, which has the unani-
mous support of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions, will be 
unanimously supported by the Assembly. Its 
purpose is purely peaceful. Its objective is to 
enhance the technological and employment 
opportunities of our countries, and to make our 
countries richer in the fullest sense of the term. 
The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank 
you, Mr. Wilkinson. 
I call Mr. Topmann. 
Mr. TOPMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, may I too first thank the 
Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, very much for his 
report on European space activities, which 
gives a balanced and accurate picture of the 
present state of affairs. 
Like Mr. Wilkinson, we see the need for close 
co-operation among the ESA member states on 
future European space activities. Of course, 
the point that is giving us increasing cause for 
concern in other political areas, for example in 
relation to the previous item on the agenda, 
arises in this report too: the ever-pressing 
constraint of financial feasibility. It is there-
fore of fundamental importance to take realistic 
account of these difficulties here as well. 
I have a comment to make from the German 
standpoint. The Federal Republic of Germany 
is advocating a total ESA budget below the 450 
million units of account mentioned in the 
report, partly because, for budgetary reasons, it 
is forced to limit its contribution to a maximum 
of DM 403 million per year. I would suggest, 
in regard to the optional programmes, that it 
might be sensible to work out a system in 
which contributions are determined according 
to the gross national product. 
' 
As regards the Ariane programme, the space 
shuttle and Spacelab, we do not feel that any 
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final decision can be taken at this time. 
Systems that have been developed at high cost 
should first be consolidated and exploited. 
Further development should be limited to what 
one might call keeping the model going. Only 
after further experience and proven demand 
should comparable further development be 
considered. This is the sense of the amend-
ment to paragraph 3 of the draft recommenda-
tion tabled by the German Social Democrats in 
this Assembly, which the Rapporteur has 
already mentioned. It subordinates the further 
development of the Ariane programme to estab-
lished demand. We feel, largely for financial 
reasons, that further development of Ariane 4 is 
out of the question at present. 
One more word about the development of 
satellites for military purposes. For us this is 
not entirely straightforward, since there might 
be allied objections with regard to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. On the other hand, 
corresponding developments are already taking 
place in NATO. For that reason we think it 
would have been better to refer to the NATO 
developments that have already taken place in 
the draft recommendation as well. 
Participation in telecommunication satellite 
programmes does not appear to us appropriate 
at the present time. The definition of new 
tasks, like the second generation of Eutelsat and 
Inmarsat, are in our view not, or not primarily, 
the concern of ESA but that of the users. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we are receptive to 
the idea of preparatory work on systems that 
promise well for the future. Thank you. 
(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, 
resumed the Chair) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Topmann. 
The next speaker is Mr. Antoni. 
Mr. ANTONI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like 
to say a few words on our reasons for voting for 
the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. 
Wilkinson, whom I should like to congratulate 
for his very detailed and thorough report. 
Among the conclusions reached by the Rap-
porteur and the Committee, we find particu-
larly praiseworthy the overall approach stress-
ing the need to overcome the persistent failings 
and difficulties in the way of a policy for space 
activities in Europe, which have so far made 
very little progress. 
Scientific developments often take place at 
national level without sufficient co-ordination 
which would assist joint choices ; as can be 
gathered from the Council's annual report itself, 
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the political directives and guidelines have not 
been either adequate or in time. 
Our Rapporteur quite rightly expresses the 
view that progress in the space field has been 
too slow ; it is regretted that the ESA Minister-
ial Council has not met to give political direc-
tion designed to give new impetus to the Euro-
pean Space Agency. The report gives us a 
valuable picture of the situation in Europe and 
of co-operation with the United States. 
We believe that we interpret this correctly 
when, side by side with positive achievements 
such as that of the Columbia space shuttle, 
whose success will enable the European 
Spacelab to be used, we draw attention to the 
widespread concern over the delays which have 
occurred, the excessive variation from country 
to country, the absence of a common response 
in the matter of space research and technology 
for which the resources made available are 
inadequate. 
We also regard as highly relevant the criti-
cism of the recognised inability of the EEC 
Council of Energy Ministers to work out a 
short- and medium-term energy programme. 
This is a real problem which has a major effect 
on space activities as well. What is needed, 
therefore, is that Europe should give itself a 
space programme, failing which, as the Rappor-
teur also fears, it will fall behind and become 
dependent. 
We support the Rapporteur's request to 
governments for such action in paragraph 1 of 
the draft recommendation proper and we also 
endorse the subsequent suggestions regarding 
fields of action and possible measures to be 
taken- full use of Spacelab's potential; meteo-
rological research ; strengthening of telecommu-
nications technology programmes ; study of the 
military implications of space techniques. 
In our view, the capacity and initiative of the 
individual countries should be increased and 
not reduced, and must in any case be safe-
guarded, and here I confirm the statements 
made in the document in question. It is only 
on the basis of the situation in each country 
that a European space policy can be elaborated 
and organised. 
The Council's annual report certainly justi-
fies the Rapporteur's statement that progress is 
essential. But progress will only be possible if 
Europe works out a genuine space strategy, 
planned at European level, borrowing from 
national experience and based on concrete 
technical research, industrial and commercial 
objectives, geared to the real situation and for 
genuinely peaceful purposes as the Rapporteur 
reiterated a short time ago. The governments 
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of member states can be committed at this 
level. 
For these reasons, Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, we shall vote in favour of the draft 
recommendation. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Antoni. 
The next speaker is Mr. Atkinson. 
Mr. ATKINSON (United Kingdom).- Thank 
you, Mr. President. First, I join in the congra-
tulations to my colleague, John Wilkinson, on a 
first-class report which contains a set of recom-
mendations which I wholly support and which 
are based on a comprehensive memorandum. 
I very much welcome this debate on Euro-
pean space activities. It is a subject in which 
we as politicians do not take sufficient interest, 
with the result that so-called European co-
operation through the European Space Agency 
has been disappointing. For far too long the 
agency has been in total disarray. I regret that 
such disinterest is widely spread among all 
WEU member states, including my own. 
For example, a few weeks ago you, Mr. Presi-
dent, may know that I initiated a debate in the 
House of Commons on British space activities, 
and that was the first time for seven years that 
the British Parliament had debated space. 
As politicians we know that the main reason 
for that disinterest is that there are no votes to 
be had in outer space - at least, not yet. To 
compaign for even greater investment of 
taxpayers' money on space research and 
technology risks unpopularity as well as the 
criticism of unjustified public expenditure, 
particularly during a recession. It therefore 
becomes much easier for politicians to ignore 
the challenge and opportunities which space 
presents to European industries and expertise. 
However, one can argue that it is precisely 
because of the recession and the high and 
growing level of unemployment in all European 
nations - perhaps caused in part by many of 
our traditional industries being overtaken by 
the emerging industries of other countries led 
by Japan, such as India, Korea and Brazil -
that we in Europe cannot afford not to turn to 
the exploitation of these new space industries of 
which we are wholly capable. 
If we ignore opportunities with which space 
provides us, that would represent a mis-
judgment of classic proportions. It would 
certainly fly in the face of the experience of the 
United States of America, whose participation 
in space for the last quarter of a century has 
shown just how labour-intensive the industry 
can be and how substantial can be the spin-off 
in contracts for large and small firms alike. 
Moreover, it would amount to a total 
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misjudgment of public attitudes, which I believe 
accept the enormous opportunities available in 
space. There is a fast-growing public interest 
in space, and I do not say that because of the 
widespread popularity of science fiction films 
such as "Star Wars". It was significant that 
in my country the television programme that 
attracted the highest viewing of that particular 
week was the live coverage of the re-entry and 
return to earth of the space shuttle Columbia. 
Our role as parliamentarians is to make it 
our business to understand fully the extent to 
which mankind has already benefited from 
space and the future opportunities. We must 
establish the right kind of intergovernmental 
framework that will ensure that private enter-
prise delivers the goods on a European scale. 
Europe must differ from the experience of the 
United States in that, instead of spending vast 
quantities of public money, we must encourage 
private enterprise to pursue, with strictly 
commercial objectives in mind, worldwide 
markets that exist for the benefits available 
from the exploitation of space. 
If I have any criticism of Mr. Wilkinson's 
report, it is that it does not go into sufficient 
detail about the opportunities open to Euro-
pean private enterprise. I was, however, 
pleased to see the reference in paragraphs 96 to 
99 to how space can be used to help solve the 
problem of European reliance on imported oil 
and gas. So long as we rely on OPEC, all our 
industry - indeed, our very way of life - is at 
risk, for example, to the continuing inability of 
Arab and Jew to live together in peace. We 
must never allow ourselves to forget that world 
progress, particularly progress in the third 
world, was put back by a decade at least as 
soon as the Egyptian army fired across the Suez 
Canal during the Y om K.ippur war in October 
1973, which resulted for the first time in a 
united Arab policy on oil prices. 
Western Europe has not yet fully come to 
terms with the consequences of that war. It 
would be extremely unhealthy if the economies 
of Western Europe came to rely on the supply 
of oil and gas from the Soviet Union, as the 
proposed natural gas pipeline from Siberia 
would imply. Free nations cannot be depen-
dent upon communism in that way, for other-
wise there will be very little room to condemn 
and retaliate in the event of any Soviet 
aggression in Poland or elsewhere. 
As Mr. Wilkinson's report suggests, the 
answer lies in a priority programme to harness 
solar energy through satellites for European 
domestic and industrial use. We have the 
technology ; all we lack is the political will and 
trust in each other. 
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One project with potential to which the 
report does not refer is the concept of the 
European small shuttle. By using existing 
Ariane and NASA shuttle hardware and 
technology, a mini-shuttle - which has been 
termed the " Space Cab " - can be developed at 
comparatively low cost for supplying manned 
space stations, servicing unmanned satellites, 
crew transportation to larger stations and other 
applications. This space cab could provide 
Europe with a realistic and versatile space 
transportation system for the late 1980s, and it 
deserves an immediate feasibility study. 
Successful European co-operation in space 
requires new initiatives and new attitudes on 
the part of the European Space Agency member 
states, a new willingness to put European co-
operation above national ambition and, 
undoubtedly, a new system of financial contri-
bution to replace the present complicated 
arrangement by which member states contribute 
different sums for different projects. 
It is a nonsense and it must be a scandal that 
the Council of Ministers on European space co-
operation has not met since 1977. I look 
forward to seeing its reply to this report, which 
I strongly support. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Atkinson. 
I now call Mr. Konings. 
Mr. KONINGS (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, at the risk of boring you, I too 
should like to begin by complimenting the 
Rapporteur on this very good report, which 
represents a valuable source of information for 
anyone who wants to catch up on developments 
in space technology. As the Rapporteur said 
in his introduction, the report shows that there 
is no genuine European space programme. 
Obviously no long-term planning exists. I 
have gained the impression, from my own and 
other parliaments, that priorities are fixed 
annually in the various countries ; this is not 
consistent with long-term planning. I agree 
with the Rapporteur that clarification is needed 
here. 
Experts in the western world all agree that 
further development of space travel and space 
technology is exceedingly important, both 
scientifically and technologically speaking. 
Employment is another argument put forward 
in this connection. The previous speaker 
deduced, from the great interest shown in 
spectacular developments in this field, that 
there is also great interest in technological 
developments. I do not agree. I think we are 
faced here by a difficult phenomenon, that of 
human estrangement from technology. Firstly, 
people do not know what is going on in the 
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technological field and, secondly, they often feel 
threatened by technical developments. 
I would mention in this connection the 
development of the chip, which people recog-
nise as a threat to their jobs. I would also 
draw attention to developments in the field of 
nuclear energy, which people feel to be a threat 
to their safety, and to the development of 
nuclear weapons, which are a threat to human 
life. The educational system is also respon-
sible. In the Netherlands we have an educa-
tional system in which many people never 
acquire even the rudiments of technical know-
ledge and I know that the same is true of many 
other countries. 
Paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation 
calls for mobilisation of public and political 
opinion ; I think this should be tackled in a 
very fundamental manner. It is a long-term 
operation. If we want to interest people in 
technical developments, they will have to begin 
by understanding the problems, and then it will 
be a question of removing the threat. 
There is another problem inherent in the 
educational system. We teach people about 
technology without giving them any idea how 
to explain the subject to others. Experts have 
scarcely any opportunity of explaining in broad 
outline what is going on. While I do think 
paragraph 6 is important, I do not think its 
effects can be other than long-term. 
As we all know, politicians usually work on a 
short-term basis, which is particularly impor-
tant in periods of economic recession. 
People have quite different problems at such 
times. They are thinking about minimum 
incomes and social security benefits. I think 
politicians are right to give these top priority. 
The result is that space activities, in parti-
cular, receive a lower priority. Various 
countries are also economising in this field. 
Moreover, the employment created by ESA's 
activities is very unevenly distributed among 
the various participating countries, nor does its 
distribution correspond to the contributions 
made by the various countries. If each country 
were to receive employment in return for the 
investment made, this could provide particu-
larly welcome support at a time of economic 
decline and might be conducive to co-
operation among the various countries con-
cerned. This division of labour will, however, 
also lead to fragmentation. As already stated 
in this Assembly, the European Space Agency 
is meant to be a co-operative body ; but some 
of the ESA member states also have bilateral 
and trilateral agreements with other countries. 
All kinds of research projects are being pur-
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sued independently of ESA. I think that all 
this should be co-ordinated by ESA, with a fair 
distribution in terms of resources and employ-
ment. 
I find the report rather on the optimistic side 
as far as foreseeable developments are con-
cerned. 
The report also mentions Brazil and India as 
countries said to be spending more and more 
on their space development projects. In view 
of Brazil's enormous inflation rate I think this 
is unlikely. I have grave doubts as to whether 
such prestige projects are well-advised and 
whether we should be trying to promote 
them. I think we ought to be very cautious 
about this. 
Lastly, a few remarks about paragraph 5 of 
the draft recommendation, concerning military 
activities. This advocates the exploitation of 
European observation and communication 
satellites in a North Atlantic Alliance context -
I believe Eastern Europe is using satellites of 
this kind. These are NATO projects, a matter 
for co-operation between the Western European 
countries and the United States. I should like to 
ask the Rapporteur to explain what he has in 
mind. ESA cannot act in this connection, 
because it is not at liberty to consider military 
projects, since a number of ESA members do 
not wish to. ESA is therefore ruled out. 
I should consider it wrong for a new, possibly 
military organisation to be created in Europe in 
order to launch European satellites. I do not 
think such an organisation is necessary. 
The outlook is far from bright as regards 
space programme developments in Europe. 
This report will certainly help, but I am not 
optimistic about the rate of progress. We must 
continue to discuss the subject, both here and 
in our parliaments, however, and do our best to 
speed up the pace. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Konings. 
I call Mr. Cornelissen. 
Mr. CORNELISSEN (Netherlands) (Transla-
tion). - Mr. President, I should like to start with 
just one remark about the Council's activities in 
the field of energy policy. I am not impressed 
by them. All the Council really does is to 
issue statements and communiques saying that 
a short-term or medium-term energy pro-
gramme must be drawn up. This actually 
amounts to no more than a series of pious 
hopes. It is indeed disappointing to observe 
that eight years after the first oil crisis - by now 
we are already talking about the third oil crisis 
- all of us together in Western Europe have still 
not succeeded in even making a start on 
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actually implementing programmes which have 
been pouring out uninterruptedly since 1973. 
Nor are there any grounds for satisfaction 
over the aircraft industry. Here, too, we have 
failed as a body to design and build the Euro-
pean aircraft for about one hundred and fifty 
passengers which has been discussed for such a 
long time. I think it might have something to 
do with the fact that a dynamic and creative 
firm like Fokker is based in a small country 
like the Netherlands, rather than in France, for 
instance. But perhaps everything will become 
new and better when the new French Govern-
ment has worked itself in. I should not be 
surprised to see several models of this type of 
aircraft on the market quite soon. To specu-
late for a moment: a British industry model, an 
Airbus model, one built by McDonnell-Douglas 
and Fokker jointly and perhaps yet another by 
Japanese industry, plus- let us not forget- one 
by Boeing. 
As usual, the cost of this fragmented national 
approach is passed straight on to the taxpayers, 
who naturally have to foot the bill again for the 
inevitable, massive government subsidies. We 
shall never, of course, be able to compete pro-
perly on the world market in this way. 
I now come to space technology. Mr. 
Wilkinson has given an interesting survey of the 
European activities which will be necessary in 
the 1980s. Space activities lead to a great deal 
of technological innovation and can therefore 
give an important boost to European industry 
to help it out of the dead end of huge 
unemployment. Moreover, it has become 
apparent over the last twenty years that the 
European satellites are of extremely high 
quality. I believe that this is another way in 
which Europe can make an important contribu-
tion to the development of third world coun-
tries in areas such as soil exploration, topo-
graphy, communications, etc. I should there-
fore like to urge the Council of Ministers of 
ESA actively to investigate what initiatives 
could be taken in this field. The ESA Council 
could also do with some political guidance in 
this field, but of course it will be necessary to 
press hard for this. I believe that the ESA 
Council has not met since 1977. I wonder 
whether this is not rather a poor showing for an 
organisation with a budget of 600 million units 
of account. 
With regard to relations with the United 
States, I deplore the fact that the new govern-
ment in Washington has thought it necessary to 
remove the so-called solar-polar mission from 
the programme. And this, please note, without 
consulting ESA! In Washington, too, it really 
must be appreciated that we cannot treat each 
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other in this way. All twelve governments 
have rightly instructed their ambassadors in 
Washington to make joint representati~ns to the 
United States Government for the wtthdrawal 
of this unilateral decisiot\. I hope they will 
succeed, because otherwise the results of ten 
years' study by many scientists, probably on 
handsome salaries - this society is like that - on 
both sides of the Atlantic will be virtually 
thrown away. That does not strike me as 
exactly inspiring, nor do I think it will help to 
increase mutual trust. 
I regard the last point as so important 
because I agree with the Rapporteur that the 
nature of space development in itself calls for 
greater co-operation among all the countries 
working in this field, and of course particularly 
with the Americans. I share the Rapporteur's 
opinion that European space plans are rather 
on the meagre side. I had in fact expected 
more of ESA. I refer to the dismal events 
taking place in connection with Eurocontrol. I 
hope that we have learnt our lesson from this. 
The paring-down of ESA's mandate undoubt-
edly plays into the hands of small-scale, natio-
nal interests. It is my firm conviction that this 
is the biggest threat to the future of European 
space technology. 
For a healthy space industry the military 
component - the production of military satel-
lites - is also important. In the United States 
about six military satellites are built for every 
civil satellite. I should therefore like to urge 
that in the forthcoming disarmament talks a 
great deal of attention should also be paid to 
the use of European satellites for surveillance. 
Lastly, I would point out that space program-
mes cost money, a lot of money. And if our 
countries are short of anything at the moment, 
it is money. So I would point once more to 
the contribution which space activities can 
make to the vital processes of industrial renewal 
on which we in Europe are so anxious to 
embark. They are essential if we are to escape 
from the trap of unemployment. To obtain 
the necessary funds, it is always important for 
public opinion to see the advantages. I would 
therefore like to tell the people concerned with 
space activities that it is best to work absolutely 
openly. It must, for instance, be made quite 
clear what role space can play in development 
for people in the third world, a matter to which 
we - many of us, at least - assign top priority. 
We must make it clear what space can mean, 
and already means, in our everyday lives. 
In conclusion I should like to congratulate 
the Rapporteur on his interesting report. I 
would add that I also enjoyed not only the 
enthusiasm with which Mr. Wilkinson prepared 
his report in the Committee but also the 
enthusiasm with which he explained it to us 
today. I am most grateful to him. 
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lissen. I believe we would all warmly endorse 
your complimentary remarks to the Rapporteur 
not only on his report and his introduction of it 
today but on the active and informed part that 
he has taken since he became a member of the 
Assembly in the scientific and technological 
aspects of our work. We are very much indeb-
ted to Mr. Wilkinson. 
We have only one speaker remaining, Mr. 
Ronald Brown. My intention therefore would 
be, if we can, to finish the debate this morning, 
including, if it is not opposed, the amendment. 
But I would not in any circumstances - I 
believe there would be procedural argument if I 
did so - put the draft recommendation to the 
vote this morning. That will be taken during 
the afternoon. 
I call Mr. Brown. 
Mr. BROWN (United Kingdom).- I am very 
grateful to you, Mr. President, for calling me 
and I would endorse your view on the work of 
the Rapporteur. In following my friend from 
Holland it is almost as if we have an old boy 
network. 
When I read my colleague's report I felt 
somehow that I had been here many times 
before, and I was then activated to think of 
your remarks, Mr. President, when you made 
the same comment about me sixteen years 
ago. I hesitate to believe that we have moved 
on all that time. I will come in a moment to 
the point on which you made those grandiose 
remarks to me at that time. 
When we started out, those of us who were 
endeavouring to get Europe concerned about 
and interested in space had a hell of a fight in 
trying to get parliamentarians in all our nation 
states to be interested. When we finally deci-
ded to try to find an alternative to ELDO, 
which had just been killed off, we decided to go 
for the new organisation of the European Space 
Agency. I was one of those who pioneered and 
argued for such an agency and in this very 
Assembly I said that I considered such an 
agency would be useless unless we could define 
its objectives. I see that paragraph 1 of the 
recommendation is virtually an image of what I 
said the new agency would have to do. I said 
it would have to elaborate long-term European 
space planning. It would have to identify 
European space strategy and Europe would also 
have to examine and determine the technical, 
industrial and commercial objectives to be met. 
That was sixteen years ago and I see that we 
have now arrived there. We are now recom-
mending exactly the same things to the 
Council. Since the Council has not met, as I 
am told, since 1977, I suppose we should have 
a reunion in sixteen years' time to remind 
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ourselves that sixteen years earlier we did it and 
that thirty-two years before we had also done 
exactly the same thing. It is sad to look 
around this Assembly, again, exactly sixteen 
years later. I recall that I expressed exactly the 
same view in that meeting. Looking around 
one can see the vast interest of parliamentarians 
in space, that is to say, their space. We are all 
here: they are all away. That epitomises the 
situation. 
We do not have to convince just the Council 
of Ministers. We might well start by convin-
cing ourselves and our colleagues that this is an 
important issue. In paragraph 6 the Rappor-
teur clearly illustrates how the issues have 
moved. He refers to the 1960s when he says: 
" The main motive was science and techno-
logy. " He tended there to rewrite history a 
little. Unfortunately, the motivation was much 
more mercenary than that. The United 
Kingdom Government had Blue Streak and did 
not know what to do, and the French had a 
launcher called Coralie which they were 
developing. They did not know how to deve-
lop it and wanted more technology. The 
Germans wanted to get back somehow into 
space through launcher development and the 
Italians were happy to have the nose cone to 
play with. Therefore, those groups came toge-
ther to form ELDO, the only European 
launcher development organisation that we had 
in mind at that time. It was brought about 
simply to find some way of using Blue Streak 
and Coralie and to give the Germans and 
Italians a chance to come back into launchers. 
The result was that we designed a launcher of 
undefined size to do an undefined job an,d the 
result was that it failed. It is interesting that 
we should be discussing it today, because the 
Assembly may not have noticed it but your 
own expertise in this field, Mr. President, ought 
not to go unnoticed since it was you who took 
Britain out of ELDO and killed that project 
stone dead. It was as a result of your decision, 
as the minister responsible, that we had finally 
to set up the European Space Agency. It is a 
pity that you are not on the floor, Mr. Presi-
dent, when you could give us the benefit of 
your knowledge of how you killed ELDO and 
why it has taken us all this time to reach a 
situation where the Council of Ministers has 
not met since 1977. 
I would also draw attention to paragraph 94 
in which the Rapporteur refers to the EEC and 
its failure to achieve a common energy 
policy. I can only say that those of my col-
leagues who served in the European Parliament 
tried desperately hard to encourage the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers to 
agree. The Commissioners always agreed. 
There was no doubt the Commissioner respon-
sible for e~~r~.Y ~ought manfully to persuade the 
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Council or Mmisters to have a common energy 
policy. The only movement that was ever 
made in that respect was by my own colleague, 
Mr. Benn, who gave a total commitment that 
he would place our energy supplies in Great 
Britain under the EEC in a crisis. That is the 
only major step that has ever been made 
towards a common European policy on 
energy. Once again it was not done by the 
Commission but by a politician. Parliament 
kept calling for a common energy policy, but it 
was ministers who refused to agree with that. 
I would draw attention to paragraph 2. One 
of the problems over giving encouragement to 
our member states is that the Voyager pro-
gramme has been very successful and looking 
beyond outer space at the planetary system has 
in a way made it difficult for us in Europe to 
argue a special case because of that most 
successful programme. We have some diffi-
culty in trying to argue that we want to cover 
stellar observations in that way, but again that 
will be a joint effort beyond Europe rather than 
ours. 
We come to paragraph 4. We have tried to 
deal with the earth resources satellite pro-
gramme on an international basis because from 
the earlier days it was argued that it was not 
fruitful to try to undertake earth resources 
satellite programmes on a regional basis. 
We felt that probably it was an international 
basis and I argued at that time that it should be 
under the control of the United Nations. 
In the past I have argued strongly not only 
for telecommunications satellites but for educa-
tional satellites in respect of which Europe 
could make a major commitment to the coun-
tries of the third world. I am sorry that the 
Committee did not think it worthwhile to put 
in the report an item on educational 
satellites. I tried long ago to catch people's 
imagination in this respect but failed. I still 
believe that educational satellites could be 
extremely valuable in the development of the 
third world. 
I support completely paragraph 6 of the 
recommendation. We have to keep on arguing 
and to mobilise political and public opinion. 
We have to go on arguing for an extended pro-
gramme, although some of us will be happy if 
we maintain the existing one. Although I have 
been arguing that our commitment in Europe 
to space activity should depend on a commer-
cial and industrial spinoff, the issue is bigger 
than that. 
I support the report ; it is extremely 
valuable. It rehearses many of the arguments. 
I hope that some day ministers will be as 
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willing to be brave and courageous about 
putting Europe in the forefront of this battle as 
this Assembly has been in past years. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Brown. As you said, I was involved with 
ELDO fifteen years ago. However, I was not 
there when the decision to end the project was 
taken. When I was concerned with it, I seem 
to remember ministerial meetings taking place 
once a week for several weeks. 
I must ask the Rapporteur and the Chairman 
whether they wish the debate to finish now, 
although the vote will have to come this after-
noon. I do not think that we shall have time 
for the amendment if it is contested. If it is 
accepted, we can deal with it now. I do not 
want the sitting to go beyond one o'clock 
because our colleagues have engagements to 
fulfil. 
Mr. WILK.INSON (United Kingdom).- I am 
grateful for your indulgence, Mr. President. I 
am sure that the whole Assembly greatly appre-
ciates your personal interest in space matters. 
This has been a wide-ranging and well-
informed debate, and I greatly welcome the 
contributions made from the floor which have 
greatly added to our perspective of this subject. 
Mr. Topmann was right to emphasise the 
budgetary constraints. We have to be practi-
cal. He was correct in suggesting that the 
system of financing the European Space Agency 
leaves much to be desired and should be based 
more on gross national product. We should 
aim at an annual expenditure of 450 million 
units of account on the programme for the next 
ten years. I think that the Director-General 
himself has suggested that that is the minimum 
amount which is practically feasible if we are to 
have a worthwhile European programme. I 
express the hope to my friend Mr. Topmann 
that as the expenditure on Space Cab dimi-
nishes - and Germany spends far more on 
Space Cab than any other member country of 
ESA - the disproportionate burden on the 
Federal Republic will also diminish. That, I 
hope, will allay his anxiety. 
Dealing with the speech of Mr. Antoni, our 
Committee, which went only in the spring to 
Italy, will be well aware of Italy's contribution 
to the Earthnet system and the importance to 
Italy of an active energy programme for Europe 
- a point which was emphasised by Mr. 
Cornelissen. 
My friend and colleague, David Atkinson, 
whose expertise is well known to the Commit-
tee - he was a rapporteur for the Council of 
Europe and did an invaluable service by raising 
this subject in an adjournment debate in the 
British Parliament- was right to emphasise the 
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neo-Keynesian benefits of an active space pro-
gramme in a recession. He was also right in 
referring to the importance of private invest-
ment. Here I draw a distinction between the 
role of ESA and that of nationally funded 
government programmes. Governments should 
pursue the question of the necessary research 
and development, whereas the applications can 
more properly be left to private enterprise. 
I was interested in what Mr. Atkinson said 
about a mini-shuttle. The British Aerospace 
Corporation has a project called Mustard 
which I saw at Warton in the mid-1960s which 
looked to me exactly the same as the space 
shuttle Columbia. 
Mr. Konings made a thoughtful contri-
bution. He was right to emphasise the 
estrangement that people feel in their practical 
daily lives from technical progress. We must 
make the benefits clear to them. This involves 
a juste retour for the investment that nations 
make on their behalf through ESA, albeit on a 
national scale. 
We should not be over-optimistic ; we should 
not paint too rosy a picture. What Mr. 
Atkinson said about time scales was absolutely 
right in view of our experience, so well 
demonstrated. 
The PRESIDENT. -I am sorry to interrupt 
you, Mr. Wilkinson, but you can continue this 
afternoon. You will not be able to speak until 
one o'clock because I have to deal with the 
Orders of the Day for this afternoon. If you 
wish to go on this afternoon, that will be all 
right, but we shall not be able to conclude the 
debate unless you are able to finish your speech 
in two or three minutes. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom). -Mr. 
Atkinson was also right in what he said about 
the role of politicians. Without Kennedy, I do 
not think that the Americans would have put a 
man on the moon by the end of the 1960s. 
We should not be put off by our experience ; 
we should learn from it. Mr. Brown's warning 
was salutary. 
I recommend the report to the Assembly. I 
hope that the Assembly has taken note of our 
response to the Council. I thank my colleague 
the Clerk, whose work was absolutely invalu-
able. I am also grateful for the assistance of 
the staff of the European Space Agency, 
who made the report possible. 
The PRESIDENT. -I was sorry to cut short 
your interesting remarks, Mr. Wilkinson, but I 
am bound by Rule 23, which provides that 
unless the Assembly otherwise decides we 
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should finish at one o'clock. Mr. Lenzer, do 
you wish to speak ? 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many). -For one minute. 
The PRESIDENT.- One minute exactly. 
Mr. LENZER (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - With your permission, Mr. 
President, just one minute. Ladies and Gentle-
men, I would like to add my voice to the 
chorus of those who have referred to and 
praised the excellent work and the commitment 
of our friend, Mr. Wilkinson. For us in the 
Committee, that is a foregone conclusion. 
A second remark - very briefly, to keep 
within my time limit - Mr. President, to hold 
the vote now if the rules of the Assembly 
permit might help to expedite proceedings this 
afternoon. The fact that the draft recommen-
dation was adopted unanimously in Committee 
leads me to hope that you, Mr. President, might 
consider whether we cannot take a vote on the 
report straight away. That was my request. 
Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT. - I well understand that, 
and that would be my wish, but I have been 
advised that as it was not put on the Orders of 
the Day, if a member came this afternoon and 
said that he wished to vote and required a roll-
call I should be in great difficulty. There is an 
amendment which we have to dispose of, and 
we have already reached 1 o'clock. I have to 
deal with the Orders of the Day for this 
afternoon. 
Mr. WILKINSON (United Kingdom).- On a 
point of order. We accept the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT.- It is a question of 
whether the Assembly accepts it. It will have 
to be put this afternoon at the beginning of the 
proceedings unless Mr. T opmann is prepared 
to move it formally. If so, I shall take the 
amendment, but not the draft recommen-
dation. Are you willing to move the amend-
ment now, Mr. Topmann? If you wish to make 
a speech, you must do it at 3 o'clock. 
Mr. TOPMANN (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, I wish to move the amendment 
now. I move that paragraph 3 be worded as 
follows: "To pursue the further development of 
the Ariane programme, taking into account an 
established demand for it ; ". 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you very much. 
The amendment has been formally moved. I 
understand that the Committee accepts the 
amendment. 
We shall therefore now vote on Amend-
ment 1. 
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(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We are obliged by rule to take the vote on 
the draft recommendation - and I hope that it 
will be non-controversial - at the beginning of 
our proceedings this afternoon. In the event of 
a roll-call vote being required, we shall take 
that later in the afternoon, after item 2. 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next 
Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting this 
afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders 
of the Day: 
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1. Future of European space activities - reply 
to the twenty-sixth annual report of the 
Council (Vote on the amended draft 
Recommendation, Document 883). 
2. Relations between parliaments and the 
press (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments, Document 873). 
3. Developments in Poland (Presentation of 
and Debate on the Report of the General 
Affairs Committee, Document 870 and 
Amendments). 
Are there any objections? ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.) 
FIFfH SITTING 
Wednesday, 17th June 1981 
SUMMARY 
1. Adoption ofthe Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Future of European space activities - reply to the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Vote on the 
amended draft Recommendation, Doe. 883). 
4. Relations between parliaments and the press (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments, Doe. 873). 
Speakers: The President, Mrs. Knight (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Enders, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Stotfelen (Chairman of the 
Committee), Mrs. Knight (Rapporteur). 
S. Developments in Poland (Presentation of and Debate on 
the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doe. 870 
and Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hanin (Rapporteur), Mr. 
Gessner, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Grieve, Mr. 
Blaauw, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hawkins. 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The Minutes ure agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings1• 
Let me again stress the importance of all 
Representatives or Substitutes signing the 
Register of Attendance, both from the point of 
view of recording their presence and also as it 
forms the basis of our quorum if a roll-call is 
required. 
3. Future of European space activities - reply 
to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
(Vote on the amended draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 883) 
The PRESIDENT. - The first Order of the 
Day is the vote on the draft recommendation 
1. See page 37. 
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reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the 
Council, Document 883. 
This morning, we concluded the debate and 
accepted the amendment proposed by Mr. Top-
mann. 
I will now ask the Assembly to vote on the 
draft recommendation itself contained in Docu-
ment 883 as amended. 
If there are no objections and no abstentions, 
and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the 
time required for a roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions? .. . 
The Assembly is unanimous. 
The amended draft recommendation is 
adopted unanimously 1• 
I am sure that it will be your wish for me to 
thank the Committee in general and Mr. Wil-
kinson in particular for an extremely interesting 
report. 
4. Relations between parliaments and the press 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments, Doe. 873) 
The PRESIDENT. - The second Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments on relations between parliaments and 
the press, Document 873. 
1. See page 38. 
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I call Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur of the Com-
mittee. 
Mrs. KNIGHT (United Kingdom).- Mr. Pre-
sident, I should first like to express my grati-
tude and that of the Committee to you for alter-
ing the position on the agenda of this presen-
tation. We are grateful to you for heeding our 
pleas and allowing us to change the position on 
the agenda. 
Let me say at the outset that no intention 
exists in my report from beginning to end other 
than the intention of improving the workings of 
WEU and thus its interest for the press. 
There is certainly criticism in it, but only by 
pointing to some of our failings can improve-
ments be wrought. Some have criticised my 
criticisms, but if none questions, none will 
reform, and there can be no valid claim that no 
reforms are needed. 
I am saying plainly in the report that some 
things are wrong with the way we work. I 
have not invented these things. They exist 
whether I point to them or not. We cannot 
make them go away if we shut our eyes or 
behave like ostriches and stick our heads in the 
sand. Eventually our eyes must open, our 
heads must come out of the sand, and the faults 
will still be present. Therefore, let us resolve 
to look our failings bravely in the face and to 
do our best to remedy them. 
I should also like to make clear at this stage 
that in no way am I seeking to criticise our per-
manent staff or those who work on the adminis-
trative side ofWEU. We are excellently served 
by these men and women who do their utmost 
to make WEU work well. As Shakespeare 
might have said, had he thought of it at the 
time, " The fault, dear Brutus, lies not with our 
permanent officials but with ourselves. " 
The report is called " Relations between par-
liaments and the press ". All of us are aware 
that as parliamentarians we depend greatly on 
the press. Although I do not agree with those 
who sometimes say that no publicity is bad 
publicity, many of our tasks here depend on 
publicity to be fully effective. If we cannot 
capture the interest of the press, we fail. 
As colleagues will note from the report, I was 
unable to carry out a study of the success or 
otherwise of our past contacts with the press, 
because we keep records for only one year. I 
very much hope that now that this has been 
pointed out, consideration will be given to pre-
serving press archives for at least five years and 
perhaps even ten. 
The report contains a section on budgetary 
matters and deals with how much is set aside 
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for the cost of WEU. Some people believe that 
all problems can be solved by greater injections 
of cash. I do not believe that at all. My 
report makes plain that I am not asking for 
more money for WEU, even though, compared 
with some bodies, the amount is sparse. I am 
saying that we can do much more ourselves. I 
want more activity. 
First, that activity must be carried out by 
ourselves. We, whom I might describe as the 
individual foot soldiers, must change our atti-
tudes to our work here. It is an honour and a 
privilege to be part of this body, but few of us 
seem to believe that at all. I refer in paragraph 
14 to a questionnaire that was taken by the 
German parliamentarians. I point to only one 
sentence, which states: 
" When asked whether the work of the WEU 
Assembly occupied an important place in 
their political work, two said yes and seven-
teen no." 
If we have no faith in our work, how in the 
world can we interest the press in what we are 
doing? 
Many members indicate this lack of interest 
by failing to turn up at meetings. On receipt 
of an agenda, they are seized with a positive 
frenzy of lethargy. Not infrequently, Commit-
tees faced with the need to make important 
decisions find that they cannot do so because 
there is no quorum. Diligent members who 
have properly arranged their affairs and flown 
off at monetary cost to their governments and 
convenience cost to themselves are angry and 
disheartened when this occurs. I am not 
saying that we can all be here all the time. We 
all know that that is impossible. At present 
there are four separate national obstructions to 
attendance here. First, there are the French 
elections. Secondly, there is the crisis in Italy. 
Thirdly, although the Dutch elections are 
over, they still represent a barrier because no 
government has been formed as yet. Then 
there is the German national holiday. So there 
are four reasons why this is a bad time. How-
ever, an attendance of sixteen members out of a 
possible eighty-nine, as happened on Monday, 
is not good enough, especially when one 
remembers that the full number is 178 if we 
include the substitutes. There were, however, 
more than eighty members in the hemicycle 
when General Rogers spoke. 
Members must do more to pursue WEU deci-
sions in their national parliaments and in the 
Press. The chances are there. How many of 
us use them? Some do. There is, however, so 
much more that we could do. In giving infor-
mation to the press and in telling it what we 
have done - even individually - we have to 
remember the time constraint within which it 
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works. It is no good giving it a splendid hand-
out at 8 o'clock at night and expecting the 
story to be in the newspapers the next day. 
That is too late. 
I spoke about the foot soldiers. Now I come 
to the captains, the generals and the Supreme 
Allied Commander himself. Greatly daring, I 
make these suggestions. The Council should 
meet more than once a year. When it meets, it 
should have an important and effective meet-
ing. It should be for the Council to consider 
the reports passed by WEU and to decide what 
should be done with them. Each decision of 
the Council greatly interests the press. If the 
Council were a little more active, that would be 
a good thing. We should ensure that agendas 
are set down sufficiently in advance and are 
adhered to. We shall be hearing Mr. Grieve's 
report tomorrow about the change in the rules. 
Some of these matters are catered for there. 
These matters are important, because if peo-
ple do not know sufficiently far in advance 
what we are debating, they cannot produce a 
meaningful report and they cannot tell the press 
about it. 
From the press's point of view it is most 
important to ensure a ministerial presence 
here. We have been told already this part-
session that ministers are busy. Of course they 
are, but so are we. If WEU is an important 
body, surely it is worth while for ministers to 
be here and to participate. We pride ourselves 
on being the only European assembly with a 
defence responsibility. However, we hardly 
ever have a defence minister from any country 
to address us. The last was in 1979. If we are 
a defence-oriented body, surely one defence 
minister from one country could address us 
once a year. 
There was a ministerial meeting recently in 
The Hague. Ministers from all our countries 
were supposed to be present. Only two were, 
in fact, present. I am glad that one was the 
British minister. The other was the Dutch 
minister. If it is not general practice for minis-
ters to attend and to answer questions, the few 
who come will think that it is not worth 
while. They will ask themselves why they 
should bother when no one else does. 
We must try - I appreciate the difficulties 
here - to secure the attendance of more impor-
tant speakers. I have in mind the privilege we 
enjoyed yesterday of hearing General Rogers. 
There is interest not only among members but 
in the press - the latter to a tremendous 
extent. There is wide coverage of that speech 
in the press today. There always will be when 
we do something of importance and of interest. 
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The Council should never pass to other 
bodies those matters that are rightly the respon-
sibility of WEU. That has happened and it 
still does. It seems to indicate a lack of faith 
in ourselves as an effective body. If we keep 
shuffling off to other people matters that are 
our responsibility, we shall believe that we are 
incapable or incompetent to handle these 
issues. That would be bad. The Coun-
cil should sometimes cast off the mantle of 
secrecy under which it sometimes seems to like 
to work. For instance, there is a report from 
the Standing Armaments Committee which was 
made on the instructions of the Council. It 
has never been reported to the Assembly. One 
might assume that it was a highly secret 
matter. It was not. It related to juridical pro-
blems. It could easily have been reported to 
the Assembly. It may be biblically wise not 
to let the left hand know what the right hand is 
doing, but it makes no sense in the context of 
WEU. That is particularly the case if we hope 
to interest the European press. 
I may have been provocative in what I have 
said. I may have been harsh. Whatever I 
have said has been said for good reason. All I 
seek is improvement in our method of work. 
The press is our ally. It is not our distant 
acquaintance. We ought not to bore it to 
tears. We ought to interest it, assist it, feed it 
and welcome it. We in WEU have the poten-
tial to be a great force. We could be an impor-
tant and influential arm for Europe's defence. 
Let us not throw away the chance. I have 
pleasure in presenting the report. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mrs. 
Knight. Your report was thoughtful, construc-
tive and, perhaps, provocative. I am sure that 
it will meet with a response from the Council. 
I noted that its representatives were closely 
following your remarks. Perhaps we may have 
some results from that quarter. 
It is not for want of trying on my part and 
that of the Presidential Committee that a defence 
minister has not spoken to us this part-
session. With great help from my Italian 
colleagues, the Italian Defence Minister was all 
ready to come. I understand, however, that 
there is no Italian Defence Minister now. He 
was unable to come because there is no govern-
ment. 
It is not for me to reply to your interesting 
remarks. On the organisation of business, 
however, I would certainly welcome more spee-
ches from ministers and others, including 
SACEUR. Our Committees must understand 
this, however: if more time is devoted to minis-
terial and other speeches, there will be no time 
to discuss and decide upon three or four reports 
from each Committee. The more outside spea-
kers there are, the more must our Committees 
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exercise a self-denying ordinance. Our dilemma 
always is that we have more business than 
our time permits us properly to dispose of. 
I have, perhaps, said more than I should. 
Than~ y~m, Mrs; Knight, for your interesting 
contnbut10n trymg to promote the outside 
image of WEU. 
I call Mr. Enders. 
Mr. E~lDERS (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(TranslatiOn). - Mr. President, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, may I congratulate Mrs. Knight 
most warmly on her excellent report, in which 
she deals with matters of interest to us all. 
The essential point is publicity for the WEU 
Assembly and proper recognition of its work by 
the public and in political life. After all this 
interparliamentary assembly is concerned on 
the one hand with interlocuting the Council 
and on the other with promoting co-operation 
in Europe. It is officially empowered to dis-
cuss matters transcending national frontiers and 
publicly to address to the national govern-
ments joint recommendations which, if the 
WEU Assembly did not exist, might be seen as 
an offensive interference in internal affairs. 
Given this institutional framework one has to 
look for the reasons for the relatively scant 
coverage in the press. In one year, from 1979 
to 1980, the recorded number of articles drop-
ped from 434 to 295, and many of the debates 
which we considered important received little 
or no coverage in our national papers. Clear-
ly, the newspapers themselves are not respons-
ible for .this negative trend - on the contrary, 
the cuttmgs on the board in the press room 
today show that yesterday's debate was relat-
ively well reported. Unfortunately the German 
press could not report it, because today and 
tomorrow are national holidays, when no news-
papers appear. 
We have to take our full share of the blame 
f?r many missed opportunities. Mrs. Knight 
gives us, as an example of their estimation of 
the WEU Assembly, the results of an enquiry 
conducted among parliamentarians, and his 
analysis of their replies, in a paper by Lutz Lei-
nert. Out of thirty-seven members of parlia-
ment to whom the questionnaire was sent 
nineteen replied. Although that represen~ 
52%, I would have some reservations, because 
the sample does not appear to be altogether 
representative. The significance of the nine-
teen should therefore not be overestimated. 
Half of those approached were undoubtedly 
una~are of the purpose and significance of the 
e~quiry, and so, as usual, many questionnaires 
will have found their way into the wastepaper 
basket unread. Nevertheless, I believe that, 
152 
FIFTH SITTING 
despite the fortuitous nature of the replies Lei-
nert's intuitive interpretation of the asses~ment 
of the WEU Assembly by its own members is 
correct. 
I would like to emphasise two points which 
on the basis of ten years' experience of thi~ 
Assembly, I regard as serious. The fact that 
debates are often interrupted has a bad effect on 
press coverage. For example, we begin in the 
morning with a certain subject. At 11 o'clock 
we hear an address by an eminent politician 
which, together with the ensuing debate, takes 
up the rest of the morning. Amendments are 
debated in the afternoon. By the time we 
come to the voting the ranks may have become 
so thin that we no longer have a quorum. 
What can we do? The vote is postponed until 
the following day. There was even one occa-
sion when the vote had to be postponed to the 
next part-session six months later. I do not 
think this is a good thing and I suggest that we 
put an end to laxity and bring our debates to a 
conclusion. This implies no criticism of the 
Chair, it simply reflects my desire to take 
account of the interests of parliamentarians 
actually in the chamber rather than of those 
who may be talking outside in the lobby. If 
debates drag on for days before reaching a 
conclusion, who can wonder if the press does 
not give due prominence to these rather enig-
matic speeches and procedures? 
Many groups from neighbouring countries, 
schools, members of various organisations and 
tourists come to Paris in the course of a 
year. Their programme includes a visit to the 
Louvre, Notre Dame, the Eiffel Tower and per-
haps the night-club district. I have never 
heard of a tourist coming to Paris to visit the 
WEU Assembly. Why not, after all? Is 
everyone so unaware of our work? One would 
think so, to look at all the empty seats in the 
gall~ry today. And it is the same at every part-
ses~lOn. . In our home parliaments things are 
qmte different. Groups of visitors come 
cro~ding in, and there is a ten-month waiting 
penod before an application can be considered. 
In my view it would do our Assembly and its 
image some good if, instead of the stacks of 
reports and minutes of colloquies outside these 
doors - including yearbooks from 1963 on - we 
put out a short, readable, illustrated brochure 
about WEU. And visitors should be able to 
come here not only during sessions but the 
whole year round. Guided tours - perhaps 
including an easily understandable film, yet to 
be produced - would explain our activities and 
provide the necessary information. 
I admit, Mr. President, that such publicity 
costs. effort ~d money. But I am firmly 
~onvmced that It would be very well spent if it 
mcreased young people's knowledge of the 
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WEU Assembly. Finally, instead of our isola-
ted, indeed sometimes invisible, existence here 
in the Palais d'Iena, interest should be aroused 
among the general public in our work and in 
our Assembly, which is an important instru-
ment of European security and· European co-
operation. If Mrs. Knight's report contributes 
towards the achievement of this goal, it will be 
of great service. I ask members to act accor-
dingly. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Enders. 
I am very much attracted to your idea of our 
becoming one of Paris's tourist attractions, 
although I am bound to say we would meet 
with quite a lot of competition. This building 
does not belong to WEU. We are privileged 
by the Economic and Social Council to have 
the use of it, for which I believe we have to pay 
some rent. Certainly, we are indebted to the 
Council for letting us use the building for two 
weeks a year, but I am sure the Council would 
not agree to our turning it into a daily tourist 
attraction, because it is the centre of the Coun-
cil's work as well. If your government were 
to come along with money in the same gene-
rous spirit as yourself, we could consider what 
we might be able to do. 
The next speaker is Mr. Hawkins. 
Mr. HAWKINS (United Kingdom).- Thank 
you, Mr. President, for calling me. I will try to 
be brief. 
I have raised matters of this kind on several 
occasions. I greatly welcome Mrs. Knight's 
forthright statement. We in the British Parlia-
ment have learned that Mrs. Knight says things 
with great emphasis, but what she says is said 
from the head and the heart and that she hits 
upon the right things to say and the way to say 
them. There is a lot in this report of which we 
must take notice - that we must take notice of, 
not that we can take notice of. 
I wish to draw attention to only a few matters 
which I think want emphasising. First, I must 
seek to speak to the President here. The Presi-
dential Committee must try better to control 
the agenda and the number of reports coming 
forward. We want far too many reports. We 
want to speak too much and no doubt we all 
bore each other. That may be the reason why 
not enough people are present in the hemi-
cycle. But the work of the defence of Western 
Europe is of great importance. Nobody who 
listened to General Rogers could think other-
wise. I have been in one war and many other 
people here have been, too. I do not want to 
see my grandchildren and children in another. 
We must rouse our people. This is what this 
is all about. We must get through to the peo-
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ple whom we represent. Unless we do so then, 
in General Rogers' words, we are not informing 
the people and we are not putting over, uni-
quely as we, as members of European parlia-
ments, can put over, the truth to our own peo-
ple, through our parliaments, through the 
governments and through our contacts with our 
constituencies. I agree with the President that 
far too many reports come forward, but he has 
to be a bit of a dictator. He and his Presiden-
tial Committee have to set up some bounds and 
rules on the numbers of reports coming for-
ward. He must guide us as to the general 
coherence of the whole of the reports so that we 
produce something at the end of each Assembly 
that comes out as a whole. That is what I 
would like to put forward. 
We must have more information on the bud-
get alone. It seems extraordinary that we have 
no knowledge at all of two-thirds of the budget 
expenditure. I was a prisoner of war in Ger-
many. Now allies of Germany and Italy, we 
were former enemies, but I sincerely hope and 
believe that we shall never be again. But we 
must drop some of this enormous expenditure 
on inspections and other things by retired 
admirals, generals and air vice-marshals. We 
must have information as to what is going on 
in that quarter. I do not know and I am only 
guessing, but I believe that that would enable us 
to concentrate more on what I believe are the 
important things of today rather than what the 
Brussels Treaty thought of many years ago. 
The President has referred to this as a buil-
ding, which has been kindly loaned or rented to 
us. For practical reasons, frankly it is an 
impossible building. We have knocked a hole 
in the wall. Now, unlike when I first came 
here, we no longer have to travel up and down 
so many stairs. There is no lift in the place, 
though probably that is a good thing because 
one tends to get stuck in lifts. There is no 
clock in the building. We do not know when 
things are happening or what is the correct 
time. There are two small clocks here which I 
believe I can just read, but we have no televi-
sion communication to tell everybody when 
something is starting to happen. That is a 
development at which we shall have to look. 
Finally, I want to speak about something 
which Mrs. Knight has put forward which we 
can do ourselves. As individuals we may not 
be able to talk to " The Times " in Great Bri-
tain, or a newspaper in Germany - I hope it is 
no longer the Volkischer Beobachter. Perhaps 
individually we cannot influence the national 
newspapers, but we can influence our own local 
newspapers. We can put in a report after each 
Assembly telling those newspapers what WEU 
is doing. We should do so. 
We must also report to our own govern-
ments. If we do not get answers to questions 
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about what our governments are doing in rela-
tion to WEU reports, we should demand 
answers in our own parliaments. 
I sum up by saying that I believe that the 
report by Mrs. Knight is most welcome but, as 
she has said, it must not become useless. It 
must not be left lying on the table. We must 
insist upon action and I hope that we shall all 
back that excellent report. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Haw-
kins. I should say, just to make it clear in case 
there is some misunderstanding, that we are 
here as the guests of the French Economic and 
Social Council. It allows us the use of this 
hemicycle without charge. I paid my respects 
to the .President when I was elected and had a 
chat with him. He was kind enough to come 
to our reception only on Monday of this week. 
He has said that we are welcome and that the 
Council will do all it can to assist us. We have 
of course to pay the cost of the rather expensive 
interpretation facilities that we have to install 
and remove, because the Council, being an 
organ of the French parliamentary system, does 
not need interpreters. 
As far as the Council can, it is willing to help 
us, but certainly this is not our building. As 
we have the use of it for only two weeks in the 
year, while we might like to do some of the 
things that have been suggested, we have to be 
practical. Naturally, if all of us were to go 
back to our national parliaments and vote a lot 
more money for the Assembly of WEU, that 
would be beneficial. I take it that the refer-
ence to the two-thirds of the budget about 
which we do not know is two-thirds of the 
ministerial and Council organs, not the Assem-
bly, for we account to the Assembly for our 
expenditure. 
I must now congratulate Mr. Stoffelen, whom 
I understand has been elected Chairman of this 
important Committee. Perhaps Mrs. Knight, 
the Rapporteur, wishes to speak first, or does 
Mr. Stoffelen wish to speak? Mr. Stoffelen, I 
congratulate you on behalf of the Assembly on 
your election. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Thank 
you, Mr. President. First, I want to thank Mrs. 
Knight for her extremely frank and interesting 
report and speech. I well remember the speech 
she made last year and I am wondering which 
was the better. I assure every member of the 
Assembly that the report is well worth reading. 
Perhaps there may be two or three members 
who have not had the time to do so, but I can 
assure them that it is worthwhile. 
Secondly, we all share the opinion that the 
work that we are doing is important, at least 
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more important than some of our colleagues in 
our parliaments may think. 
It is clear that we all share the same opinion 
about the reasons for some of our problems. 
One problem relates to the attendance of mem-
bers at Committee and Assembly meetings. As 
the Rapporteur and Mr. Enders have said, we 
must, and we can, make improvements in that 
respect. As Chairman of the Committee, I feel 
obliged to say that it is the responsibility of, for 
instance, the chairmen of political groups - and 
I know one chairman who accepts this respon-
sibility - to ensure that members of his or her 
group are present at Committee and Assembly 
meetings. It is the responsibility of national 
delegations to ensure that as many of their 
members as possible are present. 
We agree with Mr. Hawkins that we produce 
too many reports. How can we expect the 
press to deal every week with seven, eight, or 
nine reports? It is completely impossible. We 
share the opinion of Mr. Hawkins that we 
should organise our work in such a way that we 
produce fewer reports. We must produce 
interesting reports of great political relevance. 
We cannot expect journalists to write about 
reports which do not have great political inter-
est. 
I agree with Mr. Enders that we have a. duty 
to see whether we can organise our debates 
more strictly. However, it would be bad if we 
spent only one hour each half year on this 
important aspect of our work. How can we 
improve the image of Western European Union 
and our Assembly for the benefit of our work 
and of our countries? 
I thank the Rapporteur for her analysis of the 
problems and suggestions for improvements. I 
assure you, Mr. President, that our Committee 
will continue to analyse the problems and to 
make improvements. I thank again the Rap-
porteur and all those who have taken part in 
the discussion. I hope that in the near future 
we shall find ways of improving the situation. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Stoffe-
len. 
Do you wish to reply, Mrs. Knight? 
Mrs. KNIGHT (United Kingdom). - Very 
briefly, Mr. President. 
I thank those who have taken part in the 
debate. Some very constructive suggestions 
have been made which no doubt will be acted 
upon. I express my pleasure about the fact 
that, apparently, no colleague thought that an 
amendment to the report should be tabled. I 
leave the report confidently and happily with 
the Assembly. 
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Knight. I understand that there is no recom-
mendation, so that there is no formal question 
to put to the Assembly. 
I am sure that the representatives, in noting 
your report, Mrs. Knight, will wish to thank 
you and your colleagues for bringing it to their 
attention. We are also indebted to Mr. Burge-
lin, who, in addition to his onerous duties as 
Clerk to the General Affairs Committee and in 
the absence through illness of Mr. van't Land, 
has been acting as Clerk to the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. We hope for the 
return to health of Mr. van't Land, who form-
erly took care of the Committee. 
5. Developments in Poland 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the General Affairs Committee, 
Doe. 870 and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - The third Order of the 
Day is the presentation of and debate on the 
report of the General Affairs Committee on 
developments in Poland, Document 870 and 
Amendments. This is an extremely important 
subject, and I am glad that we shall have suffi-
cient time to permit a good debate. 
I call Mr. Hanin. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Ladies and Gentlemen, in my brief statement I 
shall not be following the order of items as they 
appear in my report but picking out what seem 
to me to be the salient aspects of this problem 
and explaining what prompted the solutions I 
propose. 
What has happened in Poland in recent 
months can only be regarded as completely ex-
ceptional. For the first time in an eastern bloc 
country a move towards democratisation has 
begun without provoking - at least not imme-
diately - either internal repression by the police 
or Soviet military intervention, as was the case 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The process 
is characterised not by a challenge to the com-
munist system as such or by the formation of 
independent political parties, but by the forma-
tion of trade unions independent of the power 
structure and the established system. However, 
although this process was triggered off by the 
trade unions, with all the social implications 
that that normally entails, it quite obviously 
has political implications too. In a country 
with such a homogeneous structure, to avoid 
using another term, in a country with a single 
political party and a single trade union, the for-
mation of an independent trade union that 
speaks its mind and has the power to force 
through its demands on issues it considers fair 
and worthwhile is an extraordinary develop-
ment. 
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We have asked ourselves why the dreaded 
intervention has not taken place, and there are, 
we feel, several reasons for this. 
The first is undeniably the unanimous desire 
of the Polish people to settle Polish problems 
internally and to reject any external interven-
tion. The Solidarity trade union has not been 
alone in taking up this position. It seems clear 
that the party, the government and the army -
the whole establishment - agree that, while 
their views may differ on the roots of the prob-
lem, it should be solved by the Poles and no 
one else. 
The .second reason, it seems to me, has been 
the moderation - sustained with difficulty - of 
the free trade union. The action taken by Soli-
darity has consisted not in subversion but in 
making its demands known, and it has been 
taken by non-violent means, combining, admit-
tedly, shows of strength and a willingness to 
negotiate. It must also be said that Solidarity 
has shown skill in toning down social demands 
which it would be difficult to meet because of 
the economic situation in Poland. This mode-
ration has not been easy. Everyone knows 
that, like any movement, Solidarity includes a 
· number of extremists who want to go further 
more quickly and so risk jeopardising the situa-
tion as a whole. The union deserves high 
praise for resisting these people. 
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A third reason, I feel, is the risk which 
armed intervention involves for the Soviet 
Union, not the risk of failure, because the 
balance of forces is such that it would not fail, 
but the risk inherent in a bloody confrontation 
which would even further strengthen the unity 
of the Polish people and would undoubtedly be 
followed by a period of underground resistance 
with no end in view. 
The fourth reason is, in my opinion, that the 
Soviet Union has not wanted to make its image 
any worse, if that is possible. It is quite 
obvious that, after what has happened in 
Afghanistan, military intervention in Poland 
would have given the whole world, including 
countries near the Soviet Union, and particul-
arly the Arab countries, an image of the USSR 
which it certainly does not want. 
The fifth reason, which is of particular inter-
est to us, is the desire to maintain detente. I 
believe in fact that the Soviet Union sets store 
by detente, from which it derives various 
advantages. There are aspects of the Helsinki 
conference which the USSR values. We must 
realise this and say so. This is why, I feel, it 
has agreed to certain concessions: freedom of 
expression for some of the peoples now within 
its sphere of influence and the possibility of 
challenging the extremely homogeneous struc-
ture into which the countries under its influ-
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ence are fitted. It is impossible to see why it 
should have agreed to these concessions unless 
it wanted to preserve certain aspects of its pol-
icy. 
I now come to what concerns us, the reaction 
of the West. Firstly, the western countries 
have said from the outset that they have no 
intention of interfering in Poland's internal 
affairs. Secondly, they knew full well that 
there was no question of military intervention 
by the West even if there had been military in-
tervention by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, 
the West has stated very firmly - and I feel 
WEU must do the same - that Soviet military 
intervention in Poland would have extremely 
serious implications for the process of 
detente. To tell the truth, it is difficult to see 
how a process of detente could have had any 
further meaning or how it could have continued 
if, after the signing of the Helsinki agreements, 
which recognise the right of nations to self-
determination and affirm the principle of non-
interference by the powers in the internal affairs 
of another country, the essential feature of this 
process of detente, the minimum of confidence 
nations can have in each other and in the com-
mitments they have entered into, had been 
immediately spurned and trampled under foot. 
This has been the background to our deliber-
ations: what should the West say, what should 
Western European Union say now? And so I 
come back to the draft recommendation we 
have drawn up, with the almost unanimous 
approval of the General Affairs Committee, 
there being only one abstention, although this 
has not prevented the tabling of various amend-
ments, on which I feel I should state my views. 
These amendments are not all of equal 
importance or significance, and they can be 
taken into account to some extent as long as 
they do not deprive our draft recommendation 
of all meaning. 
It must be admitted that certain points are 
not covered by the draft recommendation. It 
does not, of course, refer to armed intervention 
for the simple reason that armed intervention is 
inconceivable in the circumstances and also 
because it would serve no useful purpose to 
arouse false hopes or to encourage members of 
Solidarity who might tend towards extreme 
solutions. In fact, as Solidarity's leaders have 
done, as the Catholic church has done in its 
contacts with Solidarity, the call should be for 
moderation so that the essence of what has 
already been achieved may be preserved. 
What is proposed is firstly economic aid, 
which our countries owe to Poland. This 
country is in a critical economic situation, 
which was obviously partly responsible for the 
156 
FIFTH SITTING 
explosion of popular feeling. Dissatisfied with 
the way their country has been run, the Poles 
want economic and social reform. The wes-
tern nations have a duty to perform in this res-
pect. 
The report describes what has already been 
done, particularly at the level of the European 
Economic Community, and what further action 
is contemplated: specifically, supplies and post-
ponement of the repayment of certain loans 
that have been granted. This being so, how-
ever, the only other action we can take is to 
address a stem warning to the Soviet 
Union. What is the justification for this? 
If there were no cause for fear, if there were 
no threats, we should not say anything, of 
course. But the situation that has existed for 
some months, the verbal and written action that 
has been taken, the meetings that have been 
held, the continuation of military manoeuvres 
beyond the time they were scheduled to end, 
the criticisms which have appeared in the 
Soviet press justify the fear felt in the West. 
Consequently, it seems essential to me to 
warn the Soviet Union that, if it goes into 
Poland, if it decides on military intervention 
because what is happening in Poland is incom-
patible with what it considers to be the proper 
status of countries within its sphere of influ-
ence, it will be committing a serious violation 
of the Helsinki agreements and of two basic 
provisions of these agreements in particular. 
The Soviet Union must, of course, realise 
that it would then be jeopardising the Helsinki 
agreements themselves and that the western 
countries would have to think about the situa-
tion created not by them but by the Soviet 
Union and review their position. It would be 
too easy if a country could accept the provi-
sions of an agreement to its liking and reject 
those it considered a nuisance. Agreements 
and treaties have always been regarded as a 
cohesive whole, and everyone knows full well 
that the participants would not have agreed to 
sign a treaty if they had thought parts of it not 
worthy of their signature. 
This is, it seems to me, one of the basic ele-
ments of our proposals. I stress this point 
because one of the amendments - on which I 
shall be stating my views at greater length at 
the appropriate time - questions this proposal. 
Personally, I am quite prepared to drop the 
possibly over-rigid wording of the Committee's 
proposals, but I cannot go back on the assertion 
that, if the Helsinki agreements are violated 
through the invasion of Poland, the western 
countries would have to review their posi-
tion. There can be no denying that such an 
invasion would endanger the whole process of 
detente as well as the negotiations on disarma-
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ment. All negotiations are based on mutual 
trust. How could such trust be maintained if 
agreements only recently signed were renoun-
ced and if the action of certain signatories was 
diametrically opposed to their undertakings? 
The final question is, whom do we address? 
As the Assembly's interlocutor is the Council of 
Ministers, we shall of course initially be sending 
the draft recommendation to it. 
The question then arises, could we not go 
further? Could we not, like all international 
bodies, approach the other European organisa-
tions and say to them, here is the recommen-
dation we have adopted and have forwarded to 
the Council of Ministers? Do you not think, 
you European organisations - NATO, the 
European Communities, with your particular 
interest in economic questions, the Council of 
Europe - that your attitude might be similar to 
ours? 
The General Affairs Committee discussed 
this point. Personally, I believe that our orga-
nisation - and in the last few days various spea-
kers have regretted that it does not have a large 
enough audience - might do the other Euro-
pean and western organisations a service, provi-
ded of course that they have not already deci-
ded on their attitude, since some of them have 
already adopted positions partly in line with 
what we want. 
We could therefore call on these organisa-
tions to join with us so that the position we are 
suggesting the seven member states of WEU 
should adopt would not be confined to them 
but extended, for example, to the twenty-one 
countries of the Council of Europe. I do not 
think there is anything in the Charter of Wes-
tern European Union to prevent us from adop-
ting this approach. No one has ever claimed 
that WEU may not speak to the outside world 
but must confine itself to internal discussions. 
That is why I hope that these proposals will 
be approved. 
Finally, we shall never fully appreciate the 
extraordinary, unprecedented nature, the cardi-
nal importance of what is now happening in 
Poland. There is today a tiny glimmer of hope 
that freedom will be introduced into the system 
of an eastern bloc country. Something extre-
mely important will have been achieved if the 
people of one eastern bloc country can escape 
from the rigid pattern of institutions and can 
join freely together to make themselves heard -
but this 1s precisely what makes the process so 
difficult and so dangerous. 
Acting with the greatest possible caution but 
also with all the necessary determination, we 
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must therefore help Poland in every way we 
can. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Hanin. 
I am sure that you have properly underlined 
the great importance to all of us of events in 
Poland. 
The debate is open. 
Mr. Giinther Muller is first on the list of 
speakers but is not here. I therefore call Mr. 
Gessner. 
Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, may I first of all thank the 
Rapporteur very much for his report. One 
cannot fail to be aware of the great care and 
discretion with which he has worked. I was 
particularly impressed by the analytical section, 
much of which I can endorse without reserv-
ation; much of it has my full agreement. That 
is one side of the problem. 
I do not wish, however, to conceal the fact 
that I have some reservations about the draft 
recommendation, although there can be no 
doubt whatsoever that all the recommenda-
tions formulated by the Rapporteur are well 
meant. I am, however, rather concerned about 
the consequences of these recommendations. 
After all, when you ask for something you 
must be prepared to accept the consequences as 
well. 
Before explaining this in detail, I would just 
like to say that we are all observing the policy 
of regeneration that has begun in Poland with 
interest and great sympathy. The Polish 
nation is fighting for more self-determination, 
and this fills us with great admiration. Poland 
today is no longer the Poland of two years ago. 
The Solidarity trade union has been established 
and an agricultural union set up, not to men-
tion the efforts to secure greater free-
dom of action for the Catholic church and the 
attempts to free the Polish economic system 
from its bureaucratic fetters. Finally, Wf 
should not forget the process of democratisation 
in the Polish Communist Party itself. All this 
deserves our undivided sympathy. 
Each of us also knows, however, that the 
Soviet Union is not pleased at the way things 
are going. It feels challenged; it would like to 
reserve any developments that have taken 
place. I have no doubt that the possibility of 
military intervention cannot be ruled out. 
May I remind you ofwhat happened in 1953 in 
the German Democratic Republic, 1956 in 
Poland and 1968 in Czechoslovakia? The 
question for the Soviet Union is how, or by 
what means, it can reverse the developments 
initiated. The danger in Poland is far from 
over; on the contrary, I believe Poland has now 
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reached an extremely critical stage of develop-
ment. This, however, places certain obli-
gations on us: we must avoid anything that 
might injure the men and women who initiated 
the process of Polish regeneration. We must 
behave in such a way that the process can 
continue to flourish without outside influ-
ence. In concrete terms, we must avoid any-
thing that could be construed and exploited as 
external intervention. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is precisely with 
this in mind that I am somewhat unhappy 
about the draft recommendation. I believe we 
are all united in seeking to stabilise the situa-
tion in Poland. We should therefore refrain 
from any planning consultations with regard to 
contingencies in Poland, as proposed in para-
graph 2 of the draft recommendation, since this 
is the very thing that could be construed as 
attempted intervention. Of course I am well 
aware that this was not the Rapporteur's inten-
tion. I am in no doubt about that. Never-
theless, we must remember that the Soviet 
Union will naturally be at pains to adduce 
proof that the western states are staging an 
intervention. I would regard it as extremely 
distressing if the Soviet Union were to use in its 
campaign a document produced by Western 
European Union. How would we feel then? 
Would we not be asking ourselves if we should 
not have been more restrained and cautious? 
Another point I must mention is in para-
graph 1 of the draft recommendation, which 
recommends that we announce the principles 
that will guide our reactions in the event of 
Soviet intervention. I must admit that I find 
this recommendation rather strange, because it 
gives the Soviet Union the chance to prepare 
specifically for our reaction in advance. Can 
this be in our interests? We cannot be as 
effective if we have already announced the 
principles of our behaviour in detail. I do not 
think it advisable to blurt everything out and 
give away the details of our future conduct. 
Obviously the Soviet Union must know what 
intervention in Poland would mean, for exam-
ple in terms of the East-West dialogue, detente, 
trade relations and anything else one can think 
of. We all know that this has been repeatedly 
spelled out in the past by the Western Alli-
ance. The Soviet Union must know that it 
would thereby set in train processes that would 
no longer be in its own interests. 
May I quote from the final declaration of the 
European Council of 22nd-23rd March 1981: 
" The Council is following recent deve-
lopments in Poland with great concern. It 
underlines the obligation of all states signa-
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tory to the Helsinki final act to base their 
relations with Poland on the strict appli-
cation of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of the final act. ". 
It goes on to say that any other atti-
tude would have very serious consequences for 
the future of international relations in Europe 
and throughout the world. 
In any case, it seems to me simply a matter 
of intelligence not to lay all your cards on the 
table beforehand. What I have just said in 
relation to paragraph 2 of the draft recommen-
dation also applies, in my view, to paragraphs 
3, 4 and 5. May I remind you that yesterday 
in this Assembly General Rogers reported that 
the political leadership of the Alliance had also 
given the go-ahead for specific actions in the 
event of intervention. General Rogers men-
tioned yesterday that he had made seven propo-
sals, six of which had been accepted by the 
political leadership of the Alliance. I do not, 
however, recall the Alliance announcing any 
details of these items. I think that was a sen-
sible way to behave, and one which we should 
emulate. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, as you will have 
noted, a number of amendments have been 
tabled by my political associates. If these 
amendments are accepted we shall vote for the 
draft recommendation; if not, we shall abstain. 
Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT. -Thank you, Mr. Gess-
ner. 
Mr. Atkinson, are you willing to speak today? 
Mr. ATKINSON (United Kingdom). -If I 
may, I shall say just a few words. However, I 
shall not repeat my speech to the last Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, nor the previous 
speech I made to this Assembly when I said 
that I had not felt until then that the allies had 
learnt the lessons of Afghanistan. Of course, I 
welcome the recommendations of this report, 
which at least indicate that some eighteen 
months after Afghanistan we are coming round 
to learning the lessons of Afghanistan and deci-
ding the kind of retaliatory measures which the 
West needs to take in the event of further 
Soviet aggression. 
But let us appreciate that we have almost 
gone back to square one in terms of those com-
paratively feeble, ineffective and disunited mea-
sures which were taken in the wake of Afghan-
istan - the grain embargo has been lifted by 
both the United States of America and Europe, 
and a number of other anti-trade measures have 
been abandoned. There is very little left, apart 
from the rather ineffective Olympic Games 
expression of our disapproval of the events in 
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Afghanistan, of the West's indication of disap-
proval of that aggression. 
Soviet troops are still in Afghanistan. 
Clearly, there has been very little deterrent, and 
the Soviet Union may still think that, despite 
all the talk of retaliation, it may be 
able in Poland, as in Afghanistan, to get away 
with an invasion. 
The purpose of this report is to show that 
that will not be the case. 
Of course, the western strategy may be that 
we should have gone back on those rather inef-
fective retaliatory measures in the wake of 
Afghanistan and returned to normality, so that 
the Soviet Union depended upon western grain 
and, if we needed to retaliate properly next 
time in the event of an invasion of Poland, it 
would hurt all the more. That may be the 
strategy. 
I also think that it is very important that the 
western allies appreciate that retaliatory mea-
sures in the event of Soviet aggression in 
Poland will require a great deal more unity - a 
kind of unity which has not been experienced 
in the recent past. For those measures to 
work, they must be extremely harmful to the 
Soviet Union, but they will also be harmful to 
certain Western European countries. I repeat 
the warning which I gave in the debate on 
space technology this morning when I said that 
it was extremely unwise for some western eco-
nomies to be moving to a point where they 
relied on importing Soviet oil and Soviet gas, as 
the Siberian pipeline scheme appeared to 
imply. I have in mind France, Germany and 
some of the Benelux countries. If they are to 
depend on this oil and gas, what kind of posi-
tion will they be in if it comes to Soviet 
aggression in Poland? How will they be able to 
retaliate? I feel, therefore, that they ought to 
be thinking twice on this. 
Recommendation 5 refers to an embargo on 
the transfer of advanced technology to the 
Soviet Union. I have said before that here is 
an area where we have yet to learn sufficiently 
the lessons of our past follies on the part of the 
West. In the last ten years, I suppose in the 
interest of detente, we have made a major 
contribution to the strength of the Soviet Union 
and the might of the Soviet Union in lending 
that country our technology. To cite a few 
examples, it is as a result of our technology that 
Soviet missiles are now very much more accu-
rate than they were, because we have shown the 
Soviets how to manufacture more accurate ball-
bearings. It was an American manufacturing 
company that established the factory which 
built the trucks and engines which the Red 
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Army used in the invasion of Afghanistan. 
This is foolishness and it does not appear to 
me that we have fully learned the lesson. 
I understand that the Soviet Union's compu-
ter system is based entirely on two IBM compu-
ters which the KGB were able, in effect, to 
steal - it was certainly an illegal transac-
tion - from the United States of America. I 
hope that the Assembly will consider in due 
course that a separate study is deserved of the 
way in which the West has in recent years 
contributed to the strength and the might of the 
Soviet Union, which might be used, though we 
hope it never will be, against us. 
In concluding my remarks I refer to recom-
mendation 4, which asks that member states be 
involved in support from the Council of Eur-
ope. May I point out to the Rapporteur and 
to the Assembly that ever since the report on 
freedom of assembly in Eastern Europe was 
received unanimously by the Council of Europe 
just over a year ago - I was the Rapporteur on 
that occasion - we in the Council of Europe's 
Committee for Relations with European Non-
Member Countries have kept a watching brief 
on the developing situation in Poland. At 
every single meeting we have had a report with 
a chronology of events and would be delighted 
to accept and would most certainly welcome 
this particular recommendation and to be 
involved in it. We look forward to the 
response from this Assembly should this recom-
mendation be agreed and to being involved in 
eventually producing the kind of measures of 
which the Soviet Union needs to be fully aware 
should it decide to risk intervening militarily in 
Poland. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Atkin-
son. 
The next speaker is Mr. Bernini to be fol-
lowed by Mr. Grieve. 
Mr. BERNINI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President I was greatly interested in Mr. 
Hanin's ~peech. Although we can agree with 
some points in the explanatory memorandum 
and the draft recommendation we have serious 
doubts regarding the suggestions made to be 
Council. We say this because of the extreme 
complexity of the present situation in Poland 
and in line with the position which we Italian 
communists have always taken, supporting the 
autonomy and independence of peoples. 
We fully endorse the reference in the pream-
ble to the draft recommendation to the final act 
of the Helsinki conference and in particular to 
the undertaking given by states " to refrain " in 
international relations " from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state " and consequen-
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tly " from any intervention, direct or indirect, 
individual or collective, military, political or 
economic, or other, designed to subordinate to 
their own interest any other state". 
These are principles which have guided us 
throughout our history, in the service of our 
country and for the recovery of its liberty and 
independence; and we have reaffirmed them in 
all circumstances and have declared our com-
plete solidarity with all peoples whatsoever who 
have had to fight to win or defend their natio-
nal autonomy or independence in any part of the 
world. And we have always held consistently 
to these principles in this Assembly, as else-
where, when the sovereignty of a state has been 
threatened or attacked by the Soviet Union, the 
United States of America or any other country. 
I •do not believe, Mr. President, that as much 
can be said by many of our critics and the 
representatives of other political parties, who 
often - in this Assembly too - talk or remain 
silent about freedom and the right of peoples to 
autonomy according to whether the subject of 
discussion is the eastern or the western coun-
tries, the people of Afghanistan, El Salvador or 
Turkey, the rights of Israel or the right of the 
Palestinian people to have a homeland. 
Poland, which is at grips with the deep-
rooted and difficult problem of economic reco-
very and democratic reform and development 
has- as its present leaders have declared -rea-
ched a critical point in its history as a free and 
independent nation. 
May I recall that for us Italian communists, 
what is on trial in Poland is the ability of 
socialism, in the form that it has taken, to free 
itself from authoritarian and repressive devia-
tion resulting from the particular historical 
circumstances in which it came into being, to 
maintain all the progress made towards emanci-
pation and to move forward to new goals of 
progress, liberty and respect for human rights. 
But, above all, developments in Poland can 
affect relations in Europe, which we all wish 
to see improved for the sake of co-operation 
and the progress and security or our peoples. 
For this reason, people who realise the value 
of the present equilibrium and the danger 
of any attempt to upset it and who look upon 
the freedom and independence of all peoples as 
the condition of peace and stability in Europe 
and the world, cannot help but feel a spirit of 
solidarity with what is happenning in Poland 
while at the same time maintaining an attitude 
of discreet respect; in the knowledge that these 
events - as is confirmed by the happenings of 
the last few days - can have a happy outcome 
only through the will and responsible determi-
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nation of the Polish people and its institutions, 
without exposing themselves to any unaccept-
able outside interference. 
Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, every attempt 
so far made - as in the recommendation to the 
Council - to define possible retaliatory mea-
sures, whether economic, diplomatic or even 
military, is objectively an expression of lack of 
faith in the Polish people and brings grist to 
the mill of those inside and outside Poland who 
are seeking justification for external interven-
tion and trying to call a halt to the process of 
reform in that country. 
It is surprising and significant that there is no 
reference in the recommendation to the serious 
consequences which the worsening of the Polish 
situation can have for East-West relations and 
world co-operation; nor is the hope expressed 
that the move towards liberty and independence 
in Poland shall achieve complete success, with 
consequently favourable effects on relations bet-
ween countries in Europe and throughout the 
world. In our view, however, this should be 
the central feature and underlying spirit of the 
recommendation. Hence our reserves. 
The most recent decisions of the Sejm and 
the Polish authorities and the reaffirmation of 
the policy of reform mark a major stage in the 
process and the next few weeks look like being 
decisive. 
We Italian communists, rejecting any mea-
sure which might add to the difficulties or even 
threaten the movement towards reform, declare 
our solidarity and our faith in that movement 
and wish it complete success, for the sake of 
the freedom and independence of Poland, the 
cause of co-operation and security in Europe 
and throughout the world. 
It is in this spirit, Mr. President, that we 
shall vote on the recommendation according to 
the amendments made to it. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Ber-
nini. 
I call Mr. Grieve. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - Unlike 
Mr. Bernini, I have no reservations about the 
recommendations in Mr. Hanin's report. It is 
cautious and courageous and recognises with 
common sense our limitations in the West in 
the face of the dangerous situation in Poland. 
It recognises our solidarity with the desire of 
the Polish people for greater freedom as expres-
sed in their movement Solidarity. It recogni-
ses, as surely it must, the appalling dan-
gers to any policy of detente and any 
rapprochement between East and West which 
would automatically and inevitably ensue if 
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Russia were to be persuaded to intervene mili-
tarily in the internal affairs of Poland. 
It is inevitable that we in this Assembly 
should have the deepest sympathy with the 
aspirations of Solidarity for greater freedom. It 
is inevitable, too, that we should recognise the 
limitations on what it is possible for us to do to 
help the Poles. However, I have no doubt 
that, although there are limitations upon what 
we can do - there are no limitations on our 
sympathy - there are many things that we can 
do. I do not resile from the recommendation 
in paragraph 1 of the report that we should 
make absolutely plain the principles which 
would guide us in our reactions in the event of 
a Soviet military intervention. 
The lessons of history teach us again and 
again that the most appalling cataclysms have 
ensued precisely when freedom-loving countries 
have not made their position and their defence 
of freedom absolutely clear. We should make 
plain our position. We should make it plain 
that a Russian military intervention in Poland 
would destroy any beneficial results which we 
might expect from the Helsinki final act. We 
should make it plain that we should regard 
such an intervention as a complete breach of 
the undertaking given by Russia in the Helsinki 
final act. 
I commend the report for the spirit in which 
it is written. In particular, I commend its 
approbation of the extremely cautious, states-
manlike and courageous attitude of the Roman 
Catholic church in Poland. I hope that we 
shall give concrete expression to the recommen-
dation in paragraph 5 of the draft recommen-
dation which refers to the : 
" ... economic, financial and commercial mea-
sures which the Communities would then 
have to decide upon and which should neces-
sarily include an embargo on the transfer of 
advanced technology to the Soviet Union ". 
That is a subject on which my friend David 
Atkinson has enlarged. 
We in the West must give every possible 
commercial and financial help to the Polish 
people. Poland's debts to the West are enor-
mous, and it would be a disgrace if bankers in 
the West were to be parsimonious and cheese-
paring in their approach to Poland's economic 
and financial problems. Here is a way in 
which we can give concrete help to the Poles in 
their desire and search for freedom. I therefore 
hope that a harsh attitude will not be adopted 
and that it will not be suggested that Poland's 
debts must be repaid. On the contrary, the 
West, not only in its parliamentary aspect 
represented in assemblies such as this but in the 
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corridors of financial and commercial power, 
must give all the help it can to the free Polish 
people. 
We must make it plain that, if there should 
be a Russian military intervention in Poland, it 
would be cataclysmic for any hopes of detente. 
Goodness knows we live in a dangerous 
enough world as it is. From this I draw a les-
son, following on the statesmanlike speech of 
General Rogers which we heard in this Assem-
bly yesterday. We must, in the words of Queen 
Elizabeth I of England, look to our moat. The 
moat now is not the English Channel and the 
other waters around England and Scotland; it is 
our defences. We live in a dangerous world in 
which nobody can predict the consequences of 
any act. It is vital that we should not allow 
the Soviet Union and its satellites to achieve an 
overwhelming military preponderance, either in 
conventional weapons or in nuclear weapons, 
over the West. 
I know that in all our countries there are 
those who, for various reasons and often from 
the most profound ideals, think that we should 
disarm and seek to abandon the nuclear deter-
rent. I do not believe that we should be fulfil-
ling the will of God in any free country if we 
were to leave ourselves defenceless before our 
enemies. I hope that we in this Assembly will 
get that message across to those who have elec-
ted us to office to represent them in our respec-
tive parliaments. 
I was particularly impressed by paragraph 7 
of the explanatory memorandum to the report. 
It is not true that all the countries of Eastern 
Europe were in some way ceded to the Soviet 
Union at Y alta. I regularly receive a European 
journal with European aspirations with which I 
have great sympathy. But it regularly pub-
lishes a map of Europe which shows in black 
the countries of Eastern Europe west of the 
Soviet Union and stating that they were what 
Churchill ceded to Russia at Yalta. 
That simply is not true. Inevitably, in the 
aftermath of war, there was a zone of influence. 
But it is no more. As Mr. Hanin makes abso-
lutely plain in his report, there is a contra-
diction between the final act of Helsinki and 
the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. We would be 
well advised to make that absolutely plain in all 
our communications with the Soviet Union. 
With those few words, Mr. President, I give 
the report my unreserved support and I hope 
that it will have the unreserved support of the 
overwhelming majority of this Assembly. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Grieve. 
I now call Mr. Rosch, to be followed by Mr. 
Blaauw. 
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Mr. ROSCH (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, you asked earlier 
who wanted to speak when, so may I say on a 
point of order that I had intended - in the 
interests of a lively debate - to wait until after 
the speeches by Mr. Muller and Mr. Dejardin. 
I accordingly put my name down in the 
appropriate order. As they will not now be 
speaking this afternoon, I would ask you to 
allow me to speak tomorrow. 
The PRESIDENT. - Very well, if you insist 
on speaking tomorrow. However, if everyone 
waits until tomorrow, we shall not get through 
the business. Someone must always speak 
before someone else. Everyone likes to be last, 
but under the rules that is the privilege of the 
Chairman of the Committee. It is a pity, but 
that is position. 
Mr. Blaauw, are you willing to speak? 
Thank you very much. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, although I sympathise with the 
remarks made by the previous speaker, I appre-
ciate your problem and I will say what I have 
to say now. 
The peoples of Western Europe have been 
following recent developments in Poland with 
intense interest and often with bated 
breath. What is happening there has come as 
a surprise to many people. A country that has 
been held in the iron grip of the Soviet Com-
munist administration may yet in some way or 
other develop into something like the western 
democracies. We must therefore continue to 
observe and, where possible, support these 
developments. In Poland we are seeing the 
economic bankruptcy of the Soviet system. 
On the one hand, we can but feel satisfaction 
at seeing this system proved wrong. On the 
other, we must feel deep sympathy for the 
Polish people, suffering as they are under great 
economic shortages. The present develop-
ments not only constitute a political movement: 
they are also a reaction to the poor economic 
situation in Poland. 
I should like to express my appreciation for 
the information and analysis Mr. Hanin has 
provided in his report. It is an extensive 
report which gives a very clear picture of how 
developments have proceeded to date. But we 
do not know today what will be happening 
tomorrow, and in this respect we too have to 
keep an ear to the radio all the time. 
All kinds of things can still happen. The 
countries of WEU are therefore wise to examine 
this subject with a view to preventing a repeti-
tion of what happened in Afghanistan and 
when the American hostages were held in Iran. 
This meant assenting ad hoc and after the 
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event to things one would not have done at the 
time. Everyone knows the outcome. It was 
nothing to be proud of. It would therefore be 
wise to arrange things better this time. 
What do we want to achieve by this? We 
want the process of development in Poland to 
continue, and we do not want it disturbed by 
external intervention from the Soviet Union, 
and certainly not by military intervention. 
What we say in the recommendation must 
therefore not be provocative. It must be a sign 
to the Polish people, to let them know that we 
are behind them. It must be a sign to those 
who may be contemplating unilateral interven-
tion in Poland. We must ensure that the uni-
que process now taking place in Poland is not 
interrupted. The Liberal Group as a whole 
has therefore tabled a number of amendments. 
We have tabled them because we feel we 
should not act provocatively. We must ensure 
that the Soviet Union cannot intervene in 
Poland, armed with this recommendation. 
The amendment of the wording will not detract 
from the contents of the Hanin report but will 
assist the process of development and the peo-
ple in Poland. It will say, loudly and clearly, 
what we in WEU think about the developments 
in Poland. Mr. President, we would be deligh-
ted if a very broad consensus could be 
achieved in WEU on a declaration concerning 
Poland. 
It is not a good thing for reservations to be 
expressed on a large number of issues, simply 
because every political group would like to see 
its own shade of political opinion reflected to a 
greater or lesser extent. It is nice to be right, 
but it is far, far better and more important to 
carry one's point. We must produce a state-
ment which demonstrates a great unity within 
WEU, which fosters the process of development 
in Poland, expresses support for the Polish peo-
ple and also issues a clear warning to every-
one, and to the Soviet Union in particular, 
against disturbing this process. We shall dis-
cuss the contents of the amendments later. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Blaauw. 
I do not think Mr. De Poi, Mr. Baumel and 
Mr. Dejardin are present. 
The next speaker is Mr. Cavaliere. I am 
grateful to those members who are willing to 
speak, for otherwise much valuable Assembly 
time would be lost. 
Mr. CA V ALIERE (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this report 
and draft recommendation come at a very signi-
ficant moment in the course of events in Poland 
and both, therefore, deserve our full support. 
I have listened with interest to earlier spea-
kers and I was struck in particular by two ideas 
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expressed by Mr. Gessner and Mr. Bernini res-
pectively. Mr. Bernini urged the adoption of a 
cautious attitude to the difficult developments 
now taking place in Poland and regretted that 
the draft recommendation failed to express the 
hope that Poland would itself succeed in estab-
lishing freedom and democracy. But what-
ever we do and say, we do and say because we 
stand by the Polish people in all that is happe-
ning there, so that they may win a place among 
the truly free and democratic countries. And I 
believe that our concern over the continuing 
threats, including serious threats of armed inter-
vention, from Russia is a clear expression of 
our solidarity without any intention of inter-
vening. 
Mr. Gessner said that we should cut out any-
thing which might look like interference and 
thus give the Soviet Union an excuse to inter-
vene. In that case, what should we do ? We 
should say nothing because if we tell Poland 
that we stand at its side and that the free coun-
tries are prepared to give it the help it is 
requesting to overcome its internal problems, 
we run the risk of appearing as the ones who 
want to interfere in its internal affairs. If we 
cannot say that we will not tolerate armed 
intervention by the Soviet Union - and we are 
tolerating all the threats which are a clear viola-
tion of the Helsinki final act - what can we 
do? 
Thus, Ladies and Gentlemen, those who say 
that we stand by Poland and hope that Poland 
will achieve complete freedom and democracy 
warn us at the same time to be careful about 
what we do, to watch our words and to do 
nothing, for pity's sake, because anything else 
might look like interference and the Soviet 
Union would be able to use it as an excuse to 
send in its armed forces. This seems to me to 
be nonsense. What have the NATO countries 
said ? They have so far said that, even if the 
Soviet Union sends in its troops, there would be 
no military response. I think that this should 
allay everyone's fears. And we should say to 
everyone that we are moving with the greatest 
caution. But is it possible that there is no need 
to say what we intend to do, and then not do it 
or even go back on our words, as happened in 
the case of Afghanistan after a while ? In my 
opinion this really means wanting us to do 
nothing and to wash our hands of the matter 
completely. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, I 
consider that without addressing ourselves 
directly, which we are not doing, to the Polish 
people but addressing ourselves to those who 
are constantly threateni11g and stepping up their 
intervention in Poland's internal affairs, we 
should let it be known that in the event of an 
armed invasion measures will be taken. 
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Should we not even say that? We should say 
so, it is our duty to do so, if we want to keep 
any shadow of credibility. 
The Soviet Union has always violated the 
spirit and terms of the decisions taken at 
Helsinki, Ladies and Gentlemen. What have 
we done about the total disregard for human 
rights? We have talked but we have done 
nothing practical or perhaps we could not do 
anything practical. But is it possible that we 
should not even talk about it ? And then, 
when we talk, we must be able to show that we 
are determined to do what we say we intend to 
do. Should we not even be able to say for 
example to the Soviet Union that we shall 
supply it with no more technology, no more 
wheat - no more, that is, of the economic 
resources which go to the upkeep of the armed 
forces used for this repressive action? I think 
not, Ladies and Gentlemen. Then if we still 
serve some purpose, if we want to retain the 
least measure of credibility, I believe that we 
should give our full backing to this draft 
recommendation. We should also urge our 
countries to stand firm so that their firm atti-
tude will really show the Soviet Union that this 
time we really mean business. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Hawkins, the 
last member who is willing to speak today. I 
should be most grateful if others were prepared 
to speak after him. 
Mr. HAWKINS (United Kingdom). -If Mr. 
Rosch likes to wait until he has heard all the 
other speeches so that he can alter his own, he 
would find in the British Parliament that he 
would never make a speech, because the Spea-
ker would not call him. It is time we altered 
our rules so that if you called someone, Mr. 
President, and he did not want to speak, he 
should not have the opportunity subsequently 
to do so. I am most surprised by his attitude. 
I have many Polish friends. There are a 
large number of Poles in my constituency who 
fought for the allies during the war and 
returned afterwards to settle in Norfolk. They 
have made first-class workmen and first-class 
farmers. They are good, solid citizens who 
bring up their families in a God-fearing and 
Christian manner. 
I first visited Paris during the war when a 
kindly transport officer suggested that if I did 
not catch the first train from where I was taking 
a course - down at the Maginot line - I might 
have to spend a night in Paris. I accepted that 
opportunity with alacrity. I got as far as the 
Champs-Elysees - the only place in Paris of 
which I had heard at that time. I emerged 
from the metro to be hailed by someone who 
asked me whether I was a Scot. I was wearing 
a peculiarly coloured hat. He was a Pole who 
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had formerly been a journalist on the "Liver-
pool Daily Post". He had returned to fight 
with Polish forces, to which he belonged. In 
fewer than twenty-four hours I became a very 
close friend of that Pole. What happened to 
him subsequently I do not know. 
With my friends in my constituency and with 
the friends I made on the first and only day that 
I spent in Paris during the war I have a close 
and warm feeling for Poland. Poland is an 
example to our own people of what could hap-
pen to them and of how long it takes to show 
some signs that a country which has been 
repressed and which exists under a regime 
which does not tolerate opposition is capable of 
demonstrating its objections to that system. 
I say to my friends in Great Britain that they 
must awaken to the dangers of the type of poli-
tics which Mr. Wedgwood Benn, formerly Lord 
Stansgate, is propagating. We must realise that 
Poland remains a socialist society. Though I 
am a capitalist without capital, I recognise that 
it is not likely to become a capitalist country. 
However, Poland wants to be free· from the 
stifling inefficiency and corruption that sur-
round its people and that result in the Poles 
being without the basic necessities of life, 
including food. That is what is happening in 
Poland today. Anyone who has lived, as I 
have, on one-seventh of a loaf of bread and two 
bowls of thin soup a day knows how important 
food can become. Indeed, it becomes far more 
important than anything else in life. 
Today, Polish people are queuing for the 
basic necessities of life. We must help, but we 
must not interfere. As capitalist societies, we 
cannot say to Poland " If we are to help you, 
you must change your whole system". That 
will not happen, but we must support the 
Polish people in their desire to have more say 
in their country's affairs. 
I congratulate Mr. Hanin on his report. I 
believe that the real fear of our Polish friends is 
not so much of military intervention, although 
it has been spoken about a great deal today. I 
believe that they fear a gradual takeover once 
again by the hardliners in Polish politics who 
are tied to Russia. It is in that way that the 
Soviet Union hopes to bring Poland back fully 
as a country subservient to all its aims. 
As my colleague Mr. Grieve said, individu-
ally we can help. Our bankers in the West 
have made enormous loans to Poland. We 
cannot expect those bankers to waive their 
loans and forget about them, but we must urge 
our governments to support the banks should 
they decide not to demand repayment. 
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In my opinion, we can help individually in 
other ways. Poland has been hit by three bad 
harvests. The trouble with British and pos-
sibly other politicians today is that they do not 
understand how food is produced. It is not 
produced under an umbrella. It is not 
produced in a large tin shed. It is produced on 
land, which is open to the elements. 
Three bad harvests in a row have brought 
Poland to near starvation and have produced 
the feelings of unrest. Individually, through 
the churches and in any other way that we can, 
bearing in mind the large surpluses of food in 
the EEC and in the western world generally, we 
can divert much of that food to Poland. If we 
did, I am sure that it would not be objected to 
by out peoples in the way that they resent the 
cheap selling off of food and wine to Russia. 
Because of my emotional and real feelings for 
Poland, I hope that we shall vote unanimously 
in favour of this excellent report. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Haw-
kins. 
I want to express my pleasure at your 
mention of the warmth and affection which 
those of us who spent part of our prisoner-of-
war period in Poland feel towards the Polish 
people for the many acts of kindness that we 
received from them, often at great risk to them-
selves, when they, like us, were living in condi-
tions of great adversity. That feeling exists in 
all former prisoners of war in Poland, and it is 
right that we should be reminded of it. 
Does anyone else wish to speak in this debate 
tonight? Exceptionally, because we brought 
forward this debate, I felt it right to indicate 
that those who were not here this afternoon 
would have an opportunity to speak tomorrow 
and, because of the way in which the time-table 
worked out, not to have any votes on the 
subject today because of the absence of col-
leagues who were not aware that the debate was 
taking place today. Normally, if people are 
not here when they are called, a debate is not 
held open for their convenience. 
If no one else wishes to speak, I shall close 
this sitting. 
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the 
next Sitting 
The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the 
Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow 
morning, Thursday 18th June, at 10 a.m. with 
the following Orders of the Day: 
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1. Developments in Poland (Resumed Debate 
on the Report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee and Vote on the draft Recommen-
dation, Document 870 and Amendments). 
2. European security and events in the Gulf 
area (Presentation of and Debate on the 
Report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Document 871, Addendum and Amend-
ments). 
3. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly (Presenta-
tion of and Debate on the Report of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri-
vileges and Vote on the draft Reso-
lution, Document 877 and Amendment). 
Members will have noted that we have put 
down, on the possibility that they might be 
reached tomorrow, all outstanding items on our 
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agenda. I should make clear that I do this 
more in hope than expectation and I would ask 
everyone to make plans on the basis that, as we 
have circulated the time-table in advance, it is 
more than likely that we shall have an after-
noon sitting tomorrow, although we happen to 
have put down all the votes and all the business 
in case there is time in the morning. That 
does not mean that if the other business is not 
concluded we shall be able to finish tomorrow 
morning. We shall go on in the afternoon with 
any business that is not concluded in the 
morning. 
Are there any objections? ... 
The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are 
therefore agreed to. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 5.10 p.m.) 
SIXTH SITIING 
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SUMMARY 
1. Adoption of the Minutes. 
2. Attendance Register. 
3. Developments in Poland (Resumed Debate on the Report 
of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft 
Recommendation, Doe. 870 and Amendments). 
Speakers : The President, Mr. Giinther Miiller, Mr. De 
Poi, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Rosch, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Kurt 
Jung, Mr. Hanin (Rapporteur), Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman of the Committee), Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Hanin, 
Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Baumel, Mr. 
Gessner, Mr. Hanin; (explanation of vote): Sir Frederic 
Bennett; (points of order) : Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hanin; 
(explanation of vote) : Mr. Hanin, Mr. Giinther Miiller. 
4. European security and events in the Gulf area (Presen-
tation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee 
and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 871, 
Addendum and Amendments). 
Speakers: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman 
of the Committee), Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Lord Hughes, Sir Frederic Bennett. 
5. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly (Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doe. 877 and Amend-
ment). 
Speakers: The President, Mr. Grieve (Chairman and 
Rapporteur), Lord Hughes, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Grieve. 
6. Adjournment of the Session. 
The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m., with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair. 
The PRESIDENT. - The Sitting is open. 
1. Adoption of the Minutes 
The PRESIDENT. - In accordance with Rule 
21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been 
distributed. 
Are there any comments? ... 
The Minutes are agreed to. 
2. Attendance Register 
The PRESIDENT. - The names of the Sub-
stitutes attending this Sitting which have been 
notified to the President will be published with 
the list of Representatives appended to the 
Minutes of Proceedings1• 
I again stress to Representatives and Substi-
tutes the importance of signing the Register of 
Attendance, both to record their presence and 
because it is the basis of a roll-call should one 
later become necessary. 
l. See page 42. 
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3. Developments in Poland 
(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Com-
mittee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doe. 870 
and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT. - The first Order of the 
Day is the resumed debate on the report of the 
General Affairs Committee on developments in 
Poland and the vote on the draft recommen-
dation, Document 870 and Amendments. 
The first speaker is Mr. Giinther Muller. 
Mr. Giinther MULLER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, Mr. Hanin has presented a 
report which gives a very good and up-to-date 
analysis of the situation in Poland since 
1980. It shows the danger in which Poland 
stands and expresses our concern for develop-
ments there. As we discuss all these points 
and turn them over in our minds, we realise 
that we here in Europe are in a really serious 
situation and that, depending on developments 
there, decisions may be taken which will 
have serious repercussions for Europe and for 
the member states of WEU. 
Let me add to what Mr. Hanin said in his 
report a few words to indicate how this situa-
tion has arisen in Poland. Without wishing to 
give a detailed account of the history of the 
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Polish nation's struggle for freedom, I should 
like to point out that what is now happening is 
due, in no small measure, to an agreement 
between two dictators, the Hitler-Stalin agree-
ment of August 1939, whereby, for the first 
time in this century, a country was once again 
carved up between major powers. In 1939, as 
you all know, Poland was invaded not only by 
Hitler's armed forces but also from the East by 
the Red Army, because this had been decided 
in advance in a treaty. In 1939 any Polish 
officer was lucky to be taken prisoner by the 
Germans instead of having to set out on the 
road to Katyn, for instance. 
After 1945 this process, initiated in 1939, 
began to speed up. As you know, there was a 
Polish government-in-exile in London. There 
were strong resistance forces in Poland itself: 
the home army, which, when it rose against 
Hitler's troops in Warsaw, was left in the lurch 
by the Russians waiting on the other side of the 
river. We know that the Polish government-
in-exile was ousted by the so-called Lublin 
Committee, which, via a popular front or natio-
nal front government, was to start the transition 
to socialism in Poland. 
Just by the way, it is interesting to note that 
in 1945 a Christian Democrat Party was not 
allowed in Poland because it was regarded as 
reactionary. It did not fit in with the national 
front's policy. The Communist Party's regime 
consolidated its position. The communists 
assumed complete control and have in fact 
ruled the country since 1946. 
Now one might wonder why this difficult 
internal situation happened to develop in 
Poland precisely in 1980, since the basic ele-
ments of communist domination had already 
existed for over three decades. There were two 
main reasons for this, which we must bear in 
mind here. One, certainly, was the difficult 
agricultural situation, after three bad harvests, 
combined with the constant efforts to deprive 
the independent farmers, who still exist in 
Poland, of the resources needed for any farming 
at all to be done on a reasonably economic basis. 
The second reason was Poland's desire to 
accelerate its transformation into a modern 
industrial country. Machinery and western 
technology were imported before the country 
was ready to make any use of them, and all this 
really led to was corruption among the coun-
try's leaders. 
I should like to add, as a parenthesis, that it 
might have been better if the western countries 
had not lent Poland so much money at this 
time, since the loans were used to embark on 
economic developments which, because they 
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were too rapid and precipitous, had a catastro-
phic effect on the Polish economy. 
These are the facts, the historical back-
ground. We are all afraid now, hoping that 
the internal process which has been started in 
Poland will lead to the establishment of a grea-
ter degree of democracy in that country without 
endangering the security of Europe. Let us be 
plain : I feel sure that none of us, however 
strongly we may believe in democracy and the 
democratic system and however opposed we are 
to a one-party system, would wish to see a 
movement beginning in Poland which could 
lead to its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. 
We all know that such a policy would lead to 
immediate intervention by the Soviet Union. 
The question is simply how far the Soviet 
Union is prepared to go in tolerating a degree 
of development which would enable a slow pro-
cess of reform to take place in Poland. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, we must not view 
the Soviet Union's policy in the light of an 
ideology. I am always on my guard against 
judging the behaviour of a country by the poli-
tical party which happens to be in power there. 
That applies to the Soviet Union as 
well. I am certainly no lover of communism, 
but I prefer to ignore altogether the details of 
the Russian Communist Party's ideological 
principles or intentions. I can see that it has 
always been one of the aims of Russian policy 
to gain the upper hand over Poland. 
We are aware, when we speak about the dan-
ger of intervention, that psychological interven-
tion, pressure on a neighbouring country, has 
been going on for a long time and is still going 
on. I will give you a wonderful example of 
this. A little while ago the Russians celebrated 
the anniversary of one of their great marshals, 
an aristocrat - Marshal Suvorov. The Soviet 
press made much of the fact that Marshal Suvo-
rov quelled the Polish uprising of 1794. 
Because of this, historians have nicknamed him 
"the butcher of Warsaw". The fact that a 
reactionary nobleman, a general and marshal, 
was lauded at a time like this as a defender of 
Russia's interests, shows the extent of the ideo-
logical pressure being exerted on the Polish 
mentality. It was intentionally framed as a 
warning to the Poles, that is quite clear. 
Ladies and Gentlemen - another parenthesis 
- the Marshal Suvorov who is being thus 
honoured is in fact the same Marshal Suvorov 
who quelled the Pugachev revolt against 
Catherine 11, a revolt which actually deserves to 
be included in the annals of a proletarian party 
like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
because Pugachev fought against serfdom and 
for the little man. But today it is not Puga-
chev who is acclaimed, but Marshal Suvorov, 
the very paragon of imperialism. Nothing, I 
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think, more clearly reveals the continuity of 
Russian history, with regard to events in Poland 
as well. 
What are the implications for us today, as we 
contemplate future developments in Poland ? 
Mr. Hanin brought out very clearly in 
his report - and of course we have to vote on 
the recommendation - that a military interven-
tion in Poland would inevitably give rise to a 
response in Europe and probably all over the 
world which would render the entire previous 
policy of detente null and void. 
The consequences of this would obviously be 
serious so we must show others that we take it 
seriously. I am therefore also prepared to 
write into a recommendation : yes, measures 
will be taken if there is military intervention; 
yes, detente is at an end if military intervention 
takes place. 
After Afghanistan, we cannot again pursue a 
policy which says : " Next time you are 
naughty, we will rap you over the knuckles", 
as one might say to a child. Anyone who 
knows anything at all about bringing up child-
ren will know that this method does not work. 
In the case of a child, all it does is to push 
him into breaking the rules. The same applies 
in this case to international politics. 
I should therefore like to support what the 
draft recommendation says : all of us, the WEU 
countries, free Europe as embodied in the 
member countries of the Council of Europe, 
and other parts of the free world must consult 
together on the measures to be taken if such a 
military intervention occurs. This seems to me 
to be the only chance of showing the Soviet 
Union the cost- the great and grave costs that 
could flow from such intervention. 
Experience of Russian policy - even if you 
study Stalin's policy when he withdrew the 
troops from Iran in 1946, or the position in 
Asia, or the Truman doctrine of lOth March 
194 7 which led to the end of the civil war in 
Greece - has always shown that it reacts, not 
when certain phrases are formulated some-
where, but when the leaders of the Soviet 
Union are convinced that there is a real possi-
bility of measures materialising which must be 
contrary to their own interests. That is why I 
am in favour of the draft recommendation. 
May I make one last remark, Mr. President -
I shall soon be finished. 
Even those Poles who are fighting for greater 
freedom in their country would, I believe -
and I have had the opportunity of talking to 
such Poles, including some from the Solidarity 
trade union - like the countries of the free West 
168 
SIXTH SITTING 
to adopt a clear and firm position, because they 
believe that this clear and firm position will 
provide a better safeguard for them in their own 
country. 
I hope we shall obtain a big majority for the 
draft recommendation on Poland. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Miiller. 
I welcome the large number of visitors in the 
gallery this morning. I understand that many 
of them have come here to listen to you, and I 
am sure that they were delighted to hear your 
speech. 
The next speaker is Mr. De Poi, to be 
followed by Mr. Dejardin. 
Mr. DE POI (Italy) (Translation). - Mr. Pre-
sident, Ladies and Gentlemen, some of the 
anxieties which we expressed when the draft 
order on the situation in Poland was submitted 
last December have unfortunately proved to be 
justified. The situation in that country has 
deteriorated and there have since been ever-
growing threats to the Polish people, to its inde-
pendence and to its freedom to decide its own 
future. Fortunately, one of our chief anxieties 
has not yet been fulfilled and there has been no 
open invasion of Poland by Warsaw Pact troops 
and by the Soviet Union. 
What has happened, however, is certainly 
enough to cause us serious concern regarding 
the future of the Polish people and so far as we, 
the countries of Western Europe are concerned, 
over the proper continuation of the East-West 
dialogue. These anxieties are quite rightly 
highlighted in Mr. Hanin's excellent, fully 
detailed report on the Polish situation from 
1980 until now, with special emphasis on the 
potential threat to undertakings solemnly ent-
ered into at Helsinki and subsequently confirmed, 
despite difficulties at Belgrade and Madrid. 
Undoubtedly, the bases of the Helsinki agree-
ments could be seriously imperilled and the 
goodwill established for the first time between 
the two parts of the continent would lose all 
meaning. 
But I would remind Mr. Hanin that the Hel-
sinki agreements are still a very important ins-
trument in the hands of the Polish people and 
of all the peoples of Eastern Europe. For Soli-
darity and for the Polish workers they are and 
must remain a point of reference. In some 
ways, they are and must remain a finger poin-
ted against a return to violence. 
I would ask Mr. Hanin to tone down the 
phrase in the first clause of the recommen-
dation, which declares that such intervention 
would render the Helsinki final act null and 
void. I ask this, not so much because I do not 
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share his concern, but because I think 
that, so long as we regard this instrument as 
valid, even if others who signed and supported 
it to begin with at least are now riding over it 
roughshod, it is still a point of reference, if not 
for certain governments, at least for the peoples 
who believe and have believed in it. 
The renewed sabre-rattling mood in the 
Soviet Union is unquestionably a matter of 
serious concern. And this mood has not been 
triggered off by greater firmness in the West but 
rather calls for such greater firmness. Another 
cause for concern is the new balance now 
emerging in the Soviet Union after the 
disappearance of Kosygin from the political 
scene. It would appear that, basically, the 
technocrats have lost ground and that Brezhnev 
no longer holds the balance between the tech-
nocrats and the military in the Soviet Union 
but has rather become no more than a counter-
weight to the military. This is an objective 
matter of concern which shows how the shift in 
the situation in the Soviet Union could open 
the way to dangerous and ill-advised ventures, 
as happened in Afghanistan and is about to 
happen - although we hope that it will not -
in Poland. 
I believe - and this point would require a 
long speech but I can be brief - that some 
aspects of the system itself prevent the required 
technological development. It is the expe-
rience of Poland with its economic difficulties, 
it is the feeling of the whole pure socialist East, 
it is the experience of the developing countries 
that this pure socialist world is substantially 
unable to give the required assistance, because 
technological progress, which involves differen-
ces in earnings and jobs in society would also 
involve unacceptable pluralism, which appears 
to be in direct conflict with certain specific 
demands of the workers belonging to Solidarity 
and of the peoples of Eastern Europe. It 
would appear therefore that technological pro-
gress in the eastern countries is solely directed 
to increasing armaments which are much more 
easily controlled by rigid planning of the kind 
applied in the eastern countries. 
Brezhnev himself is probably aware of all the 
perils of such a situation and of the seriousness 
of the further blow to the credibility of the 
Soviet Union not only among the peoples of 
Europe but also among all the peoples who are 
striving for development. But what I fear is 
not so much and not solely a direct invasion. I 
believe that the present Soviet leaders in fact 
realise the obvious danger of a direct inva-
sion. I am more afraid of a kind of creeping 
invasion through an internal military coup -
and this seems to me to be desperately likely -
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through a takeover of the party, through a 
takeover of the union, so that everything falls 
back into the hands of whoever gives the orders 
in Poland, making out that the Poles them-
selves are resolving their own problems. This, 
I feel, is a very real danger in view of the 
party's weak grip and of Poland's inescapable 
position in the heart of the Warsaw Pact, in 
view of the traditional prestige of the army in 
Poland, in view of the- sole possibility of 
maintaining an appearance of sovereignty by 
presenting a takeover by the Polish armed 
forces as an internal settlement of the problem. 
Finally - and I am concluding, Mr. Presi-
dent - the Soviet Union is concerned that the 
thirty thousand million dollars missing from 
Poland's budget should not continue to be 
purely Soviet debts, leaving it to shoulder 
something which the West would unquestionably 
be unwilling to take on. This should remind 
us, therefore, that the next negotiations will 
have to be based on certainties and not on sheer 
good faith; it is also a reminder of everything 
which could harm the Soviet Union and 
certainly the Polish people if such a terrible 
development should ever take place. 
In approving the main lines of Mr. Hanin's 
draft recommendation and reminding him of 
this specific point in the first paragraph of the 
recommendation proper, I would urge that the 
dialogue must be resumed and continued on a 
more solid basis because this, in my opinion, is 
the only way of saving Poland, its people and 
peace in Europe. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. De Poi. 
Our next speaker is Mr. Dejardin, from Bel-
gium. 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I for my part shall refrain from 
recapitulating the history of Poland or of 
communism, Polish or otherwise. 
There is at least one problem on which I 
believe the Assembly can at least today show 
unanimity, namely our concern for the future 
of Poland and the Polish people. And this 
time the concern in Europe is more directly the 
result of a fresh display by a superpower - in 
this instance the Soviet Union - of its deter-
mination to be dominant. Perhaps, Mr. Presi-
dent, it is rather the striving for domination 
itself, whether hidden or open, that we should 
be denouncing. 
May I remind you, Mr. President, as well as 
other members, of the little incident in this 
chamber three years ago when I and others 
were questioning General Haig on the state-
ment he had made in his capacity as SACEUR 
to the effect that the security of the United 
States would be endangered by the entry of 
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communist ministers into the Italian Govern-
ment. 
Of course, the two things cannot be com-
pared. On the one hand we have what I would 
call an unfortunate or at any rate clumsy state-
ment, and on the other, unfortunately, more 
and more frequent cases since the last world 
war. There were the whole series of events -
coups d'etat, in fact - which took place in the 
countries of Eastern Europe immediately after 
the cease-fire of 8th May 1945. 
There was also Prague, in August 1968. 
There was Kabul. There was also, Mr. Pre-
sident, another event which prompts me to 
inform my friend and colleague Charles Hanin 
that I am not greatly in agreement with his 
report or analysis, from the very first para-
graph on. 
There was the war - what was called the civil 
war- in Greece, where the Soviet Union han-
ded over the communist leaders to the British 
and other troops fighting the Greek resistance, 
the majority of whom were communists. 
There was Yalta - and here I must disagree 
with my friend and colleague Charles Hanin. I 
deplore the fact that European and even world 
politics are today still dictated by the atrocious 
Y alta Conference, where those who considered 
themselves the great powers shared the world -
shared the spoils - among themselves. They 
made a mistake. Refusing to admit the virtues 
of historical materialist analysis, they let them-
selves be snared by the Soviet Union. They 
would not admit the prospect of decolonisation, 
which turned almost everything upside down. 
Still today the whole doctrine - what is called 
the Brezhnev doctrine, which we all condemn -
of the ageing Soviet bureaucrats is based on the 
idea wrongly inspired by the share-out of 1945. 
If ever there were a case in which we must 
resist the temptation to act like the man at the 
fairground boxing-booth, who says to his 
friends : " Hold me back, lads, or I will knock 
his block off" this is the one. If ever there 
were a situation in which such behaviour must 
be avoided, this is it. 
I am not as old as some of our colleagues. It 
is true that I was born only shortly before the 
war and do not of course remember the appeals 
for Danzig. All the same, because of what I 
have read, learnt and heard, I know how close 
Poland is - essentially, as Charles Hanin quite 
rightly says, because of its history - to our 
hearts, particularly the hearts of the French -
for reasons, dare I say, of royalist sympathies, 
the royalist past of Poland - and close to all our 
hearts. 
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Nevertheless, as far as I am concerned, the 
Hungarian, Chilean, Czech or Turkish people 
are just as close. I make no distinctions in this 
respect; human happiness cannot be divided 
according to frontiers. However, I call for 
caution in regard to Poland. Caution ! We can 
see with what prudence the Solidarity move-
ment is developing its activities, with what pru-
dence, need one say, and what resistance to 
what Mr. Hanin himself calls extremists, those 
who want to go " all the way " who want to 
demand more than they can obtain. Caution 
against contributing to any increase ·of tension 
in Polish society ! We have nothing to gain 
from any form of instability. I hope we are all 
convinced of this. 
I would like to put two questions to Mr. 
Hanin. He will excuse what is perhaps my 
naivety. 
In paragraph 19 he says that one of the dis-
turbing problems about Poland is its growing 
external debt. I note however that in the rest 
of the report and the draft recommendation he 
advocates new financial assistance to Poland. I 
would like more explanation. What does he 
mean by " economic and financial aid to 
Poland " ? Does he mean an interest-free loan ? 
An outright gift ? It would be helpful if we all 
knew. I am not saying that I would be either 
for or against - simply that this should be made 
clear. 
And then, Mr. President, comes this terrible 
paragraph 66, and here I must say to Mr. 
Hanin "Steady, steady! No crusades, for 
heaven's sake !" What does Mr. Hanin say? 
" Soviet preponderance in conventional wea-
pons in Europe precludes the use of conven-
tional forces by the West ". 
What does that mean ? Does it mean that if 
we were to gain superiority in this respect we 
should invade Poland ? Are we again being 
asked to "die for Danzig"? Well, Mr. Hanin, 
justify this sentence ! I dare say I am giving it 
the wrong interpretation, but I have apparently 
misunderstood it. Well then, please be 
precise ! Because I am saying that, if we had 
sufficient power - sea power, obviously - we 
could perhaps do what we are ready to accuse 
the Russians of doing. 
Mr. President, evidence of the prospect of 
Soviet intervention in Poland is mounting. 
Our colleague De Poi is looking for explana-
tions of rather subtle plans. We have become 
accustomed to less subtlety on the part of the 
Russians. They at least are frank enough that 
when they go in, they go in openly. They do 
not send military advisers under some cover or 
other; they go straight in with their tanks. 
And everything leads us to fear that, as some 
of us were saying months ago, the intervention 
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is going to happen. When ? As soon at it 
becomes clear that the Madrid Conference has 
failed. And this perhaps raises certain ques-
tions for us. I do not say that the failure 
of the Madrid Conference will account for the 
Soviet intervention, but if intervention takes 
place, that is when it will happen. 
Mr. President, I could perhaps agree with 
taking certain measures. But what measures ? 
After Prague 1968 we made great spee-
ches. We made great speeches and great 
recommendations after Kabul. But where do we 
stand today ? We are tributaries of the Soviet 
Union! Dare we say it? Each of our countries 
has vested interests in the Soviet Union. I 
would like to say in all conscience to the wor-
kers of my region that sanctions should be 
imposed in regard to Soviet industrial contracts 
because of Russian intervention, but the Soviet 
Union has just concluded a contract worth 
almost a thousand million dollars in industrial 
products which will save 2,000 jobs for at least 
two years in my region. Go and tell that to 
the workers ? I would not be well received, 
believe you me. You would at least have the 
good fortune not to have to listen to me here 
any more, because I would not be re-elected. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Dejardin, will you 
now finish your speech please ? 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
shall finish quickly, Mr. President. 
Supplies of natural gas, industrial contracts, 
trade. That is the context. Does the Soviet 
Union know the price it will have to pay? 
Only one price is acceptable to it. 
Mr. President, may I conclude by saying: let 
us be on our guard. I do not question Mr. 
Hanin's intentions, but we must be careful. The 
emancipation of the Polish people, in freedom 
and prosperity, must remain the work of the 
Polish people itself. 
And finally I ask myself: do we have such a 
right to preach ? If we want to do so, let us set a 
good example by implementing sanctions of a 
similar kind imposed an other totalitarian and 
dictatorial regimes. Follow my eyes and you 
will all understand what I mean... There can-
not be two different levels of belief in 
democracy. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Dejar-
din. 
The next speaker is Mr. Rosch, to be foll-
owed by Mr. Baumel. 
Mr. ROSCH (Federal Republic of Germany) 
(Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gen-
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tlemen, in my opinion one essential point has 
not been properly appreciated in the discus-
sions yesterday afternoon and this morning. 
People are always saying: "If the Soviet Union 
invades Poland as it did Afghanistan ", rather 
as if it would be doing this for the second time. 
But the truth is that the Soviet Union has 
already been in Poland for decades. The truth is 
that the Soviet Union has imposed an internal 
and external political system on the Polish peo-
ple by force. The truth is that the problems 
which have arisen in Poland are mainly due to 
the Soviet domination of that country. 
What, Ladies and Gentlemen, have thirty 
years of communism produced in that country ? 
Nothing but starving people, nothing but a 
nation which is now prepared to go to the bitter 
end because it has nothing more to lose. So 
what has the Soviet Union and its system achie-
ved, what has communism achieved in that 
country ? Precisely the situation which we now 
see! 
The Poles expelled from the areas now occu-
pied by the Soviet Union, the Poles who came 
into the areas from which the Germans had 
been expelled, came into a region which used 
to be called " the granary of Germany ". What 
has become of that granary ? It does not pro-
duce enough to go round. There is not even 
enough to provide an ordinary Polish family 
with its weekly bread. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, all the ideology and 
all the rhetoric about this must be seen against 
the background of this one clear fact : Russian 
aggression started long before the point when 
the Soviet Union may in fact bring to a conclu-
sion what it has been doing in that country for 
decades, namely imposing its will on Poland 
and reducing it to penury. 
The question which really faces us is this : we 
naturally view what is happening in Poland 
with great sympathy. All of us, I am sure, 
have applauded and sympathised with the cou-
rage which sections of the population have dis-
played in opposing this domination. But, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, if we are talking about 
realities we must also be fully aware of the 
realities both of our ability to threaten and of 
the range of measures open to us. 
The situation we face in Poland is different 
from the one which existed in Czechoslovakia, 
for instance. In Czechoslovakia the population's 
reforming impetus and reforming aspirations 
had been transferred to the government. In 
other words, in order to change the situation, 
the Soviet Union had to reimpose its power 
over the government. The aggression was then 
directed, you might say, against the govern-
ment, against the party leadership. 
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In Poland it would be different. In Poland it 
would be directed, not against the government 
or against a section of the population, but 
against the population as a whole. So what 
would the Soviet Union actually gain by an 
invasion ? It would cause the deaths of hundreds 
of thousands or millions of people. It would 
have to expect to assume responsibility 
for meeting the international commitments 
of the People's Republic of Poland. It would 
have to feed a hostile nation of thirty-five mil-
lion people. The entire credibility of the 
Soviet Union in the countries of the third world 
would collapse. The Soviet Union would no 
longer be able to prevent anyone from creating 
a climate conducive to worldwide rearmament 
and preparedness for armed conflict. 
Those, Ladies and Gentlemen, would be the 
consequences - consequences not decided upon 
by us, but resulting automatically from such a 
step by the Soviet Union. Because, if the 
Soviet Union is determined to take this step or 
does take it, it will not - I am firmly convinced 
- allow itself to be deterred by declarations 
made either by us or by anyone else. That 
would appear to me to mean that the Soviet 
Union - possibly against the background of 
internal power struggles over the succession to 
the country's now aged leaders - may perhaps 
have finally eschewed in some fields the policy 
which it has tried to pursue during the Brezh-
nev period. The world will see many changes 
then - not because of our recommendations, 
but because of the changed situation in the 
Soviet Union. 
That, Ladies and Gentlemen, is why I believe 
that we should name the aggressor openly, and 
state openly what is going on in Poland. But 
what can we possibly threaten? A threat is 
only as strong as the will to maintain it and the 
ability to put it into effect. 
One of our colleagues asked earlier: " What 
happened in Czechoslovakia? " Protest notes 
were sent. And what happened when the 
German Democratic Republic felt obliged to 
build a wall through the middle of the capital 
of Germany, through Berlin? The bells rang, 
we put out candles, and after a while things 
returned to normal. The wheat embargo lasted 
only until the American farmers protested 
against it. When the Federal Republic of 
Germany decided to impose an embargo on 
pipes, British firms got round the agreements 
and supplied them. And there are many other 
examples. 
None of us - and I believe this is inherent in 
our structure - is either willing or able actually 
to carry out our threats. Here, too, we should 
base our attitude on the real facts and not offer 
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threats which we are then unable to back up. 
Nor should we allow those who have always 
been opposed to a policy of detente in Europe 
to use such threats now as a vehicle for ulti-
mately destroying the policy of detente. I hope 
Mr. Muller of the Christian Democratic Group 
will not take it amiss if I point out that anyone 
who refers, in a recommendation, to Helsinki 
and the agreements reached there must surely 
blush to recall that on his home ground, in the 
German Bundestag, he has not been able to 
ratify the Helsinki final act. Surely we must 
see this! Anyone striking a moral attitude here 
must know exactly where it will lead and what 
he really wants to achieve. 
No, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we should 
name the aggressor, but we should be careful, in 
voicing our threats, to keep them in proportion 
to our ability to carry them out. Thank you. 
The PRESIDENT.- The next speaker is Mr. 
Baumel, who is to be followed by Mr. Kurt 
Jung. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the situation 
in Poland is disturbing and likely to become 
dramatic within weeks. Precise information 
from very reliable sources indicates that in the 
next few weeks certain eastern bloc countries 
will probably be making a number of moves 
with regard to Poland. It is in a climate of 
concern and expectation that we are today 
studying Mr. Hanin's excellent report. I would 
like to congratulate him at the outset for the 
thoroughness of his work and the excellence of 
the recommendations now before us. 
In this matter we must avoid both extra-
vagant language and a weak attitude. Our 
position in regard to Poland must be crystal 
clear. We in the West must in no event 
provide food for a campaign of provocation by 
laying ourselves open to exploitation of our 
statements and attitudes by certain of our part-
ners who want nothing better. But the caution 
we have just been speaking about must be 
neither weakness, nor resignation, nor compli-
city. The importance of today's debate in 
WEU goes far beyond this chamber. May I 
remind each of our colleagues here today that 
in this matter we must take great care to avoid 
any rash remarks and any statement not backed 
up by precise facts. 
I would like to add to Mr. Hanin's excellent 
report a number of facts which the rapid deve-
lopment of the crisis did not allow him to take 
into account. These facts are unfortunately 
extremely disturbing. The situation is growing 
worse by the day - I have had definite proof 
and precise information for several days now -
not only inside Poland but above all along its 
frontiers. A well-informed journalist could 
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write in Le Monde yesterday: " The possibility 
of foreign intervention will never be as great as 
in the next four weeks. " 
The 5th June last saw the publication of a 
letter from the Soviet to the Polish party 
demanding the resignation of the present 
leadership, the speedy organisation of a 
congress under the unconditional authority of 
Moscow, and the immediate adoption · of 
repressive measures against the press, the most 
active figures in Solidarity and, of course, all 
those usually referred to as "dissidents". In 
that letter, which some of you may not have 
read, the situation of the Polish party is 
assessed in unqualified terms: the revisionists 
and opportunists are manipulating preparations 
for the congress; Solidarity is now in the hands 
of counter-revolutionaries and is organising a 
criminal plot against the power of the people; 
the press, radio and television are no more than 
an instrument of anti-socialist activities. 
In these circumstances it is clear that, for 
Moscow, the limits of the acceptable have been 
over-stepped by a long way. It is clear that, 
for Moscow, developments in Poland mean the 
repetition in Eastern Europe of a situation 
which the Soviet Union cannot accept, on the 
one hand because it is a threat not only to 
Poland but to all the eastern bloc countries and, 
on the other, because a relaxation of Soviet 
control over Poland would mean - objectively -
calling into question Stalin's conquests, for 
which the Soviet Union sacrificed millions of 
lives. We must therefore make a clear-headed 
assessment of the situation without being 
dragged, on one side or the other, into extra-
vagant or risky lines of argument. 
The harshness of the Soviet letter, the extent 
of the demands it formulates, with a brutality 
quite exceptional in the normally coded and 
measured language of relations between foreign 
and Soviet communist parties, the threats it 
contains, cannot but recall the warning 
addressed to the Hungarian and Czechoslovak 
parties shortly before the events which we well 
remember. 
The Central Committee of the Polish party -
and this is exceptional - replied to what was 
nothing less than an ultimatum by refusing 
it. The openly pro-Soviet elements, like 
Grabski, who are calling for the heads of Mr. 
Kania and Mr. Jaruzelski, were put in the 
minority. The congress, planned for mid-July, 
will go ahead on schedule despite the demand 
from Moscow. 
It is precisely in the weeks between now and 
that date that the situation is most dangerous. 
Did not the invasion of Czechoslovakia take 
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place a few days before a congress was due to 
be held in the Federal Republic of Slovakia at 
which the pro-Soviet elements would have been 
eliminated from the leadership? 
We must bear in mind that, in Soviet think-
ing, the congress is the final authority for poli-
tical legitimation. If, by a massive majority, 
the Polish congress pronounces in favour of 
moving in a direction contrary to Soviet wishes, 
intervention, which according to the Brezhnev 
doctrine must be cloaked in the form of assis-
tance to a fraternal party under threat, would 
become much more difficult. 
It is therefore in the weeks and even the days 
to come that new and very serious Soviet 
threats may be expected. Let us understand 
clearly that the Soviet Union will do everything 
to prevent a congress of this kind reaching 
conclusions which according to present infor-
mation are likely to result in the elimination or 
neutralisation of people Moscow can count on. 
Moreover, there is to be a meeting in Sofia in 
the next few days. Its purpose is to enable the 
leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries to issue a 
joint public statement of their position on the 
Polish situation in order to avoid the initiative 
for operations appearing to come from the 
Soviet Union, and to place it upon the shoul-
ders of the reliable partners in the Warsaw Pact 
who would thus play the convenient role that 
Moscow expects of them. 
Confirmation comes from reports predicting 
new Soviet manoeuvres on the Polish frontiers 
and in Poland itself. Given the imminence of 
the danger, it is very difficult to understand the 
almost total silence of the European heads of 
state and government. If this silence were to 
continue Europe would have a very heavy 
responsibility to bear. 
Nor is it easy to understand the difficulties 
which the Poles are now encountering in 
obtaining new credit facilities, particularly from 
the banks, when such financial support is of 
crucial importance for a country whose external 
debt has reached 120 thousand million francs 
and whose home supplies of basic goods have 
been reduced to a state of desperate shortage, 
perhaps not without ulterior motive on the part 
of their Soviet neighbours. 
The PRESIDENT. - You have exceeded 
your time, Mr. Baumel, and perhaps you will 
bring your speech to a conclusion. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - I 
shall conclude, Mr. President. 
It is thus particularly fortunate that today we 
have an opportunity to say where we stand on 
the Polish crisis. Of course, our possibilities 
for action are limited, but they are not non-
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existent. And although they are not very signi-
ficant in material terms, they are morally essen-
tial. The text we adopt must serve as an 
encouragement to our governments, and 
solemnly remind the Soviet Union that 
Polish territorial integrity and sovereignty are 
vital elements in the European security for 
which Europe has already fought two world 
wars. 
We must also say that detente would be 
finished, that the Helsinki agreements, which 
have just been mentioned, would be null and 
void and that the severest diplomatic and 
economic sanctions would have to be imposed 
in such an event. Nevertheless, hope remains. 
Poland has a long historic tradition. Let us 
not forget that, among the different factors that 
make Soviet intervention difficult, the positions 
adopted by Europe should not be underestima-
ted. Nor should we forget the decisive influ-
ence that His Holiness the Pope can have in 
this matter, an influence which, although he 
has no military divisions at his disposal, is not 
negligible. Let us not forget that our support 
for Poland is also a duty to ourselves. The 
greatest enemy of the West is not the power of 
our opponents, but our own weakness. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Baumel. 
The next speaker is Mr. Jung. 
Mr. Kurt JUNG (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, in his final remarks Mr. Hanin 
refers to the possibility of the situation in 
Poland having changed or the problem no 
longer being topical by the time his report is 
debated in June. But, on the contrary, as 
speakers in the debate have already said, the 
situation in Poland flared up again during the 
Whitsun holiday. Mr. Baumel has just said 
that developments in the last few days in parti-
cular are leading to crisis point. The post-
ponement of the sitting of the Sejm until the 
12th, and corollary events, prompt us to 
consider very seriously what we in WEU can 
do. As Mr. Hanin was not in a position to dis-
cuss the very latest developments in his report, 
I should like to examine recent events again. 
With the renewed growth of unrest since the 
end of May, the strikes and demonstrations, the 
suicide of two ministers, the anti-Soviet inci-
dents, the deterioration of the economic situa-
tion and not least, of course, the episcopal See 
standing vacant since the death of the Primate, 
the Polish situation has entered a very critical 
phase shortly before the Ninth Party Congress, 
due to take place from 14th to 18th July. 
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The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central 
Committee met on 9th and I Oth June to 
consider the threatening letter, already men-
tioned here, from the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party. Notwithstanding 
the Soviet warnings - this must be pointed out 
- the Polish Central Committee adhered to its 
previous course of reform while professing 
Poland's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and its 
socialist partners. I will not go into the details 
of this letter, since Mr. Baumel has already 
quoted from it. We should recall that the 
letter speaks of the deadly peril looming over 
the revolutionary achievements of the Polish 
nation, criticises a number of things and makes 
it clear that the Soviet Union is particularly 
concerned about the preparations for the party 
congress. We should also recall that it 
concludes with a threat, a quotation from Mr. 
Brezhnev, to the effect that a fellow socialist 
country will not be abandoned in its hour of 
need. 
However, the proceedings of the Central 
Committee also show- and Mr. Kania's main 
speech before the Eleventh Plenary Session of 
the Central Committee is proof of this - that 
the dilemma for Poland's leaders is that they 
cannot halt, let alone reverse, the trend and yet 
must also take account of Soviet objections in 
some way. That is the dilemma. 
Moscow's tune was played on the first day of 
the Central Committee's Plenary Session by 
Mr. Grabski, a member of the Central Commit-
tee, who called for Mr. Kania's replacement 
and fresh elections for the Politburo. The 
reformers counter-attacked, led by Vice-Premier 
Rakowski, and rejected the demand that each of 
the eleven members of the Politburo be subjec-
ted to a vote of confidence. In the final decla-
ration Mr. Kania confirmed that the reforms 
would continue, but he also reasserted his faith 
in the ideals of socialism and his willingness to 
continue to co-operate with Solidarity. How-
ever, this was accompanied by the announce-
ment that in future resolute action would also 
be taken against anti-socialist elements in 
Solidarity. 
I have given this account in order to arrive at 
an assessment which we must bear in mind 
when we come to the final votes here in the 
plenary session of WEU. The Eleventh 
Plenary Session of the Central Committee has 
made it obvious not only to Moscow but to the 
world at large that PQland does not in fact have 
a leadership. The proceedings of the Congress, 
the dramatic confrontation, especially over the 
question of confidence in the Politburo, the 
deep schism between the two wings of the 
party, do not augur well for Poland - we must 
realise this - in view of the growing Soviet 
threat, the pressure on the country and the 
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dangerous economic situation. Poland can 
now be saved from national disaster only by 
adopting an approach based on reason, as out-
lined by Mr. Kania: the exercice of self-
discipline by the social forces and the avoid-
ance of confrontation of any kind. 
The preparations for the Party Congress, the 
elections of delegates, are still in progress. At 
the voivodeship conference in Gdansk, for 
instance, we have seen a clear victory for the 
reformers, with 90 % of the votes. This will, of 
course, prompt the Soviet Union to increase its 
pressure. As has repeatedly been said here, the 
military situation remains unchanged. The 
high level of preparedness of the Soviet troops 
in particular means that intervention could take 
place within a matter of days. In early July -
we should bear this in mind too- Warsaw Pact 
manoeuvres are scheduled to take place, as they 
do every year, and we can safely assume that 
they will represent an unmistakably menacing 
backdrop to the Ninth Party Congress. 
In view of these developments in the last few 
days, I should like to endorse what Mr. Rosch 
has said and ask you to remember that what we 
decide here must, of course, be feasible. Our 
approach must be dispassionate; above all we 
must not give the Soviet Union any further 
pretext for claiming that we are trying to exert 
an influence on the internal affairs of a country 
that belongs to the Warsaw Pact. But we must 
also give the Soviet Union a clear indication of 
the risks it will be running if it intervenes in 
Poland. As one of the liberals who have 
expressed every support for the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe - the 
Soviet Union is still interested in the CSCE, but 
we do not know how long this interest will last 
- I believe we must include a reference to the 
CSCE in our efforts to avert the threat to 
Poland, besides, as Mr. Baumel has said, conti-
nuing to provide the aid to Poland promised by 
the western countries in order to help it out of 
its difficult economic situation. 
To conclude, I can but hope that the recom-
mendation which we intend to adopt today -
the Liberal Group has tabled a number of 
amendments - will not fail to convince the 
Soviet Union of our common determination to 
support developments in any European country 
which lead to self-determination and are based 
on the principles of the CSCE. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Jung. 
Perhaps I may be allowed to explain our 
procedure very briefly to the large number of 
young visitors listening to our debate, whom we 
welcome warmly. 
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This is the conclusion of a debate which 
began yesterday on a report from our General 
Affairs Committee, introduced by the Rappor-
teur. The general debate is now concluded. 
The Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Com-
mittee will reply to the debate, then we shall 
consider a number of amendments which have 
been tabled by representatives, and after that 
we shall take a decision on the recommenda-
tion presented by the Committee for the consi-
deration of the Assembly. 
I shall now ask the Rapporteur, Mr. Hanin, 
to reply to the debate. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first 
like to thank all the speakers, by far the most, if 
not all, of whom have expressed their approval 
of the contents of the report itself. My thanks 
also go, of course, to those who have been kind 
enough to approve the draft recommendation 
originating from the report. I hope they will 
forgive me if in my reply I concentrate more on 
the critics of the draft recommendation than on 
its supporters. This is not to say that I have 
not listened carefully and been impressed by 
what they have said in support of our draft 
recommendation. 
I will begin with a brief comment regarding 
procedure: I am rather surprised that the draft 
recommendation has met with some opposition 
and that a number of amendments have been 
tabled. The report and draft recommendation 
were, after all, only made public after a long 
discussion in Committee, which approved both 
parts unanimously but for one abstention. Be 
that as it may, everyone has the right to change 
his mind or, not being a member of the Com-
mittee, suddenly to realise that what has been 
proposed does not coincide exactly with his 
views. 
From the criticism which I have heard 
certain members level at the draft recommenda-
tion and which has led to the tabling of amend-
ments, on which I shall be speaking at the 
appropriate time, two things are clear, it seems 
to me: firstly, a misinterpretation - perhaps 
because the text is poorly worded - of what is 
proposed and, secondly, a difference in the 
assessment of the results which the proposals 
may produce. 
As regards the misinterpretation, I listened 
closely to what Mr. Bernini had to say yester-
day. He said that the report went so far as to 
talk of military retaliation. I find this astoni-
shing. I ask you to read the report again: 
nowhere does it refer to military retaliation, 
which is in fact out of the question. So that 
point is quite clear. 
Then I heard Mr. Gessner asking, " Why 
reveal to the Soviet Union now what we intend 
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to do? If we want the positions we adopt to 
have any effect, the last thing we should do is 
reveal what our intentions are. " 
We do not in fact in any way advocate that 
the measures the various states will actually 
take should be revealed straight away. We 
simply feel that it is a good thing for these 
states to agree straight away on the measures 
they would take, but we do not suggest that 
they should be announced. Two days . ago 
General Rogers talked to us about vanous 
measures he had in mind, measures envisaged 
at military level. But at no time did we 
contemplate questioning him on the nature of 
these measures, knowing full well that they 
must remain secret. 
The only specific reference to be found in the 
draft recommendation is to the transfer of 
advanced technology, which goes without 
saying, it seems to me. Everyone can agree on 
that point. So it is a question not of publici-
sing straight away the specific nature of the 
measures but simply of calling on the western 
nations to agree on them among themselves. It 
is the differences of assessment that are at the 
root of the matter and divide us. 
Mr. Gessner said in particular- I took care-
ful note of this - that the measures we propose 
would be regarded as a provocation, that these 
proposals might provoke the Soviet Union to 
intervene in Poland's internal affairs and that 
we must not be responsible for provoking such 
intervention by the Soviet Union. 
We fully realise that, if the Soviet Union 
intervenes one day - unfortunately I do not 
know what is going to happen - it will be 
because it decides that it can no longer tolerate 
the course taken by events in Poland. It will 
then find, believe me, any excuse that suits it 
and it may invent a few if it thinks necessary. 
Do you really not believe that the positions 
adopted by the western powers, the action 
taken by trade unions in the West to provide 
the free trade union with material aid have not 
been regarded, and would not be duly cited, by 
the Soviet Union as a provocation, as inter-
ference in Poland's internal affairs? 
Things have not changed a great deal since 
La Fontaine. The fable of the wolf and the 
lamb is eternally true, and when the wolf wants 
to eat the lamb - I am not saying that the Poles 
are lambs; thank God they are not - he will 
always find an excellent reason to justify his 
action. 
The truth is that we must not be afraid of our 
own shadows. We are told that we must act 
wisely. I claim that the measures we are pro-
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posing are wise and moderate. We say there is 
no question of military intervention and, in this 
respect, everything has already been done to 
reassure the Soviet Union. I should like to 
reply at this point to Mr. Dejardin, who is 
unfortunately no longer here. What an excel-
lent colleague he is: he is a speaker I can never 
hear without feeling the desire to answer 
back. Unfortunately, I have heard more state-
ments from him than I have had opportunities 
to reply to in his presence. I should like to 
answer Mr. Dejardin, who implied in a quite 
extraordinary manner that, if the military 
power of the West was comparable to that of 
the Soviet Union, it would mean that we would 
be invading Poland: when, Mr. Dejardin, while 
the balance of power was better than it is now, 
did we intervene in any country to install a 
liberal, capitalist regime in place of a 
communist regime? 
When have we ever done that? When have 
we ever talked of doing so? When have we 
ever threatened to do so? That is the question 
I ask. There is no rhyme or reason to this. I 
say this with deep conviction. 
Together with Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. 
Giinther Miiller I tabled an amendment yester-
day which seeks to tone down the provisions of 
paragraph I of the draft recommendation. 
This paragraph would no longer say that every 
aspect of the Helsinki final act would automati-
cally be made null and void, but that in this 
event the western powers would have to review 
their attitude towards the final act. Is that 
really saying too much? I am prepared to go 
this far but not to water down the recommen-
dation 'to the point that it says nothing and 
becomes no more than a series of vague, incon-
sistent and hollow resolutions. So do not 
count on me. I would prefer this recommen-
dation on Poland not to be adopted. 
When faced by a grave situation, countries 
must of course, maintain a due sense of prop~rtion. But this must not be carried so far 
that our sense of proportion is again interpreted 
as weakness. It is unfortunately true that we 
live in a violent world. It is unfortunately true 
that a power such as the Soviet Union sees its 
policy only in terms of the balance of power. I 
feel that, if the balance of power is allowed to 
tilt too far to one side, world stability will be 
destroyed. Everything that is happening at the 
moment shows this to be true, and the misfor-
tune is that the risk of destabilisation becomes 
even greater when steps are taken to restore the 
balance to some extent because the other side 
knows that the imbalance will not last for ever. 
All we can do at present is state that we shall 
not sit idly by if so vile an act as the invasion 
of Poland should be perpetrated, so vile an act 
as denying a nation the right to acquire a mini-
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mum of freedom, and that we shall do every-
thing in our power short of unleashing a war. 
I am well aware that threats should not be 
uttered unless there is a will to carry them out 
if the need arises. I personally hope that the 
western countries will this time be resolute not 
only in approving but also in taking the 
measures we envisage and taking them with 
such persistence that it is realised that the fate 
of the world does not rest in the hands of one 
nation or one government. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Hanin, 
both for your introduction and for your reply to 
the debate and also for the immense amount of 
work you have done in preparing the report. 
Does the Chairman of the Committee, Sir 
Frederic Bennett, wish to speak? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I have kept silent with difficulty during the 
course of this debate, but as Chairman of the 
Committee I also have a right to explain my 
own view, particularly since changes are now 
proposed to a document which was unanimous-
ly agreed on 27th April by people of different 
nationalities within the 1\.lliance, and of 
different parties. It is odd that those who now 
want to soften this document suddenly since 
27th April yet admit that the situation has also 
become more serious. This is a difficult logic 
for me to follow. 
There have been two broad arguments 
against this report and its recommendations 
during the course of the debate. One is that it 
is useless because the Russians will take no 
notice of it and we have no power to do 
anything at all. It is an odd attitude to adopt 
when, at the same time as claiming that we are 
the only parliamentary organisation in Europe 
competent to deal with security matters, we say 
that anything we do is in any case useless. If 
that is true, it may be an argument for the 
abolition of WEU, but it is not an argument for 
failing to do one's duty so long as the Assembly 
is here. 
A second argument is that it is provoca-
tive. Yet this document has been published 
and has been public property since 27th April 
last as a united decision of the Committee, with 
only one abstention. It does not seem to have 
provoked anything in the meanwhile, unless 
anyone here is seriouly to suggest that the wor-
sening in the last few days arises out of a docu-
ment published on 27th April, which I do not 
think is a serious proposition for anyone to 
adopt. The number of books and statements 
that must have been written and spoken since 
the last war, very often from liberal and social-
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ist sources, have all held unanimously that, if 
only the free countries of Europe, the United 
States of America and others had warned Adolf 
Hitler where his aggression would lead when he 
went into the Sudetenland, into the Rhineland, 
when he occupied Austria and later Prague, 
events would have been very different. 
We have all been told for the past twenty-five 
years that the biggest mistake of statesmen at 
that time was to allow the then aggressor to 
believe that he could get away with it. As far 
as I know, not one person has written, especi-
ally from liberal sources, except along those 
lines. What has changed today? I wonder 
what our consciences will feel like if this 
aggression takes place and all we can say after-
wards is that, despite all the lessons of the 
1930s, we decided not to tell the aggressor what 
the consequences of his action would be. 
We have also had the complaint that our 
lack of success on the Afghan question was 
because we gave no indication and took no 
united action when it took place. But different 
arguments are being adduced again today. If 
we talk of provocation, I will only say as Chair-
man that I have very good contacts with 
Poland, and I am not talking only of free Poles 
living in my country. It is an open secret that 
I have friends amongst Polish Solidarity. 
Not one comment from those sources alleging 
that this is provocative or will not help their 
cause has been made to the Rapporteur or 
myself. There has not been one suggestion 
along these lines ever since this document was 
first passed on 27th April. Why is it that we 
are suddenly told today that this will only hurt 
the situation, with speakers going on to say that 
in any case it will have no effect at all on the 
Soviet Union? 
I will put one new thought. If our reaction 
is to have any impact on the Soviet Union, if it 
should go into Poland, it will have to be with 
the close collaboration of the United States of 
America and Canada, because it is from there 
that measures such as a lasting grain embargo 
will have to emanate. How can we expect the 
Americans and others to make their opposition 
clear and to take remedial measures if we in 
Europe do not say where we stand? This is the 
failure behind what has happened in Afghan-
istan. 
We are at risk in Europe of saying that we 
are not able to help and then looking to other 
countries to make their opposition clear. The 
impact then will be very much greater than the 
impact of Afghanistan, because, fortunately or 
unfortunately, many Poles - there were no 
Afghans - live in Canada, the United States, 
Argentina, Australia and so on, and their voice 
will not remain silent unless firm action is 
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taken. All that we seek to do in the document 
is not to say what measures will be taken 
but to concert our action and to avoid the mis-
takes of the past and to avoid charges being 
made against governments of not warning 
aggressors about the consequences of their 
actions. 
I come finally to my own personal position. 
I have no intention of issuing threats, but I 
agree with what the Rapporteur has said. He 
fairly pointed out that, although there was an 
overwhelming vote in April, people are entitled 
to change their minds. So am I. I say 
without wishing to make any threats that if the 
report is weakened or softened beyond the 
point indicated by Mr. Hanin, it will profoundly 
disappoint the Poles, who are looking to us 
for moral support, as they have made clear in 
the last few days, ·and it will encourage the 
Soviet Union to believe that if it does enough 
sabre-rattling, we in the West will retreat. 
I shall vote against all the amendments with 
the exception of the one tabled by Mr. Hanin 
and Mr. Muller, which I signed, because there 
are positive merits in it. If the other amend-
ments are carried - this is a democratic 
assembly and they could be carried - I shall 
have pride in voting against the report, hoping 
that some of my friends will follow me, so that 
at least in Poland there will be those who know 
that there are still voices strong enough to sup-
port them. I shall give an explanation of that 
vote if that should become necessary. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. 
That concludes the general debate. 
Before we can vote on the draft recommenda-
tion, we have to take the amendments. I shall, 
as usual, take them in the sequence in which 
they relate to the text. 
Amendment 2 has been tabled by Mr. 
Portheine, Mr. Vohrer and Mr. Blaauw : 
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the 
draft recommendation, leave out " in 1980 ". 
I do not see Mr. Vohrer or Mr. Portheine. 
Mr. Blaauw, do you wish to move the amend-
ment? 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands). - The amend-
ment simply makes the draft recommen-
dation accord more to the time in which we are 
living. 
The PRESIDENT. - Does the Committee 
accept the amendment? Amendment 2 has 
been formally moved and accepted by the Com-
mittee. Is it agreed by the Assembly? 
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(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 2 is agreed to. 
We come now to Amendments 1 and 7: 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from " Poland " to the end 
and insert: 
" which would constitute a flagrant violation 
of the principles laid down in the Helsinki 
final act and which would have consequences 
for the future CSCE process; ". 
7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out from " Poland " to the end 
and insert: 
" which would be a flagrant violation of the 
Helsinki agreements and call in question their 
content; ". 
The amendments are almost the same, but 
not quite. Unless Mr. Blaauw, on behalf of his 
colleagues, will accept Mr. Hanin's amendment, 
I shall have to put the two amendments separ-
ately. I do not know what Mr. Blaauw's 
reaction is to that. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands). - I accept the 
amendment of Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hanin 
and Mr. Muller. 
The PRESIDENT. - That is most helpful. 
Amendment 1 is withdrawn. 
Mr. Hanin, you need only formally to move 
Amendment 7. You have already spoken 
about it. Will you formally move it? 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
move Amendment 7. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr Hanin has moved 
Amendment 7, which is supported by the 
Committee. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 7. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 7 is agreed to. 
Amendment 3 has been tabled by the Liberal 
Group: 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "planning what measures all 
member countries should take in application " 
and insert "implementation". 
Mr. Blaauw, do you wish to move the 
amendment? 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands) (Translation). -
Mr. President, those who were present during 
the discussion yesterday will understand that 
this amendment is a translation of what I said 
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then. I have no desire to pare down the 
recommendation, nor am I suggesting that it 
contains empty phrases, but I do think that we 
must state clearly what we want and what 
course we propose to take. We are opposed to 
military intervention in the events proceeding 
in Poland, but we must not say that we want 
measures to be taken. 
In paragraph I of the draft recommendation 
we have stated ·clearly that the principles to be 
followed in the event of an intervention by the 
Soviet Union must be announced. When we 
speak of measures in paragraph 2 of the draft 
recommendation, I really wonder whether we 
are using the right terminology. Implementa-
tion of principles covers a wide field. If we 
only speak of measures, others might construe 
this as an intervention in internal affairs. 
There is a possibility of misinterpretation here 
which I want to avoid. I want a clear, lucid 
recommendation which can be followed if the 
national parliaments wish to take steps. 
When I think of the debates in the Nether-
lands Parliament about taking measures follow-
ing the invasion of Afghanistan in order to 
express our condemnation and horror, when it 
was impossible to do certain things within a 
very small field, I consider it wrong to go so far 
now as to speak of measures in paragraph 2 of 
the draft recommendation. That is why I have 
tabled this amendment which is closely linked 
with the amendment to paragraph 3 of the draft 
recommendation. They go together. 
I shall return to Amendments 4 and 5 later. 
The PRESIDENT. - This amendment goes 
with Amendment 4: 
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
proper, leave out "application of these 
measures" and insert "implementation". 
The amendments deal with the same 
point. If the first is carried, the second 
amendment will fall. If the first falls, I shall 
take the second amendment. 
Mr. Hanin? 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, as I tabled the amendment, I have 
nothing further to say. 
The PRESIDENT. - Mr. Dejardin, do you 
wish to speak on the amendment? 
Mr. DEJARDIN (Belgium) (Translation). -
Mr. President, I wish to speak on a point of 
order and here I addre.;s myself to the French-
speaking members of the Assembly. The text 
as proposed by Mr. Blaauw and his colleagues 
does not strictly mean anything in French. 
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Mr Blaauw would have us say: " ... de pro-
ceder des maintenant a des consultations en vue 
de mettre en a:uvre ... ". In French, "mettre en 
a:uvre " requires an object. I therefore propose 
to Mr. Blaauw that he use the following expres-
sion: " ... en vue d'agir ... ". 
Is that what he means? In French " mettre 
en a:uvre " requires an object. So there is 
something missing after " mettre en a:uvre " or 
it should be replaced with "agir ". Is that 
what Mr. Blaauw means? 
The PRESIDENT. - Do you wish to speak 
Mr. Hanin? ' 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, I find myself with a problem here: 
either this amendment does not change any-
thing and it is therefore pointless to approve it 
or it has a quite specific purpose, but although I 
have listened very carefully to yesterday's 
speeches and to the one made today, I still 
cannot understand what is wanted. After all, 
"take in application" and "implementation", 
strictly speaking, mean the same. 
What do the authors of the amendment 
mean? They are telling us to be careful 
because it might be thought that we are refer-
ring to military measures. But the amendment 
itself might be thought to refer to military 
measures. That is quite obvious. In fact, all 
the measures we propose are clearly non-
military. We are therefore asking that it be 
possible for the non-military measures con-
cerned to be implemented in practice and 
that it be established how this should be done. 
I therefore call on the Assembly to reject the 
amendment because, I repeat, either it changes 
nothing and there is really no point in adopting 
it or it seeks to change something that is 
beyond me. Above all, it would do nothing to 
change the interpretation to which the author 
of the amendment refers. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you. Does 
anyone else wish to speak to the amendment? 
If not, I put Amendment 3, which has been 
tabled by members of the Liberal Group, and 
we shall now vote on it. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
An equal number of members have voted for 
and against the amendment. Accordingly, as I 
have no casting vote, the amendment falls. I 
take it that Amendment 4 also falls. 
Amendment 3 is negatived. 
We come to Amendment 5: 
5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 4. 
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It may be convenient if we also discuss 
Amendment 6: 
6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 5. 
I call Mr. Blaauw. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands) (Translation). -. 
Mr. President, I was not present, of course, at 
the discussions in the General Affairs Commit-
tee. I wonder, however, what is the purpose of 
paragraph 4, once paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 have 
been accepted. 
What can the Council of Europe add with 
regard to measures to be taken by virtue of the 
announcement of principles in paragraph 
1? What can the Council of Europe do, 
beyond invoking human rights? In view of this 
I propose leaving out paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 
draft recommendation proper. 
The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Baumel to 
speak. 
Mr. BAUMEL (France) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Mr. Blaauw wonders what the Coun-
cil of Europe could do. As the General Rap-
porteur of its Political Affairs Committee, I can 
tell him that the Council of Europe can do a 
great deal. I am surprised by this scepticism, 
the resignation I note in certain of our 
members, to the point that I wonder whether it 
would not be advisable to table an amendment 
of a more general nature seeking to replace 
"WEU" by "UEN ", standing for the Union 
for European Neutrality. 
The PRESIDENT. - I am afraid that I would 
rule that amendment out of order if it were to 
be put as a manuscript amendment. 
I hope that we shall not take too long over 
these amendments as time is against us. 
I call Mr. Gessner. 
Mr. GESSNER (Federal Republic of Ger-
many) (Translation). - Mr. President, I should 
like to speak in support of this amendment and 
begin by taking up a remark made by the Rap-
porteur this morning, quoting from the speech I 
made yesterday. He said I believed that what 
we did here would provoke an invasion by 
Soviet troops - or military intervention by the 
Soviet Union in Poland. Please believe me 
when I say that I am by no means nai"ve enough 
to suppose that a recommendation adopted by 
this Assembly might in any way influence the 
Soviet Union's thinking on intervention. If the 
Soviet Union wants to intervene, it will do 
so. I believe we are generally agreed on that 
here. 
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The point I was making yesterday was quite 
different. What I said was that the Soviet 
Union would like to produce evidence to show 
that western countries are indulging in external 
intervention and that we must not do anything 
which would enable the Soviet Union to parade 
any papers we might adopt here before the 
public in confirmation of its thesis. That is the 
point I was making. The recommendation is 
not intended as a provocation, of course. The 
point is that it might be misinterpreted by 
people who are not well-disposed towards 
us. That is my point, Mr. Hanin. I believe 
we will weaken our position if we adopt the 
draft recommendation as it now stands. 
All the statements that have been made by 
the Alliance, the European Community and the 
heads of government have avoided giving any 
descriptions of procedures. That is no coinci-
dence. As I said yesterday, we should follow 
the example set for us here by General Rogers, 
who also refrained from describing individual 
measures, because this is a wise approach. 
That is why I advocate the deletion of para-
graphs 4 and 5. I do not think they represent 
a provocation, but I should not like to see the 
Soviet Union going around waving a Western 
European Union document and saying: here is 
the proof that the western nations want to 
interfere in Poland's internal affairs. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Gessner. 
I call Mr. Hanin. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall not 
prolong the debate unnecessarily. 
I understood what Mr. Gessner said yesterday 
and I feel I have replied to his remarks. 
What he is really saying is that, if we do not 
want to annoy the Soviet Union, we must not 
talk about this. The Committee should not 
even have begun to consider this question, as 
that was the best way not to annoy the Soviet 
Union. I am therefore against the amendment, 
Mr. President, since it would clearly be most 
valuable if the same position were adopted not 
by seven but by twenty-one states of Western 
Europe. That is quite obvious. If the recom-
mendation adopted by the Assembly serves any 
purpose - and we shall clearly think it does if 
we adopt it - it would obviously be helpful for 
it to be endorsed by the largest possible number 
of western countries. 
A British statesman once said: " Good 
speeches may have changed my mind, but they 
have never changed the way I vote. " What we 
are witnessing here today is another example of 
this. I do not claim that mine was a good 
speech, but I find that these days speeches do 
little to change the way people vote. 
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The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Rap-
porteur. I hope that the Assembly will now 
come to a decision on Amendment 5, which 
has been proposed by the Liberal Group. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 5 is agreed to. 
The remaining amendment is Amendment 6: 
6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave 
out paragraph 5. 
Does the Rapporteur wish to speak? We 
understand that the Chairman has said that he 
would be against the deletion. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I am, 
of course, opposed to this amendment. I am 
deeply disappointed at the turn this debate has 
taken, and I wonder if there is any point in 
anything we have done. 
The PRESIDENT. -We shall now vote on 
Amendment 6. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 6 is agreed to. 
I now have to put to the vote the draft 
recommendation, as amended, to Document 
870. 
If there is unanimity we can dispense with 
the need for a roll-call vote. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I object. 
The PRESIDENT.- We must therefore have 
a roll-call vote. 
The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. 
Ferretti. 
Mr. Hanin. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
should like to give an explanation of vote, but 
as I am not sufficiently familiar with the 
Assembly's Rules of Procedure - I hope the 
President can help me on this - I do not know 
whether this is possible as it is in other 
assemblies. 
The PRESIDENT. - The explanation of 
votes must take place after the vote has been 
held. I hope that the rule will not be too gene-
rously interpreted, because that could lead to 
another debate. As Rapporteur, Mr. Hanin 
has made two speeches. If he wishes to speak 
to explain his vote, I hope that he will keep it 
brief and that the same will apply to any other 
explanations of votes. 
The voting is open. 
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(A vote by roll-call was then taken) 
Does any other Representative wish to 
vote? ... 
The voting is closed. 
The result of the vote is as follows1: 
Number of votes cast . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
Ayes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Noes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Abstentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted 2• 
We now have a number of explanations of 
votes. 
Sir Frederic. 
Sir Frederic BENNE TT (United Kingdom). -
I am grateful to those who decided that to send 
out this document as the unanimous feeling of 
the Assembly would be utterly wrong. In its 
present form, it will prove to be of profound 
disappointment to the Poles. What is more, it 
will encourage those in the Kremlin to continue 
to believe that by bluster and pressure they can 
achieve their ends. 
I am proud still to be one of those who 
would like to send an assurance to the Poles 
that they have some staunch friends left in 
Europe, apart from those who for one reason or 
another have decided to abdicate a position 
which they took up in April of this year. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - On a 
point of order Mr. President. Will you rule on 
whether it is in order not to give an explanation 
of a vote but to start a discussion again and to 
insult other colleagues? 
The PRESIDENT. - It is not an approach 
that I recommend to the Assembly. I am 
afraid that the explanation of a vote is an alien 
custom in British parliamentary practice. In 
our view, when a member has made a speech 
and voted, that is it. However, in our rules 
here it is in order for a representative to explain 
his vote and, until he starts to speak, I do not 
know what he intends to say. But I hope very 
much that it will not open up another debate 
and, of course, any derogatory remarks directed 
at other colleagues are to be deplored. 
Mr. Hanin. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - Mr. 
President, Rule 26 (6) of our Rules of Proce-
dure states: " When the examination of the text 
has been concluded only explanations of vote 
l. See page 43. 
2. See page 44. 
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may be made before the vote is taken on the 
text as a whole. " I should therefore have 
given my explanation before the vote was 
taken, and I regret, Mr. President, that you did 
not give me the floor at that time. 
I do not want to make an issue of this. I did 
ask to speak, but I quite understand that you 
cannot look in all directions at once. I am not 
therefore accusing you of not being impartial. 
I am simply saying that the Rules of Proce-
dure were on my side. 
The PRESIDENT. - May I rule on that point 
immediately? I gather that the practice on 
former occasions has been that, during votes on 
amendments, explanations of votes are permit-
ted while the amendments are being consi-
dered. You did not rise to ask to explain your 
vote, Mr. Hanin, until the roll-call vote was in 
progress. Strictly speaking, I should not have 
allowed you to raise any matter when the roll-
call vote was under way. You should have 
asked to explain your vote before the roll-call 
vote began and it was clear that there was to be 
a roll-call vote. However, I did not rule you 
out of order because I warited to give you that 
opportunity. You now have that opportunity, 
and I hope that you will not spend your time 
arguing points of order. 
Mr. HANIN (Belgium) (Translation). - I 
voted against the draft recommendation for two 
reasons: firstly, to protest against what I 
consider to be an extraordinary procedure 
because all the amendments could very easily 
have been tabled beforehand; secondly, and 
above all, because I did not want to associate 
myself with the adoption of a recommendation 
which I now consider to be virtually 
meaningless. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, 
Mr. Hanin. 
I call Mr. Muller. 
Mr. Gunther MULLER (Federal Republic of 
Germany) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies 
and Gentlemen, I should like to give the 
following explanation of vote. I voted against 
because I feel that, now the vote has been taken 
on the amendments, the final outcome of our 
work has become a sign - a negative sign, of 
course - to those pursuing certain democratic 
aims in Poland. 
These matters could so easily have been dis-
cussed if only the relevant wording had been 
submitted to the meeting of the Committee in 
April, for example. But the document was 
then adopted unanimously, and now we have 
gone back on it. There can be no clearer sign 
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that democracy in Western Europe is weak-
kneed in its dealings with totalitarianism. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Muller. 
That concludes the explanations of votes. 
4. European security and events in the Gulf 
area 
(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs 
Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, 
Doe. 871, Addendum and Amendments) 
The PRESIDENT.- We proceed to the next 
Order of the Day, which is the presentation of 
and debate on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee on European security and events in 
the Gulf area and vote on the draft recommen-
dation, Document 8 71, Addendum and 
Amendments. 
Unfortunately, because of the French elec-
tions, our Rapporteur, Mr. Forni, is not able to 
be present. The Chairman of the Committee 
will introduce the report on his behalf. I am 
sure, however, that the Assembly will wish me 
to convey its congratulations to Mr. Forni who, 
I understand, has already been re-elected on the 
first ballot in the French elections. 
I ask Sir Frederic Bennett to introduce this 
report. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
It is with a genuine sense of regret from my 
point of view that I confirm that Mr. Forni is 
unable to be here to present his report. It is 
always better for the Rapporteur himself to 
undertake the task. I was informed only last 
night that Mr. Forni would not be coming to-
day, so I had no alternative but to take on the 
additional task of presenting this report. I 
hope that my colleagues will understand that I 
have not had the usual time to prepare my pre-
sentation of the report to the Assembly. 
The report was adopted by the Committee on 
27th April 1981 with complete unanimity. 
There was not even an abstention. That has 
remained the position, with the exception 
of the tabling of one comparatively minor 
amendment - assuming that others have not 
been tabled. I am now presenting the docu-
ment as drafted by Mr. Forni, with an adden-
dum by myself. Because of the French elec-
tions, I had to undertake the task of visiting the 
countries to which Mr. Forni had been autho-
rised to go by the Presidential Committee, 
namely, Pakistan and its borders with Afghan-
nistan, and two countries in the Middle East, 
Kuwait and Jordan. 
Before going on to my exposition of the 
report, which I shall keep as brief as possible 
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because of what I have said already and because 
of the lateness of the hour, I should point out 
that I have myself proposed certain amend-
ments about which I had the good fortune to 
telephone the Rapporteur, Mr. Fomi. He 
agrees without qualification with the amend-
ments that I have suggested. That means that I 
am able to ask my colleagues to appreciate that 
the amendments which I shall propose and the 
original draft are the property of the Rappor-
teur as well as of me acting in his place. 
Perhaps the best way that I can explain the 
preoccupations that we in the General Affairs 
Committee have had about this subject is, with-
out indulging in a travelogue, to give a brief 
account of my own recent travels in these trou-
bled areas and of my impressions. 
I regret to tell the Assembly that in Pakistan 
itself and on the borders of Afghanistan the 
situation has deteriorated and is continuing to 
deteriorate very gravely. When I went there a 
little over a year ago, there were only some 
600,000 refugees. One would think that would 
be enough, out of a population of eighteen mil-
lion. The figure has now reached 2,100,000 
refugees living in Pakistan, and in addition 
those coming in each month now total some-
where between 80,000 and 110,000. 
Even without taking into account the 
unknown number of refugees who have crossed 
into Iran, the figure, it has been suggested to 
me, lies somewhere between 500,000 and 
1 ,500,000. In Pakistan, one can get the figures 
because the United Nations has registered them, 
but even if we take for Iran the lowest figure of 
500,000, it means that by the time this Assem-
bly meets again, unless there is a dramatic and 
unexpected change in the course of events, 
there will be no more than 75% of the popu-
lation of Afghanistan who were living in that 
country at the time the Soviet invasion took 
place and 25% will have left the country, with 
very little prospect that one can see of their 
being able to go back. 
Who are these refugees? A certain number 
are elderly people and there are women and 
children who have been taken across the border 
by their menfolk so as to get them out of dan-
ger while the men continue their own resistance 
inside the country. Those refugees have been 
conducted out of Afghanistan across the border 
into Pakistan, and the men have then gone 
back to join in the resistance. The other kind 
of refugees, of which there are increasing num-
bers, arise from the latest Russian military stra-
tegy there, which is utterly to destroy, to rase to 
the ground, all the inhabited villages in the 
country. In that climate, without a house one 
dies. Therefore, those people have had no 
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alternative but to seek sanctuary in Pakistan 
where the climate is different and where they 
can survive. 
The resultant strains on Pakistan are enor-
mous. The Russians are exerting day after 
day threats and pressure of every conceivable 
kind, military and otherwise. There have been 
seven military incursions into Pakistan to try to 
make Pakistan stop the true moral support that 
it has given - not material support, for it has 
given none to Afghanistan, so as to avoid pro-
vocation. Nevertheless, the pressure on Pakis-
tan, economic and otherwise, is getting worse. 
Pakistan sees itself threatened also from ano-
ther source in that there is a suspicion, justified 
or not, that there may be an opportunity for 
some kind of collusive act by India against the 
integrity of Pakistan, possibly up in Kash-
mir. It is impossible to foresee this, but I will 
give the assembly two figures. The Pakistan 
army consists of eighteen divisions. Of these 
fourteen are on the Indian border, facing thirty-
three well-equipped Indian divisions and only 
four Pakistani divisions are left guarding the 
long frontier of Pakistan with Afghanistan; so 
one can see how Pakistan's resources are very 
strained at the present time. 
The suggestion of the Committee and myself, 
which has now been reinforced, is that we 
should provide urgently more aid under three 
headings; first, humanitarian aid for refugees. 
At present some aid is coming from individual 
countries, some has come through organisations 
and some has come through initiatives taken by 
the Council of Europe. The main part has 
come from United Nations agencies and from 
the League of Red Cross Societies; but still 
more is needed and it is an appalling burden on 
Pakistan at the present time. 
Pakistan has taken on itself the burden of 
providing these people with what I would refer 
to as pocket money. Over and above the aid 
that they get by way of food and sleeping 
accommodation, they get only five dollars per 
month. That is not an excessive amount but, 
when it is multiplied by 2,100,000, we get some 
idea of the financial burden that is falling on 
Pakistan, one of the poorest countries in Asia. 
The suggestions in the document are that we 
should if at all possible do our duty and help 
on the humanitarian side. 
Some initiatives have already been under-
taken by the United States of America, and 
more are being actively considered, I under-
stand, by the Nine, to give more economic aid. 
In addition, the Pakistanis are looking for 
strictly defensive aid against the threat which 
faces them. At present they are under-
equipped and have a small army. It appears 
that some agreement will be reached with the 
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United States for some limited defence aid, but 
that will not be forthcoming until October 1982 
for budgetary reasons applying to the conduct 
of these matters within the United States of 
America. 
There is therefore a need for other steps to be 
taken, even on a limited basis, to provide 
Pakistan with some of the purely defensive 
equipment that it needs to protect its own inte-
grity against the huge threat it now faces. 
I shall now move to the Gulf area. When I 
went there I was in a reasonably optimistic 
mood, feeling that the beginning of a European 
initiative towards a solution of the Palestine 
problem was under way, because it had been 
made quite clear that it would be undertaken. 
Lord Carrington had suggested that he would 
be carrying on with that work when he became 
President of the Council and he had also gone 
some way to get at least some degree of Arab 
co-operation by saying that he was ready, in the 
name of Europe, to meet the PLO leader later 
this year if that would be helpful. This was a 
break in what had previously been the rigid 
American position that they were unprepared 
to do that. Therefore, I was reasonably opti-
mistic when I went out there not that an easy 
solution would be found, because it is a highly 
intractable problem, but that something would 
be accomplished by way of improving the 
atmosphere in which ultimately, possibly with a 
different Israeli Government, decisions could be 
taken to deal with the vexed problem of the 
Palestinian homeland on the West Bank and in 
the Gaza Strip. 
I regret that when I was on the point of leav-
ing Pakistan there came the announcement of 
the Israeli raid on the nuclear energy plant in 
Iraq. I have to tell this Assembly that which I 
am sure they will have learnt for themselves -
that at the moment all hopes for a rapid initia-
tive, or any progress even in the foreseeable 
future, have evaporated. Now there is no 
doubt whatsoever that there is a feeling of out-
rage, humiliation and apprehension throughout 
the whole of the Arab countries, and do not 
forget that I went to only two states, the most 
moderate, Kuwait and Jordan. What I should 
have found had I been to some of the others I 
can only guess at from reading newspaper 
reports of what their leaders have said. 
There is no doubt that a vast new area of ten-
sion has now been formed and it is very diffi-
cult to see how the situation could do other 
than worsen in regard to any settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli problem. That would be bad 
enough in itself but as a side effect it has also 
made any co-operation for the time being invol-
ving the United States and the Gulf states 
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impossible. Rightly or wrongly, the United 
States of America is regarded as a close ally of 
Israel, and that makes any conversation in that 
field much more difficult, indeed, altogether 
fruitless for some time ahead. I am sure that 
my colleagues here will accept what I have said 
as being a realistic interpretation of events and 
that we have had a serious setback in regard to 
a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem and a 
setback in the realm of any co-ordination on 
defence matters within the Gulf area against 
any future aggression. This is a sad state of 
affairs. I do not think that we can leave it to 
time alone to heal it. We must take measures 
in the United Nations and elsewhere, not only 
to condemn - anybody can condemn - but to 
make sure that events like this never happen 
again, because it has for the time being upset 
the whole apple cart in that part of the world 
and upset any chance of co-operation with the 
West. 
I have had the help of my colleague, Mr. 
Burgelin of the secretariat, in my task. 
Although he does not hold political views, I am 
sure that he will not mind my saying that the 
impact of the sense of disappointment and out-
rage was staggering. I wish that I could have 
gone at almost any other time than two days 
after that event. Therefore, I have modified 
and brought up to date the recommendation in 
the document, which received no criticism 
when it was in Committee. It was adopted 
unanimously, without abstentions. Plainly, I 
have not been able to have a Committee meet-
ing when my amendments, which I tabled as a 
result of this threat, could have been consi-
dered, but I have telephoned Mr. Forni. The 
documents and changes have been read to him, 
and he has authorised me to say that, as 
Rapporteur, he is in agreement with them. I 
have pleasure and pride in presenting what I 
am afraid is in some ways a melancholy report, 
but it is at least factual and objective. It 
contains few personal opinions and is simply a 
record of the facts. I hope that the contro-
versies which have occurred in the past twenty-
four hours on another subject will not be 
repeated because on this subject I think that we 
are virtually united about the need to try to 
restore some stability to the most destabilised 
area of the world at present. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Sir Frederic. 
I am sure that the Assembly and your Com-
mittee are extremely grateful to you for having 
stepped into the breach created by the unfore-
seen calling of French elections, which preven-
ted Mr. Forni from undertaking the visit and 
fulfilling his appointments and for being here 
today to present the report. 
Mr. Gessner put his name down to speak, but 
I do not think he is present. There is no one 
else inscribed to speak in the debate. 
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Does any Representative present wish to 
speak? ... 
There is no debate. 
We must now examine the Amendments. 
Amendment No. 1 has been tabled by Sir 
Frederic Bennett: 
1. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to 
the draft recommendation, insert : 
"Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack 
on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension 
throughout the whole Middle East which 
reduces the credibility of the West, especially 
of the United States, in seeking to provide 
compromise solutions to intractable problems 
in the area; ". 
May I ask you, Sir Frederic, to deal with the 
amendments ? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I have received no objections to the amend-
ments and there is only one amendment, tabled 
by Mr. Vohrer, to which I should speak. I 
move Amendment 1 not only on my own 
behalf but on behalf of Mr. Forni, who agrees 
with it. 
The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to 
speak against the amendment ? I can hardly call 
Sir Frederic to reply, because it is his amend-
ment and he has already moved it. If no one 
wishes to speak, I put the amendment to the 
vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 1 is agreed to. 
We now come to Amendment 2: 
2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommend-
ation proper, insert: 
" Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakis-
tan in order to help it to receive refugees on 
its territory without unacceptable social and 
economic damage to its own economy and 
also provide that country with the armaments 
it urgently needs for its own security;". 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
This amendment flows directly from my 
remarks in my introduction. Again, it has the 
agreement of Mr. Forni and of everyone else I 
have spoken to about it. In view of the threat 
to Pakistan's security, I should like to insert the 
word "defensive" before "armaments", to-
wards the end of the amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. - I will accept that as a 
manuscript amendment. Therefore, will repre-
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sentatives note the insertion of the word 
" defensive " before " armaments " ? 
Does anyone wish to speak on or against the 
amendment ? If not, I put the amendment to 
the vote. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The manuscript amendment to Amendment 2 
is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 2, as 
amended. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to. 
I apologise to Mr. Blaauw, because strictly I 
should have called his Amendment 5 before 
Amendment 2. I notice that he has just come 
into the Assembly. Please excuse me, Mr. 
Blaauw, for not calling the amendment earlier. 
Would you like to move Amendment 5 : 
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
proper, after "assistance " insert "in particular 
in the political and humanitarian field". 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands). - The reason 
for the amendment is that I do not wish the 
wording of the draft recommendation to be too 
harsh. I stress that the main aid must be poli-
tical and humanitarian. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. 
Blaauw, for a very clear explanation of your 
amendment. 
Do you wish to speak to the amendment, 
Sir Frederic? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I hope that Mr. Blaauw will not press the 
amendment, because this Assembly is con-
cerned with security. It so happens that I am 
Rapporteur for the Committee concerned with 
refugees in the Council of Europe and a report 
on humanitarian aid is being prepared by it. 
Since this Assembly is concerned with defence, 
I hope that, as a report is being prepared 
which will, I am sure, meet with complete 
acceptance in the Council of Europe, Mr. 
Blaauw will not press the amendment. I assure 
him that I have taken the point on board. It 
will be dealt with in the Council of Europe 
report which I am preparing and which will 
deal specifically with humanitarian aid. 
Mr. BLAAUW (Netherlands). - In view of 
that explanation I withdraw my amendment. 
The PRESIDENT. -That is extremely help-
ful. Thank you very much indeed. Amend-
ment 5 is withdrawn. I invite Sir Frederic to 
move Amendment 3. 
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beg to move Amendment 3 : 
3. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert : 
" Offer active support to all efforts made by 
the countries of the area to assume collect-
ively their own security and envisage giving 
them a unilateral European or western gua-
rantee for their independence, if so reques-
ted;". 
This amendment arises because I was unable 
to say everything from the podium. During 
our visit we found - to put it crudely - that the 
days of mutual pacts between the western and 
Asian countries are over. There is .no longer a 
wish in that area to become overtly involved in 
what is called the East-West struggle. They 
want to be left alone and as far as possible to 
assume collectively their own security. 
The King of Jordan put forward the idea that 
he would like all the great powers to give a col-
lective guarantee of non-intervention in that 
area and at the same time he would welcome 
any assurances that if help was requested it 
would be forthcoming from any country to 
which such a request was made. This amend-
ment is therefore an interpretation of the wishes 
expressed to us in Pakistan and other countries 
in that part of the world. 
Contrary to what some people believe, the 
people there do not want a direct military pre-
sence anywhere on their soil. They do not 
mind a rapid deployment force at sea, but they 
do not want to become involved directly. That 
was the majority view put to me and, whether 
or not it is a view that is always shared by my 
own government, I should stress that I speak 
today as a Rapporteur and Chairman. As 
such, I have correctly conveyed the feeling that 
the days of pacts are over. The people in that 
area want to be left alone, but would like the 
right to put a request to us for support if they 
are threatened. They do not want to enter 
into bilateral arrangements which they believe 
would increase the danger. 
This is an attempt on my part to put in one 
short paragraph what I believe to be the majo-
rity Arab point of view. I hope that I have 
done enough to explain the amendment. I 
should have done so from the podium, but 
because of the lateness of the hour I was trying 
to keep matters short. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Sir Frederic. 
Does anyone wish to speak to the amend-
ment? 
Lord HUGHES (United Kingdom). -In our 
previous debate, Sir Frederic led opposition to 
his own report because, he said, that the chan-
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ges in it had been meaningless. I am doubtful 
about this amendment for the very opposite 
reason. The amendment talks about " a uni-
lateral European or western guarantee for their 
independence, if so requested". In spite of 
what Sir Frederic has stated, that conveys a wil-
lingness to give military intervention if asked in 
order to help their independence. That might 
be useful to those countries if they request it, 
but to give them the impression that there is 
any chance of military intervention in such a 
circumstance is to lead them to believe some-
thing that will not happen. 
The first part of the amendment presents me 
with no difficulty, but as soon as we indicate 
that military intervention from the West will 
take place, particularly on a unilateral basis, it 
becomes a nonsense. I could not possibly sup-
port that part of the amendment. Unless it is 
changed, I shall have to vote against the 
amendment in its entirety. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Lord 
Hughes. 
Does anyone else wish to speak ? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I understand what Lord Hughes has said. That 
may have been his impression, but it was not 
what the King of Jordan said with the support 
of his colleagues. A unilateral European or 
western guarantee could have the meaning sug-
gested by Lord Hughes, but those countries at 
least want to be able to ask for support for their 
independence if they feel threatened. 
If I left out the phrase " a unilateral Euro-
pean or western guarantee ", perhaps that 
would meet Lord Hughes' point of view. They 
want expressions of support for their indepen-
dence, not just purely negative ones such as 
" Get on with your own business, it is none of 
our business at all ". Therefore, perhaps I can 
meet Lord Hughes' point by suggesting that the 
amendment read: "envisage giving them sup-
port for their independence, if so requested". 
That is what I meant in any event. 
The PRESIDENT. - Perhaps I can help. 
Clearly, this matter could not be pursued fully 
by the Committee. Perhaps the amendment 
should stop after the word " security ". If I 
understand what Sir Frederic wishes, it is that 
we should offer active support to the efforts that 
they are making to assume collectively their 
own security. If we stop at that point it might 
make acceptance possible. 
At this stage of the Assembly, it would be 
better if we could get agreement on the amend-
ment rather than having a vote on a matter of 
such importance. 
I call on Mr. Blaauw. 
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amending an amendment, I should like to sug-
gest an amendment. It is that Sir Frederic's 
amendment should read : 
" Offer active support to all efforts made by 
the countries of the area to assume collect-
ively their own security and their inde-
pendence ". 
The PRESIDENT. - Are there any other 
speakers? 
What is your response, Sir Frederic, to the 
suggestions ? 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I am more than happy to meet the wishes that 
have been expressed. However, I would be 
failing in my duty if I did not say that it would 
not be fair to leave it at " security and ... inde-
pendence ". That could be read as meaning 
that we have no further interest in the area. 
If we could insert the words " our full sup-
port " somewhere in the amendment, that 
would be acceptable to me. 
Lord HUGHES (United Kingdom).- We are 
near to agreement, but what Sir Frederic has 
just said is repetitive because the amendment 
begins with the words "offer active support". 
Therefore, we do not need to talk about sup-
port a second time. 
The PRESIDENT.- We must bring this dis-
cussion to a close. I understand the points that 
have been made, but I should say from the 
chair that this type of proceeding is very much 
to be discouraged, because new amendments 
have come forward the texts of which have not 
been before the Committee. We are, therefore, 
presented with a problem. I know that Sir 
Frederic has strong views on this matter, but it 
is an important policy consideration for the 
Council of Ministers. We should therefore be 
clear about it. I am sorry that, because of the 
time of day, more members are not here so that 
we could come to a decision about it. Unless 
Sir Frederic meets the views of Lord Hughes, 
we shall have to take a vote on the amendment, 
and it will be a tiny vote. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT (United Kingdom).-
I make one last attempt to assist. If the 
amendment were to read " offer active support 
and help " and finish at the word " security ", 
perhaps that would meet Lord Hughes' point of 
view. 
The PRESIDENT. - The suggestion is that 
the amendment should read. 
" Offer active support and help to all efforts 
made by the countries of the area to assume 
collectively their own security". 
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Are Lord Hughes and Mr. Blaauw content 
with that? ... 
We shall therefore vote on the manuscript 
Amendment. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The manuscript amendment to Amendment 3 
is agreed to. 
We shall now vote on Amendment 3, as 
amended. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
Amendment 3, as amended, is agreed to. 
Thank you very much, Sir Frederic, for meet-
ing the views of the Assembly. 
We now come finally to Amendment 4. 
Sir Frederic. 
Sir Frederic BENNE TT (United King-
dom).- I beg to move Amendment 4: 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommenda-
tion proper, insert : 
" Express its condemnation of any aggression 
against countries in the area, and propose 
that the United Nations use appropriate sanc-
tions against any aggressor whatsoever". 
This is important. I do not believe that it is 
controversial in the sense that it is the duty of 
the United Nations, both through the Security 
Council and otherwise, to deter aggression. 
Recent events in the Middle East have made 
that much more problematic than before. In 
view of threats and counter-threats that are 
being made, I thought it right to introduce the 
words " condemnation of any aggression against 
countries in the area ". I am seeking also to 
show that primarily the United Nations ought 
in that part of the world to accept the responsi-
bility and I hope that there will therefore be no 
objection on that score. It is only right to 
mention the United Nations in such a docu-
ment since it is involved in trying to find a 
solution in every sphere in the Middle 
East. We should give it some support in that 
context. 
The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to 
oppose or speak to the amendment? ... 
Again, we face a new point in telling the 
United Nations what it should do. That is a 
matter for the Assembly, however. We shall 
now vote on Amendment 4. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing). 
Amendment 4 is agreed to. 
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I now have to put the text of the amended 
draft recommendation, Document 871. 
If there are no objections to it and no absten-
tions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save 
the time required for a vote by roll-call. 
Are there any objections? .. . 
Are there any abstentions? .. . 
The amended draft recommendation is there-
fore adopted1 • 
5. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly 
(Presentation of and Debate on the Report 
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
and Vote on the draft Resolution, 
Doe. 877 and Amendment) 
The PRESIDENT. - Thanks to the co-
operation of all concerned, we are now within 
sight of finishing our business this morning. 
We come to the remaining Order of the Day, 
the presentation of and debate on the report of 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri-
vileges on the revision of the Charter and of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and vote 
on the draft resolution, Document 877 and 
Amendment. 
While the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. 
Grieve, is taking his place, may I say how 
grateful I am for the enormous amount of work 
that he has done personally, with the support of 
his Committee, and for the advice and help of 
Clerks from both the British and French Parlia-
ments. No doubt you will be referring to that, 
Mr. Grieve. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom). - Yes, 
indeed, Mr. President. 
Arriving here at a quarter to one to move the 
adoption of the report reminds me graphically 
of my experiences as a young barrister in unim-
portant cases in distant provincial towns. I do 
not suggest that Paris is a distant provincial 
town. I regard it as my second home, as does 
any other civilised man. As a young barrister, 
in distant provincial towns I would find myself 
with the last case of the day, wondering whe-
ther the judge would go home for tea and put 
my case over until the following morning. 
That would have incurred a hotel bill which 
normally would have swallowed up the fee that 
I received for such efforts as I was able then to 
make. 
l. See page 45. 
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The PRESIDENT.- I am afraid, Mr. Grieve, 
that you will be unable to buy a cup of coffee 
with the fee that you will receive for your per-
formance this morning. 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- Yes, Mr. 
President. I have long realised, since going 
into parliament, that the days that I never 
spoke without a fee are past. 
It is plain that the rules of our Assembly 
have for long lagged behind our practice and 
have needed radical revision. Some of the 
revisions have been small - in matters of gram-
mar and matters of concordance between the 
French and English texts. They include mat-
ters such as the use of " may ", " shall " or 
" will ", words which were used by those who 
originally drafted our rules. It was plain, in 
session after session, that the rules needed 
amending. One important amendment was 
made last December, however, which, at the 
instance of President von Hassel, was referred 
to the Committee over which I then had, as I 
still have, the honour to preside. We made an 
important amendment to Rule 7. 
It was then decided that we should consider 
the rules in their entirety. You were quite 
right, Mr. President, to say that we should have 
been unable to do that without, first, the untir-
ing help of the whole Committee. It is not 
easy for a Committee of this Assembly to turn 
itself into what effectively is a drafting Commit-
tee, because we all know how difficult drafting 
is. It is done in our respective parliaments by 
skilled people who give their whole lives to it. 
Some of us acquire a certain skill in it in the 
course of parliamentary careers, but we cannot 
hope to match the skill of the experts. 
So we had the unstinting help of the 
members of the Committee who were fre-
quently able to put their fingers on points 
which the experts had failed to observe. In 
addition, however, we had the help of three 
considerable experts. These were Mr. Michael 
Ryle of the House of Commons - I apologise, 
as a British subject, for mentioning him first -
Mr. Desandre from the French National 
Assembly, and Mr. Blischke from the Bundes-
tag. We are very grateful for their help. 
I should be failing in my duty if I did not pay 
a considerable tribute to Mr. Moulias, our 
Clerk, who was on the telephone to me on most 
days at eight in the morning just as I was 
shaving or having my breakfast, raising points 
that arose from the revision. I and my Com-
mittee are deeply grateful to Mr. Moulias. 
The principal amendments to the rules are 
set out in the explanatory memorandum. I 
trust that, after the consideration that the Com-
mittee most carefully has given to these mat-
ters, the Assembly, diminished as it now is on 
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its final day, will be able to give unanimous 
approval to our proposed changes. We say in 
paragraph 7 of the memorandum that " Most of 
the other changes " - I shall refer to the prin-
cipal ones now - " are purely matters of form 
or are self-explanatory ". They have been 
clearly set out in Document 877. The text of 
the original rules is set out alongside the text of 
the proposed changes. The whole of the rules 
of the Assembly are set out there as, indeed, are 
two parts of the Charter. We have found it 
necessary - and I come now to our principal 
recommendation - to propose amendments to 
the Charter which will be necessary if we 
change the Rules of Procedure. 
The English are always brought up to precis, 
and I hope that I shall not fail my schoolmaster 
who taught me as I turn as briefly as I can to 
the concrete provisions. First, the provisions 
of Article III(a) of the Charter and of Rule 2, 
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, which 
link our Assembly sessions to the Assembly ses-
sions of the Council of Europe, have, we have 
decided, become obsolete. They are so obso-
lete that I do not think that they have been 
observed for a long time. It is time that we 
brought our rules into accordance with our 
practice. That is our first main recommended 
change. 
The same is true of Article V (d) and (e) of 
the Charter and Rule 27 of our Rules of Proce-
dure, which specify various time limits within 
which the Committee meetings have to be held 
before the Assembly, and in which documents 
have to be circulated, and so on. They impose 
a rigid Procrustean bed for the operation of the 
secretariat which with the best will in the world 
it has been unable to comply with. We have 
provided for greater elasticity in those rules. 
We consider that Rules 26 and 27 on the 
order of debates and the debate on the annual 
report should also be revised - again in the 
light of the now current procedure. In other 
words, we have not been observing the rules. 
Since it is bad for an Assembly not to observe 
its rules, it is better to make the rules accord 
with the practice that has been found conve-
nient. The new Rule 26 therefore provides 
that: 
" A general debate and the examination of a 
text shall take place on the report of the 
Committee to which the matter has been 
referred and not sooner than twenty-four 
hours after the distribution of the report ... 
When examination of and voting on a text as 
a whole have been concluded and the results 
announced, Representatives or Substitutes 
may present explanations of votes lasting not 
more than three minutes. " 
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I am sure, Mr. President, that that will meet 
with the approval of all those who have to 
listen to such explanations. In most cases that 
time will be adequate. 
In Rule 27 we have dealt with the matter of 
the Clerk sending a copy of the annual report 
of the Council and the work of the Presiden-
tial Committee in referring to the competent 
Committees the relevant chapters of the annual 
report. We have made some consequential 
amendments there. 
The revision of the Rules of Procedure has 
included more detailed definitions of the rules 
relating to amendments in Rule 29 and proce-
dural amendments in Rule 32. I shall not read 
them out. I am sure that those who have been 
interested enough to stay will have read them 
for themselves. They have the unanimous 
approval of the Committee and again we have 
moved more in accordance with the practice 
that many years have shown us to be 
convenient. 
Rule 32 has been rewritten completely. The 
new text contains the following changes, and 
this deals with the previous question. Perhaps 
I should read it. It defines what the previous 
question is, because this is a continental notion 
and one foreign to British parliamentarians. 
There was a good deal of controversy about 
what precisely was meant. 
New Rule 32 provides: 
" 1. A Representative or Substitute shall 
have a prior right to speak if he asks leave: 
(a) to move the previous question ... " 
and then follows the explanation: 
" which, if adopted, results in the subject 
of the debate being removed from the 
agenda and from the register of the 
Assembly; 
(b) to move the suspension of the sitting or 
the adjournment of the debate; 
(c) to move the closure of the debate; 
(d) to move reference back to Committee. 
Previous questions shall be notified to the 
President before the opening of the sitting 
and put to the vote immediately after the 
presentation of the relevant Committee 
report. 
None of these procedural motions may be 
moved more than once during the course of a 
debate.", 
and it goes on to provide that these matters 
shall take precedence over the main question. 
"3. In debate on the above matters the fol-
lowing only shall be heard: the proposer of 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES 
Mr. Grieve (continued) 
the motion, one speaker against the motion, 
and the Rapporteur or the Chairman of any 
Committee concerned. 
4. In addition, a Representative or Substitute 
shall have a prior right to speak if he asks 
leave to raise a point of order." 
That really is our present rule, but it is incor-
porated in the new version. 
In the new text we have been at pains to 
define the meaning of the word " Represen-
tative " which is used in its strict sense. 
Whenever appropriate - that is to say, where 
rights in the Assembly are accorded to Substi-
tutes - we put in the words " Representative or 
Substitute". 
For the sake of clarity, in Rule 35 we have 
provided that that absolute majority of Repre-
sentatives has been replaced by a full definition 
of that majority. 
In summary, those are our proposals. They 
are set out in great detail. I am fully con-
scious, as is my Committee, that the super-
vision of our Rules of Procedure, which are the 
essential tools of our proceedings, must be a 
continuing process. That is why we have a 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges. It is rather like the cleaning of the Forth 
Bridge - I say that in the presence of Lord 
Hughes, who lives not very far from it. When 
they get to one end, they start again at the 
other. So it is here. Already in Committee 
two proposals have been made for further 
changes. One is in the form of an amendment 
which is to be moved today by Mr. Stoffelen 
and Mr. Voogd. It would result in a substan-
tial change in our rules with regard to the con-
stitution of the Bureau, and they have been 
good enough to tell me that they intend to 
withdraw the amendment on my undertaking 
that it will be considered by the Committee at 
its next and any subsequent sitting and that we 
shall make a report to you, Mr. President. 
Lord Hughes has another point to which he 
intends to refer briefly. He too has been good 
enough to tell me that he will not move any 
amendment here given, once again, my under-
taking that the matter will be considered in 
Committee. Indeed, if I did not give such an 
undertaking, I am sure that he would ensure 
that it was considered in the Committee. 
With my grateful thanks for the unfailing 
support that I have had from the Committee, 
from our Clerk and from the experts, I ask the 
Assembly to give its unanimous approval to the 
report. 
The PRESIDENT.- Thank you, Mr. Grieve. 
I am sure that the Assembly is indebted to you 
and your Committee for your work. But since 
you rightly say that we must work to the rules, 
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I remind the Assembly that Rule 23 says that a 
morning sitting must be closed at one o'clock 
unless the Assembly determines otherwise. We 
have only two contributors to the debate, each 
of whom expects to be brief. Have I the leave 
of the Assembly to continue the sitting beyond 
one o'clock in order to conclude this 
business? ... 
If there is no objection, that is agreed. 
The two speakers will be Lord Hughes and 
Mr. Stoffelen. 
I call Lord Hughes. 
Lord HUGHES (United Kingdom). - Both 
the clock and my inclination require my 
remarks to be brief. However it would be 
wrong if I did not start by associating myself 
with what you said at the beginning, Mr. Presi-
dent, and with what Mr. Grieve said about the 
enormous help that the Committee had from 
officials in our national parliaments and from 
our own Clerk. I add to that the tremendous 
work put in by Mr. Grieve himself. He seems 
frequently to double the roles of both Chairman 
and Rapporteur and does both in a pleasant 
and satisfactory fashion. 
Mr. Grieve said at the meeting of the Com-
mittee this week that its work would never be 
finished because our rules constantly required 
revision. It was in respect of that that I deci-
ded to put down my name to speak. In the 
course of our proceedings this week you, Mr. 
President, found difficulty when ten representa-
tives sought a roll-call vote. Afterwards, when 
I looked at the rule which was adopted in 
December of last year, it became clear to me 
that such a request did not require to be 
submitted in writing. The rule talks merely of 
ten representatives expressing a desire for a roll-
call vote. That does not seem to be a satis-
factory position. A roll-call vote should not be 
sprung on the Assembly in that way, and I shall 
seek to amend the rule during the next meeting 
of the Committee. 
The other problem which shows that we have 
not yet completed our task is that we are still in 
the position where, if there is any opposition or 
any abstentions on a resolution or an opinion, 
there must be a roll-call vote. I am reminded 
that Mr. Stoffelen was opposed to a report but 
made it clear that he was willing to express his 
opposition by a standing and sitting vote. The 
rules prevented it. I think we have to look at 
that again. 
I told Mr. Grieve that I thought it wrong that 
a change of rules, especially a change of that 
importance, should be made by an amendment 
at a late stage in our proceedings and that it 
should be done only after full consideration by 
the Committee. Mr. Grieve knows, therefore, 
that I shall be proposing these changes at the 
next meeting of the Committee. With that 
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exception, I am in complete support of the 
document before us. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Lord 
Hughes. I am grateful to hear that the Com-
mittee is looking at these matters. You were 
right about the problem of ten representatives 
demanding a roll-call vote. There is a conflict 
between ten representatives standing and the 
requirement that their names are read out in 
the order in which they signed a list. I have 
no strong feelings about it. We could provide 
for both, and I shall be happy with whatever 
the Assembly decides. 
The explanation of votes is also a problem. 
If we retain the system, it may be necessary 
to have it on amendments as well as on draft 
recommendations. But these are all matters to 
which, I know, the Committee will give its 
attention. 
I call Mr. Stoffelen. 
Mr. STOFFELEN (Netherlands). - Very 
shortly, I want first to thank Mr. Grieve, Chair-
man and Rapporteur, and all the assistants who 
have helped the Committee. If I may com-
ment first on Rule 14, it states: 
" The Presidential Committee shall consist of 
the President of the Assembly, who shall be 
Chairman ex officio, former Presidents of the 
Assembly who are Representatives to the 
Assembly, the Vice-Presidents, and the 
Chairmen of the permanent Committees". 
When we study this composition of the Presi-
dential Committee, whose members no doubt 
are capable and experienced, we cannot see any 
reason why a former President should have a 
place in the Presidential Committee. On 
resigning as President of the Assembly, he or 
she becomes a member, like any other 
member. If there is to be no limitation in 
Rule 14, it can happen that a President loses 
his seat in his home parliament and, therefore, 
in the Western European Union Assembly and 
may return to the Assembly ten or twelve years 
later, having regained his seat in his own parlia-
ment and the Western European Union 
Assembly and then automatically becomes a 
member of the Presidential Committee. In 
those twelve years he may have had no contact 
whatever with Western European Union, may 
have missed developments and be no longer au 
fait. Yet when returning to WEU he becomes 
a member of the Presidential Committee. 
There is a very good chance that this may 
have more disadvantages than advantages. It 
was against that background that amendments 
were tabled. 
Having heard what has been said by Mr. 
Grieve, the Chairman and Rapporteur, I will be 
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perfectly happy with a reference back to the 
Committee and therefore I withdraw my 
amendment and will certainly support the 
whole of the draft resolution. 
The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Stof-
felen. You show tremendous faith in the dura-
bility and enthusiasm of former members of the 
Assembly if you think that, after bearing this 
job for two or three years and after an absence 
from parliament of ten years, their one ambi-
tion would be to come back here and be a 
representative. That may be the case with 
others, but personally I should not wish to fol-
low that practice if I had the good fortune still 
to be in parliament ten years after vacating this 
chair. No doubt that will be examined by the 
Committee. 
Mr. Grieve, do you wish to reply to the 
debate? 
Mr. GRIEVE (United Kingdom).- I am very 
grateful for the intervention of Lord Hughes 
and Mr. Stoffelen and for the action which they 
have proposed. 
The PRESIDENT. - We will all be very 
grateful if you will convey the thanks of the 
Assembly to your Committee. I will ask the 
Clerk to do so also to the advisers. Happily, 
we have one of them with us, and I am sure he 
appreciates what has been said. 
I therefore put to the vote the report and 
revision of the Charter presented by Mr. Grieve 
on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges, Document 877. The 
draft resolution is the text of all the proposed 
changes. 
(A vote was then taken by sitting and 
standing) 
The draft resolution is adopted unanimouslyl. 
6. Adjournment of the Session 
The PRESIDENT. - That concludes the 
business of this part-session of the Assembly. I 
am sorry to learn that, because of circumstances 
outside our control, some of our delegates will 
have travel problems in getting home. Never-
theless, I hope that everyone will get safely 
back home and I look forward to meeting you 
again in December. 
Does anyone wish to speak? ... 
I declare the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Ses-
sion of the Assembly of Western European 
Union adjourned. 
The Sitting is closed. 
(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.) 
l. See page 46. 
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